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ABSTRACT 
Following the terrorist attacks on America on 11 September 2001, the New 
Labour government enacted an unprecedented amount of terrorism legislation in 
the form of the Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001, the Prevention of 
Terrorism Act 2005, the Terrorism Act 2006, and finally the Counter-Terrorism 
Act 2008. Whilst the government viewed these terrorism laws as vital to national 
security, many of the measures contained in these acts, such as control orders and 
increased detentions, provoked intense debates over civil liberties. Much research 
on media-state relations in the context of responses to 9/11 have found evidence 
to support the elite-driven paradigm, whereby the media have been shown to fail 
in their adversarial ‘watchdog’ role by acting as ‘faithful servants’ (Wolfsfeld, 
1997) to the political agenda. This research tested these assumptions by 
examining the media framing of the UK government’s legislative responses to 
terrorism post-9/11. In so doing, it analyses the relationship between the media 
and the New Labour government in the context of the policymaking process. To 
date, longitudinal studies that map the UK media-state nexus within the context of 
terrorism policymaking are lacking. This thesis therefore, addresses the lacunae in 
the scholarship.  In terms of its theoretical framework, this thesis tests three 
iii 
 
competing models of media performance (elite-driven, oppositional and 
independent) on British press reporting of the parliamentary debates (Robinson et 
al., 2010). Methodologically, it takes an inductive approach to analysing the 
framing of the debates, and draws on material gleaned from interviews with four 
former home secretaries. The findings reveal that of the three meta-frames 
(national security, civil liberties and party politics), the politics frame dominated 
across all four case studies. Although government sources dominated the debates, 
the evidence suggests that they had limited influence over the news agenda, which 
runs contra to the elite-driven (redefined here as government-driven) hypothesis. 
Instead, at an aggregate level, the evidence lends greater support for the 
independent model.  There is also evidence that some sections of the press did 
subject the legislation to more robust scrutiny, and thus, to some degree, fulfilled 
their role as political watchdogs, which supports the oppositional thesis. 
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
 
This thesis analyses the relationship between the British press and the political 
elite by means of a case study approach. Following the terrorist attacks on 
America on 11 September 2001 (henceforth termed ‘9/11’), the New Labour 
government enacted an unprecedented amount of terrorism legislation in the form 
of the Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001, the Prevention of Terrorism 
Act 2005, the Terrorism Act 2006, and finally the Counter-Terrorism Act 2008. In 
the wake of the attacks, Tony Blair proclaimed that ‘terrorism has taken on a new 
and frightening aspect’ and that democratic nations had to respond accordingly to 
combat this new type of terrorism – a terrorism phenomenon comprised of global 
terror networks that kill ‘without discrimination.’1 This new global terrorism 
threat also accentuated the negative impact of globalisation by demonstrating ‘that 
global flows of technology, goods, information, ideologies, and people can have 
destructive as well as productive effects’ (Kellner, 2008: 245).  
 
However, the unknowable quality of the new terrorist risk meant that policy was 
increasingly based on a ‘precautionary response to threats’, where the ‘main 
accomplishment of this response [was] to intensify the sense of existential 
insecurity’ (Furedi, 2009: 197). For the government however, these terrorism laws 
                                                 
1
 HC Deb 14 September 2001, vol 372, cols 604–16 
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were deemed vital to national security, but many of the measures contained in 
these acts, such as control orders and increased detentions, provoked intense 
debates over civil liberties – with much of the criticism emanating from the 
media, parliamentarians and the judiciary. Much research on media-state relations 
in the context of responses to 9/11 have found evidence to support the hegemonic 
or elite-driven paradigm, whereby the media have been shown to fail in their 
adversarial ‘watchdog’ role by acting as ‘faithful servants’ (Wolfsfeld, 1997) to 
the political agenda. This research tests these assumptions by examining the 
media framing of the UK government’s legislative responses to terrorism post-
9/11. In so doing, it analyses the relationship between the media and the New 
Labour government in the context of the policymaking process. To date, 
longitudinal studies that map the UK media-state nexus within the context of 
terrorism policymaking are lacking. This thesis therefore addresses the lacunae in 
the scholarship. Although this thesis is primarily rooted in the scholastic traditions 
of media studies and political communication, the findings should be of interest to 
a multidisciplinary audience, including scholars of the law, criminal justice and 
political science. 
 
Unsurprisingly, the 9/11 terrorist attacks have provoked a raft of responses from 
scholars of media and politics, with much of it ‘focused on public response and 
reaction to terrorist attacks, definitions of terrorism, policy questions, media 
portrayals of terrorism, and framing across different media and nations’ 
(Papacharissi and de Fatima Oliveira, 2008: 52). However, a large volume of this 
research has emanated from, and concentrated on, the US perspective (Pludowski, 
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2007). In the UK context, scholars of media and political communication studies 
have generally focused on the media framing of foreign policy decisions and 
media-state relations in time of conflict, especially in relation to the military 
offensives in Afghanistan and Iraq (Davis, 2010; Goddard et al., 2008; Halttu, 
2007; Lewis & Brookes, 2004; Lewis et al., 2006; Murray et al., 2008; Robinson 
et al., 2009; Tumber & Palmer, 2004). Considerable attention has also been paid 
to media representation of Muslims in the post 9/11 era and the societal impacts of 
deleterious coverage (Elgamri, 2008; Featherstone et al., 2010; Lewis et al., 2009; 
Nickels et al., 2009; Poole, 2002 & 2006; Richardson, 2004). In the disciplines of 
politics and law, there has been some focus on the rhetoric of political elites in the 
context of ‘war on terror’ policies (Leudar et al., 2004; McLean & Patterson, 
2006; van der Veen, 2007). Whilst a further body of work examines the impacts 
of terrorism policy on human rights and civil liberties (Denney, 2008; Gearty, 
2007; Moran, 2007; Pantazis & Pemberton, 2012; Saward, 2006).  
 
A multiplicity of research exists that explores the relationship between the mass 
media and the political sphere. However, as many scholars (Archetti, 2008; Brants 
& Voltmer, 2011; Halttu, 2007; Robinson et al., 2009; Walgrave et al., 2008) have 
argued, a significant proportion of these studies are grounded in US-developed 
theoretical models of media-state relations, and largely confined to US contexts. 
Some scholars (Archetti, 2008; Bennett, 1996; Halttu, 2007) have also questioned 
the validity of US-developed models when applied to media environments in 
other democracies – on the basis that political-source relations, governmental 
systems, media policies and media ownership patterns in other countries might 
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differ significantly to US media-political structures. Similarly, outside of the US, 
there is limited scholarship relating to the theoretical and methodological 
approaches to analysing the media-state nexus during the policymaking process. 
As Koch-Baumgarten and Voltmer (2010) note, research on the impact of the 
media on ‘the processes and outcomes of political decision making’ remains 
rather ‘patchy’ and ‘incoherent’ (Koch-Baumgarten & Voltmer, 2010: 2).  
 
Writing in 1978, Stuart Hall et al. argued that the media ‘reproduce the definitions 
of the powerful’, and ‘reproduce symbolically the existing structure of power in 
society’s institutional order’ (Hall et al., 1978: 58). More recently, however, 
scholars have questioned the cogency of the elite-driven paradigm in explaining 
the media-state dynamic in advanced democracies (Davis, 2003, 2007 & 2010; 
Entman, 2003 & 2004; Robinson et al., 2009), arguing that the relationship 
between the political class and the media is more complex and mutable than 
erstwhile stimulus-response models have suggested. Although Davis (2010) 
points out that most studies suggest that political elites generally have most 
control over the news agenda, he argues that power relations between politicians 
and journalists across different policy areas are a continual site of struggle, and as 
such, news coverage ‘fluctuates, becoming more compliant or more critical of 
governments, accordingly’ (Davis, 2010: 68). Similarly, Wolfsfeld (2003) argues 
that whilst ‘political power can often be translated into power over the media’, 
both in terms of access and the extent to which they can ‘influence how they and 
their policies will be covered’, there are still sites of political contest (Wolfsfeld, 
2003: 95). These sites of contest occur when political elites ‘lose control over the 
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political environment’ allowing space ‘for challengers to promote alternate frames 
to the press’ (Ibid.: 94). Entman’s (2003) cascading activation model proffers that 
oppositional media framing of policy issues usually occurs when there is 
dissensus among political elites. When applied to the UK context, other elite state 
actors such as the judiciary or the police could also qualify as challengers to the 
official government position. The widening of the sphere of dissensus in the 
policymaking process has special relevance to the terrorism case study presented 
in this thesis, not least because challengers to the official government perspective 
– in relation to policy impacts on human rights and civil liberties – included the 
judiciary, parliamentarians, and certain factions of the press. Thus, Davis’ (2010) 
assertion that ‘Journalists, consciously or not, have come to play a role in the 
politics of politics itself’ resonates with the themes of this study.  
 
Within this conceptual framework, the aims of this research were twofold: the 
first was to analyse the media coverage of the legislative debates to ascertain 
which issues received the most attention, how these issues were framed and by 
whom; the second was to gain greater insight into media-government relations in 
the context of a particular policy area by assessing the extent to which the media 
criticised or reinforced the official political agenda. Drawing on Wolfsfeld’s 
(1997) political contest model, Robinson et al. (2009) tested three competing 
‘models of media performance’ on British media reporting of the 2003 Iraq war. 
These models are characterised as follows: elite-driven (characterised by 
supportive or reinforcing coverage of the government agenda); independent 
(characterised by either balanced and analytical coverage of events, or coverage 
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that reflects the customary ideological biases of individual newspapers); and 
oppositional (characterised by overt critical coverage of the government agenda 
and often reinforcing of oppositional standpoints). The research questions outlined 
below are examined within these competing theoretical models of media-state 
relations.  
 
1.1  Research Questions and Methods 
As Davis (2007) contends, ‘the “occupational ideology” of journalism directs 
journalists towards holding politicians to account and adopting an adversarial 
stance in their engagements’ (Davis, 2007: 48). However, to what extent is this 
journalistic ideal practiced in real world circumstances? Lawrence (2010) 
postulates that a key line of questioning in studies of media-state relations is: 
‘How independently do the media frame issues and events, versus simply passing 
along to the public the frames originated by powerful political actors?’  
(Lawrence, 2010: 265). This thesis follows a similar line of enquiry. To assess the 
extent to which the British press reinforced or criticised the New Labour terrorism 
policy agenda, it addressed the following interlinked questions: 
1. Media attention: How prominent was the coverage? What issues 
received the most attention? Was there a quantitative change in 
coverage between 2001 and 2008?  
 
2. Sources: Who shaped the debates? Whose views were prioritised or 
marginalised? To what extent were the debates indexed to political 
elites? To what extent were the debates indexed to elite challengers? 
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How prominent were non-elite views, such as human rights 
organisations or Muslim interest groups?  
 
3. Framing of debates: What were the dominant frames? To what extent 
did the media frame the debates within the broader frameworks of the 
‘War on Terror’, human rights or civil liberties? To what extent did the 
media reinforce or criticise the official policy agenda? If relevant, 
which issues received the most criticism, and did these criticisms 
reflect conventional media positions? Was there a qualitative change in 
the tone of coverage between 2001 and 2008?  
 
4. Media relations: How successful were New Labour in setting and 
managing the media agenda? What was the media-political dynamic 
during the policymaking process? 
 
These research questions were applied to four major pieces of terrorism 
legislation enacted under the New Labour government, namely: the Anti-
Terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001; the Prevention of Terrorism Act 2005; 
the Terrorism Act 2006; and the Counter-Terrorism Act 2008. Content analysis 
and framing analysis were the two primary methods employed in this study – the 
latter being the main technique in addressing question 3, and the former in 
addressing questions 1 and 2. These approaches were supplemented with in-depth 
interviews with four former home secretaries: Jack Straw (1997–2001), David 
Blunkett (2001–2004), Charles Clarke (2004–2006), and Jacqui Smith (2007–
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2009). These interviews were useful in tracing the linkage between press coverage 
of terrorism policy and the political decision making of key cabinet members 
involved in the formulation and enactment of the legislation. All three methods 
were employed to address the fourth research question. The newspaper sample 
comprised the Daily Telegraph, the Times, the Guardian, the Daily Mail, the Sun 
and the Mirror.  Of these titles, the Daily Telegraph, the Times, the Daily Mail, 
and the Sun are broadly considered to reside on the political right, whilst the 
Guardian and the Mirror are generally deemed to reside on the political left. The 
selected titles also had a higher share of the newspaper market for their respective 
class during the period under investigation. 
 
1.2  Research Context 
This section discusses the overarching contextual themes inherent to this thesis. It 
begins with discussion of the historical underpinnings of New Labour’s approach 
to media relations, before focusing on its centralised approach to media 
management in government and the eventual press backlash against ‘spin’. The 
second broad theme focuses on terrorism and New Labour’s politics of response, 
within the context of a changing media. It finally raises some of the issues 
relevant to civil liberties and human rights during the period under investigation. 
 
1.2.1 New Labour and the Taming of the Feral Beast 
On 12 June 2007, Blair delivered a candid speech to the Reuters Institute for the 
Study of Journalism at the University of Oxford, in which he outlined his views 
‘on the challenge of the changing nature of communication on politics and the 
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media’ (Blair, 2007a). It was during this speech that he used one of his most 
memorable metaphors, the ‘feral beast’, to describe the pack-like mentality of the 
media, who, in Blair’s words, often join forces in ‘tearing people and reputations 
to bits’ (Ibid). The BBC Political Editor, Nick Robinson, acknowledges that 
Blair’s speech touched on ‘some uncomfortable truths’, and provides an insider 
account of the pack like tendencies of Westminster journalists when in pursuit of 
a political story. 
The way journalists weaken their prey – helped along by opposition MPs – 
is by posing endless lists of ‘unanswered questions’. Newsrooms echo to 
the sound of reporters swapping views on the latest evidence, searching for 
inconsistencies justifying new lines of inquiry. When one emerges…the 
pack pounces.  
(Robinson, 2012: 260–261) 
 
Robinson concedes that, whilst journalists have sometimes been too hasty in 
trampling on the careers of politicians in an effort to avoid being trumped by their 
rivals, there have also been times when they have been culpable of not pursuing 
‘questions robustly enough or soon enough’, citing the Iraq War as one such 
instance (Robinson, 2012: 261).  This dualistic relationship between politicians 
and journalists highlights the problem of determining where the site of power lies 
within the political-press nexus and has attracted a polarised response from 
academics and commentators alike. Critics such as Barnett and Gaber (2001), 
Franklin (2004) and Oborne (2008) assert that the balance of power tilts in favour 
of the political elite, whilst others such as Baumgartner et al. (1997), Dean (2012), 
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Edwards and Wood (2002) and Wood and Peake (1998) believe the media play a 
significant role in shaping the political agenda. 
 
Concern over media presentation of government policy and personalities is not a 
modern phenomenon. Historically, political leaders have been well aware of the 
importance of the media in the governance of both domestic and foreign affairs. 
One only has to look at the devastating state violence conducted in Nazi Germany 
and Stalinist Russia during the first half of the twentieth century, and the part that 
the media played in propagandising certain ideologies. But what impact has an 
ever evolving media ecology had on the media-political dynamic in Britain? From 
Winston Churchill’s photo opportunity during the siege at Sidney Street in 1911 
to Anthony Eden’s attempts at controlling the media during the 1956 Suez crisis, 
politicians have sought to use the media as a conduit to communicate their desired 
messages to the public. During the 1950s, the press was still considered the most 
‘vital’ medium in which to communicate with the public. Putting aside his battles 
with the BBC, Eden considered the press to be the most ‘formidable opinion-
former’ (Shaw, 1996: 15). As Shaw notes, it is Suez that ‘ranks as the last great 
international crisis in which the press could play a direct and profound role as a 
source of information – and persuasion’ (Ibid.).  
 
A changing media has undoubtedly had an impact on the way in which the public 
perceive and relate to politicians, especially in today’s highly visual age where the 
image predominates. By the early 1960s, the ‘television effect’ was to have a 
profound change over the way in which politics and acts of terrorism were 
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represented and understood by the public. Television, more than any other 
medium has been instrumental in the drive towards ‘personality politics’ – a 
phenomenon that would serve Tony Blair very well during the first few years of 
his premiership. The 1960 presidential debates where John F. Kennedy triumphed 
over Richard Nixon is a recognised example of the power of the ‘televisual’ 
image in politics. Even though the radio audience preferred Nixon, considering 
his policies to be more persuasive, the television audience favoured Kennedy’s 
more charismatic style of politics.  
 
Three decades later, the trend towards televisual or personality driven politics was 
evident in the Labour Party leadership bid of 1994, where, in a contest dominated 
by concerns about media impact, the telegenic appeal of Tony Blair was key in 
securing his victory. Indeed, critics of that period questioned the apparent media 
sway over British politics: ‘the concern is clear: if leadership contests are now 
always to be media or “television elections”, can candidates against whom the 
media is biased or who are non-telegenic ever succeed?’ (Alderman & Carter, 
1994: 452). It is a concern that has even greater magnitude in our present media 
saturated society, as Jack Straw recognises:  
What I think is true for a variety of reasons is the focus on politics has 
become more dominated by personality and if you like by celebrity 
culture. Politicians around when I was born in the late 1940s, some of 
those would not have survived the glare of television, most notably Atlee. 
If you take something like the Today programme, that puts politicians 
under a forensic spotlight, which they didn’t really have to endure. They 
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had to make half-decent speeches to the House of Commons, and that is 
important, but it is a different kind of pressure. 
(Interview with author, 12 February 2014) 
 
To the architects of New Labour, the perceived power of the media to make or 
break a political party, or to bring down governments, is not without foundation. 
Etched in the consciousness of most Labour aficionados is the part played by the 
press, especially the Daily Mail, in bringing about the demise of the first Labour 
government. In 1924, Ramsay MacDonald’s Labour government had formally 
recognised the Soviet Union and pledged a future loan of £30 million – this, along 
with the government’s decision not to prosecute an editor for incitement over an 
article that appeared in the communist Workers’ Weekly – provided substance for 
the ‘red scare’ campaign promulgated by the right wing press (Beers, 2010: 59). 
Then, four days before the 1924 general election, the Daily Mail published what 
became known as the ‘Zinoviev letter’ – a letter purportedly from Grigory 
Zinoviev, the chairman of the Comintern in Moscow to the Communist Party of 
Great Britain. Later believed to have been penned by the British security services 
and leaked to the Conservative Party, the Zinoviev letter urged British 
communists to infiltrate the Labour Party to facilitate an Anglo-Soviet accord. 
The headlines that ensued were explicit in aligning the Labour Party with 
communism and revolutionary ideas, with the Daily Mail proclaiming a ‘Civil 
War Plot by Socialists’ Masters’ (Thomas, 2005: 9). Although it is generally 
accepted that the Labour Party was unlikely to have won the election, the negative 
coverage and alignment with anti-British values in the majority of the press 
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demonstrated the might of the media in creating a cause célèbre. Nearly seventy 
years later in the run up to the 1992 election, The Sunday Times drew on the same 
motifs by declaring: ‘Official: Kinnock’s Kremlin Connection’ – the connection 
between Neil Kinnock and the Soviet embassy was true enough, but only in the 
context of routine diplomatic business (Ibid.: 111). 
 
It was therefore unsurprising that whilst in opposition, Blair and his cohorts would 
focus so intensely on trying to win the hearts and minds of the media. Blair admits 
that it was imperative for New Labour to transform its approach to media 
relations: ‘We paid inordinate attention in the early days of New Labour to 
courting, assuaging, and persuading the media. In our own defence, after 18 years 
of Opposition and the, at times, ferocious hostility of parts of the media, it was 
hard to see any alternative’ (Blair, 2007a). During the 1980s, the Labour party 
was largely portrayed in the press as a party that was internally divided and out of 
touch with public sentiment. Peter Mandelson accepts that the press depictions 
were a true reflection of the state of the party at that time, which meant his main 
task as director of communications was ‘damage control’ (Mandelson, 2011: 83). 
In 1985, Mandelson and two fledgling members of parliament, Gordon Brown 
and Tony Blair, began to address their party’s weaknesses by embarking on the 
‘modernising project that became New Labour’ (Ibid.: li). The restructuring of 
communications and a renewal of efforts to ingratiate with the media were to 
become the mainstay of this modernising plan. Blair’s election as leader of the 
Labour Party in 1994 not only heralded a new politics but a new style of political 
communication. After his leadership victory, Blair apparently declared, ‘the only 
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thing that matters now in this campaign is the media, the media, the media’ (Dean, 
2012: 3), in which he duly hired Alastair Campbell as his chief spokesman and 
press adviser,2 whose remit alongside Mandelson was to transform the image of 
the Labour Party in the hitherto hostile press. Although later depicted in the media 
as the masters of the ‘dark arts’ of spin, Campbell and Mandelson’s media 
campaign was a crucial element in facilitating New Labour’s landslide victory at 
the polling stations on 1 May 1997. However, securing the support of a large 
swathe of the right-wing press was not without consequence, as was evidenced in 
New Labour’s adoption of more media-friendly right-wing policies, and cemented 
in their turnabout on media reforms, including the dropping of ‘restrictions on 
foreign ownership of British media; a stricter privacy law to curb tabloid 
invasions; and moves to outlaw predatory pricing’ (Ibid.: 6).  
 
1.2.2 The Backlash against Spin 
A major change to the Party’s communications came in the form of a new 
centralised approach to their 1997 election campaign, a tactic inspired by the 
campaigning strategies employed during President Bill Clinton’s 1992 
presidential campaign. As Philip Gould, one of Blair’s key political strategists, 
attests: ‘The idea of moving Labour campaigning to one modern, central space 
came from those of us who had worked on Clinton’s campaign in 1992’, which 
had confirmed the need for New Labour to have a more ‘integrated operation’ as 
opposed to the ‘scattered nature’ of previous Labour campaigns (Gould, 2011: 
293).  
                                                 
2
 For an account of Downing Street’s day-to-day media management operations, see the memoirs 
of Alastair Campbell (2011a; 2011b; 2012a; 2012b), Lance Price (2006) and Damian McBride 
(2013). 
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From 1995 to 2002, Millbank Tower was to become the hub of the party’s 
campaigning activities, where there was a new emphasis on professionalised 
media management and public relations. Indeed, a major change was the emphasis 
on a central message from the top down, which served to signify a unified party, 
with party members often having to stay on message and in the case of responding 
to issues not previously on the interview agenda, seeking approval from 
headquarters before responding to media questions (Gaber, 2000: 510). 
 
New Labour’s approach to media management became closely associated with the 
soundbite and the pseudo-event, both of which are ‘key strategies used by 
politicians to control media representations of them and their policies’ 
(Somerville, 2004: 34). The increasing pressure on journalists to produce more 
news with fewer resources has not only opened the door to public relations 
professionals, but also enabled the use of the soundbite by politicians to 
encapsulate the focus of their policy in anticipation that journalists will latch on to 
a particular phrase that supports their preferred message.3 An effective example of 
this was the wide usage in the media of Blair’s slogan ‘tough on crime, tough on 
the causes of crime’, which ‘came to symbolise New Labour’s radical centrist 
                                                 
3
 The impact that new media technology has had on the newspaper industry has also meant that the 
journalism profession itself has undergone considerable transformation. Due to the forces of 
marketization, globalisation and the frenetic nature of the 24/7 mediasphere, journalists not only 
have to be more adept at producing multimedia content, but are also under pressure to produce 
more news with fewer resources (Freedman, 2010: 41). The ‘dramatic decline in the editorial 
resources of news producers’ has allowed for the encroachment of public relations into the news 
production process, and in most cases ‘its expanding output is fulfilling a very real demand’ 
(Davis, 2000: 43). Natalie Fenton likens news production in the age of the internet as ‘more akin to 
creative cannibalization than the craft of journalism’ insofar as journalists are now desk-bound 
recirculating news sourced from other online media (Fenton, 2012: 122). This has resulted in what 
Nick Davies has defined as a culture of ‘churnalism’, which he claims is ‘the heart of modern 
journalism, the rapid repackaging of largely unchecked second-hand material, much of it designed 
to service the political or commercial interests of those who provide it’  (Davies, 2009: 60). 
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approach of combining a stress on law and order with concern for social justice’ 
(McNair, 2011: 129).  
 
Whilst New Labour enjoyed a relatively long honeymoon period, towards the end 
of their first term in office, the backlash against spin was to be continuously 
played out in the press. Indeed, during this period, press criticism of New 
Labour’s ‘spin doctoring’ was unrelenting, provoking a ‘marked deterioration in 
the already worsening relations between New Labour and the press’ (Stanyer, 
2003: 309). The hostility of the press toward government spin was to reach its 
apogee in the wake of 9/11, when a memo by Jo Moore, press advisor to Stephen 
Byers, the Secretary of State for Transport, Local Government and Regions 
(DTLR), was leaked to the press. At 14:55 on 11 September 2001, whilst the 
world was transfixed by the devastating images of the terrorist attacks, Moore sent 
an email to her press team, stating: ‘It is now a very good day to get out anything 
we want to bury’ (Public Administration Select Committee, 2002: 8). Moore’s 
blunder attracted considerable criticism from parliamentarians and the media 
alike, which ultimately resulted in the resignations of Moore and Byers (and 
indirectly, Martin Sixsmith who joined the department as Director of 
Communications in December 2001).  
 
The Moore episode also spawned a Public Administration Select Committee 
inquiry in 2001, which in turn led to the 2003 Phillis Review (published in 
January 2004). The ‘central theme’ of the Phillis Review was the ‘three-way 
breakdown in trust between government and politicians, the media and the general 
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public’ and how these breakdowns could be remedied (Phillis, 2004: 2). On the 
dichotomous disintegration of the relations between the media and the 
government, the Review questioned whether the ‘two parties [were] now locked 
into an introspective cycle of mutual distrust from which it has become impossible 
for either to escape’ (Ibid.: 27). It goes on to detail the key grievances of each 
party. The media complained that ‘politics [was] run by spin doctors and that 
politicians…stick rigidly to a rehearsed script, speak in meaningless sound bites 
and will only tell the truth when they are safely off the record’ (Ibid.). Whilst 
politicians maintained that the media were only interested in ‘personalities [and] 
the search for conflict’ (Ibid.). Furthermore, they argued that the trend for 
journalists to try to encapsulate a ‘story in 15 seconds’, along with their ‘cavalier 
approach to the truth’ had hindered political communications to the public (Ibid.). 
Indeed, the home secretaries interviewed for this thesis corroborated this view.  
 
The Review concluded that, among other things, the government should be more 
transparent in its media operations, and that its ‘communications to the public’ 
should be more ‘unmediated’ and less reliant on ‘spin’ (Ibid: 12). A report 
published in 2009 by a House of Lords Select Committee that assessed the 
changes made to government communications in the wake of the Phillis Review 
concluded that more transparency was still required. In terms of the way forward, 
the Committee advised that the internet should be more readily utilised to counter 
criticisms, from both the public and the wider journalistic community, against the 
closed and secretive Lobby system (House of Lords Select Committee on 
Communications, 2009: 37). Another key recommendation was that ‘the most 
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important announcements of Government policy should be made in the first 
instance to Parliament’, rather than, presumably, to the media (Ibid.). Just two 
years later, the Leveson Inquiry would bring to light most vividly the tightknit 
relationship between the media and the state.4 
 
1.2.3 Terrorism in the UK: From PIRA to 9/115 
Within the European context, the origin of the term ‘terrorism’ can be traced back 
to the French Revolution, with the Académie Française defining the term in 1798, 
as a ‘system or rule of terror’. Previously associated with state violence against its 
citizens, by the late nineteenth century the term had become progressively more 
linked with non-governmental groups rather than with those in power. It is this 
understanding of terrorism that persists today. In the colonial era in the wake of 
the Second World War, dissident movements used terrorist tactics against colonial 
powers to pressurise them into withdrawing from their lands, but also to terrorise 
the indigenous populations in an effort to gain political ascendency. Throughout 
these periods, the media was increasingly viewed as an important propaganda tool 
for governments and terrorists alike, not just within the confines of nation states 
but as a means to communicate their messages to an international audience. As 
Burleigh notes, during this era: ‘The colonial struggles all involved playing to 
international public opinion via the mass media. Terrorists learned this too’ 
(Burleigh, 2008: 151). The socialist and nationalistic terrorism of the 1950s 
through to the 1970s increasingly involved terror tactics involving civilian targets 
and the use of highly symbolic targets such as aeroplanes to attract media 
                                                 
4
 The Leveson Inquiry and its implications will be further discussed in Chapter 2. 
5
 Discussion on particular terrorist events and New Labour’s policy responses in the post-9/11 era 
are discussed in the results chapters (chapters 4–7). 
19 
 
attention. Neumann links these tactics directly to the television age, with the 
hijackings of aeroplanes particularly seen to be ‘staged for television audiences’ 
(Neumann, 2009: 136).   
 
In contemporary societies, most scholars agree that defining terrorism is an 
extremely difficult task (see, for example, Walker, 2009: 7; and Whittaker, 2012: 
5). The oft-said adage that ‘one man’s terrorist is another man’s freedom fighter’ 
still holds true. One only has to consider the career trajectory of politicians as 
diverse as Nelson Mandela (once defined as a terrorist by an apartheid state) and 
Martin McGuinness (formerly of PIRA, and now part of the political 
establishment in Northern Ireland), to see the complexity of the issue.6 Generally, 
most definitions of terrorism are instituted and legitimated by powerful state 
actors, as Deacon et al. point out: ‘To label an action as “terrorist” is to condemn 
it as illegitimate and to support the claims of the state against which it is aimed’ 
(Deacon et al., 2007: 165). Similarly, ‘Islamist terrorism’7 is just as difficult to 
define, as ideological motivations and terrorist tactics, as well as socio-cultural 
circumstances, can differ significantly between various groups and individuals.8 
This thesis understands terrorism, particularly ‘new terrorism’ as the use of 
                                                 
6
 Indeed, the same can be said of America’s changing view of Osama bin Laden – for President 
Ronald Reagan, he was a freedom fighter (fighting a common enemy, i.e. the Soviet Union), and 
to President George W. Bush, a terrorist. 
7
 This thesis ‘employs the term “Islamist terrorism” to refer to post 9/11 terrorist violence 
committed by extremist Muslim groups for political or religious aims, particularly (though not 
exclusively) Al-Qaeda or groups or individuals inspired by Al-Qaeda. However, it is important to 
note that [the author is] equally sensitive to the debates around the use of this particular term’ 
(Silverman & Thomas, 2012: 293). 
8
 Abu Qatada’s recent statement on the beheadings of two American journalists carried out by Isis 
(Islamic State) in Syria perhaps best exemplifies this dilemma. Indeed, whilst Al-Qaeda still has 
Qatada’s support, he denounced the actions of Isis as ‘un-Islamic’ saying that ‘Messengers should 
not be killed’. More generally, the execution of journalists is not part of the Al-Qaeda ethos, which 
has traditionally exploited the western media for propagandist aims (The Guardian, 7 September 
2014). Online. Available HTTP: <http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/sep/07/isis-
beheadings-islam-abu-qatada> (accessed 26 October 2014). 
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indiscriminate violence by groups or individuals against civilians in pursuant of 
particular ideological and/or political goals. 
 
Although it is the Provisional Irish Republican Army’s (PIRA) systematic terror 
campaign on mainland Britain during the 1970s to the mid-1990s that lives on in 
the British consciousness, in Britain there ‘exists a historical context more than a 
century long to the current British war on terror’ (Hewitt, 2008: 9). Indeed, it was 
the Irish terrorism of the late nineteenth century, which led to the Metropolitan 
police establishing Special Branch. However, until the early 1970s, acts of 
terrorism were exclusively carried out against targets in Northern Ireland, which, 
due to the contrivances of Westminster and Stormont, gained very little attention 
from the British and international media. As Butler contends, it was the 1968 
RUC attacks on peaceful demonstrators at a civil rights march in Londonderry 
(now Derry) that ‘spectacularly announced the troubles in NI [Northern Ireland] to 
the British audience as well as to the wider world’ (Butler, 1996: 58). The 
subsequent events of the early 1970s – including the introduction of curfews and 
the widespread internment of terror suspects, and the shooting of thirteen Catholic 
protesters on 30 January 1972 by the British army in what become known as 
‘Bloody Sunday’ – resulted in a campaign of Irish violence against British 
mainland targets. As such – and as the PIRA must have predicted – the Irish 
troubles became a prominent topic of news in the British (and international) 
media. In response, the British government introduced a raft of ‘censorship’ 
measures in an effort to ‘manage’ the way in which the troubles were reported in 
the British media, with Margaret Thatcher famously stating that terrorism needed 
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to be starved of ‘the oxygen of publicity’ (Curtis, 1984; Edgerton, 1996; and 
Moloney, 1991). 
 
In response to this campaign, particularly in the wake of the Birmingham and 
Guildford pub bombings, the Labour Government under Harold Wilson rushed 
through the Prevention of Terrorism (Temporary Provisions) Act 1974. David 
Miller contends that the British media’s coverage of these events not only ‘eased 
the passage of the “draconian” Prevention of Terrorism Act [but also] helped to 
convict the Maguire family, the Guildford Four and the Birmingham Six for 
bombings they did not commit’ (Miller, 1994:  276). He also notes that it was this 
same media, namely a series of World in Action television documentaries during 
the 1980s, that later ‘played a role in forcing an acknowledgement that the 
convictions were unsafe’ (Ibid.). This temporary piece of legislation had various 
additions over the following 25 years (in 1974, 1976, 1984, and 1989), and was 
eventually replaced with a permanent piece of legislation in 2000.9  
 
Although it is beyond the scope of this thesis to provide a comprehensive 
comparison between Irish terrorism and Islamist terrorism post 9/11, it is 
instructive to note the different ways in which governments have responded to 
terrorism over the past four decades. Scholars such as Ulrich Beck describe the 
post 9/11 era as living in a ‘terroristic world risk society’ (Beck, 2002: 9). For the 
New Labour government, 9/11 created a ‘new’ form of terrorism.10 Indeed, whilst 
                                                 
9
 The Terrorism Act 2000 was introduced by the New Labour government partly in response to the 
Omagh bombing of 1998. 
10
 The Home Secretaries interviewed for this research confirmed this view. See chapters 4, 5, 6 and 
7 for further discussion. 
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successive governments could identify the motivation behind PIRA’s political and 
practical objectives, they have wrestled to understand the ideological aims of 
Islamist terrorism. Consequently, governments have represented Islamist terrorists 
as a simplistic monolithic enemy of ‘western’ democratic norms and values. 
However, one major distinction between the PIRA period and the Islamist 
terrorism period post 9/11 is the modus operandi; the PIRA, for example, never 
resorted to suicide bombing. This crucial difference posed considerable problems 
for the government in terms of how best to legislate. Indeed, in the wake of 9/11, 
the government was quickly having to grapple with a new type of terrorism threat, 
one which was perceived as qualitatively different to the PIRA campaign. As 
David Blunkett affirmed: 
There were no suicide bombers from Northern Ireland.  They killed other 
people but they didn't kill themselves, unless it was by accident.  So you 
could pursue and prosecute and punish. So those three options weren’t 
available to you in a meaningful sense, [in terms] of sending signals and 
deterring people from doing things, or making it more difficult for them to 
do it.   
(Interview with author, 21 March 2014) 
 
This new form of terrorism has arguably led to a greater climate of fear, which in 
turn has led to policy being drafted on a precautionary basis. Beck argued that 
‘what is politically crucial is ultimately not the risk itself but the perception of 
risk. What men fear to be real is real in its consequences – fear creates its own 
reality’ (cited in Mythen and Walklate, 2006: 126). Ultimately, as Burnett and 
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Whyte argue: ‘The new terrorism thesis sets up an understanding of an enemy that 
is not only more apocalyptic and dangerous, but also less amenable to traditional 
forms of control’ (Burnett & Whyte, 2005: 5). Indeed, these leitmotifs were 
central to the government’s rhetoric around the need for ‘tougher’ measures 
during its terrorism legislative drives, as was the prioritising of the rights of 
citizens above those of terrorist suspects. The latter deployed by the government 
to justify its ever-increasing encroachment on civil liberties and human rights. 
 
1.2.4 New Labour and the Politics of Insecurity 
As its starting point, this thesis argues that many of the draconian measures found 
in the later legislation were not a corollary of 9/11 – but were already ingrained in 
New Labour’s general approach to crime and security from the early 1990s 
(Silverman, 2012; and Silverman & Thomas, 2012).11 For example, section 44 of 
the TA 2000 granted the police greater powers to ‘stop and search’ terror suspects, 
whilst the RIPA 2000 contained more invasive surveillance measures. Despite 
this, the media showed little interest in the passage of the legislation. Indeed, a 
content analysis of the Terrorism Act 2000 carried out for this PhD research 
showed that there was negligible press attention during its passage. Jack Straw 
also stated that he ‘did not give much thought to the press’ on its introduction to 
parliament, although he conceded that the Bill had ‘broad all party support and 
that made it a bit easier’ (Interview with author, 12 February 2014). In contrast, 
the terrorism legislation enacted after 9/11, received a high level of press 
                                                 
11
 Also, see Saward (2006) for an elucidating discussion on the ‘close links between the 
government’s anti-terrorism legislation and its broader agenda’ on criminal justice, especially in 
the context of civil liberties (Saward, 2006: 230). 
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attention. Similarly, the government paid much more consideration to its media 
strategy during the passage of the terrorism bills than it had done previously.12  
 
In Britain, the New Labour government repeatedly drew on new terrorism threat 
discourses, which were themselves entrenched ‘into broader cultural formations of 
crime and (in)security’ (Mythen & Walklate, 2006: 123), in order ‘to gain public 
support for...the tightening up of national law and order measures’ (Ibid.: 129). 
Indeed, Fairclough argues that ‘Blair’s “toughness” [had] been self-consciously 
built into his communicative style as a matter of policy and strategy’ (Fairclough, 
2000: 8). Before his leadership bid, Blair admitted that a key reason behind his 
choice to be shadow home secretary was that: ‘It showed leadership. [He] took a 
traditional [liberal] Labour position, modernised it, made it popular and upended 
the Tories with it’ (Blair, 2010: 55). The murder of two-year old James Bulger in 
Liverpool in 1993 was to become a defining moment for Blair in terms of his 
political reputation. For Blair, the tragic murder of the toddler, perpetrated by two 
ten-year-old boys from broken homes, embodied the social disintegration that had 
occurred under Thatcherism. In his memoirs, Blair admitted that he used the issue 
for political intents. 
Very effectively I made it into a symbol of a Tory Britain in which, for all 
the efficiency that Thatcherism had achieved, the bonds of social and 
community well-being had been loosed, dangerously so. I did it sincerely. 
[Gave a widely reported speech on the issue]…at the time, politically, 
there was a big impact on my standing, which rose still further. 
                                                 
12
 The extent to which this was tied up with the broader ‘war on terror’ politick will be discussed 
in later chapters. 
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(Ibid.: 57) 
 
Given Blair’s politicisation of the Bulger murder, the later criticisms from the 
press that the motivating factor behind much of the terrorism policy was to gain 
political advantage over the Opposition were not without substance. However, 
Blair’s admission also highlights the adeptness of New Labour in recognising and 
exploiting ‘opportunities beyond the narrow crime and anti-social behaviour 
agenda to represent the national mood’ (Silverman & Thomas, 2012: 281). 
 
A distinguishing feature of the New Labour government was not only how it 
responded to the terror threat, but also how these issues were communicated to the 
public. New Labour’s move towards an emotionalistic political discourse was ‘a 
rhetorical device to reach out past the office in order to connect at an imagined 
“more human” level’ (Gaffney, 2001: 131). Blair in particular, addressed the 
electorate with a ‘new’ level of intimacy and ordinariness. This new style of 
political rhetoric served to show the electorate that not only were the politicians 
listening to them, but that they were being proactive in their response. As 
Richards affirms: ‘One thing that was new about “New” Labour was arguably the 
attention paid to the emotional tasks of political leadership, to intuiting the 
anxieties of the public and seeking to respond to them’ (Richards, 2007: 107). 
Indeed, Rumford argues that New Labour’s ‘political responses’ to 9/11 and 7/7 
displayed ‘a strong emotional dimension which [had] displaced, to a certain 
extent, a rational appraisal of political realities’ (Rumford, 2008: 165).  
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However, this attuning to the emotional needs of the public was evident prior to 
9/11. Blunkett explains the reasoning behind the government’s turn towards 
‘emotional governance’ (Richards, 2007). Referring to the already heightened 
sense of insecurity in the UK prior to 9/11 – partly due to the race riots in the 
summer of 2001 and the mounting fears on asylum and immigration – Blunkett 
accredits the advent of the 24/7 news environment as a major factor in amplifying 
these existential fears. 
Immigration, subliminal fear of rapid change, threat to the 'normal' way of 
living, the instability that that causes, obviously has implications as to how 
people receive messages about other aspects of security and of what's 
happening in the world.  Coupled with the fact that we had just moved into 
an era of seven days a week, 24-hour news.  We were also beginning to 
see people using the internet and mobile technology.  All of those things 
came together at the same time.  
(Interview with author, 21 March 2014)  
 
Whilst Blunkett believed that the Home Office had ‘got on top’ of the asylum and 
immigration issue, there was growing unease amongst government officials about 
the increasing prominence of far right groups across Europe. Interestingly, the 
government ethos of attuning to, and allaying, public fears was already in 
operation prior to 9/11. Recalling the government’s anxiety over the ‘massive 
upsurge of the right across Europe’,13 Blunkett stated: 
                                                 
13
 Blunkett was referring to Le Pen in France, Pim Fortuyn in Holland, the far right coalition in 
Austria, as well as the ousting of the Social Democrats in Denmark.   
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Some of us had been arguing that we needed to be aware of this, and not 
panic or pander, but actually get a grip to the point where people were 
secure in their minds that we knew that there was an issue to be addressed.  
Providing them with that reassurance was as much a part of the security, 
because it affected their psyche and the way that they saw things, as was 
the physical security. 
(Ibid.) 
 
The advent of 24-hour news, alongside online news and government information 
websites, has meant that politicians now need to respond to issues around the 
clock. Indeed, the changing media has not only had an impact on the speed with 
which politicians need to respond, but has heralded a new style of political 
communication. As Garland argues: ‘The TV encounter – with its soundbite 
rapidity, its emotional intensity, and its mass audience – has tended to push 
politicians to be more populist, more emotive, more evidently in tune with public 
feeling’ (Garland, 2001: 157). Indeed, New Labour’s preoccupation with populist 
sentiment during its anti-terrorism campaigns was heavily criticised in the press.  
 
Charles Clarke affirmed the significant impact that a changing media has had on 
political life. Whilst working for Neil Kinnock during his stewardship of the 
Labour Party, Clarke recalled that politicians had far greater time to reflect on an 
issue before having to make a statement to the press. The new media environment, 
in Clarke’s view, has heralded an ‘utterly different press timetable and that has 
changed the whole relationship [between politicians and journalists] very, very 
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substantially’ – and for Clarke, not for the better (Interview with author, 4 
February 2014).   
 
1.2.5 New Labour, the Press and the Human Rights Act  
Given New Labour’s turn toward more draconian criminal justice policies in their 
first parliamentary term in office, it was perhaps inevitable that their political 
responses to terrorism after 9/11 would sit uncomfortably with their former 
commitment to safeguarding civil liberties and human rights – a commitment best 
expressed in the enactment of the Human Rights Act 1998. Much of the criticism 
emanating from parliamentarians and certain sections of the press focused on the 
impact that various measures would have on ancient civil liberties, especially 
concerning the perceived attack on habeas corpus. Despite this, there was also 
considerable criticism levelled at the HRA/ECHR, as well as to the wider remit of 
the EU on British constitutional affairs. For a large section of the press, the HRA 
was seen as undermining ‘parliament’s sovereignty’, with much of the discourse 
claiming that the Act ‘privileged the legal rights of convicted prisoners, asylum 
seekers and suspected terrorists above those of law-abiding citizens and 
“victims”’ (Silverman & Thomas, 2012: 290). Indeed, the tabloids in particular 
defined the Act as a ‘Villain’s Charter’, with much of its vitriol reserved for 
‘liberal’ judges and human rights lawyers. 
 
Thus, this thesis highlights the dualistic nature of the press around issues relating 
to civil or human rights – it would seem that among some sections of the press, 
the rights pertaining to press freedom are sacrosanct, whilst human rights are 
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subject to a caveat. In explaining the attitude of the press toward the HRA, Gies 
notes that ‘the HRA’s poor reputation is also not helped by the fact that it is 
regularly mistaken for a ‘European’ law imposed on the UK by ‘Brussels’, i.e. the 
European Union.’(Gies, 2011: 169). This is an argument shared by Petley, who 
states: ‘press hostility to the HRA dates back to its birth, which the press feared 
(wrongly) would bring about a privacy law. But it also had deeper roots in 
conservative opinion’s hostility to anything smacking of ‘European’ ideas, human 
rights among them’ (Petley, 2006: 14). The impact of press reporting on Jack 
Straw’s criticisms of the HRA can only be surmised, but in 2008, Straw gave an 
interview to the Daily Mail (an ardent critic of the Act) in which he publically 
criticised the way that some judges had interpreted the Act. He declared:  
I fully understand that [Daily Mail readers] have concerns about the 
Human Rights Act. There is a sense that it's a villains' charter or that it 
stops terrorists being deported or criminals being properly given publicity. 
I am greatly frustrated by this. Not by the concerns, but by some very few 
judgments that have thrown up these problems.  
(Daily Mail, 8 December 2008). 
 
Moran highlights some of the concerns raised above, arguing that, whilst critics 
have quite rightly focused on the civil liberties implications of some of the more 
draconian counter-terrorism powers, ‘It is away from the intense area of 
countering terrorism that civil liberties concerns may arise’(Moran, 2007: 91). An 
example being the expansion in ‘conventional police powers’ since New Labour 
came to power, including the power to cordon off public spaces, DNA sampling 
30 
 
and storage, and ‘impressive powers of asset recovery’ (Ibid.). On the other hand, 
Denney argues that ‘the relationship between New Labour, fear and human rights 
is a complex one’ (Denney, 2008: 570). Whilst New Labour’s security and 
criminal justice measures have certainly encroached on civil liberties, during their 
term in office Blair and his ministers also demonstrated ‘a commitment to 
enhance the rights of some groups’ (Ibid.). The emphasis on ‘the removal of civil 
liberties’, Denney argues, has, however, ‘[distracted] attention from measures 
taken by New Labour with the intended aim of enhancing inclusiveness and 
human rights’ (Ibid.). 
 
1.3 Thesis Structure 
This thesis is divided into nine chapters. Chapter 1 has provided an overview of 
the theoretical and methodological direction of this thesis. In terms of its 
theoretical framework, it tests three competing models of media performance on 
British press reporting of anti-terrorism legislation enacted between 2001 and 
2008. Methodologically, it takes an inductive approach to analysing the framing 
of the legislative debates, and draws on material gleaned from interviews with 
four former home secretaries. Furthermore, this chapter has outlined some of the 
central themes relevant to this thesis. In particular, it looked at the relationship 
between New Labour and the British press, from its reorganisation of its 
communication strategies in opposition to the role of ‘spin’ in the policy cycle, 
with special consideration of the impact a changing media has had on the 
government-press dynamic. Section 1.2 concluded with a discussion of the issues 
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pertaining to New Labour’s politics of insecurity, and the concomitant debates on 
civil liberties and human rights. The rest of the thesis is structured as follows. 
 
Chapter 2 is divided into two parts. The first part focuses on the fourth estate 
thesis. Beginning with an account of the issues highlighted by the Leveson 
Inquiry, it goes on to explore the historical antecedents of the struggle for press 
freedom, alongside the ideal function of the press in a democracy. The second part 
of the chapter details the three competing models of media-state relations (elite-
driven, independent and oppositional), with particular reference to the tripartite 
models of Hallin (1986), Wolfsfeld (1997) and Robinson et al. (2010). It also 
discusses the modifications made to these models to fit the particular 
circumstances of the adversarial character of the British press. The independent 
model in particular draws on an eclectic range of research paradigms that moves 
the model beyond normative definitions of press objectivity, and allows for a 
more nuanced understanding of what constitutes independent press reporting in 
the British context.  
 
Chapter 3 provides a detailed discussion of the approaches and methods used in 
the research. Primarily, the research takes an inductive approach, and employs the 
methodological frameworks and framing definitions of Gamson and his 
colleagues (Gamson & Lasch, 1983; and Gamson & Modigliani, 1989), with 
particular reference to their construction of a signature matrix. Beginning with a 
discussion of the quantitative and qualitative methods deployed for the content 
analyses, the chapter then provides an overview of the sampling decisions, as well 
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as an outline of the character and political affiliations of the newspapers that 
constitute the objects of analysis. Finally, it discusses the utilisation of the in-
depth interviews, before concluding with a summary of the chapter. 
 
Presented in chronological order, chapters 4 to 7 present the findings of the press 
framing of the four case studies. Each chapter begins with an overview of the key 
provisions contained in its respective Act, as well as the different standpoints of 
the main actors involved in the debates. The main actors being the government, 
the political opposition, members of the House of Lords, as well as the police and 
security services, and to a lesser extent, civil liberties and Muslim advocacy 
groups. In terms of the news content studies, each chapter has been organised as 
follows: firstly, it details the quantitative findings, which include the level of press 
attention devoted to the Bill and the key sources that shaped the news agenda. In 
regards to media-source relations, it seeks to discern the primary definers of the 
news agenda, and the extent to which the press might have challenged elite 
consensus or dissensus.  Secondly, it discusses the findings of the framing 
analysis, specifically looking at how the media framed the policy debates as well 
as the editorial responses of particular newspapers. Each chapter concludes with a 
consideration of the overall performance of the press, with special reference to the 
theoretical arguments discussed in Chapter 2. To underpin particular points of 
discussion, the chapters also refer to some of the insights gleaned from the 
interviews with the former home secretaries. 
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Chapter 8 provides a comparative analysis of the four case studies. It begins with 
a review of the quantitative findings, specifically focusing on the longitudinal 
patterns of press attention and media-source relations. Then, it discusses the 
findings of the qualitative analyses, specifically looking at trends in the press 
framing of the policy debates over time. This is followed by an overall assessment 
of the performance of the press, with special reference to the theoretical 
frameworks relative to media-state relations. The section concludes with an 
overall assessment of the extent to which the press fulfilled its historic ‘fourth 
estate’ role. Finally, this chapter evaluates some of the key themes to emerge from 
the interviews with the four home secretaries, especially regarding the 
government-press dynamic during their time in office, before concluding with a 
summary of the key findings of the comparative analysis. 
 
Chapter 9 provides a summary of the research findings, with particular reference 
to the research questions. It then goes on to discuss the theoretical implications of 
the research and its contribution to knowledge, the strengths and limitations of the 
conceptual framework, and concludes with a summary of possible areas for 
further inquiry. 
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CHAPTER 2: CONCEPTUALISING THE 
MEDIA-STATE NEXUS 
 
This chapter is divided into two broad parts. The first part focuses on the ‘Fourth 
Estate’ thesis. Beginning with an account of the issues highlighted by the Leveson 
Inquiry, it goes on to explore the historical antecedents of the struggle for press 
freedom, alongside the idealised function of the press in a democracy. The second 
part of the chapter details the three competing models of media-state relations 
(elite-driven, independent and oppositional), with particular reference to the 
tripartite models of Hallin (1986), Wolfsfeld (1997) and Robinson et al. (2010). It 
also discusses the modifications made to these models to fit the particular 
circumstances of the adversarial character of the British press. The independent 
model in particular draws on an eclectic range of research paradigms that moves 
the model beyond normative definitions of press objectivity, and allows for a 
more nuanced understanding of what constitutes independent press reporting in 
the British context. Similarly, the elite-driven paradigm has been more narrowly 
defined as government-driven, which enables a clearer distinction between 
government/official positions and non-government elites. 
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PART 1: THE FOURTH ESTATE 
What the proprietorship of these papers is aiming at is power, and power 
without responsibility – the prerogative of the harlot throughout the ages.14 
(Stanley Baldwin, 1931) 
 
With any of these big media groups, you fall out with them and you watch 
out, because…it is literally relentless and unremitting once that happens, 
and my view is that that is what creates this situation in which these media 
people get a power in the system that is unhealthy and which I have felt, 
throughout my time, uncomfortable with. 
(Tony Blair, 2012) 
 
Two prime ministers speaking in very different media eras ascribe an almost 
mythic level of power to the press, illustrating the enduring influence the press has 
had on political life over the past century. Although successive governments have 
been wary of imposing any restrictions on the press, several inquiries since 1947 
have provided fora for an introspective examination of the ethics and practices of 
the press. Three Royal Commissions on the Press (1947–1949, 1961–1962 and 
1974–1977) have each made appeals to the industry for greater robustness in its 
self-regulatory systems – the 1977 Report stipulating that the press should be 
given one final chance to prove the workability of self-regulation. The Press 
Council set up in the wake of the first Royal Commission was also heavily 
criticised in the 1977 Report for failing to uphold acceptable standards in its 
                                                 
14
 The author Rudyard Kipling, who was incidentally Stanley Baldwin’s cousin, originally coined 
the phrase. 
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inquiries into press abuses – failings that had already been identified by the 
Younger Committee on Privacy in 1973. Press intrusion into the personal lives of 
politicians and members of the Royal Family reached its nadir in the 1980s, 
leading to the setting up of the (Sir David) Calcutt Committee to scrutinise the 
practices of the press and the perceived failure of the Press Council in dealing 
with abuses within the industry. The Calcutt Report of 1990 concluded that the 
Press Council was ineffectual and recommended it be replaced with the Press 
Complaints Commission (PCC). Echoing the findings of the 1977 Royal 
Commission Report, Calcutt also advised that the press be given a final 
opportunity to prove that self-regulation was a satisfactory option (Committee on 
Privacy and Related Matters, 1990). In 1993, the second Calcutt Report into the 
efficacy of the newly formed PCC found it an ineffective regulator and 
recommended the introduction of a new ‘statutory regime’ (Department of 
National Heritage, 1993: xi–xii). Despite the findings of these inquiries, statutory 
regulation of the press was never implemented. In the years that followed, the 
issue of press regulation was raised in several select committees, but it was the 
Leveson Inquiry that would bring to light most vividly ‘issues such as privacy, 
regulation and accountability which have been muffled or dormant for a couple of 
decades’ (Brock, 2012: 520).  
 
In 2011, the revelations of widespread transgressions committed by the British 
press over a period of ten years were, rather ironically, making headlines in 
newspapers and television news broadcasts around the world. To some, the British 
press represents the ideal of an unrestricted and democratic media, to others it is 
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an industry with far too much power without the encumbrance of responsibility. 
Although the issue of phone hacking had been brought to public attention in the 
summer of 2006 – with the arrests of Clive Goodman, former royal editor of the 
News of the World, and private investigator Glenn Mulcaire – these deeds were 
not seen as representative of the journalistic culture as a whole, but rather the 
actions of a couple of ‘rogue’ individuals.15 However, further revelations of phone 
hacking by journalists at the News of the World appeared in The Guardian in July 
2011, instigating a series of events that would bring to light the unethical practices 
of certain segments of the British press, as well as exposing the nature of the 
relationship between the media and senior representatives of both the government 
and the police.  
 
The hacking of the voicemail messages of the murdered schoolgirl Milly Dowler 
shortly after she went missing in 2002 proved to be one of the most controversial 
cases.16 This activity not only gave the Dowler family false hope that she was still 
alive, but also had a direct bearing on the police investigation. Public outcry 
ensued, which ultimately led to the closure of the News of the World, along with 
the resignations of several senior employees of News International, including 
former News of the World editor and chief executive of News International, 
Rebekah Brooks. Along with her former colleague Andy Coulson, Brooks was 
                                                 
15
 Clive Goodman and Glenn Mulcaire were arrested in relation to a story written by Goodman in 
November 2005, which referred to Prince William’s medical treatment for a knee injury, 
information that Buckingham Palace believed was obtained via the hacking of the Prince’s 
voicemails. Goodman and Mulcaire were convicted of phone hacking in January 2007 and were 
sentenced to four and six months respectively. 
16
 In 2012, the IPCC released a report that was highly critical of Surrey Police during their 
investigation into the disappearance of Milly Dowler. The report found that Surrey Police ‘at all 
levels’ were aware of the News of the World’s involvement in hacking the schoolgirl’s phone, and 
that despite this knowledge they failed to take action for almost a decade. 
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subsequently charged with nineteen offences relating to phone hacking. Several 
senior Metropolitan Police officers also resigned in the immediate aftermath of 
the revelations, including the Met Police Commissioner Sir Paul Stephenson and 
the Met Police Assistant Commissioner John Yates, in relation to their links with 
News International, as well as to criticisms of the Met’s handling of the phone 
hacking affair.  
 
On 13 July 2011, David Cameron responded to the furore by announcing that a 
public inquiry into press standards was to be set up, with Lord Justice Leveson 
appointed as Chair of the Inquiry. A week later, having previously stood by his 
decision to employ Andy Coulson as his Communications Director and publically 
declaring his support for him after his arrest over the phone hacking affair, 
Cameron finally conceded ‘regret’ over his hiring of the former News of the 
World editor.   
 
The Leveson Inquiry was divided into two parts. The aim of the first part was to 
scrutinise the ‘culture, practices, and ethics of the press’ (Leveson Report, 2012: 
4), and to offer recommendations on regulation, issues of media ownership, and 
future guidelines on how to ensure appropriate conduct between the press and 
state agencies, namely the police and the political class. Part 2 was concerned 
with the level and nature of misconduct within News International, and other 
news organisations. In light of the close relationship that had developed between 
the press and the police, particular attention was paid to the way in which the 
39 
 
police had handled allegations of illegal activities carried out by journalists 
working for News International.   
 
Published in November 2012, the Leveson Report proclaimed that both the police 
and politicians had ‘developed too close a relationship with the press’ (Leveson 
Report, 2012: 1439), with the recommendation that a greater degree of 
transparency was required in their future dealings with journalists and media 
proprietors. The Report also contained several key recommendations concerning 
the regulation of the press, the overriding one being the establishment of a self-
regulatory body, independent of press and government. Moreover, that such a 
body should be underpinned by statute to ensure that standards are upheld and 
complaints from the public effectively processed.17  
 
In the wake of the Report, the three main political parties agreed on a new Royal 
Charter that would include powers to impose fines and enforce retractions for 
inaccuracies in news stories.18 To ensure its independence, it proposed that any 
amendments to the charter would require at least a two-thirds majority of both 
houses. The press opposed the charter on the grounds that it amounted to little 
more than ‘state-sponsored legislation’, which contravened the ideal of a free 
press independent of political influence. Eschewing what they perceived to be a 
‘politician’s charter’, a majority of the press proposed its own self-regulatory 
                                                 
17
 There was widespread criticism of Leveson’s failure to address the challenges of legislating in 
the age of the internet (see, for example, Clark, 2013; and O’Neill, 2013). The Report simply 
acknowledged that the internet was an ‘ethical vacuum’ (Leveson Report, 2012: 735), but 
skimmed over criticisms that many of the recommendations contained in the Report would very 
quickly be rendered obsolete. 
18
 Despite fierce contestation from the press, the Royal Charter on press regulation was granted by 
the Privy Council on 30 October 2013. On the same day, the prosecution began its opening in the 
trial of Rebekah Brooks and Andy Coulson.   
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body, the Independent Press Standards Organisation (IPSO), to replace the highly 
criticised PCC. It remains to be seen whether the outcomes of the Leveson Inquiry 
will inspire any significant change both in terms of self-regulation and in terms of 
the relationship between the press and various state agencies. However, as 
previous inquiries can attest, the press have a long history of dogged self-
preservation when threatened with regulatory reform, especially when buttressed 
by decree.  
 
2.1 An Overview of the Fourth Estate Thesis 
Give me the liberty to know, to utter, and to argue freely according to 
conscience, above all liberties.  
(John Milton, 1644) 
 
A free press is the unsleeping guardian of every other right that  free men 
prize; it is the most dangerous foe of tyranny…Under dictatorship the 
press is bound to languish, and the loudspeaker and the film to become 
more important. But where free institutions are indigenous to the soil and 
men have the habit of liberty, the press will continue to be the Fourth 
Estate, the vigilant guardian of the rights of the ordinary citizen.  
(Sir Winston Churchill, 1949)  
 
Although uttered three hundred years apart, John Milton and Sir Winston 
Churchill’s impassioned appeals for the importance of a free press sprang from a 
common resistance to state censorship of the written word. Milton was speaking 
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at a time when the printing press was subject to strict government censorship 
under the Licencing Order of 1643, whilst Churchill was speaking in the 
aftermath of World War II, where state control of media in Nazi Germany had 
overseen some of the worst atrocities in modern history. Milton’s Areopagitica 
(1644) is often regarded as one of the first expositions on the right to ‘freedom of 
expression’. Whereas Milton’s petition to parliament was to prove futile, the 
European philosophers of the Enlightenment were to have a much more 
influential role in transforming the politics of France. Propelled by the political 
and philosophical ideas of the Age of Reason, the French Revolution of 1789 
proved to be a key turning point in the history of the struggle for press freedom. 
The role of the press in the circulation of revolutionary ideas was crucial in 
mobilising the people against the absolutist monarchy, and marked the beginning 
of ‘the interaction between politics and the media, the concept of the fourth estate, 
[and] the influence of the media on democracy’ (Chapman, 2005: 15). Although 
Jean-Jacques Rousseau and Voltaire19 both died a year before the storming of the 
Bastille, their ideas were to have a profound impact on the leaders of the 
revolution.20 
 
Often considered the embodiment of the Enlightenment, it was Voltaire ‘who 
made the principles of libertarianism a powerful ideological weapon against kings 
and tyrants’ (Trager & Dickerson, 1999: 51). An advocate of freedom of thought 
and expression, he also argued for the practical defence of those liberties by 
                                                 
19
 Voltaire was the nom de plume of François-Marie Aroue. 
20
 Both Rousseau and Voltaire were influenced by the political philosophies of John Locke (1632–
1704). Considered one of the founding fathers of liberalism, Locke argued that since man was born 
free he should be ruled by consent rather than by coercion. 
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arguing that only then ‘can citizens participate meaningfully in their government 
and promote policies and laws that enhance rights’ (Ibid.).21 The philosophical 
arguments contained in Rousseau’s Social Contract (1762), most notably the 
advocacy of the universal ‘rights of man’, were to inspire the substance of the 
Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen of 1789 (Burrowes, 2011: 34). 
The latter work being viewed as a precursor to contemporary human rights 
dogmata (Kemp, 2009: 33). In relation to freedom of expression, Article 11 of the 
Declaration makes clear that, ‘The free communication of ideas and opinions is 
one of the most precious of the rights of man. Every citizen may, accordingly, 
speak, write, and print with freedom’.22 A sentiment that would be echoed a 
century and a half later in Article 19 of the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights, which states: ‘Everyone has the right to freedom of opinion and 
expression; this right includes freedom to hold opinions without interference and 
to seek, receive and impart information and ideas through any media and 
regardless of frontiers’. 23 
 
Introduced into the public consciousness by Rousseau, the phrase ‘rights of man’ 
was to appear in the later works of the English writers Mary Wollstonecraft, 
namely in her Vindication of the Rights of Men (1790) and Thomas Paine, in his 
Rights of Man (1791). Paine’s treatise was in response to Edmund Burke’s 
Reflections on the Revolution in France (1790), a tome which attacked the radical 
                                                 
21
 A famous statement ‘I disapprove of what you say, but I will defend to the death your right to 
say it’ is often misattributed to Voltaire. It was Voltaire’s biographer S. G. Tallentyre who coined 
the phrase as a way of encapsulating his views on freedom of expression. 
22
 National Assembly of France (1789) Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen, 
Online. Available HTTP: <http://avalon.law.yale.edu/18th_century/rightsof.asp> (accessed 28 
February 2014). 
23
 UN General Assembly (1948) The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Online. Available 
HTTP: < http://www.un.org/en/documents/udhr/index.shtml#a19> (accessed 28 February 2014). 
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ideas of the French revolutionaries in favour of the hereditary system of monarchy 
that was already in place in Britain. The conservatism of Burke was in stark 
contrast to the idealistic radicalism of Paine, whose thesis extolled the events of 
1789 as a paragon of egalitarian governance. Paine’s seminal work was hugely 
popular, and his ideas were to inspire a renewed political interest among the 
working classes, referred to by Burke as ‘the swinish multitude’ (Chapman, 2005: 
24). However, the libertarianism that was the fulcrum of the French Revolution 
was to be short lived both in France and in Britain. In Britain, the circulation of 
revolutionary ideas had led to the government censoring radical literature, 
including the banning of Paine’s Rights of Man in 1793. As Williams (2010) 
observes, this period marked a divisive change in Britain, insofar as ‘throughout 
the early nineteenth century, literacy and print culture was a battleground between 
competing political interests in British society and at the heart of this struggle was 
the press’ (Williams, 2010: 32). 
 
During the nineteenth century, libertarian thinkers such as John Stuart Mill 
championed the rights of the individual above those of the state, arguing that for 
there to be a truly pluralistic society, there had to be a continual scrutiny of 
conformist knowledge, with a free press being a natural facilitator for this (Street, 
2001: 254). In On Liberty (1859), Mill reasoned that all individuals have the right 
to free expression as long as any utterance does not cause harm to others, and that 
this should be an inalienable right enshrined in law. Moreover, he asserted that 
‘the enforcement of universal education of citizens should be recognized by the 
state, as the fundamental condition for freedom of opinion formation and 
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expression’ (Splichal, 2002: 16). Mill also argued that the protection of minority 
opinion and the free expression of a multiplicity of views was a crucial element in 
the pursuit of truth. He states: ‘If all mankind minus one, were of one opinion, and 
only one person were of the contrary opinion, mankind would be no more justified 
in silencing that one person, than he, if he had the power, would be justified in 
silencing mankind’ (Mill, 1867 [1859]: 10). As Splichal (2002) argues, out of the 
post-revolutionary thinkers, it was Mill who presented the ‘most thorough 
argument for the freedom of the press as an implement, a genuine medium of a 
free public discussion’ (Splichal, 2002: 16).24  
 
By 1861, the abolition of the last of the newspaper taxes had paved the way for a 
rapid transformation of the press in Britain.25 This change was a result of the 
combined forces of industrialisation, chiefly the capacity for mass printing, and 
the increasing commercialisation of the press.  Once emancipated from the state, 
the press expanded significantly and a tide of new titles appeared. The political 
freedom of the press during this period also led to greater political partisanship 
among newspapers. There was also a natural kinship between politicians and 
journalists, due in part to the overlap of the two professions, with some members 
of the House of Commons enjoying dual roles as newspaper proprietors or 
journalists.  Moreover, newspapers were at times subsidised by political parties, 
                                                 
24
 Also, Mill’s ‘harm principle’ was at the heart of the debates about civil liberties versus security, 
and which would come to the fore in the anti-terrorism legislative debates. Mill stated: ‘That the 
only purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised over any member of a civilized 
community, against his will, is to prevent harm to others’ (Mill, 1867 [1859]: 22). 
25
 Known as the ‘taxes on knowledge’, newspaper proprietors had to pay duty on each newspaper 
sold, paper used, as well as on each advertisement that appeared in any given edition. The 
newspaper taxes were designed to keep the press in check by reducing circulation and restricting 
ownership. The repeal of the Stamp Act occurred in 1855, and the paper tax was abolished in 
1861. 
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leading to editorial copy advocating the policies of its sponsors. Although 
theoretically the press, as the so-called fourth estate, served the public in holding 
politicians to account, in actuality they were very much a part of the state 
apparatus during this period (Negrine, 1989: 51).  
 
The term ‘Fourth Estate’ was attributed to Burke by Thomas Carlyle in his work 
On Heroes, Hero Worship, and the Heroic in History (1841). Speaking to 
parliament in 1787, Burke purportedly used the term sardonically when he said 
that ‘there were Three Estates in Parliament; but, in the Reporters' Gallery yonder, 
there sat a Fourth Estate more important far than they all’ (Carlyle, 1841: 265; and 
Schultz, 1998: 49). During Burke’s era, the ‘Three Estates’ in Britain was 
comprised of the House of Commons, the aristocracy and the clergy, with the 
Fourth Estate acting as a ‘counterbalance and check to the other three estates’ 
(Harrison, 2006: 38). Describing the relationship between the press and society as 
a ‘social contract’, Sjøvaag (2010) asserts that:  ‘By tracing the social contract 
metaphor through its origins in the political-philosophical traditions of 
liberalism…the concept of rights and obligations within a contractual relationship 
provides explanation and justification for the role of the press in democracy’ 
(Sjøvaag, 2010: 874). The idea of the press as a nonpartisan ‘Fourth Estate’, 
upholding the principles of democracy and freedom of expression, whilst holding 
the powerful to account is an enduring part of our political culture. Indeed, much 
of the literature on the ideal democratic function of the press ‘revolves around 
journalistic responsibility to the public or the citizenry’ above that of the state 
(Ibid: 875).  
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By the late nineteenth century, the consequences of industrialisation and 
commercialisation had created a notable shift in the political-press dynamic, 
which in theory at least, paved the way for the press to fulfil its role as the ‘Fourth 
Estate’. Whilst still ‘primary definers’ (Hall et al., 1978) of the news agenda, 
politicians no longer had the sway over the press that they once had – largely due 
to a changing journalism which saw the downgrading of political news in favour 
of more ‘entertaining’ content. Newspapers were also enjoying greater 
commercial success, the outcome of an enlarged readership and increasing profits 
from advertising revenue. The growing influence of advertising was not only a 
defining factor in liberating the press from state authority, it was also a precursor 
to our extant press model. However, some critics have contended that far from 
this period heralding the age of the free press, ‘political controls were simply 
replaced by the control of the market’ (Kuhn, 2007: 32), the same market forces 
that were responsible for the demise of the radical press. As Curran (2002) 
concurs, the weakening of the influence of the political class over the press:  
…did not inaugurate a new era of press freedom: rather, it introduced a 
new system of press censorship more effective than anything that had gone 
before. Market forces succeeded where legal repression had failed in 
establishing the press as an instrument of social control, with lasting 
consequences for the development of modern British society. 
(Curran, 2002: 81) 
 
Indeed, the structure of the press from the late nineteenth century onward 
epitomises the dichotomy of the free market ideal – on the one hand you have a 
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‘free press’ independent of state control, but on the other hand a concentration of 
press ownership that weakens the ideal of an impartial democratic media. The 
high costs of establishing a national newspaper further confine levels of 
competition, which means that alternative groups competing for a share of the 
newspaper industry are priced out of the market. Fundamentally a commercial 
enterprise, the British press proliferate news values that invariably reflect and 
enhance institutional interests. As the Leveson Inquiry showed, the formation of 
mutually beneficial alliances between political, media and corporate elites to 
sustain their interdependent interests is commonplace, and despite the instigation 
of a new self-regulatory system, is likely to remain so. Although now challenged 
by the rise of online news, an over reliance of newspapers on advertising revenue 
can also result in news values reflecting the mercantile concerns of their corporate 
clientele. Therefore, the notion that the ‘media are neutral institutions which have 
severed links with sectional interests’ is contradictory to the economically driven 
business corporations controlling global media sectors (Curran, 2002: 130). 
Moreover, a plutocratic media means that far from the press subjecting powerful 
organisations to robust scrutiny, ‘market incentives work against such vigilance’ 
(Street, 2001:262). According to Habermas, the potential for the press to become 
a public sphere for democratic interchange after its emancipation from the state 
instead became ‘the gate through which privileged private interests invaded the 
public sphere’ (Habermas, 1992: 185). 
 
 
 
48 
 
2.1.1 The Occupational Ideology of Journalism 
Nonetheless, it is the historical struggle for the emancipation from state control 
that fuels much of the justifications for press freedom today, and explains in part 
why there is so much resistance among the press to any political interference 
(Negrine, 1989: 49). Indeed, in contemporary societies the ‘freedom to publish’ is 
seen as the journalistic ideal, where autonomy of the press is synonymous with 
democracy (Lloyd, 2011: 1).  Moreover, the commercialisation of the press is 
often celebrated as the harbinger of the democratisation of the modern press, as 
Paul Dacre, the editor of the Daily Mail argues: ‘Britain’s commercially viable 
free press, because it’s in hock to nobody, is the only real free media in this 
country. Over-regulate that press, and you put democracy itself in peril’ (Leveson 
Report, 2012: 89). Out of these historic endeavours for press freedom, an 
occupational ideology of journalism emerged. Drawing on Golding and Elliott 
(1979), Merritt (1995), and Kovach and Rosenstiel (2001), Deuze (2005) defines 
these journalistic principles as follows: 
 Public service: journalists provide a public service (as watchdogs or 
‘newshounds’, active collectors and disseminators of information); 
 Objectivity: journalists are impartial, neutral, objective, fair and (thus) 
credible; 
 Autonomy: journalists must be autonomous, free and independent in their 
work; 
 Immediacy: journalists have a sense of immediacy, actuality and speed 
(inherent in the concept of ‘news’); 
 Ethics: journalists have a sense of ethics, validity and legitimacy. 
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(Deuze, 2005: 447) 
 
In modern democracies, it is these values that journalists characteristically invoke 
when championing the essential qualities of their profession. Despite the 
transformative impact of the digital revolution on journalistic routines, empirical 
studies have found that these established principles remain sacrosanct to the 
journalistic ethos (O'Sullivan & Heinonen, 2008). However, as the Leveson 
Inquiry demonstrated, the advocacy of a ‘free press’ has often been exploited by 
the tabloids to justify some of their more pernicious activities, where lives have 
been damaged by stories that are deemed to be in the ‘public interest’, when they 
are often nothing more than gossip or in some instances complete 
misrepresentations. The oft cited adage ‘power without responsibility’ epitomises 
the nature of some sections of the press in the late twentieth and early twenty-first 
centuries, where they were seen by many as an inexorable force riding roughshod 
over whomever they pleased. As several inquiries into the ethics and practices of 
the press have shown, the past sixty years has seen widespread contempt for 
people’s privacy and a culture of chequebook journalism. Despite the existence of 
privacy laws,26 even pre-Leveson the murky depths to which some journalists 
would stoop for an ‘exclusive’ was well documented. The arrest of private 
investigator, Steve Whittamore in 2003 is one case in point. Known as the 
Motorman Operation, Whittamore eventually pleaded guilty to obtaining 
information that persistently breached the Data Protection Act. A surprising 
aspect of this case was the breadth of newspapers involved in the trading of illegal 
                                                 
26
 A key privacy clause is contained in Schedule 1 to the Human Rights Act 1998, namely Article 
8, which advocates the right to privacy. The Act also contains provision for safeguarding ‘freedom 
of expression’. 
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information, including several broadsheets, namely The Observer, The Times, The 
Sunday Times, and the mid-market Daily Mail, the latter proving to be one of the 
most prolific users of Whittamore’s services (Davies, 2009: 260).  
 
Along with a growing dissatisfaction with the perceived lack of accountability of 
the press and the failings of self-regulation, there has also been much criticism of 
the PCC, which was viewed as not fit for purpose due to it being ‘unduly 
dominated by powerful newspaper groups’ (Brock, 2012: 520). Indeed, as Davies 
(2009: 365) contends, the statistics demonstrate just how ineffective the PCC has 
been as a regulatory body, with only 197 out of a total of 28,227 complaints 
having been upheld over a ten-year period. It is hardly surprising, then, that 
opinion polls have shown a steady decline in public trust of the media (Thomas & 
Finneman, 2014: 184). Analysing the press reporting of the Leveson Inquiry, 
some critics argued that far from being introspective of their practices and 
responsibilities, the press clung to a ‘reductive libertarianism’ by conflating press 
freedom with democracy, when they should have been debating how newspapers 
could best restore ‘trust with audiences that no longer believe it to be an honest 
broker of information’ (Ibid.). 
 
Post Leveson, the debates continue on how best to manage the press. Some critics, 
such as Petley (2012), support a legislative approach, to ‘[ensure] that [the press] 
meets the democratic obligations which attend its right to express itself 
freely…[which is] entirely consistent with the ideals of those who fought so 
passionately for the freedom of the press in the first place’ (Petley, 2012: 537). 
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Whilst Dawes (2013: 17) argues for a ‘civic republican approach to press 
regulation’ on the grounds that: 
Only an approach that considers the freedom of both the press and the 
individual from the market as well as from the state, and that underlines 
the active freedom to hold both political and economic power to account 
as well as the passive freedom from political and economic intervention, 
can ensure that the press and the public are truly free. 
(Ibid.: 29) 
 
Those opposed to interventionist measures argue that existing laws are adequate 
to deal with any misdemeanours committed by ‘individual’ journalists, and that 
government-sponsored regulation would have a ‘chilling effect’ on the industry, 
particularly investigative journalism (O’Neill, 2013). Indeed, as Luckhurst (2012) 
reminds us, it was the Guardian’s investigation into phone hacking that led to an 
inquiry into the ethics and practices of the press in the first place, in which he 
argues: ‘Were the superb work the Guardian did to expose phone hacking to 
result in state-supervised regulation of British newspapers, the injustice would be 
grotesque’ (Luckhurst, 2012: 29).  
 
 
PART 2: THREE MODELS OF MEDIA-STATE RELATIONS 
The theoretical starting point for this thesis rests on models of media-state 
relations that have traditionally been applied to wartime reporting and ongoing 
conflict situations (e.g. the Israeli-Palestinian conflict). A large majority of media-
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state relations research has been in the realm of foreign policy (Althaus et al., 
1996; Balabanova, 2007; Bloch & Lehman-Wilzig, 2002; Gilboa, 2002, 2005; 
McLean & Patterson, 2006; Robinson, 2001, 2002a, 2002b; Wood & Peake, 1998; 
and Zaller & Chiu, 1996). Moreover, critics have argued that such studies have 
usually involved US-developed models of media-state relations applied to US-
contexts (Archetti, 2008; Brants & Voltmer, 2011; Halttu, 2007; Robinson et al., 
2009; Walgrave et al., 2008). Scholars such as Archetti (2008) have argued that 
‘indexing cannot apply to foreign [non-US] countries because the dynamics it 
postulates are based on a specific idea of the role of the journalist in society and 
the nature of press-government relations’ (Archetti, 2008: 6). Indeed, Bennett 
(1996), the originator of the indexing hypothesis, also questioned its cogency 
outside of the US, as ‘other democracies organize press coverage on the basis of 
different normative understandings about power, citizen information, and the role 
of the press in political communication’ (Bennett, 1996: 376). Bennett and 
Entman (2001) have also acknowledged that US-conceived models of media-state 
relations pose problems for cross-country comparative study.  
Comparative analysis is challenging for many reasons, not the least of 
which is that at some level of specificity, every nation, locality, institution, 
culture, and communication system is unique. At the other extreme, 
attempts to force generalizations for the sake of advancing contentious 
theories do not serve the cause of understanding political experience at the 
human level. 
(Bennett & Entman, 2001: 9–10) 
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Even when comparing the US and UK media systems – two countries that share 
many socio-economic and cultural norms – the differences are apparent. For 
example, considering the size of the US, there are relatively few national 
newspapers compared to the UK, and the US press is not deemed as overtly 
partisan in terms of its political coverage as is the UK press. As Sparks affirms, 
whilst there are ‘a large number of newspapers in the US…[these] 
overwhelmingly…enjoy local monopolies. Even where there is competition…the 
number of competing titles is tiny. Consequently, partisanship and social 
stratification of readers, which are such strong features of the European press, are 
much less present in the US case’ (Sparks, 2007: 77). However, Bennett and 
Iyengar (2008) argue that the US media deliberately appears to be moving away 
from the model of professional objectivity toward more partisan journalism: 
As part of the American audience polarizes over matters of politics and 
public policy, it is possible that rational media owners stand to gain market 
share by injecting more rather than less political bias into the 
news…politically slanted news programming [such as Fox News] allows a 
new organization to create a niche for itself. 
(Bennett & Iyengar, 2008: 723) 
 
Nonetheless, the impact this might have on future US media-state nexus research 
paradigms and their applicability to media systems outside of the US remains to 
be seen. Thus, for now, rumination of the differences between the US and the UK 
media systems in terms of their normative cultural, institutional and journalistic 
routines must be considered when applying US-developed models to UK contexts. 
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2.2 Introducing the Research Paradigms 
Despite the challenges associated with the level of fit between US-originated 
models and their applicability to non-US contexts, Halttu’s (2007) cross-country 
comparative study of the press reporting of the Iraq war ‘indicates that theories of 
media-state relations predict the behaviour of Finnish and British press rather 
well, although the editorial policy of the news outlet may play a more important 
role in the European context than is assumed by the US-originating theories of 
media-state relations’ (Halttu, 2007: 264). Similarly, other researchers have 
adapted media-state relations theories that have typically been applied to the US 
foreign policy domain to other policy contexts. For example, Howarth (2010) 
drew on Robinson’s (2001) media influence frameworks to analyse media impact 
on GM food policy in Britain. Howarth found that ‘modified versions of 
Robinson’s core concepts of ambiguity and uncertainty’ transposed well to the 
UK context in explaining the conditions that might determine media influence on 
policy outcomes (Howarth, 2010: 148). Similarly, for their study on UK media 
performance in wartime, Robinson et al. (2010) drew heavily on the theoretical 
frameworks employed by Hallin (1986), originally applied to US coverage of the 
Vietnam War, and Wolfsfeld (1997), originally applied to Israeli media coverage 
of the Middle East conflict. 
 
This thesis draws on the works of Robinson and his colleagues (Goddard et al., 
2008; Murray et al., 2008; Robinson et al., 2006, 2009a, 2009b, 2010), who 
‘[used] the broad categories of “elite-driven”, “independent”, and “oppositional” 
in order to differentiate between theoretical positions, each of which makes 
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distinct claims with regard to media-state relations. Within these broad 
categories…there exist a range of specific hypotheses or models’ (Robinson et al., 
2009b: 536). In their Iraq war study, Robinson et al. (2010) synthesised a range of 
theories relative to each category, drawing heavily on the tripartite frameworks of 
Hallin’s (1986) media spheres and Wolfsfeld’s (1997) political contest model. 
Before outlining the three models of media performance proposed by Robinson et 
al. (2010) and the modifications made for the purposes of this thesis, this section 
will briefly outline the models originally conceived by Hallin (1986) and 
Wolfsfeld (1997). 
 
In theorising his model, Hallin (1986) believed that US journalism was ‘governed 
by [three] different journalistic standards’, which he defined as the ‘spheres of 
consensus, controversy and deviance’ (Hallin, 1986: 116–117). The ‘Sphere of 
Consensus’ predicated that ‘journalists do not feel compelled either to present 
opposing views or to remain disinterested observers. On the contrary, the 
journalist’s role is to serve as an advocate or celebrant of consensus values’ (Ibid.: 
117). The ‘Sphere of Legitimate Controversy’ related more to ‘electoral contests 
and legislative debates’, which was ‘defined primarily by the two-party system 
[i.e. debate between the main political parties]…as well as by the decision-making 
process in the bureaucracies of the executive branch’ (Ibid.: 116). This sphere is 
closely aligned to the journalistic ideal of objectivity and balanced reporting. 
Whilst the ‘Sphere of Deviance’ relates to ‘those political actors and views which 
journalists and the political mainstream of the society reject as unworthy of being 
heard…[with journalists playing] the role of exposing, condemning, or excluding 
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from the public agenda those who violate or challenge the political consensus’ 
(Ibid.: 117). In its reporting of the Vietnam War, Hallin found that generally the 
press operated within the spheres of consensus or legitimate controversy, with 
‘[most] press reports, particularly on the front page, still simply [reporting] 
official statements at face value’ (Ibid.: 118). 
 
For Wolfsfeld (1997), the news media during political conflicts27 should be 
viewed ‘in terms of a continuum of independence’, in which he posits three 
distinct media positions (Wolfsfeld, 1997: 69). At one end of the spectrum, the 
‘news media serve as faithful servants to the authorities’, relaying the official 
version of events whilst ‘ignoring or discrediting challengers’ (Ibid.). Wolfsfeld 
found that there were more instances of ‘faithful servant’ coverage during ‘times 
of national crisis and war’ (Ibid.). In the middle of the spectrum, ‘the news media 
act as semi-honest brokers by offering challengers a significant amount of time 
and space to air their views against the authorities’ (Ibid.). The media were most 
likely to adopt this position during ‘domestic debates over controversial issues’ 
with debate still largely indexed to officials and oppositional political elites 
(Ibid.). At the far end of the spectrum, the media act as ‘advocates of the 
underdog by amplifying the claims of challengers against authorities’ (Ibid.). 
This, for Wolfsfeld (1997), is the news media at its most independent, largely 
eschewing officialdom to champion the causes of victims and draw attention to 
                                                 
27
 In terms of Wolfsfeld’s usage of the term ‘political conflict’, he has defined inter alia the wars in 
Bosnia and Iraq, protests in Tiananmen Square and Eastern Europe against Communist regimes, 
and Pro-Choice/Life movements in the US, as political conflicts, with the various actors involved 
competing to control the news agenda (Wolfsfeld, 1997: 2). Wolfsfeld’s study dealt primarily with 
unequal political conflicts in the Middle East. Specific case studies included the 1993 Oslo peace 
accords, the first Palestinian Intifada and the 1991 Gulf War.  
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injustices (Ibid.: 70). Acknowledging that there is a degree of ‘theoretical overlap’ 
with Hallin’s (1986) model, Wolfsfeld (1997) argues that ‘Hallin’s model 
excludes the possibility of the news media serving as advocates for 
challengers…[which] is a particularly significant exception in which the press 
becomes a full participant in the conflict’ (Ibid.: 71).  
 
2.3  Elite-Driven Model of Media-State Relations 
Mermin’s assertion that ‘[t]he job of an independent press is not just to report the 
words and deeds of official actors, but to offer a perspective based “outside the 
government”’ (Mermin, 1999: 144) is generally accepted as an unattainable 
journalistic ideal amongst elite-driven theorists. Herman and Chomsky’s (1994 
[1988]) manufacturing of consent thesis is perhaps one of the most well-known 
contributions to the elite-driven paradigm, with one of the model’s key filters 
being the over-reliance of journalists on official sources, which consequently 
leads to coverage that serves elite interests.28 Moreover, Herman and Chomsky 
(1994) assert that the media is not only complicit in propagandist campaigns 
initiated by the government, but is often a co-conspirator in propagandising issues 
that are of mutual benefit to the media and government (Herman & Chomsky, 
1994: 33). Whilst political economy theory is more closely aligned to traditional 
Marxist positions, namely that the media acts in symbiosis with the state to 
manipulate public opinion, hegemony theory essentially views the media as 
                                                 
28
 The propaganda based ‘manufacturing of consent’ thesis predicates that news values are 
determined by five ‘filters’ that function to propagandise elite interests, whilst marginalising or 
denigrating dissenting voices that threaten the status quo (Herman and Chomsky, 1994 [1988], 
2004). These interrelated filters ‘derive from the fact that the dominant media are firmly imbedded 
in the market system’, and are influenced by ‘ownership, advertising, sourcing, flak, and 
anticommunist ideology’ (Herman, 2003: 2-3). 
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biased toward state and corporate elites (the media itself being a part of the 
corporatist sector), but that the struggle for hegemonic supremacy takes a much 
more subtle form. Tankard (2001) provides a useful definition of media 
hegemony, which he ‘viewed as a situation in which one frame is so dominant 
that people accept it without notice or question' (Tankard, 2001: 97). Whilst for 
Gitlin (1980), Gramsci’s concept of hegemony provides a useful framework in 
which to explain the media-state nexus in contemporary democratic societies. On 
defining his understanding of Gramsci’s theory, Gitlin (1980) writes: 
[T]hose who rule the dominant institutions secure their power in large 
measure directly and indirectly, by impressing their definitions of the 
situation upon those they rule and, if not usurping the whole of ideological 
space, still significantly limiting what is thought throughout 
society…Hegemony is done by the dominant and collaborated in by the 
dominated. 
(Gitlin, 1980: 10)  
 
In their seminal work, Policing the Crisis, Hall et al. (1978) were amongst the 
first UK-based scholars to draw on the subtler suppositions of the Gramscian 
hegemonic model, arguing that media bias toward official sources was mainly due 
to normative journalistic practices, rather than a contrivance between corporate 
and political elites to win public consent. Hall et al. (1978) believed that the 
media’s dependence on official sources propelled the crime of mugging to the top 
of the media agenda, which in turn enabled the government to introduce a range 
of legislative measures to deal with the ‘mugging crisis’. Despite some dissensus 
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amongst the media, Hall et al. (1978) asserted that generally, the media were 
crucial in replicating and maintaining the elite consensus.  
The media thus help to reproduce and sustain the definitions of the 
situation that favour the powerful, not only by actively recruiting the 
powerful in the initial stages where topics are structured, but by favouring 
certain ways of setting up topics, and maintaining certain strategic areas of 
silence. Many of these structured forms of communication are so common, 
so natural, so taken for granted, so deeply embedded in the very 
communication forms which are employed, that they are hardly visible at 
all, as ideological constructs. 
(Hall et al., 1978: 65) 
 
More recently, explanations for the elite-driven model have typically been 
associated with Bennett’s indexing hypothesis, which predicates that journalistic 
norms dictate that the ‘news is indexed implicitly to the dynamics of 
governmental debate’ (Bennett, 1990: 108), with ‘[a] closely related second rule 
of political coverage [involving] keying a story to disagreements among officials 
– particularly officials with the power to affect the outcome of the developing 
news events’ (Bennett, 1996: 376). Bennett goes on to argue that ‘[such] conflict 
serves as a signal for journalists to expand a story to encompass the views of 
experts, social groups, opinion polls, and other sources that reflect the observed 
differences among powerful politicians’ (Ibid.). The endurance of Bennett’s 
model is not without substance, as demonstrated by a raft of studies that have 
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found consistent evidence to support the indexing hypothesis (Althaus et al., 
1996; Groshek, 2008; Mermin, 1999; and Zaller and Chiu, 1996). 
 
Despite Bennett’s misgivings about the applicability of his model beyond the 
confines of the US experience, British scholars have also found that the UK media 
rely heavily on official sources, which in turn has a significant impact on the 
shaping of news agendas (see, for example, Lewis et al., 2006; and Schlesinger & 
Tumber, 1994). Whilst Davis (2010) asserts that the relationship between 
politicians and journalists is a symbiotic one, with ‘politicians [needing] publicity 
and journalists [needing] high-level access and story information’, he suggests 
that the balance of power lies with politicians (Davis, 2010: 68). Indeed, Barnett 
and Gaber (2001) posit that the arguments put forward by Hall et al. (1978) have 
endured. In relation to media-source relations under the New Labour government, 
Barnett and Gaber (2001) found that a key pressure point was the ‘changing 
nature of the relationship between political journalists and formal political sources 
– in particular, the ways in which greater power [was] being exercised by 
government sources to the detriment of the other’ (Barnett & Gaber, 2001: 4). 
 
Nonetheless, challengers of the indexing hypothesis have also presented 
persuasive arguments in terms of its ineffectiveness in some cases. For example, 
whilst Archetti’s (2008) study of news coverage of foreign policy in non-US 
contexts did not include a UK case study, it did raise important questions around 
‘how to establish the relationship between political debate and media coverage in 
empirical terms; and…how to draw conclusions from the data’, especially as 
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official sources are always likely to be the most newsworthy and thus it is 
inevitable that there will be some degree of ‘indexing’ to elite debate (Archetti, 
2008: 7). This thesis adopts a similar position, which is reflected in the adaptions 
made to the elite-driven model employed in this study. Essentially, this study 
investigates the framing of parliamentary debate, with the debates themselves 
largely constituting the news topic. Thus, it is reasonable to expect that the 
debates will be indexed to both official government sources and elite challengers. 
For journalists to do otherwise would contradict established journalistic norms 
and conventions, regardless of the ideological direction of a particular newspaper. 
Moreover, as official sources constitute the most newsworthy actors, 
consideration of the findings must be viewed within broader journalistic cultures 
and working practices. More importantly, a preponderance of elite sources does 
not necessarily suggest that the press reporting reflected the elite-driven 
perspective, i.e. the press might well have contested the government’s preferred 
frame in favour of coverage that reflects independent or oppositional arguments. 
 
Whilst the media can certainly be seen as an influential agent in shaping ‘policy 
processes, the content of policy debates and the institutional contexts of 
policymaking’, critics have argued that the extent of this influence depends on the 
policy domain and timeframe in which the debate occurs (Koch-Baumgarten & 
Voltmer, 2010: 224). For Lawrence, in the realms of foreign policy and national 
security the ‘media typically show less independence in framing issues and 
events, instead tending to rely heavily on high government officials to frame the 
news’ (Lawrence, 2010: 267). Indeed, the most cited reasons for media deference 
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in times of national crises are due to the constraints of journalists’ dependence on 
official sources, patriotism and/or ideology (Robinson et al., 2010: 35).  Citing the 
British media coverage of the Falklands war as a prime example of the dominance 
of both official sources and ‘patriotism’ in narrowing the parameters of debate, 
Wolfsfeld (1997) argued: ‘Once the enemy had been defined and engaged, the 
news media became a passive transmission belt for official frames intended to 
build up domestic and international support’ (Wolfsfeld, 1997: 69).  
 
It is instructive to note that whilst the anti-terrorism legislative debates were not 
subject to the same ‘patriotism’ constraints inherent in wartime reporting, the 
policy debates did fall under the rubric of the ‘war on terrorism’, with the 
government explicitly employing the tropes of war to defend its policies. Indeed, 
from the very beginning, Blair defined the 9/11 attacks as an act of war,29 with the 
legislative responses bracketed as the domestic defence against the new globalised 
terrorism threat. As scholars have argued, ‘in the scope and consequences of its 
policy-shaping impact [on domestic and foreign policy], the War on Terror may 
be the most important frame in recent memory’ (Reese & Lewis, 2009: 778). 
Moreover, in terms of the ideological constraints imposed on media reporting 
during national crises, the ‘war on terror’ frame (Domke, 2004; Jackson, 2005) 
can be seen as a direct successor of the anti-communist frame (Hallin, 1986; 
Herman & Chomsky, 1994[1988]) during the Cold War, both of which ‘have been 
advanced as explanations for supportive coverage’ (Robinson et al., 2010: 37). 
                                                 
29
 For example, in an interview with CNN on 16 September 2001 Blair declared: ‘Whatever the 
technical or legal issues of that declaration of war, the fact is we are at war with terrorism. What 
happened on Tuesday was an attack not just upon the United States but upon the civilised 
world…it is a war, if you like, between the civilised world and fanaticism’ (Blair, 2001). 
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To conclude this section, the elite-driven model proffered by Robinson et al. 
(2010), is broadly related to Hallin’s (1986) ‘sphere of consensus’ and 
Wolfsfeld’s (1997) ‘faithful servant’ concept, with both categorising media 
coverage as supportive of the government agenda.  
 
2.4 Challenging the Elite-Driven Thesis: Models of Press 
Independence 
Negrine (1989) argues that, whilst the press still draw on historic justifications for 
its ‘fourth estate’ status in contemporary society, these arguments are based on 
‘ideas whose true meanings are but a memory of past struggles in very different 
circumstances’ (Negrine, 1989: 28). Whereas the elite-driven model is based on 
theories of hegemony and indexing, both of which ‘perceive the media as too 
subservient to the government’ (Entman, 2004: 4), the libertarian and the social 
responsibility models position the press as independent of government control. 
Whilst the libertarian model predicated that the main purpose of the press was ‘to 
help discover truth and to check on government’, this view was complicated by 
‘the reality that newspapers…were no more than private organs for private gain’ 
(Negrine, 1989: 29). In an attempt to mitigate the problems associated with the 
commodification of the press, the social responsibility model assumed that the 
press had ‘obligations to provide information, to allow a diversity of views to be 
printed, to encourage the best and most professional of journalistic activity so as 
to pursue truth and knowledge’ (Ibid.). However, as many critics have argued 
(Curran, 2002; and Curran & Seaton, 2009), ‘[a] critical revision needs to think 
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further not only about the functioning of the public sphere, but also about the 
idealist premises of liberal theory. The traditional justification for media pluralism 
– that truth will automatically confound error in open debate – now seems 
implausible’ (Curran, 2007: 29). 
 
Whilst the main challengers to the elite-driven thesis are the independent model 
and the oppositional model, Robinson et al. (2010) argue that ‘the notion of an 
independent and objective news media…has traditionally received little in the 
way of empirical and theoretical support from the field of political 
communication’ (Robinson et al., 2010: 40). Moreover, research that has provided 
‘empirical support’ for the oppositional model ‘is understood as an even rarer 
phenomenon’ (Ibid.: 46). Nonetheless, there is evidence that the media have 
provided some degree of independent reporting, but this has been determined by a 
particular set of circumstances. For Bennett (1990), Hallin (1986), Wolfsfeld 
(1997) and Robinson et al. (2010) ‘independent journalism can occur only as a 
function of elite political disagreement and/or [policy] uncertainty’ (Robinson et 
al., 2010: 41).  
 
Another major factor in explaining independent or oppositional reporting is the 
end of the Cold War, which had previously placed considerable ideological 
constraints on the ways in which the media reported particular conflicts. Hallin 
(1986) found that during the reporting of the Vietnam War, whilst there was some 
elite dissensus, this always tended to operate within the sphere of legitimate 
controversy. Whereas media coverage that reflected anti-war views was largely 
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absent, presumably for fear of being labelled as an apologist for Communist 
ideology. More recently, Entman has put forward the ‘cascading activation’ model 
that, ‘highlights what the hegemony model neglects: that the collapse of the Cold 
War consensus has meant [that] differences among elites are no longer the 
exception but the rule’ (Entman, 2004: 5). In his study on media contestation of 
the White House’s framing of 9/11, Entman found that whilst the media ‘patrol 
the boundaries of culture and keep discord within conventional bounds...inside 
those borders, even when government is promoting “war”, media are not entirely 
passive receptacles for government propaganda’ (Entman, 2003: 428). 
Nonetheless, the cascading activation model still relies on ‘elite discord [as] a 
necessary condition for politically influential frame challenges’ (Ibid.: 415). The 
decline in patriotism in the UK has also been viewed as a major factor for more 
independent reporting, as Tumber and Webster (2006) argue: ‘[In] most advanced 
societies outside of the United States, heroic nationalism holds less of an appeal. 
There is a heightened awareness of the artificiality of national frontiers…in 
countries like Britain, nationalism is on the ebb’ (Tumber & Webster, 2006: 163).  
 
However, the arguments presented in this thesis draw mainly on theories relating 
to ‘new institutionalism’, which ‘[articulate] the importance of understanding 
news media as an actor that, at the very least, is semi-autonomous’ (Robinson et 
al., 2010: 42). As Robinson et al. (2010), go on to explain: ‘At the core of this 
approach is an attempt to take seriously the analytical and explanatory 
significance of media systems, considering them to be more than just passive 
transmitters of political and economic elite interests’ (Ibid.). Indeed, as discussed 
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in the first part of this chapter (with further discussion on the political ideology of 
the press in Chapter 3), the British press differs significantly from other media 
systems, insofar as ‘newspapers still tend to endorse political parties or their 
policy ideas at election times and to remain broadly supportive of, or critical 
towards, the party in power. It is common also for newspapers to attempt to 
influence the policy agenda themselves through the pressure that they place on 
politicians’ (Goddard et al., 2008: 13).  
 
In terms of oppositional coverage, unexpected events can often lead to coverage 
that goes beyond the bounds of elite debate. Two such examples of an unexpected 
event include the US media coverage of police brutality in the case of Rodney 
King and the criticism of President George W. Bush in his handling of Hurricane 
Katrina. Indeed, with the advent of new media and social media, event-driven 
reporting may well become the norm, usurping the power of elite sources over the 
news media. Indeed, the terrorist attacks on the London transport system on 7 July 
2005 is a prime example of the public as news gatherers and reporters, with the 
BBC receiving 22,000 emails and texts, as well as photographs and user generated 
videos of the events in London that day (Franklin, 2008: 4; and Sambrook, 2005). 
Consequently, several news websites, most notably BBC News Online and 
theguardian.com, created space for the public to publish eyewitness accounts, as 
well as to provide photographs and video footage taken on mobile phones. Both 
websites also made extensive use of the blogosphere by including Londoners’ 
accounts of the day’s events (Allan, 2006: 149).  Citizen journalism has also 
played a role in bringing social injustices to light, such as the role of UGC (user 
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generated content) in exposing the unlawful killing of Ian Tomlinson by a police 
officer during the 2009 G20 summit protests in London, which in turn shifted the 
news framing of the demonstrations from ‘protester violence’ to ‘police violence’ 
(Greer and McLaughlin, 2010). 
 
To conclude this section, the independent model proffered by Robinson et al. 
(2010) is broadly related to Hallin’s (1986) ‘sphere of legitimate controversy’ and 
Wolfsfeld’s (1997) ‘semi-honest broker’ concept, with both defining media 
coverage as balanced and receptive to views beyond the government perspective. 
Whilst the oppositional model conceived by Robinson et al. is similar to Hallin’s 
(1986) ‘sphere of deviancy’ and Wolfsfeld’s (1997) ‘advocate of the underdog’ 
model. However, Robinson et al. conceptualise oppositional media coverage 
‘more broadly’ by ‘referring not only to instances of news media support for non-
elite groups but also to coverage that opposes government policy (whether or not 
it might be advocating the interests of non-elite groups)’ (Robinson et al., 2010: 
35). The following section will further discuss the tripartite models of Robinson et 
al. (2010) and explain how these models have been applied to the present study. 
 
 
2.5 Applying the Media Performance Models of Robinson et al. 
to the Domestic Policy Domain 
To provide a theoretically informed understanding of the government-press 
dynamic during the terrorism legislative debates, this thesis employs the three 
competing models of media performance (elite-driven, independent and 
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oppositional) proposed by Robinson et al. (2010). Although originally applied to 
the foreign policy domain, Robinson et al. (2010) surmised that their analytical 
framework might also transpose well to other policy fields.30 This thesis makes a 
modest attempt at testing the cogency of their conceptual framework by applying 
it to the domestic policy domain. This section summarises how the three models 
of media performance were operationalised in the Iraq War study, before 
discussing how these models have been interpreted and applied to the present 
study. In brief, this thesis examines the press material within the same elite-driven 
framework as Robinson et al. However, to enable a clearer distinction between 
government/official positions and non-government elites the elite-driven 
paradigm has been more narrowly defined as government-driven. Similarly, the 
independent and oppositional models have been more narrowly defined. Here, the 
independent model places more emphasis on theories of new institutionalism, 
particularly in relation to the system characteristics of the British press, whilst 
downplaying the other normative interpretation of press independence (i.e. the 
professional ideal of journalistic objectivity) on the grounds that it is ‘more 
imagined than real’ (Robinson, 2011). Equally, the oppositional model departs 
from some of the normative understandings of the model by moving beyond the 
confines of non-elite challengers to include elite challengers who reflect the 
concerns of the civil liberties lobby. For clarity, Table 2.1 provides a summary of 
each media performance model and its corresponding meta-frame, as well as the 
type of coverage each model/frame would predict. The concluding chapter will 
                                                 
30
 See Chapter 3 for a fuller discussion. 
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evaluate the cogency of these three models of media performance as applied to 
this particular study. 
 
Table 2.1 Media Performance Models and Corresponding Frames 
MODEL FRAME DEPICTIONS 
Government-Driven 
Press coverage will largely be 
supportive of the government 
and its policy aims, with much 
of the coverage reinforcing the 
government’s preferred 
security frame.  
Security  Legislation is a proportionate 
response to the current threat 
level; Government is tough but 
even-handed in its approach to 
handling the terrorist threat. 
Oppositional perspectives are 
illogical, undemocratic and 
unpatriotic in the face of the 
current threat. 
Oppositional 
Press coverage will largely be 
against the government and its 
policy aims, with much of the 
coverage reinforcing the 
discourse of politicians, peers 
and interest groups that oppose 
the legislation due to its 
negative impact on civil 
liberties. 
Civil 
Liberties 
 
 
Legislation is undermining 
civil liberties; Negative impact 
on individuals’ human rights; 
Government is excessive and 
authoritarian in its approach to 
dealing with the terrorism 
threat; Oppositional arguments 
depicted as rational and 
apolitical in tone. 
Independent 
The press will largely use the 
legislative debates as a conduit 
either to criticise the politics of 
New Labour or to focus on the 
political conflict between or 
within parties. Coverage will 
reflect traditional political and 
ideological biases. 
Consideration of the legislation 
itself will be limited, often 
reflecting a neutral editorial 
stance. 
Politics Negative depictions of New 
Labour’s policies and 
governance; Personal attacks 
on Blair/Brown leadership 
and/or attacks on the 
competency of Home 
Secretary; HRA and ECHR 
heavily criticised; Disharmony 
within the Labour Party used to 
undermine government 
authority. 
 
Government-Driven (Elite-Driven) Model 
When theorising media performance in wartime, Robinson et al. proffered that 
‘the elite-driven model would predict coverage that reinforces official 
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justifications for war and avoids substantive criticism’ (Robinson et al., 2010: 
538). Moreover, coverage would be patriotic and supportive of both the military 
(i.e. ‘our boys’) and the government, whilst oppositional perspectives would be 
subject to criticism, downplayed or ignored entirely. They found that coverage in 
the Sun, the Daily Mail, the Times and the Daily Telegraph tended to reflect the 
elite-driven model, whilst the Mirror, the Guardian and the Independent provided 
more instances of independent or oppositional coverage. In attempting to explain 
the reason for the prevalence of supportive coverage amongst much of the British 
media (broadcast news and national press), Robinson et al. point to several 
‘explanatory variables associated with the elite-driven model – patriotism, the 
ideology of humanitarianism and…reliance upon official sources’ (Ibid.: 164). 
Overall, they found that much of the news media failed to challenge the 
coalition’s justifications for war or the official framing of the allied military 
incursions, especially echoing the official language pertaining to military 
successes. Whilst there was some variation amongst the national press, 
‘supportive battle coverage prevailed even among newspapers that had opted to 
oppose the war’ (Ibid.: 104). 
 
The elite-driven thesis conceived by Robinson et al. has been adopted for the 
present study, albeit with modifications that fit the particular circumstances of the 
case studies. As previously mentioned, the case studies focus on the news framing 
of parliamentary debate in the domestic policy domain. It is therefore reasonable 
to assume that the debates will largely be indexed to government and other 
political elites. This, then, requires a definition of ‘elite-driven’ that clearly 
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distinguishes between government positions and non-government elite positions. 
In the Robinson et al. study, elite sources encompassed a ‘coalition’ of elite 
actors, including UK and US government officials and military spokespersons. 
Here, the focus is on the extent to which the press supported or challenged the 
government agenda, and as such, it is more apt to provide a narrower 
interpretation of the elite-driven paradigm. Thus, elite-driven has been redefined 
as government-driven. The government-driven model would expect coverage that 
is supportive of the government and its policy aims, with much of the coverage 
reinforcing the government’s preferred ‘security’ frame. Depictions relating to the 
security frame would include the legislation being defined as a proportionate 
response to the current threat level, with the government being portrayed as tough 
but even-handed in its approach to handling the terrorist threat. Oppositional 
perspectives are likely to be depicted as illogical, undemocratic and unpatriotic in 
the face of the current threat. There is also likely to be a high level of government 
source representation. However, it is important to note that a preponderance of 
government sources does not necessarily suggest that the press reporting reflected 
the government-driven perspective, i.e. the press might well have contested the 
government’s preferred frame in favour of coverage that reflects independent or 
oppositional arguments. Thus, both of these conditions will need to be met to 
qualify as supportive coverage. 
 
Oppositional Model 
In terms of what kind of coverage the oppositional model would predict, 
Robinson et al. ‘[expected] to find coverage which incorporate[d] information 
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from government sources but [was] dominated and shaped by the viewpoints of 
those challenging them’ (Robinson et al., 2009: 541). Contra to the elite-driven 
paradigm, coverage would focus on military failures as well as include ‘a 
preponderance of “substantive” criticism’ of government policy (Ibid.). Robinson 
et al. identified three newspapers that took an anti-war stance: the Mirror, the 
Guardian and the Independent. Oppositional coverage was especially prevalent 
when reporting civilian and military casualties.  
 
The oppositional model adopted for this thesis relies heavily on the one proposed 
by Robinson et al. However, as mentioned above, it allows for the inclusion of 
elite challengers who offer a profound challenge to government policy in the 
interests of the civil liberties lobby. Press coverage that reflects the oppositional 
model will be characterised as being largely against the government and its policy 
aims, with much of the coverage reinforcing the discourse of politicians, peers and 
interest groups that opposed the legislation due to its negative impact on civil 
liberties. The meta-frame is civil liberties, with the press coverage defining the 
debates as a disproportionate legislative response. Moreover, coverage will 
overwhelmingly reflect the civil liberties perspective, albeit as communicated by 
elite challengers.  
 
Independent Model 
As Robinson et al. point out, ‘while supportive coverage can be defined and 
operationalised with relative ease through reference to existing descriptive studies 
of wartime news media coverage, few studies provide a clear idea of what 
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negotiated [independent] coverage might look like’ (Robinson et al., 2010: 44). In 
terms of what kind of coverage the independent model would predict, Robinson et 
al. expected more impartial accounts of the conflict, which would include a 
balance of perspectives, as well as occurrences where journalists followed their 
own agenda  (i.e. coverage that moved beyond the confines of the news agenda set 
by the coalition). Furthermore, the model predicted that coverage would be more 
questioning of official accounts of the war. They cite Channel 4 News as being 
exemplary in its commitment to independent reporting during the Iraq War, 
instances of which were most often seen when ‘unexpected, dramatic and 
disturbing events [occurred] beyond the control of authorities’ (Ibid.: 125). 
Moreover, despite being ‘embedded journalists’, Channel 4 News reporters were 
reluctant to take official accounts at face value. Indeed, by drawing ‘attention to 
what they had been directed to say or show visually’ the reporters in fact 
‘provided a metacommentary on the coalition’s media-management strategies’ 
(Robinson et al., 2009: 552). Similarly, the Mirror, the Guardian and the 
Independent were also singled out for providing alternative accounts of the 
conflict. For Robinson, these findings ‘[speak] directly to new institutionalist and 
field theory accounts of news media. At the core of these relatively new accounts 
is an attempt to take seriously the analytical and explanatory significance of media 
and media systems’ (Robinson, 2011). Drawing on Benson (2004; 2006), 
Robinson argues that new institutionalism theory highlights ‘how differences in 
the structure, history and organization of national media systems generate 
different patterns of media performance and different levels of independence and 
autonomy’ (Robinson, 2011). As discussed elsewhere in this thesis, the British 
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press is a commercial and highly competitive media system, which caters to a 
socially diverse readership. It also has a long tradition of political and ideological 
partisanship, and crucially, is not subject to the same regulatory constraints as the 
broadcast media.  
 
This study prioritises the theories of new institutionalism in explaining the 
independent model as it applies to the British context, particularly focusing on the 
system characteristics of the national press.31 As Robinson (2011) has pointed out, 
other normative interpretations of press independence within the liberal tradition, 
namely the professional autonomy thesis, are perhaps overstated. Indeed, the 
clearest indication of professional autonomy could be found amongst Channel 4 
News reporters. This fits with Robinson’s claim that ‘national media systems with 
a significant public-service ethos and structure are likely to generate news that is 
less commercial and sensationalist than a media system dominated by commercial 
media’ (Ibid.). That said, this thesis recognises that there might well be 
occurrences of genuine journalistic autonomy, but that most journalists will, to 
varying degrees, reflect the political and ideological biases of their particular 
newspaper.  
 
Press coverage that reflects the independent model will be characterised as largely 
using the legislative debates as a conduit either to criticise the politics of New 
Labour or to focus on the political conflict between or within parties. 
Consideration of the legislation itself will be limited, often reflecting a neutral 
                                                 
31
 See Chapter 3 for a fuller discussion of the political and ideological biases of the British press. 
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editorial stance. The meta-frame is politics, with the media package reflecting a 
party politics focus. Overall, coverage will tend to reflect traditional political and 
ideological biases. Common depictions will include negative representation of 
New Labour’s policies and governance, as well as personal attacks on Tony Blair 
or Gordon Brown or the incumbent Home Secretary. There is also likely to be a 
heavy focus on the disunity within the Labour Party, which will be highlighted as 
a means to undermine government authority. Traditional biases against the 
Human Rights Act and the ECHR will also be present in the coverage.  
 
Whilst the independent and oppositional models proffered by Robinson et al. offer 
a valuable framework in which to analyse the domestic policy debates, there were 
times when the distinction between what constituted independent coverage and 
oppositional coverage overlapped. Explanatory frameworks for press 
independence (at least in the broadest sense) could equally apply to both the 
oppositional model and the independent model insofar as both models would 
predict coverage that fails to support unquestionably the government agenda. 
Nonetheless, like Robinson et al. this thesis attempts to distinguish the different 
positions pertaining to each model, especially in relation to the type of coverage 
each would predict. Indeed, whilst both models predict instances where coverage 
will be antipodal to the government’s position, a crucial difference between the 
two can be located in the focus of its coverage. The oppositional model predicts 
coverage that overtly challenges government policy, whilst the independent model 
predicts coverage that focuses on aspects of the debates that reflect the 
longstanding concerns and biases of particular newspapers. Accordingly, the 
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oppositional model adopted for this study is more closely associated with the 
‘Fourth Estate’ thesis. As Robinson et al. argue: ‘the argument underpinning 
oppositional journalism is that news media in a democracy are there to hold those 
in power to account by persistently asking difficult and challenging questions’ 
(Robinson et al., 2010: 49). 
 
2.6 Summary 
The first half of this chapter reviewed the historical antecedents of the rise of the 
adversarial press in Britain and its relevance to contemporary contexts. 
Consideration of press freedom is especially important as it still has significant 
bearing on contemporary debates about the role of the press in British society. As 
Negrine argues: ‘one must not underestimate the importance of earlier ideas about 
press freedom, nor must one underestimate the extent to which these ideas still 
reside within more complex statements about the mass media’ (Negrine, 1989: 
23). The second half of this chapter detailed the tripartite models of media-state 
relations and their applicability to this thesis. Specific attention was paid to the 
ways in which these models have been adapted to suit the particular circumstances 
of the British press. In summary: whilst this thesis draws on the established 
arguments proffered within the elite-driven paradigm, it recognises that 
journalists’ dependence on official sources does not necessarily provide 
substantive evidence that the press coverage reflects this model. Instead, such a 
finding needs to be considered in the round, i.e. when drawing overall 
conclusions, consideration of the degree of fit between source-relations findings 
and the extent to which the press framing of the debates reflected the official 
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government agenda, is required. Secondly, the independent model has been 
modified to reflect the adversarial nature of the British press. Thus, press criticism 
that might reflect the traditional ideological-political positions of a particular 
newspaper would be characterised as independent reporting insofar as coverage is 
not restricted to either official consensus or elite dissensus, but follows an 
independent, wholly partisan line of inquiry. For the oppositional model, this 
thesis retains many of the traditional arguments associated with this paradigm, but 
when press reporting reflects the civil liberties perspective, this is defined as 
oppositional despite it often reflecting elite dissensus. Thus, whilst civil liberty 
advocacy groups might not have direct representation in the press, their views 
may well be communicated via elite challengers. The next chapter provides 
further discussion of the three models of media-state relations, especially in terms 
of their incorporation into the overall analytical framework of this thesis. 
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CHAPTER 3 
RESEARCH DESIGN 
 
This thesis analysed the relationship between the British press and the New 
Labour government by means of a case study approach, focusing on the media 
framing of four pieces of terrorism legislation enacted after the events of 9/11. 
The four case studies under examination are the: 
 Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001; 
 Prevention of Terrorism Act 2005; 
 Terrorism Act 2006; and the  
 Counter-Terrorism Act 2008. 
 
This study has employed a similar epistemological line of enquiry as Robinson et 
al. (2006, 2009a, 2009b, 2010) who tested the congruency of competing 
theoretical positions of media performance during the 2003 Iraq war, namely the 
relative merits of the elite-driven (redefined in this thesis as government-driven), 
independent and oppositional models.32 Within this conceptual framework, the 
following research questions were formulated to assess how independently the 
press reported the passage of the abovementioned terrorism legislation, and how 
successful the government was in setting the media agenda. 
 
                                                 
32
 See Chapter 2 for an elaboration of these models. 
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RQ1. Media attention:  
 How prominent was the coverage?  
 What issues received the most attention?  
 Was there a quantitative change in coverage between 2001 and 2008?  
 
RQ2. Sources:  
 Who shaped the debates?  
 Whose views were prioritised or marginalised?  
 To what extent were the debates indexed to political elites?  
 To what extent were the debates indexed to elite challengers?  
 How prominent were non-elite views, such as human rights organisations 
or Muslim interest groups?  
 
RQ3. Framing of debates:  
 What were the dominant frames?  
 To what extent did the media frame the debates within the broader 
frameworks of the “War on Terror”, human rights or civil liberties?  
 To what extent did the media reinforce or criticise the official policy 
agenda?  
 If relevant, which issues received the most criticism, and did these 
criticisms reflect conventional media positions?  
 Was there a qualitative change in the tone of coverage between 2001 and 
2008?  
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RQ4. Media relations:  
 How successful were New Labour in setting and managing the media 
agenda? 
 What was the media-political dynamic during the policymaking process? 
  
Content analysis and framing analysis were the two primary methods employed in 
this study – the latter being the main technique in addressing question 3, and the 
former in addressing questions 1 and 2. These approaches were supplemented 
with in-depth interviews with four former home secretaries. These interviews 
were useful in tracing the linkage between press coverage of terrorism policy and 
the political decision making of key cabinet members involved in the formulation 
and enactment of the legislation. All three methods were employed to address the 
fourth research question. Method triangulation is often utilised by social scientists 
to examine the same object of analysis using a multi-method approach (Brannen, 
1992: 11), and as such is designed to assuage the weaknesses and limitations of 
any one particular method (Arksey & Knight, 1999: 23) and to enhance the 
cogency of research findings. 
 
Content analysis is a useful technique to determine quantifiable patterns of 
coverage and the substantive contents of visual and textual records. Units of 
analysis can be devised to measure the manifest or marginal properties of a media 
text, including the prevalence of topics, themes, elements of language and 
narrative structures, which can reveal the core ideological values embedded in a 
particular text, and consequently the ideological intentions of its producer. 
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However, as Hansen et al. (1998) note: ‘content analysis is and should be enriched 
by the theoretical framework offered by other more qualitative approaches, while 
bringing to these a methodological rigour, prescriptions for use, and systematicity 
rarely found in many of the more qualitative approaches’ (Hansen et al., 1998: 
91). 
 
Accordingly, this research also employs framing analysis drawing on the media-
state theoretical approaches of framing analysts such as D’Angelo (2010, 2012), 
D’Angelo and Kuypers (2010), de Vreese (2005, 2012), Entman (1993, 2003, 
2004, 2007, 2010), Entman et al. (2010), Lawrence (2010) and Reese (2001, 
2007, 2010), and the social constructionist approaches of Gamson (1988), 
Gamson and Modigliani (1989), Pan and Kosicki (1993), and Van Gorp (2005, 
2007). As Entman notes: ‘Successful political communication requires the 
framing of events, issues, and actors in ways that promote perceptions and 
interpretations that benefit one side while hindering the other’ (Entman, 2003: 
417). Thus, framing analysis can provide a rigorous means for understanding how 
politicians and/or the media frame or define a particular issue or problem, and is 
often integrated into content analysis to evaluate the extent to which the media 
frame the government’s preferred version of events. This research particularly 
sought to assess whether the media accepted the government’s ‘framing of an 
issue or event at face value’ or whether they ‘reframed the actor’s point of view’ 
(Lawrence, 2010: 265).  
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However, framing analysis cannot be considered in isolation from theories of 
discourse, and thus discourse analysis informed the construction of the framing 
matrix. For this aspect, the research drew on the work of Fairclough (2000), 
Fowler (1991), MacDonald (2003), Mautner (2008), Pan and Kosicki.(1993, 
2001) Richardson (2007), van Dijk (1985, 1988) and Wodak (2008). As Deacon 
et al. (2007) point out, framing and discourse analysis ‘are compatible with each 
other because of the way they help to provide a text or discourse with a central 
governing framework which conditions the meanings it produces’ (Deacon et al., 
2007: 160). However, it is instructive to note that this thesis does not take a 
formal discourse analytical approach. As scholars have maintained, formal 
discourse analysis techniques are usually applied to a much smaller sample, and 
thus would not be conducive to the aims of this particular study.  
 
A growing body of work has examined the threat discourses inherent to the ‘war 
on terrorism’ thesis. Altheide’s (2003; 2006a; 2006b; 2007) work on the politics 
of fear, and Jackson’s (2005) study of the political construction of the ‘war on 
terrorism’ discourse are particularly apposite to the present research. Indeed, this 
thesis especially draws on Jackson’s conceptualisation of the ‘war on terrorism’ 
discourse as outlined below. Altheide’s work examines the politics of fear within 
the ‘context of social control and change’ after 9/11, especially focusing ‘on how 
fear has become incorporated into political decisions, language, and much of 
everyday life’ (Altheide, 2006a: 9). Moreover, Altheide contends that 9/11 led to 
a ‘coalescing of the discourse of fear with terrorism’ (Althedie, 2007: 304), which 
in turn ‘enabled decision makers to couch control efforts as being in the best 
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interests of citizens in order to protect them’ (Ibid.: 302). The threat discourses 
emanating from the New Labour government during the domestic ‘war on 
terrorism’ certainly confirm this view. One such example being Charles Clarke’s 
address to the Labour Party conference in September 2005, in which he argued 
that the ‘tough measures to confront terrorism’ were vital to protect ‘the British 
people’.  
‘[T]he threat of terrorism is real and it is here. It needs to be challenged 
with every weapon at our disposal. No-one can just close their eyes and 
hope it goes away…I believe that the British people expect from us not 
only the protection of individual rights but also the protection of 
democratic values such as safety and security under the law…We face an 
extremism that knows no bounds, a hatred unfettered by compassion or by 
the understanding of the worth of human life. In the face of this threat, we 
must act to defend our values, both by tough measures to confront 
terrorism directly, and by policies to remove the extremism that fosters it.’ 
(Clarke, 2005) 
 
For Jackson, ‘the “war on terrorism” is both a set of institutional practices and an 
accompanying set of assumptions, beliefs, forms of knowledge and political and 
cultural narratives’ (Jackson, 2005: 16). The ‘institutional practices’ of the ‘war 
on terrorism’ encompassed global military campaigns, diplomatic offensives and 
domestic counter-terrorism drives. Jackson maintains that the political discourse 
was ‘discursively constructed’ to persuade the public that the practice of the ‘war 
on terrorism’ was necessary and morally justifiable (Ibid.: 18–19). He identified 
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four ‘primary narratives at the heart of the “war on terrorism” [discourse]…that 
taken together make up the whole’ (Ibid.: 153). These were: 
 the 9/11 attacks were an act of war;  
 terrorists were barbaric whilst citizens of the US and allied countries in the 
‘war on terrorism’ were ‘innocent’ and ‘decent’;  
 terrorism posed a ‘catastrophic threat’ to democracy and the very fabric of 
‘our way of life’; and 
 the ‘war on terrorism’ was a ‘purely defensive’ and ‘just war’, but more 
crucially a ‘new’ and ‘different’ type of war that required extraordinary 
measures. 
(Ibid.: 5–6). 
 
Whilst the British government did not employ the same level of militaristic 
language as the US government in terms of defining the 9/11 terrorist attacks as 
an ‘act of war’,33 there is evidence that they reiterated many of the ‘war on 
terrorism’ narratives constructed by the Bush administration. For example, Blair 
and his Home Secretaries especially adopted the ‘Them’ and ‘Us’ paradigm when 
discussing Islamist terrorists, juxtaposing the barbaric qualities of the terrorists 
with the decency of the British public. Indeed, in the immediate aftermath of the 
9/11 attacks, Blair was quick to categorise ‘these terrorists and those behind them’ 
as ‘the enemies of the entire civilised world’.34 
                                                 
33
 For example, Walker argued that within the legal discourse the British government’s ‘dalliance 
with a “war model” has been confined to military operations in Afghanistan and Iraq’, with its 
‘domestic application of executive powers’ largely eschewing the terminology of the ‘war on 
terrorism’ (Walker, 2009: 5). However, see Chapter 8 for examples of New Labour’s ‘war 
rhetoric’ when discussing the domestic terrorism threat. 
34
 HC Deb 14 September 2001, vol 372, col 606 
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We are democratic. They are not. We have respect for human life. They do 
not. We hold essentially liberal values. They do not. As we look into these 
issues it is important that we never lose sight of our basic values. But we 
have to understand the nature of this enemy and act accordingly.35  
 
The threat narrative was also widely employed, as was the focus on the new type 
of war. For example, in his address to the nation on 20 March 2003, Tony Blair 
justified the US-led invasion of Iraq by emphasising both the ‘new threat of 
disorder and chaos’ and the ‘entirely different nature’ of the threat to British 
security. 
The threat to Britain today is not that of my father's generation. War 
between the big powers is unlikely, Europe is at peace, the Cold War 
already a memory. But this new world faces a new threat of disorder and 
chaos born either of brutal states like Iraq armed with weapons of mass 
destruction or of extreme terrorist groups. Both hate our way of life, our 
freedom, our democracy. My fear, deeply held, based in part on the 
intelligence that I see is that these threats come together and deliver 
catastrophe to our country and our world…My judgement as prime 
minister is that this threat is real, growing and of an entirely different 
nature to any conventional threat to our security that Britain has faced 
before. 
(Blair, 2003) 
 
                                                 
35
 Ibid. 
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One year later, Blair’s speech on Iraq and the continuing threat of terrorism to 
Britain reiterates the same theme, with his key argument being that only by 
eradicating the global threat can Britain be truly safe from terrorism. He states: 
‘[it] remains my fervent view that the nature of the global threat we face in Britain 
and round the world is real and existential and it is the task of leadership to expose 
it and fight it, whatever the political cost’ (Blair, 2004). Similarly, speaking after 
the 7/7 attacks, Blair warned that ‘[t]he greatest danger is that we fail to face up to 
the nature of the threat we are dealing with’ (Blair, 2005a). Again, when debating 
the case for increasing the detention limit to 90 days in the Commons, Blair 
focuses on the ‘[new] terrorism that wants to destroy our way of life’.36 
[W]e are living in a country that faces a real and serious threat of terrorism 
– terrorism that wants to destroy our way of life, terrorism that wants to 
inflict casualties on us without limit – and when those charged with 
protecting our country provide, as they have, a compelling case for action, 
I know what my duty is: my duty is to support them, and so is the duty, in 
my view, of every Member.37 
 
This theme of Islamist terrorism posing a ‘catastrophic threat’ to democracy and 
‘our way of life’ also frequently surfaced in the press notices released by the 
Home Office. For example, Blunkett declared that, ‘[o]ur enemies who would 
seek to undermine and destroy our way of life are also operating in a new, 
globalised world…Modern civilised values are their target and our civilised 
values are used as the Achilles heel to destroy us’ (Home Office, 2004). The 
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protection of ‘our values and our freedoms’ was also a fixture of the terminology 
used by Clarke during his stewardship of the Home Office (Home Office, 2005a). 
For example:  
The terrorist threat facing the UK is real and significant, and the 
Government is determined to do all it can to protect our citizens from 
groups who would try to destroy our society, our way of life and our 
freedoms’ (Home Office, 2005b) 
  
The Government is determined to do everything possible to protect our 
citizens from those who seek to destroy our society, way of life and our 
freedoms (Home Office, 2006). 
 
 
The starting point for the qualitative aspects of the textual analyses was to decide 
on whether to take an inductive or deductive approach. In brief, an inductive 
approach requires open coding and categorisation of the texts and is often applied 
to ‘cases where there are no previous studies dealing with the phenomenon or 
when it is fragmented’ (Elo & Kyngas, 2008: 107). A deductive approach requires 
that ‘all decisions on variables, their measurement, and coding rules must be made 
before the observation begins’ (Neuendorf, 2002: 11), and is often used ‘to retest 
existing data in a new context’ (Elo & Kyngas, 2008: 111). Numerous studies 
relating to media coverage of foreign policy have been conducted after 9/11, with 
the Israeli-Palestinian conflict (see, for example, Gaber et al., 2009; Handley, 
2010; Noakes & Wilkins, 2002; O’Regan, 2007; Philo & Berry, 2004; and 
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Thomas, 2011 & 2012), and the 2003 Iraq war (see, for example, Christie, 2006; 
Entman et al., 2010; Gillespie, 2007; Groshek, 2008; Halttu, 2007; Kumar, 2006; 
Lewis & Brookes, 2004; Lewis et al., 2006; McLean & Patterson, 2006; O’Regan, 
2008; Taylor, 2008; Tumber & Palmer, 2004; and Zollman, 2011) being particular 
fertile fields of enquiry – and as such there exists a rich resource of 
methodological examples to draw upon. However, there has been a dearth of 
research that deals specifically with press coverage of legislative debates, and 
very few that have focused exclusively on domestic terrorism policy in the context 
of media-state paradigms. Whilst this does provide opportunity to make an 
original contribution to this particular sub-category of political communications 
research, a lack of forerunners does present greater methodological challenges.  
 
Studies that have obvious comparable topographies to this research include two 
US based studies that deal with the coverage of the Patriot Act.38 Chang and 
Izard’s (2009) study focused on the coverage of the Act in four newspapers, 
measuring the extent to which the press acted as ‘faithful servants’ to the 
government agenda (Wolfsfeld, 1997). They found that the press coverage of the 
Patriot Act focused on discourses of individual liberty, and that there appeared to 
be an increasing turn toward independent journalism with the press challenging 
the official line. Whereas Domke et al. (2006) looked at the extent to which 
political elites won consent among the press and Congress in passing the 
legislation, concluding that the press generally echoed the government’s 
                                                 
38
 Also, see Bossio (2011), who examined the media representation of anti-terrorism legislation in 
the Australian context, concluding that there was a lack of contestation to the laws amongst the 
Australian press.  
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perspectives, which in turn had an impact on congressional decision makers. 
Taking a content analytic approach to framing, both studies found that the 
majority of political and media debates centred on two key divergent ‘themes’ 
(Domke et al., 2006) or ‘frames’ (Chang & Izard, 2009), that of national security 
as set against individual liberty.  
 
Although not related to the field of terrorism policy, the methodology employed 
in another US based study has some resonance with this research. The study in 
question focused on how the media framed the legislative debates surrounding 
gun control over a period of several years (Callaghan and Schnell, 2001) and 
found that the media played an active role in shaping alternative policy frames, 
indicating a significant degree of media autonomy. A key starting point in the 
textual analyses conducted by Callaghan and Schnell (2001) and Domke et al. 
(2006) was the formal analysis of official and oppositional discourses, in the form 
of congressional debates, speeches and/or press releases, which were used as a 
comparable means to establish the repertoire of frames available. This study 
implements the same procedure by analysing the press releases of the government 
(which reflected the national security frame), and interest groups (which reflected 
the civil liberties frame), which informed some of the coding decisions relating to 
the signature matrix. 
 
The textual analyses were carried out on press cuttings sourced from the British 
Library Newspapers collection in Colindale, London. Newspapers were selected 
as the object of study rather than television or online news because the press 
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continues to be seen as the primary definer of news agendas, often acting as an 
agenda setter for the broadcast news (Critcher, 2002; and Dearing and Rogers, 
1996). Runciman (2011) provides an interesting discussion on the enduring 
importance of the press to politicians. For example, when David Cameron 
released a list of his media contacts in 2011, the overwhelming majority of these 
meetings were with the editors or proprietors of national newspapers rather than 
with television executives. The home secretaries interviewed for the purpose of 
this research also confirmed the primacy of the press above that of the 
broadcasters in terms of its agenda setting influence on the broadcast media as 
well as its bearing on the political process. Indeed, as Charles Clarke maintained:  
It wasn’t so much that they set the political agenda, although they did, it 
was that they set the broadcasting media agenda, and so politicians had 
been brought up on the idea that what really influenced peoples thinking 
was the broadcasting media, particularly television. And, the Mail in 
particular was very effective in determining what would be the news story 
that day. Now, it did affect politicians directly as well, I’m not saying it 
didn’t, but its direct effect through the broadcasting media was real. 
(Interview with author, 4 February 2014) 
 
The print editions of the newspapers were selected for reasons of accessibility, but 
more importantly to ensure uniformity across the sample. The fluid nature of the 
news environment in the internet age often results in online copy being 
continuously updated as new facts relative to a particular story come to light, 
whereas the asynchronous nature of the print versions allow for a static record of 
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the previous day’s events and makes comparison of factual and opinion-led 
content far easier. It also allowed for the inclusion of a story prominence variable, 
taking into account the page in which the item appeared as well as its contextual 
features, which would not have been possible if only consulting the article online 
or via a news database such as LexisNexis. Another reason for eschewing the use 
of LexisNexis or its counterparts in favour of the print versions is due to concerns 
over its reliability as a data resource. In his study on the reliability of news 
databases in content analysis research, Deacon (2007) found instances of missing 
or duplicated content and inconsistencies in the unitisation of news, whereby two 
or more news items were amalgamated into one news story, meaning that the 
reliability and validity of any statistical findings could be in question.  Indeed, 
Deacon contends that the over reliance on digital databases means that ‘a lot of 
important evidence is lost in translation’, believing that researchers ‘should still 
aspire to analyse media content in its original form wherever possible’ (Deacon, 
2007: 23). 
 
As mentioned above, a comprehensive review of policy documents and 
parliamentary speeches was made to determine the key issues and prevailing 
discourses around terrorism policy. Many of these sources were obtained via the 
UK Parliament website. In addition, the entire archive of Home Office press 
releases on terrorism related matters released between 2001 and 2009 was 
obtained under the provision of the Freedom of Information Act. The press 
releases of civil liberties groups such as Liberty, JUSTICE and Article 19, and 
Muslim groups such as the Islamic Human Rights Commission were also 
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reviewed to determine the dominant issues and discourses that were promulgated 
by non-elite oppositional factions. These documents were valuable sources for 
establishing the dominant frames of both the government and those who opposed 
the terrorism bills. 
 
To summarise, the primary stages of research were as follows: the first stage 
entailed a general review of the literature surrounding the theoretical and 
methodological frameworks applied to terrorism policy in the UK since 9/11. It 
also examined literature pertaining to the relationship between the media and Irish 
terrorism of the latter half of the twentieth century, mainly as a comparative 
component to the present war on terror. Finally, in terms of background research, 
sources surrounding some of the key issues relevant to the ‘war on terror’, such as 
New Labour’s approach to foreign policy and conflict, as well as to issues around 
asylum and immigration, were also examined. At the same time, press cuttings 
sourced via the news database LexisNexis that dealt with terrorism legislation 
from 1999 to 2008 were reviewed. Using key search terms relating to terrorism 
legislation and/or terrorism policy alongside the title of each Act provided an 
insight into the level and type of press coverage devoted to the passage of each 
piece of legislation. Increased coverage of the passage of each Act corresponded 
with increased activity in the Houses of Commons or Lords, which influenced the 
selection of the sample dates (as outlined below). Hard copies of the newspaper 
articles were then sourced from the British Newspaper Library in Colindale, 
which was followed by an inductive analysis of media content, which informed 
the coding categories for the content analysis as well as the construction of the 
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signature matrix for the framing analysis. Comparable literature that dealt with 
terrorism legislation in the US context also provided a useful indicator of the 
dominant political and media frames emanating from large swathes of the Global 
North. A thorough review of the media content then served to inform the 
interview questions for the Home Secretaries.  
 
The following sections detail the abovementioned stages of research, and provide 
a detailed discussion of the procedures of analysis. Beginning with a discussion of 
the primary methods deployed for the textual analyses, namely content analysis 
and framing analysis, the chapter then provides an overview of the sampling 
decisions, as well as an outline of the character and political affiliations of the 
newspapers that constitute the objects of analysis. Finally, it discusses the 
utilisation of the in-depth interviews, before concluding with a summary of the 
chapter. 
 
3.1 Media Content Analysis 
Content analysis was the primary method used to address research questions 1 and 
2, with the former focusing on the prominence of the coverage and the latter the 
sources who shaped the debates. The unit of analysis was the news article. 
Although content analysis is classically viewed as a quantitative method, it is 
unusual for a codebook not to contain several qualitative categories that require 
some degree of subjective inference by the researcher. It is the qualitative aspect 
of the research procedure that requires some discussion in terms of issues of 
reliability and validity of research data.  Although content analysis is often 
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perceived as a consistent method in terms of its reliability and validity in the 
quantifying of research phenomena, its dependability as an objective tool of 
analysis is wholly dependent on the theoretical framework in which the study is 
defined, and one which ‘must articulate the relationship of the texts analysed to 
their wider context of production and/or consumption’ (Hansen et al., 1998: 124). 
Indeed, researchers in the field of social science tend to agree that the most 
difficult aspect of conducting a content analysis is in the defining of ‘dimensions 
or characteristics that should be analysed’ (Hansen et al., 1998: 106).  
 
One of the pitfalls of content analysis can be a tendency for researchers to focus 
on phenomena that lends itself to easy measurement, whilst overlooking its 
significance to the overall research aims and questions. In his famous content 
study on the Vietnam war, Hallin (1986) acknowledged that although ‘content 
analysis lends an aura of scientific authority to media research…it requires 
dealing with all the content sampled, not just those parts of it that fit the story line 
the analyst starts out with’, warning that the data yielded ‘are always a result of 
many choices and sometimes conceal a good deal of ambiguity or subjectivity in 
coding procedures’ (Hallin, 1986: 112–113). This is why researchers must situate 
their research within a viable theoretical context – with the theory not only 
guiding the formation of the research questions but also providing a contestable 
framework for establishing inter- and intra-coder reliability. As previously 
discussed, this research examines media-state relations within three competing 
models of media performance, drawing on the historical antecedents of the press 
as the watchdogs or guardians of democracy, and the hegemony models of vis-à-
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vis media and state. Moreover, it adapts some of the methodological approaches 
used by Robinson et al. (2006; and 2009), Goddard et al. (2008) and Murray et al. 
(2008), who themselves drew on the established frameworks of Hallin (1986), 
Semetko et al. (1991) and Wolfsfeld (1997) to address issues of media autonomy.   
 
A main problem with conducting a content analysis is how to ensure an 
acceptable level of consistency either in terms of inter-coder reliability (two or 
more researchers reaching the same results when analysing the same data), or 
intra-coder reliability (a single coder aspiring to reproduce the same results with 
repeat testing). Thus, reliability in content analysis is understood as ‘a research 
procedure [that] is reliable when it responds to the same phenomena in the same 
way regardless of the circumstances of its implementation’ (Krippendorff, 2013: 
267). It must be noted that the nature of the PhD differs from other academic 
studies in the sense that all coding decisions are typically made and carried out by 
a single coder, which can prove problematic when ascertaining the reliability of 
coding decisions. The author recognises that the test-retest method is not without 
its critics, and is largely a method that tests the stability of a method over a period 
of time; ‘that is, one observer rereads, recodes, or reanalyses the same text’ to 
detect whether there are any inconsistencies in the coder’s original findings at 
different points in time (Krippendorff, 2013: 270). Whilst a single researcher can 
carry out a replicability test on a particular study, it can lack the rigour of the 
inter-coder replicability test, whereby two or more researchers perform the same 
coding procedure to compare the level of reliability between coders. The reliance 
on the theoretical and methodological frameworks employed in other studies, as 
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well as taking an inductive approach to the coding procedures, is an attempt to 
mitigate any single coder biases.   
 
Thus, this research borrows the tried and tested categorisations and valence scales 
employed in other large-scale content analysis studies, most notably the major 
ESRC funded study of the British media coverage of the Iraq War carried out by 
Robinson et al. (2006). A major component of the study was the development and 
testing of the methodology, which was designed to act as a model for further 
political communication research – with a key objective being the replicability of 
their theoretical framework and methodology to the study of inter alia post-war 
conflicts to assess whether a more ‘adversarial and questioning stance than the 
one found in [their] study [should come] to be adopted in the media’ (Robinson et 
al., 2006: 30). This could be taken to include policy perspectives on domestic 
security within the context of the ‘war on terrorism’, which is especially relevant 
for the research purposes presented here, which contends that the government 
often framed the arguments for legislation within the broader discourses of the 
‘war on terror’. When developing their codebook for the Iraq war study, Robinson 
et al. (2006) also worked in tangent with Aday et al. (2005) who conducted an 
analogous study that focused on the US experience of the media coverage of the 
Iraq war. 
 
Finally, the researcher applied the test-retest method to ten percent of the article 
population within each case study to check whether the coding decisions were 
consistent with repeat testing. Using Holsti’s (1969) statistical formula to 
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ascertain the level of consistency, there was consistency in the coding 95 percent 
of the time – with the reliability coefficient being 90 percent or above. The 
following section details the coding procedure for the content analysis, as well as 
the variables and valence measurements employed in this research. 
 
3.1.1 Coding Procedure 
Several ‘identifier categories’ (Hansen et al., 1998: 106) or standard variables are 
often utilised in newspaper content studies, including prominence categories such 
as the page on which a news item appears, length and type of article, sources cited 
and length of citation and so forth. In light of this, variables 1–8 deal with article 
prominence, format and article authorship, while variables 9 and 10 assess the 
number and type of visuals present. Variables 11–14 code the sources that have 
been cited, the space allotted to each source and the source’s position on the 
legislation. Bennett’s (1990) indexing theory, discussed in more detail in the 
previous chapter, predicates that the news is often indexed to elite opinion, which 
defines the parameters of media debate and thus limits the ideological possibilities 
of how to understand a particular policy issue – these variables were thus 
operationalised with reference to Bennett’s theory. The elite sources pertaining to 
this particular study include the government and other political elites such as 
Labour backbenchers or Conservative MPs. In theory, a preponderance of these 
sources could confirm Bennett’s thesis. However, if non-elite sources such as 
Liberty or interested Muslim groups were to have proportionate representation in 
the press, then this might challenge the indexing hypothesis, as might a high 
proportion of elite challengers. 
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As Chang and Izard (2009) point out, ‘the influence of framing in previous work 
has been especially recognized in research that determines the tone of political 
reporting’ (Chang & Izard, 2009: 8).  The tone valences used by Robinson et al. 
(2006; and 2009), Goddard et al. (2008) and Murray et al. (2008) in their study on 
media coverage of the Iraq war are defined as either straight (i.e. non-evaluative), 
reinforcing, mixed (i.e. a combination of reinforcing and deflating evaluations), or 
deflating. These values were originally designed for use in the election research 
carried out by Semetko et al. (1991) and are ones which were also appropriated 
for the present study. The purpose of measuring the tone was to ‘capture how 
often reporters are making judgements and to whom they are directed’ (Goddard 
et al., 2008: 15), which provides a useful tool to measure ‘journalists’ adherence 
to norms of objectivity and neutrality towards actors’ (Robinson et al., 2006: 25). 
For their own study, Robinson et al. (2006) found that ‘reporting in the broadsheet 
newspapers was straight over 80% of the time…By this measure, then, much of 
UK media largely fulfilled expected norms of neutrality and objectivity (Robinson 
et al., 2006: 25). They also advise that since overt reporter opinion is uncommon 
in hard news items, the tone should be coded as straight unless ‘a clear slant or 
interpretation is given by the journalist’(Robinson et al., 2005: 77). However, 
‘[w]here there is no explicit favourability, it is also important to look for loaded 
word choice…which is not attributed to another source. Only where loaded words 
are used repetitively in a clearly evaluative way would a directional code be used’ 
(Robinson et al., 2005: 77). 
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Thus, to assess the extent to which the press reported the debates objectively, 
variable 15 takes into account the reporter tone toward the sources cited, variable 
18 the actors/bodies as subject, and variable 21 the reporter tone toward the core 
positions presented. For all three variables, if the reporter presents the facts of the 
story without the inclusion of evaluative comments then this would be coded as 
straight reporting, which would typically apply to most brief news items. If the 
reporter clearly interpolates with evaluative comments that support or undermine 
the position of the source/story actor or core position presented then this would be 
coded as reinforcing, mixed or deflating accordingly.   
 
The inclusion of the story actors/bodies as subject (variable 16) is also derived 
from the Iraq war study and provides a measure to assess prominence and attitude 
toward those depicted. The use of two measures to assess the prominence of 
actors (as sources cited and as subject matter) is justified by Robinson et al. 
(2009: 543) as follows: 
Using these measures, we can assess which actors were most successful at 
accessing media, illustrating the extent to which journalists achieved 
balance between competing sources. As such, these variables allow us to 
gauge the extent to which each model (elite-driven, independent, and 
oppositional) prevails.  
 
Finally, the analysis melds a content analytic approach with the frame analysis 
model of Gamson and his colleagues (see, for example, Gamson & Lasch, 1983; 
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and Gamson & Modigliani),39 with variables 19–23 designed to quantify the 
framing and reasoning devices intrinsic to a particular ‘interpretative’ or 
‘discourse’ package (O’Regan, 2008). A quantitative approach to framing has 
been employed by several researchers, with one such example being Beckett’s 
study of law and order discourse in American politics in which ‘displays of any of 
the signature elements of the various issue packages were identified in each story 
and then coded according to which package they signified’ (Beckett, 1997: 74). 
Likewise, in Dimitrova and Lee’s (2009) study of the framing of Saddam 
Hussein’s execution, the coding variables were designed to quantify the 
qualitative aspects of the media content by isolating the symbolic devices that 
constitute a particular media package. Their inclusion of a tone variable to 
measure the overall story perspective echoes the valence scales included in the 
Iraq war study carried out by Robinson et al. (2006).  
 
The ‘media package’ approach of Gamson et al. has proved to be a useful tool in 
measuring media frames. Indeed, in reference to Gamson et al. as well as his own 
approach to frame analysis, Tankard argues that framing can provide ‘quantitative 
researchers a means to examine the hypothesis of media hegemony, one that has 
been difficult to validate empirically’ (Tankard, 2001: 97). Tankard proffers that 
the key strengths of the empirical turn towards framing are manifold, with its 
main advantages being its ability to reduce the subjectivity in frame identification 
and therefore improve issues of reliability and replicability, as well as in 
                                                 
39
 Further details of the framing model designed by Gamson and his colleagues can be found in the 
next section. 
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strengthening the role of theory building and testing within the field of framing 
research (Tankard, 2001: 104).  
 
3.2 Framing and the Construction of the Signature Matrix 
In political communication scholarship, the two principal approaches to analysing 
the government-press nexus are hegemony and indexing, with both approaches 
viewing the press as too deferential to the government (Entman, 2004: 4). 
Framing as a concept has been criticised by Entman and others (see, for example, 
Kitzinger, 2007; Matthes, 2009; and Van Gorp, 2005) as being a ‘fractured 
paradigm’ (Entman, 1993: 51) or ‘imprecise catchall that means slightly different 
things to each researcher employing it’ (Entman, 2004: 5). Indeed, whilst framing 
is a mainstay of media and political communications research, there remains a 
‘bewildering array of approaches’ (Kitzinger, 2007: 135) to framing and thus a 
notable lack of a ‘unified paradigm’ (Matthes, 2009: 349).  
 
To discern patterns of commonality in the conceptualisation and 
operationalisation of news frames in media scholarship over a period of several 
years, Matthes (2009) analysed 131 media framing studies conducted between 
1990 and 2005. Of these studies, over half focused on newspaper content, with 
Entman’s classification of media frames being the most cited. A main critique of 
Matthes was the vagueness in defining the term ‘frame’ and that most studies 
failed to provide any ‘clear guidelines for operationalization’, with an 
overabundant use of ‘general definitions, while useful, leave the explicit 
operational understanding of the frame concept open’ (Matthes, 2009: 350). 
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In terms of the types of frames that were operationalised, most of the studies 
applied 2-3 frames to their research, measuring the thematic unit (most typically 
the whole article). The limiting of frames can ‘improve the reliability of coding’, 
but can also reduce some of the complexity of framing (Tankard, 2001: 105). To 
address the limitations of using a reduced number of frames, this research applied 
three meta-frames to the case studies, which, while informed by the literature 
review, were identified inductively. Thus, in constructing the signature matrix, 
this research employed an inductive approach, by examining the material to see 
which frames emerged as opposed to a deductive approach, which applies pre-
defined frames to the media material in question. It follows the formal inductive 
steps of Van Gorp (2010), in which the ‘end product of the inductive phase is a 
frame matrix’ (Van Gorp, 2010: 93).  
 
In summary, the first step requires the collection of source material, including the 
press releases from ‘frame sponsors’ such as political parties or interest groups. 
Step 2 requires an open coding of news content, to assess the material without 
applying any predefined categories. Rather the researcher is to compile an 
inventory of key issues and themes as well as key actors within a text, with a key 
condition being ‘not to focus on what a text is about, but on how the story is told’, 
or on the aspects highlighted by the news producer (Van Gorp, 2010: 94). The 
third step requires a close examination of ‘patterns of devices by linking them to 
overarching ideas’, which should result in an ‘organising of the ‘codes around 
“axes” of meaning’ (Ibid.: 95). This is followed by the ‘selective coding’ stage, 
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which entails the naming and defining of the core message of the frame by 
‘making an association with a cultural motive that can function as the core idea, 
thus fusing the framing devices into a coherent unit’ (Ibid.: 96). Once the frame 
matrix is complete, this is then followed by the deductive phase, which is 
essentially a quantitative content analysis that measures ‘the extent to which 
inductively reconstructed frame packages are actually applied in a representative 
sample of texts’ (Ibid.: 99). 
 
This research employs the methodological frameworks and definitions of Gamson 
and his colleagues (Gamson & Lasch, 1983; and Gamson & Modigliani, 1989), 
with particular reference to their construction of a signature matrix, as well as Van 
Gorp (2005; 2007) and Wolfsfeld (1997) whose work follows a similar praxis. 
Wolfsfeld’s seminal work on the political contest model was derived from the 
methods of Gamson and his colleagues. The main thrust of Gamson and Lasch’s 
(1983) argument is that the political and media discourses surrounding a particular 
‘issue draws on a catalogue of available idea elements, and makes use of a variety 
of symbolic devices to express these ideas’ (Gamson & Lasch, 1983: 397). They 
go on to argue that such idea elements do not exist in a vacuum, but rather are 
clustered into ‘interpretive packages’ – often the package can be identified with a 
single manifest element. Gamson & Modigliani suggest ‘that media discourse can 
be conceived of as a set of interpretive packages that give meaning to an issue. A 
package has an internal structure. At its core is a central organizing idea, or frame, 
for making sense of relevant events, suggesting what is at issue’ (Gamson & 
Modigliani, 1989: 3).  
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A package is comprised of two parts, with the first part dealing with the framing 
devices or symbolic or organising principles of political discourse; the second part 
deals with the reasoning devices. Thus, to distinguish between the two parts: 
‘framing devices…suggest how to think about the issue and reasoning 
devices…justify what should be done about it’ (Ibid.). Gamson et al. define the 
five framing devices as follows: (1) metaphors; (2) exemplars (historical examples 
from which lessons are drawn); (3) catchphrases (summary statements that 
encapsulate a particular frame); (4) depictions (subjects characterised in a 
particular manner); and, (5) visual images (e.g. icons) (Ibid.: 3–4). The second 
part of the package contains the three reasoning devices, which are (1) roots (i.e. a 
causal analysis); (2) consequences (i.e. a particular type of effect); and, (3) 
appeals to principle (i.e. a set of moral claims). The signature matrix constructed 
for the present study is outlined below (see Appendix 2 for a diagrammatic 
presentation of the signature matrix), alongside the concomitant media 
performance models (Ibid.). 
 
Security Meta-Frame 
The Security meta-frame corresponds with the government-driven media 
performance model, which proffers that the press will largely be supportive of the 
government and its policy aims, with much of the coverage reinforcing the 
government’s preferred security frame, with the overall package reflecting a 
‘proportionate legislative response’. The core frame or issue is the immediate 
threat that post 9/11 terrorism poses to the nation’s way of life, and the most 
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effective legislative means to protect British citizens, with the issue of security 
requiring urgent action, and which is often viewed within the broader context of 
the ‘war on terrorism’. The core position of the frame is that the new terrorism 
posed by the events of 9/11, and the resulting ‘war on terrorism’, requires 
extraordinary measures to safeguard UK citizens. Thus, the legislation is not only 
deemed vital for national security but is a proportionate response to the current 
threat level.  
 
In terms of the framing devices, the metaphors and lexical choices reinforce the 
US/UK official ‘war on terrorism’ discourse, largely constructing the  terrorism 
threat as an ‘act of war’, ‘battle’ or ‘disease’ that needs to be ‘fought’ and ‘won’ 
or ‘excised from humanity’. The discourse will draw heavily on discourses of risk, 
with the government portrayed as the ‘moral guardians’ of democratic values. 
Those opposed to the legislation are depicted as ‘traitors’ in the ‘war on terror’.  
 
Exemplars include stories that promote the legislation as strengthening national 
security, and the government winning the war on terrorism. Historical exemplars 
might include the ‘Spirit of the Blitz’ and the unifying of Britain in times of war, 
especially relevant in the aftermath of 7/7.  
 
Catchphrases might include ‘state of emergency’, ‘war on terrorism’, ‘crackdown 
on terror’, [vital we] ‘protect our way of life’. Those who oppose the Bill are ‘airy 
fairy liberals’.  
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Depictions might include legislation being portrayed as a proportionate response 
to the current threat level, with the government shown as tough but even-handed 
in its approach to handling the terrorist threat. Oppositional voices will typically 
be represented as illogical, undemocratic and unpatriotic in the face of the current 
threat. 
 
The reasoning devices will be as follows: 
Roots: Terrorists willing to be suicide bombers necessitate policies that can deal 
with this new terrorism threat.   
Consequences: Without legislative action, the UK leaves itself vulnerable to a 
terrorist attack.  
Appeals to principle: UK citizens deserve measures that will keep them safe and 
safeguard their way of life. Terrorists must not be allowed to win the ‘War on 
Terrorism’. 
 
Civil Liberties Meta-Frame 
The Civil Liberties meta-frame corresponds with the oppositional media 
performance model, which  proffers that the media will largely be against the 
government and its policy aims, with much of the coverage reinforcing the 
discourse of politicians, peers and interest groups that oppose the legislation due 
to its negative impact on civil liberties, with the overall package reflecting a 
‘Disproportionate Legislative Response’. The core frame is ‘Civil Liberties’ with 
the key issues being the impact the legislation will have on civil liberties, human 
rights and minority Muslim groups. There is also concern that the legislation will 
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undermine community cohesion, as well as augment the powers of the state 
without any utilitarian gain. The core position is that the legislation erodes civil 
liberties and has a negative impact on human rights. Moreover, that the proposed 
legislation with its inclusion of measures that enhance state power has no 
substantive benefit other than to make the government look as though it is 
tackling the terrorist threat. The legislative response is viewed as disproportionate 
to the actual threat level. 
 
In terms of the framing devices, the metaphors and lexical choices will depict the 
government as ‘warmongers’ or ‘scaremongers’ or as an ‘authoritarian regime’, 
with the government portrayed as using the Bill to ‘smuggle’ in wide ranging 
measures that are not relevant to current threat levels. References to Britain 
becoming a ‘Big Brother’ state or of ‘Ancient freedoms’ under threat will also be 
evident. 
 
Exemplars might include stories about rebel MPs/peers tempering some of the 
measures contained in the terrorism Bill. Historical exemplars might include the 
failure of internment in the PIRA era. 
 
Catchphrases might include ‘draconian laws and/or powers’, ‘traditional 
freedoms/civil liberties under threat’, and [the government is] ‘riding roughshod 
over democracy’. 
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Depictions will include the legislation portrayed as undermining civil liberties. 
Stories that deal with the impact the legislation is having on individuals’ human 
rights will also be evident, with the government being depicted as excessive and 
authoritarian in its approach to dealing with the terrorism threat. Oppositional 
arguments will be depicted as rational and apolitical in tone. 
 
The reasoning devices will be as follows: 
Roots: In its desire to be seen to act, the government has rushed to legislate 
without adequate deliberation or scrutiny.  
Consequences: The introduction of wide ranging laws have undermined civil 
liberties.  
Appeals to principle: Present legislation is adequate to deal with the perceived 
terrorist threat. Further legislation will only serve to augment state power without 
enhancing security. In fact, some of the measures contained in the Bill could make 
the UK even more of a terrorist target. 
 
Politics Meta-Frame 
The politics meta-frame corresponds with the independent media performance 
model, which proffers that the media will largely use the legislative debates as a 
conduit either to criticise the politics of New Labour or to focus on the political 
conflict between or within parties. Consideration of the legislation itself will be 
limited, often reflecting a neutral editorial stance. The overall package reflects a 
‘Party Politics Focus’, with the core frame being ‘Politics’, whereby the issue is 
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the state of UK politics itself – with a focus either on the politics of the New 
Labour government or on the political conflict between or within parties. 
The core position is that New Labour’s modernising project is to the detriment of 
democracy. Too much power resides with the executive, which has led to the 
government abusing its power to bring in too many draconian laws, without 
adequate parliamentary scrutiny. Labour MPs have become lapdogs to the 
government. At the other end of the spectrum, disunity within the Labour Party is 
evident, and indicates that Blair (or Brown) has lost authority over his own party.  
 
In terms of the framing devices, the metaphors and lexical choices construct 
MPs/peers as ‘rebels’ or ‘revolutionaries’; Government at ‘war’ or doing ‘battle’ 
with own party members and/or oppositional parties; Government referred to as 
‘dictatorial’ in its approach to governance. 
 
Exemplars include the Home Secretary losing the battle against rebel 
MPs/opposition. Historical exemplars might include the Maastricht Rebellion 
when rebel MPs in John Major’s government voted against the Maastricht Treaty 
(Treaty on the European Union). 
 
Catchphrases likely to include ‘Home Secretary under fire’, ‘Rebel MPs savage 
bill’, ‘lack of parliamentary scrutiny’, and ‘New Labour abusing power’. 
Depictions might include New Labour policies and governance being portrayed in 
a negative light; Personal attacks on Blair/Brown leadership and/or attacks on the 
competency of the Home Secretary; Human Rights Act and ECHR will be heavily 
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criticised; Disharmony within the Labour Party will be used to undermine 
government authority. 
 
The reasoning devices will be as follows: 
Roots: New Labour’s modernising of parliament and the reforms to the House of 
Lords have undermined the parliamentary process.  
Consequences: The government has too much unchecked power.  
Appeals to principle: New Labour should revise its approach to leadership and 
governance or else face an increase in rebellions from Labour backbenchers and 
peers alike. 
 
3.3  Sample 
The newspaper sample comprised three broadsheets: the Daily Telegraph, The 
Times and the Guardian; and three tabloids: the Daily Mail, the Sun and the 
Mirror.40 Of these titles, the Daily Telegraph, The Times, the Daily Mail, and the 
Sun, are broadly considered to reside on the political right, whilst the Guardian 
and the Mirror, are generally deemed to reside on the political left. The selected 
titles also had a higher share of the newspaper market for their respective class. Of 
the right-leaning broadsheets, the Daily Telegraph and The Times had the highest 
circulation figures, as did the left-leaning Guardian compared with its nearest 
competitor The Independent. Of the right-leaning tabloids, the Sun had the highest 
circulation figures, followed by the Daily Mail, with the Mirror being the only 
                                                 
40
 Although a tabloid in terms of character and size, the Daily Mail has also been defined as a 
‘Blacktop’ or ‘Midmarket’ newspaper, for the purposes of this research it will be referred to as a 
‘tabloid’. 
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major left-leaning tabloid on the market during the period under investigation. 
Table 3.1 shows the circulation figures during the month in which each piece of 
legislation received the Royal Assent. 
 
Table 3.1 Newspaper circulation figures during the month in which each Act 
received Royal Assent   
 Circulation Figures 
Newspaper Dec 2001 Mar 2005 Mar 2006 Nov 2008 
The Sun 3,306,814 3,250,176 3,110,895 3,045,899 
The Mirror 2,046,792 1,720,722 1,634,584 1,400,206 
Daily Star 696,029 843,701 783,511 714,192 
Daily Mail 2,323,020 2,279,201 2,284,081 2,193,715 
The Express 859,202 878,001 831,923 752,181 
Daily Telegraph 957,534 859,330 840,081 835,497 
The Times 654,036 630,422 626,987 621,831 
Financial Times 470,151 405,023 412,774 448,523 
The Guardian 384,406 340,623 364,521 358,379 
The Independent 192,448 221,779 217,883 201,113 
Source: ABC 
  
The dates were selected to encompass the coverage of key phases in the 
progression of each Act with the sample of each case study beginning the day 
after the Bill was introduced in the House of Commons and ending one day after 
the Act received royal assent. Whenever there was any activity in the Commons 
or the House of Lords, such as a reading or a report stage, the next day’s date was 
selected to examine the coverage of that previous day’s events. This provided a 
uniform timeline that could be applied to each case study. A comprehensive 
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breakdown of the progression of each Act and the corresponding dates for the 
newspaper sample can be found in the relevant results chapter. Table 3.2 shows 
the newspaper sample dates and the total number of days for each Act, as well as 
the total quantity of articles analysed for each case study. Overall, the study 
encompassed 69 days of news coverage, which yielded a total of 642 articles. 
 
Table 3.2 Newspaper sample dates 
Act Newspaper sample 
dates 
Total days 
in sample 
Total 
articles 
Anti-Terrorism, Crime 
and Security Act 2001  
13 November 2001 –  
14 December 2001 
15 88 
Prevention of Terrorism 
Act 2005  
23 February 2005 –  
12 March 2005 
10 226 
Terrorism Act 2006  13 October 2005 –  
31 March 2006 
20 166 
Counter-Terrorism Act 
2008  
25 January 2008 –  
27 November 2008 
24 162 
Total 69 642 
 
 
3.3.1 Political Affiliations of the British Press 
The unprecedented rise of multinational media corporations, precipitated by a 
string of mergers and takeovers in the 1990s, has resulted in a handful of large 
conglomerates dominating the global media market. Moreover, the international 
media market has seen a convergence of media commodities, whereby major 
transnational organisations have control over multi-media sectors. Media 
consolidation with a concentration of media ownership makes market control 
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policies ever more challenging to facilitate, increasing further the power of the 
oligopolies. Press concentration, in particular, is much higher in the UK than in 
the rest of Europe (Curran & Seaton, 2009: 76). The hegemony of the national 
press in the UK also contrasts with much of Europe and the United States where 
there is much more reliance on regional and urban press.  
 
Just eight media corporations, who between them circulate twenty of the leading 
daily and Sunday national newspapers, govern the British press. However, four 
companies, News International, Associated Newspapers, Trinity Mirror and 
Northern and Shell, dominate the market with a combined circulation share of 85 
percent, with News International’s share of the market being nearly double that of 
its nearest competitor, Associated Newspapers. News International, whose titles 
include the Sun and The Times, has a 37 percent share of the market. Associated 
Newspapers, who owns the Daily Mail and Trinity Mirror, who owns the Mirror 
have a share of 19 percent and 17 percent respectively, followed by Northern and 
Shell with a market share of 12.5 percent. The left-wing broadsheet newspaper 
groups, International News and the Guardian Group have a combined market 
share of just 6 percent. 
 
Of the daily titles, the Sun has consistently had the largest share of the market in 
terms of newspaper sales, and The Independent the lowest. Generally, the popular 
and mid-market titles sell considerably more copies than the broadsheets. 
Although several of the traditional ‘broadsheets’ have been repackaged in tabloid 
or Berliner format in the last few years, this thesis retains the term ‘broadsheet’ to 
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refer to the ‘quality’ newspapers, and the term ‘tabloid’ to refer to the ‘popular’ 
(also commonly referred to as ‘red tops’) and ‘mid-market’ (also known as 
‘blacktops’) publications. In terms of their journalistic style, the broadsheets are 
considered to be of higher quality and less sensationalist than the tabloids. The 
tabloids are characterised by their focus on scandal guised as human interest 
stories and their willingness to pay high prices for a salacious scoop, especially if 
it involves a major celebrity or public figure. However, since the late 1990s, the 
competiveness between newspapers of all persuasions has seen the quality press 
foraging into the realm of ‘cash for stories’, one notable example being the 
payment of £110,000 for parliamentary expenses data by the Daily Telegraph in 
2009.41  
 
Previous research (see, for example, Worcester, 1998) has also shown differences 
in readership demographics across newspaper categories, with the broadsheets 
appealing to the upper middle classes and elite groups, the mid-market titles to the 
middle and lower middle classes, and the tabloids to the working classes 
(Richardson, 2007: 80). Broadsheets and tabloids also differ in their news values 
and ideological representation, with the tabloids being more explicit in their 
political bias. In terms of bias, there is an imbalance in ideological positions in the 
press as a whole, with right-leaning newspapers accounting for 80 percent of the 
market share.  Figure 3.1 shows newspaper party allegiance during the general 
elections from 1945 to 2010. 
 
                                                 
41
 The ‘MPs expenses scandal’, as it became known, led to resignations, suspensions, and in some 
cases criminal charges for false accounting, of several prominent MPs.   
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Figure 3.1 Newspaper party allegiance during national elections, 1945–2010 42  
 
 
The political allegiance of the press during the New Labour years was as follows: 
News International, whose titles include the Sun and The Times is the UK arm of 
Rupert Murdoch’s News Corporation, which is one of the largest media 
conglomerates in the world. Politically, Murdoch’s titles reside on the right, but 
notably switched allegiance to the Labour Party under Tony Blair’s leadership. 
They reverted to type by supporting the Conservative Party during the 2010 
general election. Associated Newspapers is a division of the Daily Mail and 
General Trust plc of which Viscount Rothermere is chairman. Its newspaper 
portfolio includes the Daily Mail and the Mail on Sunday, both of which reside on 
the political right. The Daily Mail is renowned for its anti-liberal rhetoric and its 
                                                 
42
 Source: The Guardian. Online. Available HTTP: http://static.guim.co.uk/sys-
images/Guardian/Pix/site_furniture/2010/5/4/1272980214851/Party-support-in-general--003.jpg 
(accessed 15 January 2014). Permission to use this figure was granted by Guardian News & Media 
Ltd on 8 May 2014 via email.  
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promotion of conservative values. Unsurprisingly, both titles have remained 
largely consistent in their support for the Conservative Party. Known as 
representing the views of ‘Middle England’, the Mail brand also has a high female 
readership. Trinity Mirror plc publishes the Mirror, and is considered a left-wing 
title, with a long history of supporting the Labour Party. Alastair Campbell, New 
Labour’s ‘spin doctor’, was political editor and columnist on the Mirror during 
the 1980s and 1990s. The Telegraph Media Group (known as the Telegraph 
Group until 2006) is owned by Sir David Barclay and Sir Frederick Barclay and 
publishes the Daily Telegraph and the Sunday Telegraph. From 1986 to 2004, the 
titles were owned by Conrad Black.43  Politically, the Telegraph brand resides on 
the right, although the group considers itself centre-right. The group’s national 
newspapers have a long tradition of supporting the Conservative Party. The Scott 
Trust owns the Guardian Media Group, and as a trust does not cater to 
shareholders, rather all profits are reinvested into the Group. Key newspaper titles 
include The Guardian and The Observer, both of which can be defined as liberal 
or left of centre. A supporter of the Labour Party throughout the 1990s, by the 
2005 general election The Guardian’s support was beginning to wane and by 
2010, they publically backed the Liberal Democrat Party. A key reason being: ‘On 
civil liberty and criminal justice, [the Liberal Democrats] have remained true to 
liberal values and human rights in ways that the other parties, Labour more than 
the Tories in some respects, have not’ (The Guardian, 30 April 2010). 
 
                                                 
43
 Conrad Black owned Hollinger, one of the world’s largest newspaper groups until he was jailed 
in America in 2007 for defrauding his investors.  
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Despite the majority of the press residing on the political right, journalists draw on 
a range of idiosyncratic news values. However, there are certain issues that are 
common across titles; for example, the Daily Mail and the Sun are both highly 
critical of immigration, the European Union and the European Court of Human 
Rights. The unrelenting negative reporting of the European Court of Human 
Rights even led to the Court issuing a statement on 11 October 2013 lambasting 
the British press for its distorted and misleading coverage of its activities.  The 
Daily Mail was singled out for a story it had published on 7 October 2013, which 
was entitled ‘Human right to make a killing: Damning dossier reveals taxpayers’ 
Bill for European court payouts to murderers, terrorists and traitors’, a claim that 
was rejected by the Court as being ‘simply wrong’.44 Notwithstanding these 
mutual crusades, the press are not always constant in their political allegiance.  
For example, while the Sun and the Daily Mail are both considered proliferators 
of ‘right wing’ discourses, they supported different political parties in the 1997, 
2001 and 2005 general elections. Similarly, despite the Mirror emphatically 
opposing the 2003 Anglo-American invasion of Iraq, and their criticisms of New 
Labour’s shift to the centre of the political spectrum, it has remained steadfast in 
its party allegiance.  
 
After the 1992 election there was a blurring of the traditional partisan lines among 
the right wing press, with a turn towards a more pragmatic style of journalism. 
Post-Thatcher, the ‘press-government coalition fell apart’ (Curran & Seaton, 
                                                 
44European Court of Human Rights (2013) ‘Court concern at “seriously misleading” UK news 
articles’, Press Statement, 11 October 2013. Online. Available HTTP: 
<http://www.humanrightseurope.org/2013/10/court-concern-at-seriously-misleading-uk-news-
articles/> (accessed 28 January 2014). 
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2009: 73), with much of the right wing press disillusioned with the government of 
John Major, who they viewed as weak and ineffectual, and whose administration 
was seen as a betrayal of Thatcher’s legacy. A series of scandals involving Tory 
MPs provided much fodder for the press, with the harshest criticisms coming from 
the tabloids. However, although critical at times, the Daily Mail and the Daily 
Telegraph remained largely aligned to the Conservative Party. During this 
uncertain period, it was the Murdoch press where the major political turnaround 
was to occur.  
 
The meeting and subsequent alliance between Murdoch and Tony Blair in the run 
up to the 1997 election is well known. Ever the pragmatist, Murdoch recognised 
that the conservatism of the Thatcherite era was over, and that the growing 
dissatisfaction with the Major administration was unlikely to lead to a Tory win at 
the next election. Moreover, the populist appeal of Tony Blair and New Labour’s 
Tory friendly policies, such as their pro-market stance and the relaxation of cross-
media ownership, appealed to his business perspicacity. It is worth noting that 
while New Labour appealed to Murdoch on a number of levels, his support did 
not alter his politics. Thus, Murdoch remained an advocate of conservatism, using 
his media outlets to support his own political agenda and policies that bolstered 
his own commercial interests (Gaber, 2012: 642). 
 
Whether a press baron’s endorsement of a political party has any real influence 
over the outcome of a general election remains open for debate (Barnett & Gaber, 
2001; Gaber, 2006; Newton & Brynin, 2001; Norris, 2006; and Wring & Deacon, 
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2010), but, real or imagined, most politicians believe that powerful media 
proprietors do have a significant hand in shaping public opinion. As Barnett and 
Gaber (2001) point out, ‘the real significance is not the impact exerted by the 
media on public opinion, but the impact exerted on the perceived effect of the 
media on public opinion by an almost obsessive political class’ (Barnett & Gaber. 
2001: 29). Labour’s defeat in the 1992 general election is a case in point, where 
many MPs and supporters attributed their loss to the unrelenting undermining of 
Neil Kinnock in the right wing press. They viewed the Sun, in particular, as a 
major influential force, despite academic research indicating that the influence of 
the tabloid press on voter preferences was secondary to other prevailing factors, 
such as the unpopularity of its leader Neil Kinnock and policies that failed to sway 
the electorate (Barnett & Gaber, 2001; Crewe, 1992; and Thomas, 1998).45 
Nonetheless, Alastair Campbell attributes their 1992 defeat to the tabloid press 
campaign against the Labour Party: 
I am not sure if it can be claimed, as The Sun did after the Tories won in 
1992, that “it was the Sun wot won it,” but there is no doubt in my mind 
that the systematic undermining of Labour and its leader and policies 
through these papers, actively encouraged and fed with lines of attack by 
Tory HQ, was a factor in Labour’s inability properly to connect with the 
public, and ultimate defeat.  
(Leveson Report, 2012: 1135) 
 
                                                 
45
 In Tony Blair’s view, the defeat of Labour in the 1992 election was due to the unpopularity of 
Neil Kinnock and policies that were out of touch with the voting public. In his biography he 
acknowledges that the Party ‘needed a complete, top-to-bottom reorientation of [their] programme 
and policies’, especially in relation to taking a tougher approach in areas of defence and law and 
order (Blair, 2010: 49). 
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A sentiment shared by Jack Straw: 
Few of us who took part, for example, in the 1992 General Election are in 
any doubt that The Sun’s approach lost us seats. That was their purpose, 
and it is disingenuous for any now to deny this…It did contribute to our 
defeat. I took that as power.  
(Leveson Report, 2012: 1135) 
 
Many politicians lament that the unregulated power of the press has done little to 
benefit civil society. Indeed, Charles Clarke’s view that the press have been ‘a 
blight on British national life’ is one that is shared by many of his peers 
(Interview with author, 4 February 2014). However, as was discussed in the 
previous chapter, there are contra arguments to the role of the press in political 
life, with many concluding that, far from the press being robust critics of the 
government, ‘the vital function of  independent and critical political reporting is 
being progressively undermined to the ultimate benefit of those in power’ (Barnett 
& Gaber, 2001: 1).  
 
3.4  Interviews 
Four former Home Secretaries were interviewed for this research,46 namely: Jack 
Straw and Jacqui Smith, who were both interviewed via telephone; and David 
Blunkett and Charles Clarke, who were both interviewed face-to-face in London. 
Each semi-structured interview lasted approximately 40 minutes, and was 
                                                 
46
 Due to his prior dealings with the interviewees, Professor Jon Silverman made the initial 
approach to each former Home Secretary via email, with follow-up arrangements made by the 
author. 
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recorded and later transcribed. All of the interviewees granted prior permission to 
be recorded, and were provided with the interview guide in advance. The 
interviews followed a semi-structured format whereby a list of questions were 
devised to define the parameters of discussion, but that also allowed for ‘an 
active, open-ended dialogue with [the] interviewees’ (Deacon et al., 2007: 67). 
However, the interviewer tended to take a passive role in the dialogue to allow the 
interviewee plenty of time to address each question, with the interviewer only 
interjecting on issues of clarity, to request further elaboration on points raised, or 
to explore new lines of inquiry enthused by a particular response.  
 
Interviews with key politicians is a valuable method in ascertaining the impact 
that external forces, such as the media, have on the political process (Brazier et 
al., 2008; and Davis, 2007), and in extracting data which cannot be reliably 
obtained from textual analyses alone. The purpose of the interviews, therefore, 
was to gain insight into the relationship between senior government ministers and 
the press in the context of the policy making process, with particular reference to 
terrorism legislation. General questions covered the agenda setting ability of the 
press, the influence of the press on political decision making, and the impact of a 
changing media on government-press relations. Questions were then tailored to fit 
the particular policy circumstances of each interviewee (see Appendices 3–6 for 
the full interview guides). The interviews also served to establish the 
government’s position on terrorism policy, the media and civil liberty issues 
during the period under investigation, with Jack Straw’s views on the Terrorism 
Act 2000 providing information on the government’s stance on security before the 
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terrorist attacks on America in September 2001. The aggregate interview data is 
presented in the relevant results and discussion chapters. The following provides 
an overview of each Home Secretary and the terrorism legislation passed during 
their tenure at the Home Office.  
 
Jack Straw was Home Secretary from May 1997 to June 2001, and was in office 
during the passage of the Terrorism Act 2000, the first piece of permanent 
terrorism legislation on the statute book. The Act widened the definition of 
terrorism to include domestic terrorism, extended detention without charge to 
seven days, and provided the police with greater powers to stop and search. Straw 
also oversaw the passage of the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000, 
which gave public bodies increased authority to conduct surveillance and intercept 
citizens’ private electronic communications; as well as the Human Rights Act 
1998, which incorporated the European Convention on Human Rights into 
domestic law. The information gleaned from the interview provided a 
comparative component in terms of the government-press relationship during the 
passage of the Terrorism Act 2000. The interview with Mr Straw took place on 12 
February 2014. 
 
David Blunkett was Home Secretary from June 2001 to December 2004, and was 
in office at the time of the 9/11 terrorist attacks. Famously declaring that he would 
‘make Jack Straw look like a liberal’ (Silverman, 2012: 78), Blunkett was viewed 
as a more interventionist and hard line Home Secretary than his predecessor – but 
also, alongside Blair, attuned to the importance of appealing to the emotive 
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qualities of public consciousness.  These were traits not lost on Blair, who 
allegedly replaced Straw with Blunkett in an effort to mollify the media’s 
portrayal of the government as being weak on asylum and immigration and out of 
touch with the public mood. The interview with Mr Blunkett took place on 21 
March 2014. 
 
Charles Clarke was Home Secretary from December 2004 to May 2006, and was 
in office at the time of the 7/7 terrorist attacks. Hailed by some as a more 
moderate force than David Blunkett, Clarke shepherded two of the four pieces of 
terrorism legislation enacted after 9/11. Clarke’s first day at the Home Office 
coincided with the Law Lords’ ruling that the detainment of nine Belmarsh 
prisoners without charge or trial was in contravention to the HRA/ECHR. 47 This 
resulted in the alternative measure of control orders. Clarke also oversaw the 
Identity Cards Act 2006 during his time in office. In May 2006, Clarke lost his 
post over the foreign prisoners’ scandal, in which the Home Office released over a 
thousand foreign prisoners who should have been considered for deportation. The 
interview with Mr Clarke took place on 4 February 2014.  
 
Jacqui Smith was in office from June 2007 to June 2009, and was both the first 
female Home Secretary and the first to hold the post under the premiership of 
Gordon Brown. Smith had only been at the Home Office a few days prior to the 
terrorist attack on Glasgow International Airport. Unlike the 2001, 2005 and 2006 
legislation, the Counter-Terrorism Act 2008 was not the result of a particular set 
                                                 
47
 A and Others v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2004] UKHL 56. 
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of circumstances, but rather a means to strengthen existing laws. The interview 
with Ms Smith took place on 5 March 2014. 
 
3.5 Summary 
This chapter has provided a detailed discussion of the approaches and methods 
used in the research, which comprises quantitative and qualitative content 
analyses of six daily national newspapers. These are supplemented by in-depth 
interviews with four former home secretaries, who between them oversaw the 
introduction of five pieces of terrorism legislation enacted between 2000 and 
2008. Primarily, the research takes an inductive approach, and employs the 
methodological frameworks and framing definitions of Gamson and his 
colleagues (Gamson & Lasch, 1983; and Gamson & Modigliani, 1989), with 
particular reference to their construction of a signature matrix. This chapter has 
also provided a summary of the character and political affiliations of the 
newspapers that constitute the objects of analysis. Presented in chronological 
order, the following four chapters (chapters 4 to 7) present the findings of the 
press framing of the four case studies. 
  
125 
 
 
CHAPTER 4 
ANTI-TERRORISM, CRIME AND SECURITY ACT 2001 
 
It is indisputable that the events of 9/11 had a profound impact on how Western 
governments and their publics came to view both domestic security and foreign 
policy. Given New Labour’s turn toward more authoritarian criminal justice 
policies in their first parliamentary term in office,48 it was perhaps inevitable that 
their political response to the cataclysmic attacks on America would sit 
uncomfortably with their former commitment to safeguarding civil liberties and 
human rights (a commitment best expressed in the enactment of the Human 
Rights Act 1998).  
 
Addressing the nation on the evening of 11 September 2001, Tony Blair declared 
that Britain was to stand ‘shoulder to shoulder’ with America in eradicating the 
new terrorism in the world. This ‘war on terror’, which pitched the democratic 
West against individuals and states that supported the barbarism of Islamist 
terrorism, was to become ‘the most extensive counter-terrorist campaign in 
history and the most important conflict since the fall of the Berlin Wall’ (Jackson, 
2005: 8). However, unlike the Cold War, it was to be a war fought against an 
intangible enemy, consisting of a loose network of stateless cabals rather than a 
monolithic federation of states, as in the case of the former Soviet Union. Indeed, 
                                                 
48
 Discussion of New Labour’s draconian approach to criminal justice policy in their first term in 
office can be found in the introductory chapter. 
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defining who and what the enemy is, as well as where the enemy resides in the 
geographic sense, has proved an elusive concept both at a political level and 
within the public sphere (Croft and Moore, 2010: 823). This has resulted in some 
Western governments employing an ever-evolving series of threat narratives to 
justify precautionary policy responses in its perpetual fight against terrorism.49 
Chief among them was the UK government, which not only became one of 
America’s strongest allies, but was also the architect of some of the most 
draconian security measures in Europe. In the domestic context, therefore, the 
legal response to 9/11 came in the form of the Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security 
Act 2001 (hereafter referred to as ATCSA 2001), which was introduced in the 
Commons by the then Home Secretary, David Blunkett, on 12 November 2001.  
 
This chapter focuses on how the British press reported the ATCSA 2001. Before 
presenting the findings of the quantitative and qualitative content analyses of the 
news content, it provides an overview of the key provisions contained in the Act, 
as well as the different standpoints of the key actors involved in the debates. The 
key actors being the government, the political opposition, members of the House 
of Lords, as well as the police and security services, and to a lesser extent, civil 
liberties and Muslim interest groups. In terms of the news content study, the 
chapter has been organised as follows: firstly, it details the quantitative findings, 
which include the level of press attention devoted to the Bill and the key sources 
that shaped the news agenda. Secondly, it discusses the findings of the framing 
analysis, specifically looking at how the media framed the policy debates as well 
                                                 
49
 In the UK context, key threat narratives promulgated by the government have included inter alia, 
Al Qaeda as a centralised terrorist organisation with global reach, Iraq’s weapons of mass 
destruction, and post-7/7, the fear of the home grown terrorist threat.  
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as the editorial responses of particular newspapers. The chapter concludes with a 
consideration of the overall performance of the press, with special reference to the 
theoretical arguments discussed in previous chapters. To underpin particular 
points of discussion, this chapter also draws on some of the insights gleaned from 
the interview with David Blunkett, conducted by the author on the 21 March 
2014. 
 
4.1  Background to the ATCSA 2001 
In the immediate aftermath of 9/11, the primary concern of both Blair and 
Blunkett was to allay the fears of the British public without causing undue alarm. 
Blunkett affirms that this was vital for the credibility of the government, as 
‘unless people knew that we were absolutely on top of this, that we were up for it, 
we understood the risk, then they would turn on us’ (Interview with author, 21 
March 2014).  An approach that the ‘commentariat’ claimed was simply a cynical 
ploy by the government ‘to be seen to be doing something’ in their attempt to 
restore public confidence. As previously outlined in the introductory chapter, 
Blunkett’s emotive style of political communication and fervent approach to 
media relations, particularly chimes with the concepts relative to emotional 
governance (Richards, 2007). Both Blunkett and Blair viewed the media as the 
most powerful channel for message sending, and were keenly aware of the 
importance of fostering positive connections with journalists as a means not only 
to transmit their messages to the electorate but also to relay their preferred version 
of events. Blunkett confirms that one of the first lines of defence was to get the 
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media onside and to use them as a ‘conduit for reassurance, alert but not alarmed’. 
He goes on to say that:  
To do that you have to reassure the editors and the senior political 
correspondents that you knew what you were doing, and to have a 
reasonably open relationship with them.  Otherwise, all the stories would 
be that you hadn't got a clue what you were doing, and things were out of 
hand, which could make matters even worse…in a democracy the 
channels of communication and the messages that the population receive 
do matter. 
(Interview with author, 21 March 2014) 
 
In terms of the newspapers that held most sway over the government during the 
passage of the Bill, Blunkett singled out the Guardian as having the most 
resonance inside the Labour Party, especially in relation to issues around civil 
liberties and human rights. Whilst the Daily Telegraph and the Times were 
important due to their access to ‘voices from inside the security services’ (Ibid.). 
The tabloids, on the other hand, were of concern in terms of their ability to 
amplify a particular risk such as ‘individuals who were fostering hate’ (Ibid.).  
 
Vis-à-vis the legislative response, for Blunkett the new world order brought about 
by 9/11 revealed a fearsome new form of terrorism, which required an urgent 
redefining of existing terrorism laws. As Blunkett argues, the government needed 
to have new measures that could ‘deal with this new eventuality of people who 
wouldn't give a damn if they were apprehended and prosecuted, because 
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prosecution and conviction were meaningless to those who wanted to be suicide 
bombers’ (Ibid.).  Moreover, Blunkett asserts that in the immediate aftermath of 
9/11 he was receiving intelligence from the security services that an attack on 
British soil was imminent, and that the government had to try to ‘adjust very 
quickly to that possibility’ (Ibid.). Blunkett also believed that the role of Home 
Secretary came with an overriding responsibility to protect the public, as he 
argues: ‘You cannot be Home Secretary and not actually be driven by the critical 
importance of protecting people.  Because in the end, it lands on your desk, so you 
have an absolute imperative to be on top of the security issues’ (Ibid.). Another 
consideration was the public response to 9/11. Blunkett and other ministers, 
backed up by a slew of opinion polls, have affirmed that the pulse of the nation 
indicated that citizens were willing to sacrifice fundamental civil liberties in the 
interest of national security. 
 
Officially, then, the ATCSA 2001 was intended to create further provisions that 
would arm the government with laws to deal with this neoteric form of terrorism. 
In the bill’s explanatory notes, specific measures were designed to:  
 Cut off terrorist funding 
 Ensure that government departments and agencies can collect and 
share information required for countering the terrorist threat 
 Streamline relevant immigration procedures 
 Tackle those who seek to stir up religious and racial hatred or violence 
 Ensure the security of the nuclear and aviation industries 
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 Improve the security of dangerous substances that may be targeted or 
used by terrorists 
 Extend police powers available to relevant forces 
 Ensure that [they] can meet [their] European obligations in the area of 
police and judicial co-operation and [their] international obligations to 
counter bribery and corruption 
 Update parts of the UKs anti-terrorist powers.50 
 
Although many of the measures contained in the Bill gained little attention from 
parliamentarians and the media alike, there were several provisions that proved to 
be highly controversial. Press releases and briefing notes from civil liberty groups 
and Muslim interest groups, as well as statements emanating from both the lower 
and upper houses, voiced concern about how the government would achieve the 
required equilibrium between national security and civil liberties.51 Many also 
dismissed the practicability of the legislation, arguing that the UK had an array of 
existing laws in the areas of anti-terrorism, criminal justice and immigration that 
could deal adequately with the potential terrorist threat.52 However, both the 
                                                 
50
 Extract taken from the ‘Explanatory Notes’ to the ATCSA 2001. Online. Available HTTP: 
<http://www.parliament.the-stationery-office.co.uk/pa/cm200102/cmbills/049/en/02049x--.htm> 
(accessed 22 March 2014) 
51
 For example, writing in the Daily Telegraph on 16 November 2001, the shadow Home 
Secretary, Oliver Letwin, stated that his Party believed that the Bill ‘raise[d] deep questions about 
the balance between safety and liberty’ (p. 28). Similarly, the leader of the Liberal Democrats, 
Charles Kennedy, argued that he would only back the Bill if the government paid greater attention 
to getting the ‘balance right’ (BBC One's War Report, 25 November 2001). 
52
 For example, in their Second Report on the Bill, published on 16 November 2001, the Joint 
Committee on Human Rights (2001) argued that the Terrorism Act 2000 already contained 
provisions that ‘makes it a criminal offence triable in the United Kingdom to do anything to 
finance, prepare for or carry out acts of terrorism (very widely defined) anywhere in the world 
(para 6). Furthermore, increased powers for the police and security services to conduct ‘intrusive 
and other kinds of surveillance were thoroughly re-examined and extended in the Regulation of 
Investigatory Powers Act 2000’ (para 7). 
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Conservatives and the Liberal Democrats were broadly supportive of the proposed 
measures, with most of the oppositions to the Bill emanating from the House of 
Lords and NGOs. The police and the security services were also supportive of the 
proposals, as confirmed by the recollections of the Labour MP Chris Mullins who 
met with both Ben Gunn from the Association of Chief Police Officers and the 
head of MI5, Sir Stephen Lander, prior to the bill’s introduction to parliament 
(Mullins, 2010: 234–235). 
 
One of the major difficulties for the government was what to do about foreign 
nationals who were considered a significant risk to national security, but who 
could not be deported to countries with poor human rights records. In an attempt 
to overcome this dilemma, the government included a section (Part 4) that would 
allow for the indefinite detention without charge or trial of foreign terrorist 
suspects, as well as provisions that could severely hinder the appeals process.53 
However, the enactment of Part 4 required the derogation from Article 5 of the 
European Convention on Human Rights – protecting the individual’s right to 
liberty and security. Under the ECHR, such derogation is reserved for ‘public 
emergencies threatening the life of the nation’ (Article 15, ECHR). On its 
introduction, civil liberty advocates and parliamentarians from across the political 
spectrum questioned the implications of Part 4 on human rights, particularly its 
threat to the protections afforded by habeas corpus.54 Liberty argued that the 
                                                 
53
 One of the most controversial measures disallowed the detainee to access the evidence held 
against him/her. 
54
 On 16 December 2004, a committee of law lords found in favour of nine foreign detainees by 
declaring that that the indefinite detention of foreign suspects without charge or trial contravened 
the ECHR/HRA. This case, as well as the government’s response to it, will be further discussed in 
the next chapter. 
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measure would contravene the right to due process, as well as remove the ancient 
right of presumption of innocence. In its Briefing on the Bill, Liberty stated that, 
‘[t]he most dangerous measure being proposed [indefinite detention] will give the 
authorities the power to intern on the basis of suspicion, to imprison not on the 
basis of what a person has done but what some intelligence expert thinks they 
might do’ (Liberty, 2001: 3). Likening indefinite detention to the internment of 
Irish nationalists during the Northern Ireland troubles, Liberty goes on to argue 
that, ‘[t]his time those interned are likely all to be [Muslims]’ (Ibid.: 5). Just as 
Irish nationalists during the troubles were constructed as a ‘suspect community’, 
Liberty argued that the measure would unduly target Muslims, which ‘could have 
a disastrous effect upon community relations’ (Ibid.).55 Similarly, the Islamic 
Human Rights Commission (IHRC) maintained that most of the terrorist suspects 
detained under the new laws would likely be nationals from Muslim countries 
already defined ‘as rogue states that harbour terrorists’ (IHRC, 2001). 
Consequently, ‘[t]he targeting of those nationals and the disproportionate effect of 
the anti-terrorism measure upon them, is likely to create tension amongst the 
British Muslim communities who may again feel that Muslims are being 
intentionally subjected to adverse treatment’ (Ibid.). The IHRC also argued that 
the measure could ‘result in the incarceration of innocent asylum seekers who, 
having fled from oppression in their own homelands, will find themselves having 
draconian measures imposed upon them in the “safe haven” of the UK’ (Ibid.). 
                                                 
55
 In their 2004 report on the impact of anti-terrorism laws on the British Muslim population, 
Liberty argued that, ‘[t]he similarities between the treatment and experiences of the Irish 
community at the height of the IRA threat and of the British Muslim community today, are 
striking’ (Liberty, 2004: 3). The report also stated that, ‘[p]olice powers have been used 
disproportionately against the Muslim population in the UK’, with the majority of those arrested 
‘subsequently [being] released without charge, or charged with offences unrelated to terrorism’ 
(Ibid.). This, Liberty claimed, has resulted in the Muslim population being ‘stigmatised’ and 
‘feeling under siege’ (Ibid.). 
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Additional powers for the police and security services (both domestic and foreign 
agencies) was another contentious area, with campaigners arguing that under Part 
3 of the Bill (‘Disclosure of Information’), state agencies would be able to bypass 
legal safeguards to obtain personal data held by public bodies (Liberty, 2001: 4).  
Whilst under Part 11 of the Bill (‘Retention of Communications Data’) 
communications companies would be required to retain data in the event that it 
might be required for future investigations, which many argued, undermined the 
fundamentals of data protection and individual privacy (Ibid.). Challengers to 
these provisions also argued that the measures were too wide ranging and not 
specifically aimed at countering terrorism (Ibid.). 
 
Criticism was particularly levelled against the incitement to religious hatred 
clause (Part 5 of the Bill), which was intended to extend the laws pertaining to 
incitement to racial hatred to religious hatred. The press was particularly 
antagonistic to the measure because of its perceived threat to their most cherished 
right, the freedom of expression. After a double defeat in the Lords, the 
government conceded and removed the clause. For Blunkett, the hysteria whipped 
up in the media was the key factor in its withdrawal. Citing the Times as being 
especially provocative on the issue, he admits that there were underlying issues 
about how to get the balance right: 
You're almost bound to be caught as Home Secretary between the two 
pincer movements of people saying, "Well people should have entire free 
speech”…On the other hand, why aren’t you clamping down on these 
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people who are very clearly abusing the freedom of speech and 
communication to cause havoc in our community, and you're trying to 
walk that tightrope. 
(Interview with author, 21 March 2014) 
 
Blunkett made several concessions to get the Bill through the Lords, including a 
five-year sunset provision for the indefinite detention clause. Despite the 
difficulties, Blunkett concedes that ‘the combination of a genuine rigorous debate 
in the media, and a debate in the two houses of parliament, particularly it has to be 
said in the House of Lords, did make a difference to the outcome of the Bill.  It 
was a better bill’ (Ibid.). Contrastingly, many critics believed that the lack of 
parliamentary scrutiny hindered both the democratic process and the value of the 
legislation itself. 
 
4.2  Press Attention  
This section presents the results of the quantitative part of the news content study. 
For ease of reference, Table 4.1 illustrates the progression of the ATCSA 2001 
with the corresponding newspaper sample dates, and spans the period between 12 
November 2001 (the day the Bill was first introduced) and 15 December 2001 
(the day after the Bill gained the Royal Assent).  
 
 
 
135 
 
Table 4.1 Progression of the ATCSA 2001 with corresponding newspaper 
sample dates (12 November 2001 – 14 December 2001) 
PROGRESSION OF ACT NEWSPAPER SAMPLE 
DATES 
HC first reading: 12 November 2001 
HC second reading: 19 November 2001 
HC committee stage:  
21 November 2001 
26 November 2001 
HC third reading: 26 November 2001 
HL first reading: 26 November 2001 
HL second reading: 27 November 2001 
HL committee stage:  
28 November 2001 
29 November 2001 
3 December 2001  
4 December 2001 
HL report stage:  
6 December 2001 
10 December 2001 
HL third reading: 11 December 2001 
HC consideration of Lords amendments:  
12 December 2001 
13 December 2001 
HL consideration of Commons amendments:  
13 December 2001 
Royal assent: 14 December 2001 
13 November 2001 
20 November 2001 
 
22 November 2001 
27 November 2001 
 
 
28 November 2001 
 
29 November 2001 
30 November 2001 
4 December 2001 
5 December 2001 
 
7 December 2001 
11 December 2001 
12 December 2001 
 
13 December 2001 
14 December 2001 
 
 
15 December 2001 
TOTAL: 15 days 
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In terms of press attention, the broadsheets devoted significantly more coverage to 
the ATCSA 2001 than did the tabloids. The Times was the most prolific in terms 
of output, devoting 13,009 words (23 articles) to the debates surrounding the 
passage of the Bill. This was closely followed by the Guardian with 12,098 words 
(20 articles) and the Daily Telegraph with 9,365 words (19 articles). Out of the 
tabloids, the Daily Mail devoted 4,518 words (10 articles) to the debates 
compared with its redtop rivals, the Sun and the Mirror, with the Sun devoting 
1,662 words (10 articles) and the Mirror just 875 words (6 articles). Figure 4.1 
provides an illustrative representation of the number of words each newspaper 
devoted to the debates, and Table 4.2 shows the number of words and total 
number of articles per newspaper. 
 
Figure 4.1 Words devoted to the ATCSA 2001 by newspaper 
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Table 4.2 Total number of words and articles devoted to the ATCSA 2001 per 
newspaper 
Newspapers Total Words N Articles 
Daily Mail 4,518 10 
Daily Mirror 875 6 
Daily Telegraph 9,365 19 
The Guardian 12,098 20 
The Sun 1,662 10 
The Times 13,009 23 
Total 41,527 88 
 
 
Figure 4.2 shows a timeline of the number of articles that appeared in each 
newspaper over the duration of the passage of the Bill. In terms of which issues 
garnered the most attention, media interest peaked on 20 November 2001 (17 
articles) and 11 December 2001 (12 articles), which corresponded respectively 
with the bill’s second reading in the commons on the 19 November 2001 and the 
second day of the House of Lords report stage on 10 December 2001. On 20 
November, much of the focus was on the political conflict between Blunkett and 
Labour rebels, which attracted headlines such as ‘Blunkett barracked by Labour 
MPs’ in the Times (p. 4), ‘MPs savage terror bill’ made the front page in the 
Guardian and from the Mirror, ‘MPs’ fury at Blunkett terror laws’ (p. 2). Whilst 
on 11 December 2001, much of the coverage dealt with the government’s defeat 
in the Lords. 
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Figure 4.2 Number of articles appearing in all newspapers over the sample 
period (12 November 2001 – 14 December 2001) 
 
 
Table 4.3 shows the story location of news items by newspaper. In terms of story 
location, the three broadsheets were the only newspapers to devote front page 
coverage to the debates. On 20 November 2001, the front pages of both the 
Guardian and the Times included stories that focused on the political conflict in 
parliament. Whilst the front page of the Daily Telegraph on 22 November 2001 
focused on the ‘biggest backbench rebellion’ of the current parliament, resulting 
in Blunkett having to curtail some of his powers, and 11 December 2001 the focus 
switched to the opposition in the Lords to the religious hatred clause. Attention on 
this issue continued in the Guardian on 12 December 2001, and on 14 December 
2001, both the Guardian and the Daily Telegraph focused on Blunkett’s 
climbdown on the clause after its rejection in the Lords. Meanwhile, the Times 
included only a brief front page news item on 27 November 2001, announcing 
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that Labour rebels had joined forces with the opposition in voting against the 
religious hatred clause, whilst the focus on 7 December 2001 was on the Lords 
defeats. However, the vast amount of news items included in both the broadsheets 
and the tabloids were reserved for the inside pages. Very few articles appeared in 
the features pages or editorial sections.  
 
Table 4.3 Story location by newspaper (ATCSA 2001) 
Newspaper Front 
Page 
Inside 
Pages 
Feature Editorial Total  
Daily Mail 0 8 0 2 10 
Daily Mirror 0 6 0 0 6 
Telegraph 3 14 1 1 19 
The Guardian 3 12 4 1 20 
The Sun 0 9 1 0 10 
The Times 3 15 2 3 23 
Total 9 64 8 7 88 
 
 
Table 4.4 shows the format of the news items. The majority of the articles were 
defined as hard news, with few background or editorial pieces. Of the editorials, 
the Times included three, with the Daily Telegraph and the Times including one 
apiece. Among the tabloids, the Daily Mail included two editorials, but none 
appeared in the Mirror or the Sun. However, with the exception of the Mirror, 
there were a few feature articles appearing across the newspaper spectrum – three 
in the Daily Telegraph, and five each in the Guardian and the Times. Of the three 
tabloids, both the Daily Mail and the Sun included one a piece. 
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Table 4.4 Article format (ATCSA 2001) 
Newspaper Hard 
News 
Background Editorial Feature Total  
Daily Mail 6 1 2 1 10 
Daily Mirror 6 - - - 6 
Telegraph 15 - 1 3 19 
The Guardian 14 - 1 5 20 
The Sun 9 - - 1 10 
The Times 14 1 3 5 23 
Total 64 2 7 15 88 
 
 
Table 4.5 shows the type of author. Of the three titles that included pieces by 
guest opinion writers, the Daily Telegraph contained a piece on 20 November 
2001 by the novelist Robert Harris, the Guardian published pieces by David 
Blunkett on 20 November 2001 and his counterpart the then Conservative Shadow 
Home Secretary Oliver Letwin on 7 December 2001. Letwin also wrote a similar 
piece for the Times on 13 December 2001. Overall, staff writers penned the most 
articles. 
 
Table 4.5 Type of Author (ATCSA 2001) 
 
Newspaper 
Staff  
News 
Regular 
Opinion 
Guest 
Opinion 
Editorial Not 
Stated 
Total 
Daily Mail 4 2 - 2 2 10 
Daily Mirror 5 - - - 1 6 
Daily Telegraph 12 2 1 1 3 19 
The Guardian 14 3 2 1 - 20 
The Sun 1 1 - - 8 10 
The Times 13 3 1 3 3 23 
Total 49 11 4 7 17 88 
 
 
Table 4.6 shows the number and type of visuals that appeared in each newspaper. 
There was a notable lack of visuals accompanying the articles across the 
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newspapers, with ten visuals appearing, representing just ten per cent of the total 
news output. The Times featured the most visuals, four in total. These included 
two generic photos of Blunkett and one depicting a mass crowd of Muslims 
praying in Trafalgar Square in front of the National Gallery, which accompanied 
an article about the religious hatred clause, with the caption announcing that the 
clause would benefit Muslims. They also included a cartoon depicting Blunkett in 
Muslim religious dress with a rifle firing a plume of smoke with the caption: ‘Bin 
Blunkett targets terrorism’ replacing the o in terrorism with a bull’s-eye. Blunkett 
also appeared alongside articles in the Mirror and the Sun, as well as twice in the 
Daily Mail. The Daily Mail also included a cartoon under the banner ‘Britain will 
be under a state of emergency today’, depicting an elderly couple who had set up 
camp on the platform of Baker Street underground station. The depictions of a gas 
mask and a stash of Vera Lynn records by the side of a wind up record player with 
the caption: ‘Look mate. This is where we came during the last lot and we’re not 
leaving till the all clear’, have obvious connotations of the Blitz spirit. The 
Guardian included just one visual, which was of the Labour MP, Diane Abbott, in 
the context of a news item on the Labour rebels who voted against the Bill. 
Overall, visuals were not used to reinforce the textual content or to bolster 
particular frames, and in the Barthesian sense, captions were not used to anchor a 
particular meaning.56 The most surprising aspect was the lack of visuals depicting 
                                                 
56
 The structure of the press photograph relies on ‘at least one other structure, namely the text – 
title, caption or article’ to anchor a particular meaning (Barthes, 1977: 16). For Barthes, ‘all 
images are polysemous’, which ‘poses a question of meaning’ (Ibid.: 38–39). Thus, anchorage in 
the Barthesian sense of the term, is text that ‘directs the reader through the signifieds of the image, 
causing him to avoid some and receive others; by means of an often subtle dispatching, it remote-
controls him towards a meaning chosen in advance’ (Ibid.: 40).  
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the aftermath of the attacks on the Twin Towers, especially since the Bill was 
declared as the British response to 9/11.  
 
Table 4.6 Number and type of visuals per newspaper (ATCSA 2001) 
 
Visual Type 
DT Times Guard Mail Sun Mir Total 
Blunkett - 2 - 2 1 1 6 
Cartoon - 1 - 1 - - 2 
Muslims - 1 - - - - 1 
Labour Rebel - - 1 - - - 1 
Total - 4 1 3 1 1 10 
 
 
4.3  The Primary Definers of the News Agenda 
This section focuses on which sources shaped the parameters of debate, 
particularly taking into account the reporter tone toward the sources cited. It 
assesses the extent to which the assertions of the source were presented in terms 
of the inclusion or absence of reporter evaluative interpolation. The reporter tone 
combined with the frequency in which each actor appears can provide evidence to 
support or challenge the indexing hypothesis. For example, whilst a particular 
group may be seen to be the primary definers of the news agenda, the inclusion of 
the reporter tone variable might show that whilst their voices are particularly 
dominant, the reporter tone may well be deflating. 
 
As predicted, elite sources dominated the parameters of debate, with government 
sources (Downing Street, the Home Office and Labour MPs) appearing 90 times 
(123 paragraphs), constituting 39 percent of all actor appearances, and a 38 
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percent share of all paragraphs devoted to source citations. The second most 
represented source group was Conservative peers, appearing 38 times (55 
paragraphs), which accounted for 16 percent of all source appearances and a 17 
percent share of all paragraphs devoted to source citations. Conservative MPs 
represented 12 percent of all source citations, and an 11 percent share of all 
citation paragraphs. When considering the opposition parties at an aggregate level 
– the Conservatives and the Liberal Democrats – they constituted only 14 percent 
of all source appearances and 14 percent of the total paragraphs devoted to source 
citations. Therefore, as an oppositional player to the government, their role was 
greatly diminished in the press. Instead, priority – in terms of citation space – was 
given to the Conservative peers. 
 
Although many civil liberty and Muslim human rights groups issued several press 
releases and briefing notes during the course of the bill’s passage, the British press 
significantly underrepresented their voices – that is not to say, however, that their 
views were absent from the coverage, merely represented in an indirect form. The 
Daily Mail was the only newspaper to include a citation from a civil liberties 
group, with the Daily Telegraph and the Guardian being the only newspapers to 
include citations from Muslim interest groups. Given the centrality of the 
incitement to religious hatred clause and its impact on freedom of expression, this 
was a surprising finding. Table 4.7 shows the frequency of appearance and total 
paragraphs devoted to all source citations. 
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Table 4.7 Frequency of appearance and total paragraphs devoted to direct and 
indirect source citations (ATCSA 2001)57 
 
Source 
DT 
n  
(Pars) 
Times 
n  
(Pars) 
Guard 
n  
(Pars) 
Mail 
n  
(Pars) 
Sun 
n  
(Pars) 
Mir 
n  
(Pars) 
Total 
n  
(Pars) 
Civil Lib - - - 1 
(2) 
- - 1 
(2) 
Con Party 8  
(12) 
8 
(8) 
8 
(10) 
3 
(5) 
- - 27 
(35) 
Con Peers 17  
(24) 
6 
(9) 
9 
(15) 
3 
(4) 
2 
(2) 
1 
(1) 
38 
(55) 
Con Opp - - 1 
(1) 
- 
 
- - 1 
(1) 
Downing St. 4  
(4) 
1 
(1) 
- - 1 
(1) 
- 6 
(6) 
Home Office 8  
(14) 
17 
(22) 
20 
(28) 
10 
(18) 
4 
(9) 
5 
(5) 
64 
(96) 
Lab Party 5  
(5) 
4 
(4) 
8 
(9) 
2 
(2) 
1 
(1) 
- 20 
(21) 
Lab Peers 6 
(12) 
3 
(7) 
8 
(10) 
- 1 
(1) 
1 
(2) 
19 
(32) 
Lab Rebels 3 
(3) 
5 
(5) 
7 
(7) 
2 
(2) 
2 
(2) 
1 
(1) 
20 
(20) 
Law Lords - 1 
(1) 
- - - - 1 
(1) 
LD Party 1 
(2) 
2 
(2) 
3 
(5) 
- - - 6 
(9) 
LD Peers 7 
(13) 
3 
(3) 
5 
(6) 
- 1 
(1) 
- 16 
(23) 
Muslim 1 
(1) 
- 1 
(1) 
- 0 - 2 
(2) 
All Opp - - 2 
(2) 
- - - 2 
(2) 
Other Peers 2 
(9) 
1 
(1) 
2 
(2) 
- - - 5 
(12) 
Security - - - - 1 
(2) 
- 1 
(2) 
Speaker HC 2 
(2) 
1 
(1) 
- - - - 3 
(3) 
Total 64 
(101) 
52 
(64) 
74 
(96) 
21 
(33) 
13 
(19) 
8 
(9) 
232 
(322) 
 
                                                 
57
 NB. The first figure in each cell represents the number of times a particular source was cited, 
whilst the figure in brackets represents the total paragraphs devoted to each source group. 
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Figure 4.3 shows the proportion of pro-legislation, anti-legislation and 
mixed/unstated sources included in each newspaper based on frequency of 
appearance (a full breakdown of the sources and their positions on the legislation 
can be found in Appendix 7). Across all of the newspapers, pro-legislation sources 
accounted for 48 percent of the total share, anti-legislation 34 percent and 
mixed/unstated sources 18 percent. Individually, the Daily Telegraph included 
quotes from a higher proportion of anti-legislation sources (42 percent) compared 
with 36 percent for pro-legislation and 22 percent for mixed/unstated sources. 
Inversely, the Times devoted the most space to pro-legislation sources (46 
percent) and the least amount of space to anti-legislation sources (23 percent), 
with mixed/unstated sources constituting 31 percent of the share. Proportionally, 
the Guardian included the most pro-legislation sources (53 percent), with 35 
percent of space devoted to anti-legislation sources and 12 percent to 
mixed/unstated source positions. Across all the newspapers, the Daily Mail had 
the highest proportion of pro-legislation sources (67 percent), with 29 percent of 
space devoted to anti-legislation sources. The Sun and the Mirror also had a 
higher proportion of pro-legislation sources than the broadsheets, with 54 percent 
and 63 percent of all their respective sources reflecting a pro-legislation stance, 
with anti-legislation sources constituting 38 percent of the share across both titles.  
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Figure 4.3 Source position on legislation as proportion of frequency of 
appearance (ATCSA 2001) 
 
 
Across all the newspapers, Figure 4.4 shows that 91 percent of the reporter tone 
toward the sources cited was coded as straight, with 6 percent of all source 
citations coded as deflating and 3 percent as reinforcing of source assertions. 
However, this is not a remarkable finding. As stated in the previous chapter, the 
preponderance of straight reporting has been commonplace in studies employing a 
similar tone measure. 
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Figure 4.4 Reporter tone toward all sources across all newspapers as percentage 
(ATCSA 2001) 
 
 
Table 4.8 illustrates the reporter tone toward the different source positions in each 
newspaper.  As Figure 4.4 revealed, the vast majority of articles contained a 
straight reporter tone toward the sources cited. When looking at the newspapers 
individually, the most surprising finding was the absence of any evaluative 
comments that supported or undermined the assertions of a source in the Sun and 
the Mirror, especially as both titles are known for their overtly opinionated style. 
Similarly, the Daily Mail also had a high preponderance of straight reporting, with 
the only occurrence of a reinforcing tone reserved for a Home Office source. On 
the two occasions where the reporter tone was coded as deflating toward a source, 
one was directed at the Conservative Party and the other a Labour MP. Out of the 
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broadsheets, only the Times included evaluative comments that were reinforcing 
of a source assertion, twice toward Home Office sources, twice toward the Liberal 
Democrat Party and once toward the Conservative Party. Of the two occurrences 
of deflating evaluative comments, one was directed at a Conservative peer and the 
other toward a crossbench peer, the former being anti-legislation and the latter’s 
position coded as not stated. On three occasions, the Daily Telegraph made 
deflating evaluative remarks against government source assertions, once against 
the Conservative Party and once against the Speaker of the House of Commons.  
Whilst the Guardian made one deflating comment toward a Labour rebel, with 
four directed at assertions made by government sources. 
 
Table 4.8 Reporter tone toward pro- and anti-legislation sources (ATCSA 2001) 
 
Source Position 
DT Times  Guard  Mail  Sun Mir  Total 
 
Pro-Legislation 
 
23 
 
24 
 
39 
 
14 
 
7 
 
5 
 
112 
        Straight 20 22 35 12 7 5 101 
        Reinforcing - 2 - 1 - - 3 
        Deflating 3 - 4 1 - - 8 
 
Anti-Legislation 
 
27 
 
12 
 
26 
 
6 
 
5 
 
3 
 
79 
        Straight 27 11 25 6 5 3 77 
        Reinforcing - - - - - - - 
        Deflating - 1 1 - - - 2 
 
Mixed/Unstated 
 
14 
 
16 
 
9 
 
1 
 
1 
 
- 
 
41 
        Straight 12 12 9 - 1 - 34 
        Reinforcing - 3 - - - - 3 
        Deflating 2 1 - 1 - - 4 
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4.4 Media Framing of Policy Debates 
This section discusses the ways in which the press framed the political debates 
surrounding the passage of the Bill. Beginning with an overview of the findings of 
the content analysis, it then provides a comparative analysis of the key themes or 
depictions inherent across the newspaper sample. 
 
Across the entire newspaper sample, the politics frame predominated, amounting 
to 34 percent of all articles, whilst 28 percent of the articles did not display any 
significant framing or reasoning devices relevant to a particular frame. Just seven 
percent of all articles displayed exclusive elements of the security frame, 16 
percent the civil liberties frame, with mixed frames constituting the remaining 15 
percent of the articles. Figure 4.5 provides an illustrative representation of which 
frames predominated across the sample. When comparing the broadsheets and the 
tabloids, five percent of all articles in the broadsheets and 12 percent of all articles 
in the tabloids reflected the security frame. The ratio is inverted for the civil 
liberties frame, where 21 percent of the broadsheets output framed the debates as 
a civil liberties issue compared with just four percent of all articles in the tabloids. 
There was a heavy slant towards the politics frame in both the broadsheets and the 
tabloids, constituting 37 percent and 27 percent of their respective outputs. 
However, there was a higher prevalence of frameless articles across the tabloids 
sample, 38 percent, compared with 24 percent for the broadsheets. This can partly 
be explained by the tabloids higher use of the brief news format, as well as the 
tendency to downplay or ignore political news that might not contain enough 
newsworthy elements for their readership. The high proportion of articles 
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reflecting the politics frame across the entire sample could also be due in part to 
audience demand – on the basis that conflict has a higher news value than the 
mundane processes of politics, coupled with the increasing apathy toward politics 
amongst the British public. 
 
Figure 4.5 Predominant frames (%) across all newspapers, broadsheets and 
tabloids (ATCSA 2001) 
 
 
Table 4.9 shows the predominant frames per newspaper. The security frame was 
most prevalent in the Times and the Daily Mail with two articles apiece. Only one 
security-slanted article was published in the Guardian, but this was a guest 
opinion piece by David Blunkett. Despite the Sun’s overt support of the 
government’s position, only one article was defined as reflecting an exclusive 
security frame.  The Daily Telegraph and the Mirror did not include any articles 
that focused exclusively on security perspectives. The civil liberties frame made 
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over twice as many appearances as the security frame, and was particularly 
prevalent in the three broadsheets. It made just one appearance in the Daily Mail 
but was non-existent in the two redtops. As hypothesised, the civil liberties frame 
was most prevalent in the Guardian, but surprisingly absent from the Mirror, a 
tabloid that is generally seen as being more sympathetic to civil rights issues. 
Leaving the ‘none or insufficient frames present’ category aside, as noted above, 
the politics frame was the most prevalent across the whole newspaper sample, 
occurring most frequently in the Daily Telegraph. 
 
Table 4.9 Predominant frames per newspaper (ATCSA 2001) 
 
Frames 
DT Times Guard Mail Sun Mir Total 
Security - 2  1 2 1 - 6 
Civil Liberties 4 4 5 1 - - 14 
Politics 10 7 6 3 2 2 30 
Sec/CL/Pol - 1 2 - 1 - 4 
Sec/CL - 1 - 1 - 1 3 
Sec/Pol - 1 - - 1 - 2 
CL/Pol 1 1 1 - - 1 4 
None 4 6 5 3 5 2 25 
Total 19 23 20 10 10 6 88 
 
 
Figure 4.6 presents the quotient of frames per newspaper. The following presents 
the percentages with the exclusion of the mixed frame constituent. Twenty-one 
percent of the Daily Telegraph’s coverage reflected the civil liberties frame, and 
53 percent the politics frame. In the Times, 9 percent of articles reflected the 
security frame, 17 percent the civil liberties frame and 30 percent the politics 
frame. The Guardian devoted more space to civil liberty perspectives, with 25 
percent of all articles reflecting this frame, and 30 percent reflecting the politics 
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frame. Thirty percent of all articles in the Daily Mail also reflected the politics 
frame, with 20 percent devoted to security perspectives and 10 percent to civil 
liberties.   The Sun and the Mirror had the highest proportion of frameless articles, 
50 percent and 33 percent correspondingly.  
 
Figure 4.6 Composition (%) of frames per newspaper (ATCSA 2001) 
 
 
Figure 4.7 shows the predominate frames at an aggregate level. When the mixed 
frames are combined with the three meta frames (security, civil liberties and 
politics) the findings show that the politics frame is still the most prevalent across 
the newspaper sample. The exception being the Daily Mail, where at an aggregate 
level, no single frame dominated the coverage, with each frame gaining more or 
less equal prominence.   
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In relation to the other two tabloids, half of the articles in the Sun did not display 
any framing or reasoning devices of a particular frame, whilst four reflected the 
politics frame, three the security frame and just one article contained elements 
relevant to the civil liberties frame. The Mirror devoted the least amount of 
coverage to the debates, with just one article displaying the security frame, two 
the civil liberties frame, three the politics frame, and two articles were coded as 
frameless. 
 
The Daily Telegraph was the only newspaper whose news items did not contain 
any elements of the security frame. At an aggregate level, the politics frame 
predominated with 11 articles displaying relevant framing or reasoning devices. 
Five articles displayed elements of the civil liberties frame, whilst four were 
coded as frameless.  
 
Figure 4.7 Predominate frames at an aggregate level (ATCSA 2001) 
 
Telegraph Times Guardian Mail Sun Mirror
Security 0 5 3 3 3 1
Civil Liberties 5 7 8 2 1 2
Politics 11 10 9 3 4 3
None 4 6 5 3 5 2
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As detailed above, the politics frame was the most prevalent frame at an aggregate 
level. In terms of which themes or depictions were most heavily represented, the 
majority of the focus was on the political conflict between the government and 
elites, and to a lesser extent between the government and Labour rebels. This was 
especially the case in the three broadsheets. Negative references to the Human 
Rights Act or the ECHR, as well as to the EU or the European Court of Human 
Rights were especially prevalent in the Murdoch press, and used as a means to 
criticise New Labour’s policies within these areas. Similarly, there was also a 
heavy focus on the government’s ‘weak’ asylum and immigration policy in both 
the Times and the Sun. Whilst the Guardian also focused on the government’s 
abuse of power and draconian laws in the wider context. 
 
The most prevalent theme or depiction in relation to the civil liberties frame was 
the lack of parliamentary scrutiny especially in terms of the impact this would 
have on the legislation itself rather than as a critique of New Labour’s 
modernising project. Again, this was most prevalent in the three broadsheets. This 
was closely followed by the ‘excessive state powers’ theme and the concern that 
the provisions contained in the Bill were too wide-ranging. Also, there was a 
focus on how the legislation would compromise civil liberties in general. 
 
In relation to the security frame, the two most prevalent themes related to the 
perceived threat level. The first theme reflected the urgency with which the Bill 
needed to be passed, with the second depicting the government’s proposals as a 
proportionate response to the threat level. In relation to the need for urgent 
155 
 
legislation, this was most prevalent in the Times and the Daily Mail, whilst the 
proportionate response theme had most prominence in the Murdoch press.  
 
4.5  Editorial and Commentary Standpoints 
This section focuses on the explicit ideological direction of each newspaper, as 
expressed in the editorials and commentary pieces. Where limited or no editorial 
or commentary content has been included, examples of article headlines and 
subject matter will be substituted to provide a snapshot of characteristic coverage. 
 
Daily Telegraph: On 13 November 2001, an article focused on opposition MPs 
objection to Blunkett’s announcement of the new security measures via the media 
rather than before the Commons, with a political sketch focusing on Blunkett’s 
absence from the House to the annoyance of opposition MPs and Labour 
backbenchers. On 20 November 2001, Frank Johnson’s political sketch explicitly 
accused the Home Office of scaremongering by introducing ‘incomprehensible 
measures’ that are being rushed through parliament because they ‘Must Be Seen 
To Be Doing Something About It…the “it” being, in this case, the September 11 
events’ [Capital letters in the original]. The same article also included the oft-cited 
phrase by the Labour MP Kevin Hughes who denounced those opposed to the Bill 
as ‘the yoghurt-eating, muesli-eating, Guardian-reading fraternity’ (20 November 
2001, p. 16).  
 
Another opinion piece that appeared on 20 November 2001 was by the writer 
Robert Harris, who focused exclusively on the ways in which the proposed 
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measures would infringe ancient civil liberties. Attacking the proposals that would 
require internet service providers to retain records of individuals search history 
and emails – which the police would be able to examine in the interests of 
national security – Harris warns that ‘the prevailing atmosphere of war hysteria’ 
will lead to ‘a kind of technological totalitarianism’, where individual liberties are 
‘permitted only under Home Office licence’ (20 November 2001, p. 25). 
Interestingly, Harris was part of the original New Labour project, and a close 
friend of both Blair and Peter Mandelson. Therefore, to compose a piece for an 
avowed Tory newspaper criticising the policies of his erstwhile friend gives 
succour to the stance taken by the Daily Telegraph. In his opening paragraph, 
Harris mentions Hitler’s belief that fighting terrorism can be a positive means in 
ensuring that ‘Germany will remain in a state of perpetual alertness’ (Ibid.). The 
point that Harris is making is that ‘all governments, be they elected or imposed, 
strive ceaselessly to maximise their power, and never is this more easily done than 
in wartime’ (Ibid.). 
 
Editorially, the Daily Telegraph argued that, whilst some of the measures 
proposed were ‘sensible’, the government had failed to make a strong enough case 
‘to justify greater intrusion’ into the private lives of British citizens (30 November 
2001, p. 29). The newspaper took particular issue with the incitement to religious 
hatred clause on the basis that it could hinder freedom of expression, as well as 
the provision allowing police greater powers to access private data held by public 
bodies. Another major point of disagreement was the indefinite detention without 
trial clause, which it viewed as a ‘direct attack on the ancient legal right of habeas 
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corpus’ (Ibid.). Like the Daily Mail (see below), the Daily Telegraph also use the 
editorial to attack the European Convention on Human Rights, which, due to the 
UK being party, meant that the deportation of terrorist suspects to countries with 
poor human rights records was disallowed. This had, they claimed, led the 
government to propose a ‘thoroughly illiberal and unjust’ clause (Ibid.).  
 
The Times: Overall, the Times was supportive of the Bill and of the government 
in general. In an editorial entitled ‘Blunkett’s Bill: A necessary measure to deny 
terrorists a haven in Britain’, the newspaper is explicit in its advocacy of both 
Blunkett as Home Secretary, which it extols as having argued his case with 
‘admirable clarity’, as well as of the ‘balanced and proportional’ measures 
contained in the Bill (20 November 2001, p. 17). Whilst voicing its approval of 
the government’s decision to derogate from Article 5 of the European Convention 
on Human Rights, the Times also uses the editorial to deride the government’s 
previous judgement to incorporate the Convention into domestic law. The 
editorial argues: ‘Britain has been caught in a trap of its own making’, which has 
led to the UK being ‘bound not only by the Convention itself but also by its 
subsequent interpretation by the Strasbourg judges’ (Ibid.). 
 
The Guardian: In the interest of balance, the newspaper provides space for 
opinion pieces by David Blunkett, entitled ‘This is not internment’ (20 November 
2001, p. 17), as well as the shadow home secretary Oliver Letwin, who states that, 
‘We want the terror bill to become law. But only if the onslaught on our civil 
liberties is first removed’ (7 December, p. 22). However, editorially, the Guardian 
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had contempt for both sides of the political equation, albeit for different reasons. 
Blunkett, for his support of draconian measures, and for his service to a party that 
had sacrificed its leftist principles in the pursuit of power, and Letwin for 
belonging to an ineffectual faction of the political class that no longer has the 
power to challenge the autocracy that is New Labour. 
 
On 20 November 2001, Simon Hoggart is critical of the lack of time allowed for 
parliamentary scrutiny of the Bill. In a sideways swipe at New Labour’s turn 
towards the right on the political spectrum, he states: ‘The bill is likely to be law 
by this time next week. Even rightwing MPs felt that, when it came to abolishing 
a right established in Magna Carta 786 years ago, they should spend slightly 
longer than seven days on the job’ (20 November 2001, p. 4). 
 
Hugo Young, in his opinion piece entitled ‘Once lost, these freedoms will be 
impossible to restore’ is also critical of New Labour’s move towards the right. 
Highlighting the shared stance of the ‘ultra-hard right’ US attorney general John 
Ashcroft and Blunkett, a stalwart of the ‘old Labour left’, he accuses both of being 
‘fellow spirits, hungry for power in the name of a security that piously throws to 
the jailers the freedom it’s supposed to be defending’ (11 December 2001, p. 14). 
Comment is also made on the role of the Commons and the Lords in terms of the 
extent to which each House questioned the proposed measures. Highly critical of 
the Commons, who in his view, ‘have been useless’ and ‘showed such utter 
negligence towards so impressive a list of fundamental principles’, with the 
Lords, on the other hand, praised for their serious debate, formidable resilience 
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and moral standing, who have been far more effective scrutinisers, questioners 
and amenders of the Bill than the lower house (Ibid.).  
 
This theme is repeated in an editorial on 15 December 2001, entitled: ‘The tame 
parliament: MPs need to reassert their independence’ (15 December 2001, p. 21). 
Attacking the incompetence of parliament whilst praising the accomplishment of 
the House of Lords, it argues: 
Parliament, but not the government, has come well out of this week. The 
anti-terrorism Bill was a classic example of a piece of legislation that was 
drafted too quickly, too broadly and too loosely. It cried out to be 
scrutinised and debated properly and, up to a point, it was - but only in the 
unelected House of Lords. The performance of the upper house in the last 
three weeks has been admirable in the circumstances, which is a lot more 
than can be said for the lower one. If it had all been left to the elected 
House of Commons, the people's liberties would have been plundered 
even more shamefully than they have been in David Blunkett's 
controversial new law.  
(Ibid.) 
 
However, the majority of the editorial focuses on the wider state of modern 
politics under the New Labour government. Attacking the ‘culture of autocratic 
centralism’ of Blair and his cohorts, it warns that the political system in Britain is 
becoming ever more presidential, run from the top down to the detriment of any 
proper parliamentary procedure. It warns that even the political media are in the 
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service of the New Labour apparatus, with the only watchdog being the ‘almost 
wholly autonomous but parallel Gordon Brown government’, albeit one which has 
an ‘identically autocratic culture’. In a special appeal to Labour MPs, the 
Guardian writes:  
The Commons…have allowed themselves to become the servants of a new 
form of autocratic power, in the shape of the executive presidency. MPs - 
Labour MPs in particular - therefore have to decide whom they serve. Do 
they serve their voters and the parliamentary system which is intended to 
protect local and sectional interests? Or do they serve the executive 
presidency (either version of it) which tells them what they must do, think, 
and say? They cannot do both. The future of our country rests on the 
choice they make.  
(Ibid.) 
 
The Daily Mail: In an editorial on 20 November 2001, the Daily Mail declared 
that they were ‘broadly’ supportive of the measures contained in the Bill, stating 
that ‘These are dangerous times and they demand special measures’ (20 
November 2001, p. 10). However, in justifying the measures, the Daily Mail also 
use it as an opportunity to attack the meddling role played by the European Court 
of Human Rights in British affairs. It states: 
But is it not absurd that he [Blunkett] is having to introduce a draconian 
measure like the right to jail foreign terrorist suspects without trial, 
because we have handed over to European courts the basic right to remove 
from 'our home' those whose presence we do not want?  
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(Ibid.) 
 
The perceived power of ‘Brussels’ over domestic constitutional matters is a theme 
that recurs in an editorial on 11 December 2001, where it strongly objects to 
‘foreign’ police having the power to pry on British citizens. Indeed, whilst the 
Daily Mail continue its ‘broad’ support of Blunkett’s ‘sensible measures’ it goes 
on to warn that the ‘whole enterprise is at risk of being tainted by others that have 
little bearing on anti-terrorism’ (11 December 2001, p. 10). Specific criticism is 
levelled at the incitement to religious hatred clause, which it regards as ‘a heavy-
handed restriction on free speech [that] would prove unworkable in practice’ 
(Ibid.). There was also concern that the government was sneaking in other crime 
related clauses that had little bearing on anti-terrorism, such as personal data held 
by hospitals, arguing that measures encroaching on our private lives are ‘utterly 
unacceptable’ and could ‘set a dangerous precedent for further prying’ (Ibid.). 
Another major theme was the concern over the lack of proper parliamentary 
scrutiny due to the haste in which the legislation was being debated. 
 
On 13 November 2001, the day after the Bill was introduced to parliament, the 
headline in the Daily Mail declared: ‘Blunkett defiant over crackdown on the 
enemy within’, with much of the content of the article supportive of the 
government’s position. For example, the first half presents Blunkett’s perspective, 
with oppositional viewpoints that expressed concerns about the infringement of 
civil liberties appearing towards the end of the article. However, the majority of 
the latter half of the article reflects Oliver Letwin’s appeal to derogate from the 
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section in the Human Rights Act that disallowed the deportation of foreign 
terrorist suspects to countries with poor human rights records. Later coverage 
focused on Blunkett’s defeat in the House of Lords, with headlines declaring a 
‘Bruising for Blunkett’ (11 December 2001, p. 4) and ‘Blunkett is forced into 
terror U-turn’ (14 December 2001, p. 6). 
 
The Sun: In terms of the direction of opinion pieces, a feature article by the 
regular columnist Richard Littlejohn that appeared on 13 November 2001 was 
explicit in its support for the Bill, contending that the curtailing of civil liberties 
was acceptable in times of national emergency. Equating asylum seekers, also 
described as the ‘enemy within’, with terrorism, Littlejohn surmises: ‘But these 
are not normal times and the fact that known terrorists are at large in this country, 
often claiming asylum and living on benefits, is an affront to all decent people as 
well as a threat to national security’ (13 November 2001, p. 17).  
 
The ‘enemy within’ theme reoccurs on 20 November 2001, where the focus 
switches to how the legislation will deal with British Muslim ‘traitors’ who return 
to the UK after fighting alongside the Taliban or Al Qaeda (20 November 2001, p. 
8).  
 
The Mirror: Most of the articles focused on either intra party conflict or the 
dissension between the government and the House of Lords. These themes are 
illustrated by the headlines: ‘Terror Revolt’ (27 November 2001, p. 6), ‘Terror 
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Laws Spiked’ (7 December 2001, p. 4) and ‘Blunkett in Climbdown’ (14 
December 2001, p. 4). 
 
4.6  Summary 
This chapter has analysed the press coverage of the passage of the ATCSA 2001, 
and found that the overwhelming focus was on party politics with a particular 
emphasis on the political conflict between the government and the House of 
Lords, and to a lesser extent between the government and oppositional factions 
within the Labour party. Whilst some attention was paid to the civil liberties 
aspects, this, as well as issues pertaining to national security, were secondary to 
the politics frame. That said, the editorial and commentary analyses revealed that 
there was broad support for the government’s position from the Daily Mail and 
the Murdoch press. The Guardian mainly reflected an anti-government stance, 
with editorials or commentary used as a conduit to criticise the politics of New 
Labour more generally. Although the Daily Telegraph agreed with some of the 
measures proposed, the views expressed followed the hitherto anti-government 
line. 
 
In terms of press attention, the broadsheets devoted more copy to the debates than 
did the tabloids, and were the only sector of the press to include front page 
coverage. As mentioned, most of the peak coverage was in relation to the political 
conflict motif. The majority of news items were defined as hard news, with only a 
handful of editorials and opinion pieces – mostly contained in the Guardian and 
the Times. A surprising aspect was the lack of visuals accompanying the articles, 
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with only ten percent of articles comprising images, especially given that a large 
element of the dramatic discourse around 9/11 relied on the iconic imagery of the 
attacks unfolding in real time. 
 
Source-relations were as predicted, with elite sources dominating the parameters 
of debate. Government sources were most prevalent followed by Conservative 
peers, whilst the views of Conservative and Liberal Democrat MPs were largely 
subordinated. The criticism levelled at the political opposition during the debates 
could partly explain why this was the case, namely the lack of protest against the 
Bill meant that their newsworthiness was diminished in the eyes of the press. 
There were also very few citations from civil liberties and Muslim rights 
campaigners.  Proportionately, pro-legislation sources accounted for nearly half of 
all citations, with anti-legislation sources making up a third of the share. As 
expected, the high percentage of the reporter tone was straight, with the 
reinforcing comments reserved for pro-legislation and mixed/unstated sources, 
both of whom also received the majority of the deflating reporter interpolations.  
 
Regarding the view from the Home Office, Blunkett affirms that he was most 
sensitive to the coverage in the broadsheets (particularly the Guardian), and 
believes that he largely failed to get his message across to this sector. In his mind, 
this was partly due to cynicism about the role of government in message sending, 
but also because the critics failed to grasp the true nature of the terrorism threat. 
According to Blunkett: 
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The subtlety of reassuring people by indicating that you understood their 
fears, whilst not pandering to them.  I don't think they got that, I think the 
tabloids were just the tabloids, so it was a story.  It was more important to 
me that the leading figures in the broadsheets got it…But to influence 
them, to understand that these things were not black and white, that it 
wasn't, are you in favour of civil liberties or are you against, it's just 
absurd.  That was a struggle, and I don't think I necessarily succeeded, 
particularly the Guardian and the Independent.  They genuinely thought 
that we were out to use the genuine threat as a way of carrying through 
draconian acts. 
(Interview with author, 21 March 2014) 
 
In terms of the theoretical implications, on the face of it the dominance of 
government sources in the press coverage lends support to the government-driven 
model. However, perceptions that government sources shaped the news agenda 
are belied by the findings of the framing analysis. Despite the dominance of 
government sources, there is little evidence to suggest that they had any 
substantial success in shaping the news agenda. Although there were pockets of 
support for the Bill across the newspaper sample, a truer reflection of the 
government’s success in terms of message sending would have been a higher 
incidence of the security frame. This leads to the conclusion that there are 
occasions when the ‘importance of sources should not be overstated’ (Robinson et 
al., 2010: 165). Indeed, this correlates with some of the findings of the Iraq War 
study, where the overreliance on elite sources could also be found in media 
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coverage that reflected oppositional and independent reporting (Ibid.). For this 
particular case study, the overarching evidence provides support for the 
independent model. On one level, the framing of the debates suggest that even 
when the country was in the grip of a common threat, the press maintained its 
adversarial political role. However, by failing to subject the legislation to more 
robust scrutiny, it could be argued that the press mainly failed in its role as 
political watchdog. 
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CHAPTER 5 
THE PREVENTION OF TERRORISM ACT 2005 
 
By the end of 2004, one of the most controversial provisions contained in the 
ATCSA 2001 – the indefinite detention of foreign terrorist suspects – was to 
prove problematic for the government. A 2003 review of the legislation 
undertaken by a committee of Privy Councillors, headed by Lord Newton, 
criticised Part 4 of the Act for not being a ‘sustainable way of addressing the 
problem of terrorist suspects’, especially in regards to its discriminatory and 
exclusive focus on foreign nationals (Privy Counsellor Review Committee, 2003: 
5). In 2004, the Joint Committee on Human Rights reached the same conclusions, 
arguing that new legislation should be drafted that dealt with all terrorism, 
‘without derogating indefinitely from important human rights obligations’ (Joint 
Committee on Human Rights, 2004: 3). Blunkett’s response was characteristically 
emphatic – he not only defended Part 4 in the strongest terms but also claimed 
that its removal would result in him ‘failing in [his] duty of public protection’.58 
The matter might have rested there had it not been for the intervention of a 
committee of nine Law Lords,59 which, on 16 December 2004, found in favour of 
nine foreign detainees held in Belmarsh prison by declaring that their indefinite 
detention without charge or trial contravened the HRA and the ECHR.60  In 
                                                 
58
 Home Office Press Notice STATO55-2003, Response to the Report of The Anti-Terrorism, 
Crime And Security Act 2001 Review, Rt Hon David Blunkett MP, 18 December 2003. 
59
 Eight of the nine Law Lords agreed to the ruling. 
60
 A and Others v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2004] UKHL 56.  
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summing up, the former Lord Chief Justice, Lord Bingham said that: ‘the decision 
to detain one group of suspected international terrorists, defined by nationality or 
immigration status, and not another’ was indefensible and contrary to Britain’s 
‘obligations under international law within the meaning of article 15 of the 
European Convention.’61 Whilst in his scathing summation, Lord Nicholls 
declared: ‘Indefinite imprisonment without charge or trial is anathema in any 
country which observes the rule of law. It deprives the detained person of the 
protection a criminal trial is intended to afford.’62 
 
Press reaction to the ruling tended to reiterate established leitmotifs, with the 
Daily Telegraph urging the government to prioritise the rights of UK citizens 
above the rights of foreign terrorist suspects, but reserving most of its vitriol for 
New Labour’s poor judgement in incorporating the ECHR into British law. The 
Daily Mail also shared the Daily Telegraph’s sentiments that the government had 
played into the hands of the judiciary with the ratification of the HRA. Regarding 
the Murdoch press, the Sun was particularly derisive of the judges’ decision, 
accusing them of undermining the safety of the nation by putting the interests of 
foreign terrorists above those of innocent British nationals, whilst the Times used 
its editorial to call on the government to tighten up its asylum and immigration 
policies. As expected, the Mirror and the Guardian, the leftist-libertarian arm of 
the press, greeted the ruling as a triumph for human rights. However, all of the 
newspapers pondered on how the government would deal with the conundrum of 
the Belmarsh detainees in light of the ruling. The statutory response came in the 
                                                 
61
 Ibid [68] (Lord Bingham). 
62
 Ibid [74] (Lord Nicholls). 
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form of control orders, a highly contestable provision included in the Prevention 
of Terrorism Act 2005 (hereafter referred to as PTA 2005). 
 
This chapter focuses on how the British press reported the PTA 2005. Before 
presenting the findings of the quantitative and qualitative content analyses of the 
news content, it provides an overview of the key provisions contained in the Act, 
as well as the different standpoints of the key actors involved in the debates. The 
key actors being the government, the political opposition, members of the House 
of Lords, as well as the police and security services, and to a lesser extent, civil 
liberties and Muslim interest groups. In terms of the news content study, the 
chapter has been organised as follows: firstly, it details the quantitative findings, 
which include the level of press attention devoted to the Bill and the key sources 
that shaped the news agenda. Secondly, it discusses the findings of the framing 
analysis, specifically looking at how the media framed the policy debates as well 
as the editorial responses of particular newspapers. The chapter concludes with a 
consideration of the overall performance of the press, with special reference to the 
theoretical arguments discussed in previous chapters. To underpin particular 
points of discussion, this chapter also draws on some of the insights gleaned from 
the interview with the then Home Secretary, Charles Clarke, conducted by the 
author on the 4 February 2014. 
 
5.1  Background to the PTA 2005 
The Law Lords’ verdict on A and Others v Secretary of State for the Home 
Department [2004] also coincided with Charles Clarke’s first day at the Home 
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Office.63 Reflecting on the Law Lords ruling, Clarke felt that it was necessary to 
honour their judgement rather than to challenge it further. As Clarke contends:  
I thought it was my role as Home Secretary not to criticise judges’ 
decisions or for that matter chief constables’ decisions.  I don’t think the 
Home Secretary should provide roving commentary on the decisions that 
are taken to prosecute, to not prosecute, whatever, in individual cases.  I 
think it is the role of the Home Secretary to supervise the whole system.  
(Interview with author, 4 February 2014) 
 
The difficulty was deciding which measures would be the most effective in light 
of the Belmarsh ruling, with Clarke eventually opting for control orders.64 
Although a controversial approach, Clarke conceded that any policy choice would 
have been contentious. On matters of national security, Clarke accepted that his 
role as Home Secretary would inevitably involve ‘perpetually dealing with the 
tensions between civil liberties and security’ (Ibid.).  Defending the government’s 
decision to give ‘more emphasis to the security threats’ (Ibid.), like his 
predecessor, Clarke also paid considerable attention to public sentiment, which he 
believed was largely supportive of the government’s overall mission.65 Clarke 
found that, despite his constituents being amongst the most liberal in the country, 
they were broadly accepting of the realpolitik of the security threat, claiming that 
‘even people who were more sharply critical of what we were doing accepted that 
                                                 
63
 Clarke had replaced Blunkett who had resigned a day earlier over allegations that he had abused 
his ministerial position by fast tracking a visa application for his paramour’s nanny. 
64
 Clarke said that prior to his arrival at the Home Office several options had already been 
considered by civil servants and their legal advisors in the event that the Law Lords ruled against 
the Home Secretary, with one of these options being control orders (Interview with author, 4 
February 2014). 
65
 Clarke also drew inferences from the polling data during his time at the Home Office to 
substantiate his claims (Ibid.). 
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we were doing it for reasons which they could understand and could relate to’ 
(Ibid.). The sentiments of the press, on the other hand, elicited a very different 
response from Clarke. 
 
As discussed elsewhere in this thesis, Clarke had a ‘very low opinion’ of the 
press, especially in terms of the pervasive ‘snideness, cynicism, and despair of the 
broadsheets’, which he regarded as ‘really terrible’ (Ibid.).  Clarke also despaired 
at the number of stories that appeared about him that were ‘untrue’.66 Having 
shepherded two of the five pieces of anti-terrorism legislation enacted under New 
Labour through parliament, Clarke recalled his frustration with the ‘dishonesty in 
some parts of the press around the civil liberties agenda’ during his tenure.  
The cynicism of the tabloid press in this case was terrible because you had 
people like the Daily Mail, on the one hand, very strongly pro-security; 
and on the other hand, very strongly pro-civil liberties. And you just think 
that just shows the type of people they are.  The Sun less so actually, it was 
not so bold on the civil liberties front. But the Guardian, they really were 
not prepared to look at the fact that there was a security issue, their general 
view was almost “security issues are invented, they are not really 
questions.”  I think it is very frustrating, but the constant process of trying 
to square the circle of those relations, that is what the policy making 
process is. 
(Ibid.) 
                                                 
66
 During the phone hacking trial of Andy Coulson and Rebekah Brooks, Clarke gave evidence in 
relation to the hacking of his aide’s phone, which centred on the threat he received from Brooks 
about a story the Sun was intending to publish. The Sun alleged that Clarke was having an illicit 
relationship with his aide, which Clarke denied. The story was never published. 
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Thus, for Clarke, the relationship between the government and the press during 
this period was a dichotomous one. On one level, the government was sorely 
aware of the importance of the press in terms of communicating its policies to the 
public, but on another level, there was a general discontentment toward the 
journalistic class. As Clarke lamented:  
The problem is we only talk to the public through the media, so we do not 
have a means of direct communication.  So, we have to try to get our case 
across to the media as effectively as we can and that is obviously what we 
try to do.  It is all under pressure. 
(Ibid.)  
 
The analyses presented in this chapter suggest that there was considerable 
scepticism amongst the press toward the government’s general approach to 
national security during the passage of the PTA 2005. For the press this was a 
justified stance, but to Clarke and many of his colleagues, the tone of the reporting 
was politically motivated and ‘par for the course’ (Ibid.). Responding to the 
charge that the terrorism threat was overstated, the government and various state 
agencies have pointed to a number of terrorism related episodes that in their view 
gave weight to their claims. Indeed, after 9/11 (and prior to 7/7) several terrorist 
plots against targets in the UK were exposed, including the Ricin plot and the 
surface-to-air-missile threat to Heathrow Airport in 2003, and the Old Trafford 
bomb plot in 2004.67 There were also a number of international terrorism 
                                                 
67
 Blunkett recalled a ‘deep scepticism’ amongst the broadcast media about whether the Heathrow 
threat was real, with some journalists suggesting that it was a government invention to keep the 
‘hype up so that security measures would be tolerated by the population’ (Interview with author, 
21 March 2014). Dismissed as ‘nonsense’ by Blunkett, he claimed that the media were actually 
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incidents where UK interests were targeted, including the bombing of the British 
consulate in Turkey in 2003. Additionally, there were cases of British citizens 
attempting to commit terrorist acts abroad, such as the ‘shoe bomber’, Richard 
Reid, who in 2001 boarded an American Airlines flight from Paris to Miami with 
explosives concealed in his shoe. 
 
By 2005, the police had become much more publically involved in the 
government-led anti-terrorism legislation drives than they had been previously, 
with high-ranking police officers using the media to express support for the 
terrorism Bill. Sir John Stevens, the former head of the Met, along with his 
successor Sir Ian Blair, gave credence to the anti-terrorism measures by 
maintaining that there were ‘several hundred’ individuals in the UK plotting 
terrorist attacks against the mainland.68 Like the police, Downing Street had also 
moved from the periphery to the centre in terms of the press focus. Politically too, 
the prime minister was much more visible during the passage of the 2005 Act than 
in previous anti-terrorism legislative campaigns.69 Whilst debate raged in 
parliament, Blair echoed the concerns of the police and the security services in his 
direct appeal to the public via Woman’s Hour, by stating: 
What they say is that you have got to give us powers in between mere 
surveillance of these people. There are several hundred of them in this 
                                                                                                                                     
stoking public fears by showing armoured vehicles outside the main entrance to Heathrow.  Trying 
to calm the situation, he appealed to the police and security services to be more discrete in their 
operations. 
68
 Writing in the News of the World on 6 March 2005, Sir John Stevens claimed that the number of 
‘Osama Bin Laden-trained terrorists walking Britain's streets [was] probably nearer 200’ (Stevens, 
2005). Speaking on the BBC’s Breakfast with Frost programme, Sir Ian Blair confirmed that the 
police believed that ‘several hundred, al-Qaeda affiliates’ were operating in the UK (BBC 
Breakfast with Frost, 2005). 
69
 Tony Blair’s role in the passage of the legislation will be discussed further in the next chapter. 
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country who we believe are engaged in plotting or trying to commit 
terrorist acts. You have got to give us power in between just surveying 
them and being sure enough to prosecute them beyond reasonable doubt. 
There are people out there who are determined to destroy our way of life 
and there is no point in us being naive about it. 
(BBC Woman’s Hour, 28 February 2005) 
 
Hewitt raises an interesting point in relation to Blair’s statement, arguing that: 
‘Implicit in his message was the idea that in a democratic country the police and 
the security services were determining government policy when it came to anti-
terrorism measures’ (Hewitt, 2008: 47). A view that was also held by some 
sections of the press, with the Mirror being especially vocal on the issue. 
 
Officially, the purpose of the PTA 2005 was ‘to provide for the making of 
“control orders” imposing obligations on individuals suspected of being involved 
in terrorism-related activity. These are preventative orders which are designed to 
restrict or prevent the further involvement by individuals in such activity.’70 At 
the behest of the government, control orders could be imposed on both foreign 
and British individuals suspected of terrorism related activity at an international or 
domestic level, thereby addressing the Law Lords’ judgement that Part 4 of the 
ATCSA 2001 was discriminatory. Based on an ‘anticipatory risk’, the measure 
was wholly ‘intelligence-led’ with the ‘mechanism for trigger [being] executive-
based’ (Walker, 2009: 214). Restrictions allowed under the orders included house 
                                                 
70
 Extract taken from the ‘Explanatory Notes’ to the PTA 2005. Online. Available HTTP: 
<http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2005/2/notes/contents> (accessed 22 March 2014) 
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arrest or curfews, electronic tagging, having to report daily to the police, as well 
as constraints on the use of communications technologies. Furthermore, the orders 
could dictate where a suspect lived and worked, as well as whom they could 
contact. Failure to comply with the restrictions could result in a prison sentence of 
up to five years.  
 
The legislation created two types of control order. Control orders that did not 
require derogation from Article 5 of the ECHR were defined as non-derogating 
orders, and could be issued by the Home Secretary. Whilst derogating control 
orders were orders that derogated from human rights obligations (e.g. house 
arrest) and consequently needed to be applied by the High Court.71 Valid for an 
initial period of 12 months, non-derogating control orders were subject to annual 
renewal, whilst derogating control orders were subject to renewal every six 
months. However, critics argued that in actuality control orders could be imposed 
indefinitely on the say-so of the government. Indeed, the avenues for controlees to 
challenge the Home Secretary’s decision were circumscribed, not least because 
any appeal was subject to a hearing in a closed court with suspects having limited 
access to the evidence held against them. More generally, critics have argued that 
the PTA 2005 established a scheme that functioned ‘on a low standard of proof’ 
which, as seen during the Northern Ireland troubles, could lead to ‘miscarriages of 
justice’ (Fenwick, 2007: 1439). Viewed through the prism of human rights, on the 
surface, control orders could be considered as ‘less of an infringement on human 
rights’ than the provision it replaced, nonetheless they did place ‘very real 
                                                 
71
 It should be noted that derogating control orders required derogation under Article 15 of the 
ECHR. 
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constraints over an individual’s freedom of movement, association and general 
involvement in the life of society’ (Stone, 2012: 457).  
 
Consequently, there was severe resistance to the Bill from the Conservatives, the 
Liberal Democrats, Labour backbenchers, and peers from all political persuasions, 
as well as from civil liberties campaigners. The main criticisms were the lack of 
time for parliamentary scrutiny and the limited safeguards for suspects. Detractors 
of the Bill also referred to the undermining of the ancient right of due process said 
to be enshrined in the Magna Carta as well as the apparent suspension of habeas 
corpus. Debating the introduction of the Bill in the Commons on 22 February 
2005, the Shadow Home Secretary, David Davis, posed the following questions to 
his political adversary.  
[W]hat is the immediate emergency that demands that draconian powers 
against British subjects be rushed through these Houses of Parliament 
without proper consideration, scrutiny or debate? What is the emergency 
that has arisen in the past 12 months that demands that, without proper 
debate, we give the Home Secretary the right to fetter the liberty of British 
subjects, from restricting their ability to communicate right up to and 
including house arrest?72 
 
Whilst the Liberal Democrat Mark Oaten argued that ‘Proof should be “beyond 
reasonable doubt” when it comes to removing the liberties of people in this 
country.’73 In its briefing for the second reading in the House of Lords, Liberty 
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 HC Deb 22 February 2005, vol 431, cols 151-70 
73
 Ibid. 
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rejected the Bill in its ‘entirety’, concluding that ‘allowing a politician to place 
severe restrictions on the liberty of British citizens without proper process is 
unjustifiable’, and described the appeal process as ‘fundamentally flawed’ 
(Liberty, 2005: 21). However, one of the mightiest blows for the government, 
especially for Blair personally, came from Lord Derry Irvine, the former Lord 
Chancellor and close friend of Blair, who joined the Labour rebels in voting 
against the government’s proposals. Lord Irvine’s defection from the Blair camp 
inevitably generated a flurry of headlines and political analysis in the press.  
 
The contestability of control orders culminated in one of the longest sittings of the 
House of Lords in its history, with the government eventually having to concede 
to a sunset clause, whereby Parliament agreed to the control order provision on 
the condition that it was subjected to an annual review. Once on the statute book, 
Clarke wasted no time in signing control orders for ten of the soon to be released 
Belmarsh detainees.74 However, whilst parliament might have been appeased, 
criticism of the control order scheme amongst the judiciary continued unabated. 
On 12 April 2006, the Administrative Court ruled that the review procedure for 
control orders was incompatible with Article 6 (right to a fair hearing) of the 
                                                 
74
 The radical cleric Abu Qatada was one of the ten Belmarsh detainees subject to a control order. 
After 9/11 until his eventual deportation in 2013, successive governments had battled to deport 
him to Jordan where he had been found guilty in absentia of terrorism offences. However, in 2008 
the Court of Appeal ruled that since the evidence that convicted him was likely obtained under 
torture, the UK government would be in breach of its human rights obligations if it were to deport 
him (Othman (Jordan) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2008] EWCA Civ 290). A 
mutual legal assistance treaty (MLA) between the two countries eventually led to his deportation 
(See Foreign & Commonwealth Office, Treaty on Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters 
between the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the Hashemite Kingdom 
of Jordan [Cm 8612, 2013]). His retrial the following year resulted in an acquittal (Al-Khalidi, 
2014).  
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ECHR, a judgement that Clarke appealed.75 The scheme received a further knock 
in June 2006, when the High Court ruled in favour of six controlees by declaring 
that control orders contravened Article 5 of the ECHR (right to liberty and 
security).76 Despite Clarke’s successor John Reid appealing the decision, on 1 
August 2006, the Court of Appeal announced that it upheld the original ruling.77  
 
For Clarke, there was particular frustration with the closed lines of 
communication between the executive, legislature and the judiciary in relation to 
the control orders scheme. On the verdicts that the control orders were in breach 
of human rights obligations, Clarke insisted that the scheme was not politically 
motivated but based on the expert advice received from his legal team. Clarke 
asserted that whilst the government was operating ‘within the constraints of the 
ECHR on the basis of this legal advice…the Supreme Court said that that won’t 
do’ (Interview with author, 4 February 2014).  Therein lay the frustration for 
Clarke, who believed that the judges did ‘have an obligation to say what would 
do’ (Ibid.).78 Instead, the judiciary told Clarke that the matter rested with the 
executive and to come back to them again with a new proposal, a process that 
went ‘on for literally years’ with ‘nobody knowing where they stood’ (Ibid.). 
 
 
 
                                                 
75
 MB, Re [2006] EWHC 1000 (Admin). 
76
 Secretary of State for the Home Department v JJ & Ors [2006] EWHC 1623 (Admin). 
77
 Secretary of State for the Home Department v MB [2006] EWCA Civ 1140. 
78
 However, Clarke pointed out that he respected the judges’ right to make a particular ruling, 
rather he took issue with the lack of dialogue between the executive and the judiciary on the 
drafting of alternative measures (Interview with author, 4 February 2014). 
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5.2  Press Attention 
This section presents the results of the quantitative part of the news content study. 
For ease of reference, Table 5.1 illustrates the progression of the PTA 2005 with 
the corresponding newspaper sample dates, and spans the period between 22 
February 2005 (the day the Bill was first introduced) and 12 March 2005 (the day 
after the Bill gained the Royal Assent). 
Table 5.1 Progression of the PTA 2005 with corresponding newspaper sample 
dates (22 February 2005 – 11 March 2005) 
PROGRESSION OF ACT NEWSPAPER SAMPLE 
DATES 
HC first reading: 22 February 2005 
HC second reading: 23 February 2005 
HC committee stage: 28 February 2005 
HC third reading: 28 February 2005 
HL first reading: 1 March 2005 
HL second reading: 1 March 2005 
HL committee stage:  
3 March 2005 
7 March 2005 
HL report stage: 8 March 2005 
HL third reading: 8 March 2005 
HC consideration of Lords amendments: 
9 March 2005 
10 March 2005 
HL consideration of Commons amendments: 
10 March 2005 
Royal assent: 11 March 2005 
23 February 2005 
24 February 2005 
1 March 2005 
 
2 March 2005 
 
 
4 March 2005 
8 March 2005 
9 March 2005 
 
 
10 March 2005 
11 March 2005 
 
 
12 March 2005 
TOTAL: 10 days 
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As with the ATCSA 2001, the broadsheets devoted significantly more coverage to 
the PTA 2005 than did the tabloids. There was little difference between the 
broadsheets in terms of output, with the Daily Telegraph devoting 34,644 words 
(52 articles) to the debates surrounding the passage of the Bill, the Guardian 
32,747 words (49 articles) and the Times 30,016 words (52 articles). Out of the 
tabloids, the Daily Mail devoted 18,730 words (30 articles) to the debates, 
significantly more than the Mirror and the Sun, who devoted 7,886 words (26 
articles) and 4,270 words (17 articles) respectively. However, when comparing 
the number of articles produced by each tabloid, the gap between the Daily Mail 
and the Mirror closes significantly, with the latter publishing just four fewer 
articles than its blacktop rival. Figure 5.1 provides an illustrative representation of 
the number of words each newspaper devoted to the debates, and Table 5.2 shows 
the number of words and total number of articles per newspaper. 
 
Figure 5.1 Words devoted to the PTA 2005 by newspaper 
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Table 5.2 Total number of words and articles devoted to the PTA 2005 per 
newspaper 
Newspapers Total Words N Articles 
Daily Mail 18,730 30 
Daily Mirror 7,886 26 
Daily Telegraph 34,644 52 
The Guardian 32,747 49 
The Sun 4,270 17 
The Times 30,016 52 
Total 128,293 226 
 
 
Figure 5.2 shows a timeline of the number of articles that appeared in each 
newspaper over the duration of the passage of the bill. In terms of which issues 
garnered the most attention, media interest peaked on 23 February 2005 (30 
articles), 11 March 2005 (31 articles) and 12 March 2005 (35 articles). These 
dates corresponded respectively with the bill’s introduction into the Commons on 
22 February 2005, the Commons consideration of the Lords amendments on 10 
March 2005, and the subsequent Lords consideration of the Commons 
amendments on 11 March 2005. On 23 February 2005, the Daily Telegraph’s 
front page headline declared ‘Clarke uses terror threat to justify ending 800 years 
of legal history’, whilst the Guardian’s front page coverage focused on Clarke’s 
retreat on house arrest. The Times outlined the main measures, whilst the Daily 
Mail declared that the Bill was an ‘assault on civil liberties’ (p. 6). Focusing on 
the release of the ten terrorist suspects, the Sun uses the introduction of the Bill to 
take a swipe at the ECHR by proclaiming that Clarke ‘has no power to keep ten 
Arabs locked up in Belmarsh prison – thanks to the European Convention on 
Human Rights’ (p. 2). Aligning the new ‘Bodgy Dossier’ [sic] with the Iraq 
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WMD dossier, the Mirror accuses the government of ‘rehashing’ the ‘terror 
threat’ discourse ‘to back new law’ (p. 18). The focus across the newspapers on 
the 11 March  and 12 March 2005 was on the political ping-pong between the two 
houses, as well as the historic length of the Lords sitting.  
 
Figure 5.2 Number of articles appearing in all newspapers over the sample 
period (22 February 2005 – 11 March 2005) 
 
 
Table 5.3 shows the story location of news items by newspaper. In terms of story 
location, all of the newspapers except the Mirror included front page coverage of 
the policy debates. The Daily Telegraph devoted front page coverage nine days 
out of a total of ten, with the Guardian and the Times both providing eight days of 
front page coverage. Of the tabloids, the Daily Mail devoted two days and the Sun 
one day of front page coverage. Whilst it is evident that the broadsheets found the 
policy debates to be highly newsworthy, the Daily Mail and the Sun only devoted 
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front page coverage on the 11 March 2005, and in the case of the Daily Mail, 
again on 12 March 2005.  
 
In contrast to the coverage of the ATCSA 2001, all of the newspapers devoted a 
higher number of editorials to the debates. The Guardian included six editorials, 
closely followed by the Daily Telegraph, the Sun and the Times with five 
editorials, and the Daily Mail and the Mirror with four apiece. As a proportion of 
their total output, the Sun produced the highest number of editorials, which 
comprised nearly a third of their total articles.  
 
Table 5.3 Story location by newspaper (PTA 2005) 
Newspaper Front Page Inside 
Pages 
Feature Editorial Total  
Daily Mail 2 23 1 4 30 
Daily Mirror - 19 3 4 26 
Daily Telegraph 9 29 9 5 52 
The Guardian 8 30 5 6 49 
The Sun 1 11 - 5 17 
The Times 8 35 4 5 52 
Total 28 147 22 29 226 
 
 
Table 5.4 shows the format of the news items. Compared with the 2001 case 
study, the hard news format did not dominate the coverage to quite the same 
extent. Across the newspaper spectrum, the hard news format constituted just 
under half of all articles, with features making up a quarter of the total output, 
followed by an even distribution of background pieces and editorials. This 
suggests that not only were the debates surrounding the passage of the PTA 2005 
deemed highly newsworthy, but that the press felt it necessary to interject their 
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own opinion via the editorial pages as well as to provide considerable space for 
opinion pieces. 
 
Table 5.4 Article format (PTA 2005) 
Newspaper Hard 
News 
Background Editorial Feature Total  
Daily Mail 14 3 4 9 30 
Daily Mirror 13 2 4 7 26 
Daily Telegraph 22 7 5 18 52 
The Guardian 23 8 6 12 49 
The Sun 10 1 5 1 17 
The Times 28 6 5 13 52 
Total 110 27 29 60 226 
 
 
Table 5.5 shows the type of author. Staff writers and regular columnists wrote the 
majority of articles. Of the three titles that included pieces by guest opinion 
writers, the Daily Mail included an article by the barrister and writer, John 
Mortimer, the Guardian an article by the human rights lawyer Gareth Peirce, 
whilst the Daily Telegraph contained one commentary piece from Tony Blair. 
 
Table 5.5 Type of Author (PTA 2005) 
Newspaper Staff  
News 
Regular 
Opinion 
Guest 
Opinion 
Editorial Not 
Stated 
Total 
Daily Mail 12 8 1 4 5 30 
Daily Mirror 11 7 - 4 4 26 
Daily Telegraph 28 17 1 5 1 52 
The Guardian 29 11 1 6 2 49 
The Sun 9 - - 5 3 17 
The Times 21 13 - 5 13 52 
Total 110 56 3 29 28 226 
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Table 5.6 shows the number and type of visuals that appeared in each newspaper. 
Charles Clarke appeared the most with nineteen appearances, followed by 
political cartoons with fifteen appearances. There were thirteen photographs of 
terrorists or terror suspects, most of which depicted the radical cleric Abu Qatada, 
who was set to be subject to a control order after his release from Belmarsh 
prison. The nine images of the police were mainly in the context of the police 
announcement that several hundred terrorists were at large.  A noticeable change 
from the coverage of the 2001 Act was the appearance of Blair, as noted 
elsewhere this could be explained by his increasing public involvement in the 
anti-terror law debates. 
 
Table 5.6 Number and type of visuals per newspaper (PTA 2005) 
 
Visual Type 
DT Times Guard Mail Sun Mir Total 
Blair 3 1 - 1 - 2 7 
Clarke 3 3 3 3 2 5 19 
Clarke/Blair - - 1 - - 2 3 
Blair/Howard 1 - - - 1 - 2 
Blair/Irvine 2 - - - - 1 3 
Lord Irvine - 1 1 3 - - 5 
Con MPs 1 - - - - 2 3 
Lab MPs - - - 1 - - 1 
Lab Opp MPs 2 - - - - - 2 
Peers 1 1 - 1 - - 3 
Police 1 3 3 - 1 1 9 
DPP - - - 1 - - 1 
Judges - - - - - 1 1 
Campaigners/
protestors  
1 2 - - - 1 4 
Terrorists or 
suspects 
2 - 2 4 3 2 13 
Cartoon  7 2 4 1 - 1 15 
Graphic - 1 1 - - - 2 
Stock Image 2 2 - - - - 4 
Total 26 16 15 15 7 18 97 
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NB. Stock images include an image of the aftermath of 9/11, a non-descript prison 
cell, hands in handcuffs and an interior image of the House of Commons. 
 
Figure 5.3 shows the percentage of articles that contained images. 
Proportionately, the articles published by the Mirror included the most 
accompanying images and the Guardian the least. Just under half of the Daily 
Mail’s articles included images, whilst a significant proportion of articles in the 
rest of the newspapers did not include accompanying images. 
 
Figure 5.3 Percentage of articles with accompanying images (PTA 2005) 
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accompanying article. The exception being the Mirror, which included a few 
captions that served to underpin the core message of the article. For example, 
under the banner ‘Bodgey Dossier’ [sic] and ‘Terror threat “rehash” to back new 
law’, was a photograph of Clarke stating his case in the Commons alongside 
snippets of the Iraq dossier on the supposed existence of WMD. The juxtaposition 
of the text to the images has obvious connotations to the faulty intelligence on 
Saddam Hussain’s weapons programme. In terms of depictions of political 
personalities, as with the 2001 case study, the newspapers tended to use generic 
photographs of both Clarke and Blair.  
 
5.3  The Primary Definers of the News Agenda 
Unsurprisingly, elite sources dominated the parameters of debate, with 
government sources (Downing Street, the Home Office and Labour MPs) 
appearing 213 times (302 paragraphs), constituting 39 percent of all actor 
appearances, and a 42 percent share of all paragraphs devoted to source citations. 
The second most represented actor or body was the Conservative Party, appearing 
108 times (137 paragraphs), which accounted for 20 percent of all source 
appearances and a 19 percent share of all paragraphs devoted to source citations. 
As with the 2001 case study, the civil liberties and Muslim contingents were 
markedly underrepresented. The Guardian and the Mirror, both deemed more 
sympathetic to civil liberty issues, provided the most space to civil liberty 
campaigners with three appearances apiece. Only the Daily Telegraph and the 
Guardian included citations from Muslim campaigners. Table 5.7 shows the 
frequency of appearance and total paragraphs devoted to all source citations. 
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Table 5.7 Frequency of appearance and total paragraphs devoted to direct and 
indirect source citations (PTA 2005) 
 
 
Source 
DT 
n  
(Pars) 
Times 
n  
(Pars) 
Guard 
n  
(Pars) 
Mail 
n  
(Pars) 
Sun 
n  
(Pars) 
Mir 
n  
(Pars) 
Total 
n  
(Pars) 
Civil Lib 1 
(1) 
1 
(1) 
3 
(4) 
- - 3 
(3) 
8 
(9) 
Con Party 32 
(34) 
21 
(26) 
26 
(33) 
19 
(31) 
3 
(4) 
7 
(9) 
108 
(137) 
Con Peers 9 
(9) 
7 
(8) 
3 
(3) 
8 
(13) 
- - 28 
(34) 
Downing St. 29 
(35) 
23 
(25) 
13 
(19) 
10 
(15) 
9 
(13) 
12 
(26) 
95 
(132) 
Home Office 21 
(33) 
33 
(38) 
15 
(30) 
12 
(19) 
9 
(12) 
8 
(14) 
98 
(146) 
All Lords - - - 1 
(3) 
- - 1 
(4) 
Lab Party 3 
(5) 
8 
(9) 
7 
(8) 
2 
(3) 
- - 20 
(24) 
Lab Peers 12 
(12) 
11 
(14) 
10 
(12) 
2 
(3) 
- 1 
(1) 
36 
(42) 
Lab Rebels 15 
(19) 
2 
(2) 
10 
(11) 
8 
(8) 
- 3 
(3) 
38 
(43) 
Law Lords 3 
(3) 
2 
(2) 
- - - - 5 
(5) 
LD Party 7 
(7) 
7 
(8) 
10 
(14) 
2 
(2) 
- 3 
(3) 
29 
(34) 
LD Peers 4 
(5) 
3 
(4) 
7 
(7) 
1 
(1) 
- - 15 
(17) 
Muslim 4 
(8) 
- 2 
(4) 
- - - 6 
(12) 
All Opp 2 
(3) 
2 
(2) 
- - - - 4 
(5) 
Other Peers 11 
(15) 
4 
(4) 
8 
(11) 
1 
(1) 
- - 24 
(31) 
Police 6 
(9) 
3 
(4) 
3 
(3) 
1 
(1) 
5 
(6) 
6 
(9) 
24 
(32) 
Security - 2 
(3) 
4 
(4) 
- 1 
(1) 
- 7 
(8) 
SIAC - 1 
(1) 
- - - 1 
(1) 
2 
(2) 
Total 159 
(198) 
130 
(151) 
121 
(163) 
67 
(100) 
27 
(36) 
44 
(69) 
 
548 
(717) 
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Figure 5.4 shows the proportion of pro-legislation, anti-legislation and 
mixed/unstated sources included in each newspaper, based on frequency of 
appearance (a full breakdown of the sources and their positions on the legislation 
can be found in Appendix 8). Across all of the newspapers, pro-legislation sources 
accounted for 49 percent of the total share, anti-legislation 47 percent and 
mixed/unstated sources 4 percent. As with the previous case study, the Daily 
Telegraph included quotes from a higher proportion of anti-legislation sources (57 
percent) compared with 42 percent for pro-legislation and one percent for 
mixed/unstated sources. The Times devoted the most space to pro-legislation 
sources (55 percent), followed by anti-legislation sources (23 percent), with 
mixed/unstated sources constituting just seven percent of the share. 
Proportionally, the Guardian included the least pro-legislation sources (36 
percent), with 55 percent of space devoted to anti-legislation sources and nine 
percent to mixed/unstated source positions. Apart from the Times, the tabloids 
tended to devote more space to pro-legislation sources than did the broadsheets, 
with the Daily Mail providing an equivalent amount of space to pro- and anti-
legislation sources, 49 percent and 51 percent respectively. Whilst pro-legislation 
sources in the Sun accounted for 89 percent of all sources, with just 11 percent 
devoted to anti-legislation sources. The Mirror also contained a higher proportion 
of pro-legislation sources (61 percent), with anti-legislation sources constituting 
36 percent of the share, and mixed/unstated sources just two percent. 
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Figure 5.4 Source position on legislation as proportion of frequency of 
appearance (PTA 2005) 
 
 
Across all the newspapers, Figure 5.5 shows that 77 percent of the reporter tone 
toward the sources cited was coded as straight, with 12 percent of all source 
citations coded as deflating and 11 percent as reinforcing of source assertions.  
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Figure 5.5 Reporter tone toward all sources across all newspapers as percentage 
(PTA 2005) 
 
 
Table 5.8 illustrates the reporter tone toward the different source positions in each 
newspaper.  Over three quarters of the articles contained a straight reporter tone 
toward the sources cited. However, when reporters did deviate from straight 
reporting, the majority of deflating comments were aimed at pro-legislation 
sources, whilst the most reinforcing comments were aimed at anti-legislation 
sources. When considering the newspapers individually, the Sun included the 
most reinforcing comments toward pro-legislation sources, with four directed at 
government sources, five toward the police and one toward the security services. 
The Sun was the only title that did not include any negative evaluative comments 
in relation to source assertions. Proportionately, the broadsheets provided most of 
the negative commentary toward pro-legislation sources, with the Daily 
77%
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0%
12%
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Mixed
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Telegraph, the Times and the Guardian including 18, 14 and seven deflating 
comments respectively. Most of these comments were directed at the government, 
with 15 occurrences in the Daily Telegraph, 11 in the Times and five in the 
Guardian. Out of the tabloids, the Daily Mail reserved all four of its deflating 
comments for the government, as did the Mirror with one comment.  
 
Negative evaluative commentary aimed at anti-legislation sources only appeared 
in the three broadsheets, with the Times devoting 10 deflating comments, the 
Guardian eight, and the Daily Telegraph, five.  The majority of the deflating 
remarks against anti-legislation sources were made against the House of Lords in 
the case of the Daily Telegraph and the Guardian, with the Conservative Party 
accruing half of all negative comments in the Times.  Regarding reinforcing 
evaluative comments devoted to anti-legislation sources, these were most 
prevalent in the Daily Telegraph and the Guardian, with 23 and 12 reinforcing 
comments respectively. Anti-legislation sources who received the most attention 
in the Daily Telegraph included Conservative MPs and peers, as well as other 
peers who opposed the terrorism legislation. The Guardian, on the other hand, 
reserved most of its positive judgements for the Liberal Democrat Party.  
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Table 5.8 Reporter tone toward pro- and anti-legislation sources (PTA 2005) 
 
Source Position 
DT Times  Guard  Mail  Sun Mir  Total 
 
Pro-Legislation 
 
67 
 
72 
 
43 
 
33 
 
24 
 
27 
 
266 
        Straight 47 56 34 28 14 26 205 
        Reinforcing 2 2 1 1 10 - 16 
        Mixed - - 1 - - - 1 
        Deflating 18 14 7 4 - 1 44 
 
Anti-Legislation 
 
90 
 
49 
 
67 
 
34 
 
3 
 
16 
 
259 
        Straight 62 38 47 31 3 16 197 
        Reinforcing 23 1 12 3 - - 39 
        Mixed - - - - - - - 
        Deflating 5 10 8 - - - 23 
 
Mixed/Unstated 
 
2 
 
9 
 
11 
 
- 
 
- 
 
1 
 
23 
        Straight 1 8 10 - - 1 20 
        Reinforcing 1 1 1 - - - 3 
        Mixed - - - - - - - 
        Deflating - - - - - - - 
 
5.4  Media Framing of Policy Debates 
In terms of which frames predominated at an aggregate level, a similar pattern to 
the framing of the ATCSA 2001 emerges. The politics frame was the most 
prevalent across the entire sample of newspapers, accounting for 31 percent of all 
articles, whilst 23 percent of the articles did not display any significant framing or 
reasoning devices relevant to a particular frame. Just 8 percent of all articles 
displayed exclusive elements of the security frame, 15 percent the civil liberties 
frame, with mixed frames constituting the remaining 23 percent of the articles. 
Figure 5.6 provides an illustrative representation of which frames predominated 
across the sample. When comparing the broadsheets and the tabloids, 6 percent of 
all articles in the broadsheets and 14 percent of all articles in the tabloids reflected 
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the security frame. However, when considering the tabloids at an individual level, 
this measurement reflected the high incidence of the frame in the Sun, with the 
Mirror containing just two instances and the Daily Mail none. With the exception 
of the Murdoch press, support for the civil liberties frame was greater than the 
security frame in both the broadsheets and the tabloids, where 13 percent of the 
broadsheets output framed the debates as a civil liberties issue compared with 19 
percent of all articles in the tabloids. There was a heavy slant towards the politics 
frame in both the broadsheets and the Daily Mail, but not the other two tabloids, 
constituting 34 percent and 26 percent of their respective outputs. Both the 
broadsheets and the tabloids had a similar prevalence of frameless articles, 
comprising 24 percent and 21 percent correspondingly. 
 
Figure 5.6 Predominant frames (%) across all newspapers, broadsheets and 
tabloids (PTA 2005) 
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Table 5.9 shows the predominant frames per newspaper. The security frame was 
most prevalent in the Times and the Sun with five and eight articles respectively, 
whilst the Daily Mail was the only newspaper not to include any articles that 
exclusively reflected national security perspectives. The civil liberties frame was 
particularly prevalent in the Daily Telegraph, the Guardian and the Mirror, and 
was the most represented frame in the latter title, whilst the Sun was the only 
newspaper not to include an article with an exclusive civil liberties frame. As 
previously mentioned, the politics frame predominated in all three broadsheets 
and the Daily Mail.  
 
Table 5.9 Predominant frames per newspaper (PTA 2005) 
 
Frames 
DT Times Guard Mail Sun Mir Total 
Security 2 5 2 - 8 2 19 
Civil Liberties 11 2 7 5 - 9 34 
Politics 16 19 17 14 1 4 71 
Sec/CL/Pol 1 1 1 - - - 3 
Sec/CL 2 - 2 - - 1 5 
Sec/Pol 1 3 
- 
- 3 5 12 
CL/Pol 10 6 9 4 - 2 31 
None 9 16 11 7 5 3 51 
Total 52 52 49 30 17 26 226 
 
 
Figure 5.7 presents the quotient of frames per newspaper. Only four percent of the 
Daily Telegraph’s coverage reflected the security frame, 21 percent the civil 
liberties frame (the highest proportion of all the newspapers), 27 percent mixed 
frames and 31 percent the politics frame. In the Times, 10 percent of articles 
reflected the security frame, just four percent the civil liberties frame and 37 
percent the politics frame, with 19 percent of articles coded as reflecting mixed 
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perspectives. The Guardian devoted most of its space to the politics frame, with 
35 percent of all articles reflecting this frame, and 14 percent reflecting the civil 
liberties frame. Just under half of all articles in the Daily Mail reflected the 
politics frame, with 17 percent devoted to civil liberty perspectives. Forty-seven 
percent of the articles in the Sun reflected the security frame, whilst the civil 
liberties frame predominated in the Mirror, representing 35 percent of all articles.  
 
Figure 5.7 Composition (%) of frames per newspaper (PTA 2005) 
 
 
Figure 5.8 shows the predominate frames at an aggregate level. When the mixed 
frames are combined with the three meta frames (security, civil liberties and 
politics) the findings show that the politics frame was the most prevalent in the 
three broadsheets and the Daily Mail. With the exception of the Daily Mail, all of 
the newspapers included some aspects of the framing or reasoning devices of the 
security frame, with a higher incidence in the Times, the Sun and the Mirror. In 
0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100%
Telegraph
Times
Guardian
Mail
Sun
Mirror
Security
Civil Liberties
Politics
Sec/CL/Pol
Sec/CL
Sec/Pol
CL/Pol
None
197 
 
the case of the Sun, the security frame was the most prevalent across its entire 
output. Inversely, the civil liberties frame had the most appearances in the Mirror. 
The civil liberties frame was also heavily represented in the Daily Telegraph and 
the Guardian, and to a lesser extent in the Times and the Mail, whereas none of 
the articles in the Sun reflected civil liberties standpoints. At an aggregate level, 
the Mirror was the only title that had a more or less even distribution of frames, 
with the other newspapers showing a distinct bias toward or against a particular 
frame(s). 
 
Figure 5.8 Predominate frames at an aggregate level (PTA 2005) 
 
 
In terms of which themes or depictions were most heavily represented within the 
politics frame, as expected the political conflict between the government and the 
Lords was heavily represented. However, there was also much commentary on the 
government’s evoking of the ‘war on terror’ motif to justify its draconian laws. 
Telegraph Times Guardian Mail Sun Mirror
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Negative references to the Human Rights Act or the ECHR were mainly prevalent 
in the Sun and the Daily Mail. Similarly, there was also substantial focus on the 
government’s weak asylum and immigration policy in both newspapers. Another 
major theme was the lack of parliamentary scrutiny as a comment on the wider 
implications of New Labour’s modernising project on parliamentary processes. 
 
The most prevalent theme or depiction in relation to the civil liberties frame was 
the lack of parliamentary scrutiny in the context of the legislation itself. In 
addition, the ‘excessive state powers’ theme was widely represented, as was the 
extent to which the legislation would compromise civil liberties in general, with 
much focus on the threat to ancient liberties. In the final couple of days of 
coverage, there was also a heavy focus on the Lords triumph in curtailing some of 
the more draconian measures proposed by the government.  
 
In relation to the security frame, the majority of depictions related to the perceived 
threat level, with the government’s proposals seen as a proportionate response to 
the threat level. There were also instances where the government’s defeat in the 
Lords was seen as a negative development, with the Opposition defined as 
illogical and unpatriotic. All of these themes were most prevalent in the Sun. 
 
5.5  Editorial and Commentary Standpoints 
This section focuses on the explicit ideological direction of each newspaper, as 
expressed in the editorials and commentary pieces. As detailed above, there was a 
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high occurrence of editorials and commentary pieces across the entire newspaper 
sample. 
 
Daily Telegraph: In its first editorial, the Daily Telegraph declared that the 
proposed legislation was a ‘hasty, illiberal act with unknown consequences’ (23 
February 2005, p. 25). The overarching theme was that British citizens can be 
subject to house arrest ‘on the say-so of a politician’ rather than a court of law. 
The editorial also makes a point that the law could be discriminatory against 
ethnic minorities, it states: ‘An unspoken, unpleasant defence of the new law is 
that only certain kinds of British citizen would suffer its rigours. Those citizens 
would tend to be dusky, with unEnglish names’ (Ibid.). It goes on to say that this 
could lead to Muslims feeling like a ‘suspect people’, and end up being a 
‘recruiting sergeant for political Islamist extremists, just as internment was for 
Irish republican extremists’ (Ibid.). Commentaries published on the same day 
focused on the relegation of the judiciary and the ever-encroaching power of the 
executive, with Andrew Gimson’s parliamentary sketch likening Clarke to a 
terrorist who is about to assemble a ‘crude, home-made bomb that he is going to 
detonate under the British judicial system’ (p. 6). 
 
On 24 February 2005, both the editorials and feature articles focused on the 
‘hasty’ passage of the bill and the government’s onslaught on the ‘cornerstones of 
our judicial system’ (particularly habeas corpus and the right to a fair trial), with 
its editorial arguing that the new laws are about to remove these ancient rights (p. 
29). The editorial itself was a riposte to an opinion piece by Blair in which he 
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states that he is acting on advice from the security services ‘to protect the security 
of our nation’, arguing that ‘there is no greater civil liberty than to live free from 
terrorist attack’ (p. 28). This assertion is met with disdain from Boris Johnson, 
who states that habeas corpus is being ‘treated shabbily by New Labour’ (p. 28), 
with another commentary reminding its readers that Blair relied on comparable 
spurious reassurances about the WMD programme in Iraq (p. 12).  
 
On 2 March 2005, the editorial focused on the haste in which the government was 
legislating, but also calls into question ‘Blair’s motives’, stating that ‘suspicion is 
rife that this Bill is intended, not so much to make the nation safer, as to make the 
opposition parties look soft on terror’ (p. 23). This argument was repeated in an 
editorial on 10 March 2005, in which the newspaper concurred with Michael 
Howard’s assertion that Blair’s refusal to compromise on the Bill was to make it 
appear that ‘Labour was tougher than the Tories on terror’ (p. 23). On 11 March 
2005, the editorial announced that ‘Michael Howard is not being weak, or diluting 
the proposed legislation by attempting to amend it’ but rather ‘trying to strengthen 
this flimsy Bill’ (p. 27). It goes on to demand that if it is ‘true’ that the nation 
faces a ‘grave threat’ from terrorism, then the government needs to be more 
transparent in its motives and more forthcoming with the evidence (Ibid.).  
 
The coverage on the final day of the debates focused on ‘How the old guard 
taught Blair a lesson’ (12 March 2005, p. 4), maintaining that, whilst the 
Commons was ineffective against the might of the New Labour government, the 
House of Lords ‘put up the strongest show of defiance’ (Ibid.).  
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The Times: In an editorial on 23 February 2005, the Times declared that, despite 
the Bill retaining some ‘rough edges’, it was generally supportive of the 
government’s aims. It goes on to dismiss accusations that the government was 
‘inventing a danger to serve their own interests’, claiming that the critics are 
ignoring the ‘harsh reality’ that Al-Qaeda remains a credible threat (p. 17). 
However, it also approved the Conservatives position that ‘further judicial 
involvement in [the] process…is sensible’, arguing that Michael Howard was 
correct to have ‘genuine concerns about civil liberties’ (Ibid.). 
 
In contrast, Simon Jenkins demanded that the Lords defend the Magna Carta, 
defining control orders as ‘proof positive of the corruption of power’ (23 February 
2005, p. 19). Jenkins even goes so far as to compare the powers sought by Clarke 
as analogous to those employed by despots in Zimbabwe, Russia, Libya and 
Pakistan, where ‘all pleaded state security to justify executive justice’ (Ibid.). As 
with the Daily Telegraph, reference was made to the Iraq ‘weapons dossiers’ 
arguing that the government used scare tactics to invade Iraq when no threat 
existed (Ibid.). Jenkins goes on to attack the politics of New Labour, arguing that 
the ‘municipal Left’ had transformed into the ‘new authoritarians’ (Ibid.). In the 
event that the government should evoke the Parliament Act to marshal through its 
Bill, Jenkins final plea is reserved for the ‘old House of Lords’, in which he 
‘cannot imagine a nobler baronial epitaph than to die fighting for the Great 
Charter against a dictatorial Crown’ (Ibid.). Jenkins reprised these themes in later 
commentary pieces. 
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A commentary piece and an editorial published on 1 March 2005 concentrated on 
the ‘farcical proceedings’ taking place in the Commons (p. 17). The editorial, in 
particular, declared that the ‘casual and arrogant dismissal of proper parliamentary 
process brought the Commons to near-chaos’, with the debates showing the 
‘Government at its worst’ (Ibid.). Although the editorial did not voice concern 
about the civil liberty aspects of the Bill, acknowledging that the ‘danger of [a] 
terrorist attack is real and present’, it was disapproving of the ‘pre-election 
posturing of a supposedly tough government [which] has left it and democracy 
weakened’ (Ibid.). Peter Riddell echoes these themes in a piece on 4 March 2005, 
in which he argued that, whilst ‘civil liberties are not an absolute and have to be 
balanced against national security’, the government should agree that ‘immediate 
judicial involvement should extend to all control orders’ (p. 8). After its defeat in 
the Lords, the editorial on 9 March 2005 declared that the ‘government has only 
itself to blame’ for the ‘humiliating defeats’ on the basis that they should have 
made compromises at an earlier stage (p. 17).  
 
Just one opinion piece focused exclusively on civil liberties perspectives (8 March 
2005, p. 18), with the majority of editorials and commentary pieces concentrating 
on the ‘Carry On [at] Westminster’ and the epic battle between the government 
and the Lords (12 March 2005, p. 23).  
 
The Guardian: On 23 February 2005, the Guardian’s editorial declared that the 
proposed legislation was ‘certainly a much improved measure compared with 
[previous] proposals’ (p. 25), but that the government needed to go further to 
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safeguard civil liberties. Its main appeals included greater ‘judicial scrutiny’ at the 
outset and sufficient time for parliamentary scrutiny of the Bill (Ibid.). In the case 
of the latter entreaty, on 2 March 2005, the Guardian expressed regret that, whilst 
‘Clarke has tried to bring some overdue calm and civility to the discharge of his 
ministerial duties’, he had failed in his duty to allow sufficient time for ‘detailed 
consideration’ of the Bill in parliament (p. 27). The editorial goes on to criticise 
New Labour’s ‘abuse of executive power’ (Ibid.). This motif is repeated in several 
opinion pieces, which criticised the ever-increasing ‘might of the executive’, in 
which ‘a majority of the Commons…rolled over and allowed that to happen’ (9 
March 2005, p. 21).  
 
The human rights lawyer, Gareth Peirce, ‘spells out the dangers of control orders’ 
in her guest opinion piece published on 8 March 2005, in which she implored 
parliamentarians to oppose the measure on the grounds that ‘national security 
depends on every individual in this country having inalienable rights’ (p. 23). 
Whilst the Guardian’s security editor centred on the conjoint scaremongering 
tactics of the government and the police, especially criticising Sir John Stevens’ 
use of the News of the World as a conduit to report that ‘200 terrorists’ were ready 
to ‘commit atrocities in Britain’ (p. 23). Richard Norton-Taylor goes on to argue 
that ‘while ministers talk up the rhetoric, senior security and intelligence officials 
privately paint a more sober picture’ (Ibid.). 
 
In light of Clarke’s negative view of the Guardian, a surprising aspect of the 
editorial coverage was its general support for Clarke as Home Secretary, even 
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when it was at odds with some of the measures he proposed. On 9 March 2005, 
the editorial praised Clarke for agreeing to compromise on certain issues, 
particularly in his acceptance that the judiciary should have an enhanced role in 
the control order process. It goes on to credit Clarke for ‘his handling of the bill 
throughout, [which] is marked by a reasoned approach’ (p. 23). 
 
The editorials in the final couple of days of the debates focused on the 
parliamentary ping-pong between the two houses, declaring that it showed 
‘parliament at its best’ (11 March 2005, p. 25). The Guardian also pointed out 
that the government’s large majority had enabled it to make ‘bad laws…without 
the traditional checks and balances’ (Ibid.). In its final editorial it commended the 
Opposition for its role in ensuring there would be ‘more judicial detention 
decisions and fewer political detentions’ (12 March 2005, p. 23). However, it also 
argued that ‘all sides [played] general election politics’ during the passage of the 
Bill (Ibid.). 
 
The Daily Mail: In its first editorial, the Daily Mail declared that the ‘government 
proposes to tear up our treasured safeguards as part of the war on terror’ (23 
February 2005, p. 14), before accusing the government of ‘playing politics’ ahead 
of the general election in an effort to ‘portray the Opposition as “soft” on terror’ 
(Ibid.). However, it reserves its most acerbic attack on New Labour’s ‘crass 
human rights’ laws, which are blamed for the current legal quagmire over what to 
do with the Belmarsh detainees (Ibid.). A theme that is repeated in an editorial 
published on 10 March 2005. Viewing the issue through the prism of asylum and 
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immigration, its editorial of 1 March 2005 declared that the  ‘only way to deal 
with this threat is for Britain to regain control of her borders, deport those who 
intend us harm and arrest, charge and try those against whom proper case can be 
made’ (p. 14).  
 
The assault on traditional liberties theme appeared throughout the Daily Mail’s 
coverage. In his guest opinion piece on 2 March 2005, the barrister and writer 
John Mortimer examined the ways in which New Labour had ‘shown itself as 
impatient and contemptuous of civil rights as it is of proceedings in Parliament’ 
(p. 14). However, its final editorial focused on Blair’s ‘humiliating climbdown’, at 
the hands of ‘their lordships’, before stating that Blair ‘blundered into a crisis of 
his own making’ because of his ‘barmy decision to incorporate the [ECHR] into 
British law’ (12 March 2005, p. 16).   
 
The Sun: Overall, the Sun was supportive of the Bill and of the government in 
general. Echoing the language used by the government, an editorial on 23 
February 2005, argued that ‘urgent action is vital’ to deal with the Belmarsh 
detainees. The Sun’s traditional stance against the EU and the ECHR was reserved 
for its final proclamation, that the government needed to take a tougher line and 
fight the Belmarsh ruling as control orders ‘will be no substitute for the security of 
a prison cell’ (p. 8). The editorial the following day attacked the ‘limp’ Liberal 
Democrat leader Charles Kennedy for his criticism of the Bill, before going on to 
argue that the government’s attempt to safeguard the country is ‘being thwarted 
by a European treaty on human rights’ (24 February 2005, p. 8). The Sun’s 
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irritation with human rights laws, along with Britain’s weak asylum policy,  was 
repeated in a commentary on 11 March 2005, where the political editor claimed 
that, ‘Millions of people are baffled and bewildered that a law made in Brussels 
prevents our elected government from keeping ten dangerous terrorists locked up’ 
(p. 2). The article goes on to argue that the ‘ten…citizens from Arab countries 
[who] sought asylum under our soft laws only to abuse our hospitality by plotting 
murder’ should be put ‘on the next plane home’ (Ibid.). 
 
In the final two days of the bill’s passage, the Sun’s editorials focused on the ‘hot 
air in Westminster’, which had left ‘millions of [its] readers…baffled by the 
political infighting…when innocent lives seem to be put at stake by arguments 
over liberty and “rights”’ (11 March 2005, p. 6). Reaffirming their ‘full backing of 
the PM’s war on terror’, the Sun goes on to say that Britain should ‘ignore the 
human rights laws…and keep terror suspects behind bars’, and that even if they 
must be freed then they should be returned to their native countries (Ibid.). On 12 
March 2005, the Sun asserted that both politicians and peers ‘made intelligent 
debate on new terror laws impossible’ (p. 6), arguing that whilst politicians 
‘prattle on about winners and losers’, British citizens are left in doubt about the 
adequacy of the terrorism laws (Ibid.). The Sun’s final entreaty was for the 
government to push ‘aside that part of the human rights law which gives terrorist 
freedom and renders the police powerless’ (Ibid.). 
 
The Mirror: Editorially, the Mirror was vehemently opposed to the legislation, 
arguing that it endangers civil liberties and delivers too much power to the state. 
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On 1 March 2005, the newspaper declared that the law would do little to 
safeguard the country, accusing the government of using the legislation to make 
them look ‘tough’ on terrorism (p. 10). On 10 March 2005, the government’s 
approach to security was likened to a ‘police state’, in which the terrorism threat 
was evoked to justify its draconian laws. Consequently, Blair is accused of 
‘playing a dangerous game with this country’s treasured freedoms’ (p. 6). 
Interestingly, the terrorism policy is defined as ‘Blair’s bill’ rather than Clarke’s 
Bill. This is in stark contrast to the 2001 Act, where the proposals were very much 
seen as being driven by Blunkett rather than dictated by Downing Street. In its 
final editorial on 12 March 2005, the Mirror argued that the legislation 
jeopardises homeland security, and makes a direct comparison with the dossier on 
Iraq, with the ultimate point being that as with the current situation there was ‘no 
evidence’ to vindicate the government’s course of action (p. 6).  
 
Commentary standpoints echoed the arguments proffered in the editorials. A 
feature article on 1 March 2005, questioned the true nature of the terrorism threat, 
arguing that whilst it acknowledged the existence of a terrorism threat the 
government’s discourse does little to promote public understanding. Highlighting 
the difficulty of defining what the threat is, it goes on to say that the nature of the 
threat is evolving and that more effort needs to go into understanding ‘the issues 
which drive young men into the arms of militant organisations’ (p. 10). Like the 
editorials, it also referred to the Iraq War, this time in the context of ‘fuelling 
terror’ (Ibid.). The article makes a direct appeal to the government to look at ‘the 
causes of terrorism, rather than casually sacrificing our basic freedoms’, 
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especially the abolishment of the right of presumption of innocence that could 
lead to British citizens being ‘labelled a “terrorist” without charge or trial’ (Ibid.).  
 
There is also a strong focus on excessive state powers, with the government 
accused of undermining the democratic process by rushing the Bill through 
parliament without proper debate. As with the editorials, the article draws on the 
same ‘police state’ leitmotifs, perhaps incongruently, aligning Britain’s draconian 
security policy with that of Burma and South Africa under apartheid. The 
government is also charged with allowing unelected security services to dictate 
policy (4 March 2005, p. 29).  
 
In the final few days of coverage, the commentary pieces focused on the political 
machinations within government and between parties, as well as on individual 
personalities. On 10 March 2005, an opinion piece declared that Blair and Clarke 
might have ‘won the terror law votes…but still lost the arguments’ (p. 2), with the 
same article attacking Michael Howard for playing into the hands of the 
government ‘by nakedly making it a party political issue instead of a point of 
principle’ (p. 2). An opinion piece on 12 March 2005 claimed that the debates 
around the Bill were ‘raw politics’, with both the government and the Opposition 
using parliament as a warm up for the forthcoming general election. It accused the 
Tories of using the Commons as a forum to ‘paint Blair as weak by forcing him to 
blink first and climb down’ (p. 2), with Blair using it as a means to expose the 
Tories as weak on terrorism.  
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5.6  Summary 
This chapter has analysed the press coverage of the passage of the PTA 2005, and 
whilst there was certainly a heavy focus on party politics, there was a much higher 
incidence of the civil liberties frame than in the previous case study. The editorial 
and commentary analyses revealed that there was broad support for the 
government’s position from the Murdoch press. However the Times did include 
pieces that were critical of the government for failing to make concessions that 
would have strengthened the Bill. The Guardian mainly reflected an anti-
government and pro-civil liberties stance, but that said, was surprisingly 
sympathetic to Clarke as Home Secretary. Unsurprisingly, the views of the Daily 
Telegraph and the Daily Mail reflected their hitherto anti-New Labour positions. 
The coverage in the Mirror also tended to reflect its previously held opinion that 
New Labour’s ‘war on terror’ policies were detrimental to civil liberties and 
human rights. 
 
In terms of press attention, the broadsheets devoted more copy to the debates than 
did the tabloids. However, with the exception of the Mirror all of the newspapers 
included front page coverage. Unlike the previous case study, hard news did not 
dominate the coverage to quite the same extent. Indeed, there was a much higher 
prevalence of editorials and feature articles across the newspaper spectrum. The 
relatively short period between the introduction of the Bill and it gaining the 
Royal Assent, combined with the dramatic ping-ponging between the houses, 
could explain the high level of press coverage. Also, the newsworthiness of the 
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dramatic backdrop – to pass new laws to deal with the imminent release of the 
Belmarsh detainees – could also go some way in explaining this phenomenon.   
 
Source-relations were as predicted, with elite sources dominating the parameters 
of debate. Government sources were most prevalent, followed by Conservative 
MPs. Like the 2001 case study, there were also very few citations from civil 
liberties and Muslim rights campaigners. However, whilst unattributed, their 
concerns were certainly represented in the coverage.  Proportionately, pro-
legislation sources accounted for nearly half of all citations, as did anti-legislation 
sources. Three quarters of the reporter tone was defined as straight, with the 
majority of reinforcing comments reserved for anti-legislation sources, and 
deflating comments for pro-legislation sources.  
 
Again, despite the dominance of government sources, there is little evidence to 
suggest that they had any substantial success in shaping the news agenda, and thus 
this negates the government-driven thesis. Instead, at an aggregate level, the prime 
evidence lends support for the independent model.  However, there is also 
evidence that some sections of the press, namely the Daily Telegraph, the 
Guardian and the Mirror, did subject the legislation to more robust scrutiny, and 
thus fulfilled their role as political watchdogs. These instances provide evidence 
for the oppositional model. 
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CHAPTER 6 
THE TERRORISM ACT 2006 
 
 
On 7 July 2005, just four months after the PTA 2005 received the Royal Assent, 
four suicide bombers carried out a coordinated attack on the London transport 
system, claiming the lives of 52 individuals and injuring over 700 people.79 For 
the government, the worst-case scenario had materialised, and later it would 
transpire that three of the four perpetrators had been born and raised in Britain.80 
However, despite the perpetrators being ‘home grown’, the government would go 
to great lengths to emphasise ‘the distinction between the bombers’ nationality 
and the nationality of their ideology’ (Bulley, 2010: 83). This was a means, some 
critics argued, to minimise the role that British foreign policy might have played 
in the perpetrators radicalisation.81 Speaking at the Labour Party’s national 
conference on 16 July 2005, Blair refuted claims that Britain’s foreign policy was 
the mainspring for the London bombings:   
                                                 
79
 On 21 July 2005, further suicide attacks on the London transport system were averted, due to the 
bombs failing to detonate. Whilst in pursuit of the suspects, the police fatally shot a Brazilian 
student, Jean Charles de Menezes, at Stockwell Underground Station, after mistaking him for one 
of the suspects. The employment of the ‘shoot to kill’ policy was widely criticised, as was the 
police investigation into the shooting. 
80
 Three of the perpetrators (Mohammad Sidique Khan, Shehzad Tanweer and Hasib Hussain) 
were born and raised in Britain to Pakistani immigrants. A fourth bomber, Germaine Lindsay, was 
born in Jamaica but migrated to England when he was five years of age.  
81
 The day after the bombings, both Tariq Ali writing in the Guardian and Robert Fisk in the 
Independent argued that the suicide attacks were undoubtedly influenced by the Anglo-American 
wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. The Respect MP, George Galloway, expressed a similar opinion. In 
videos made by two of the perpetrators, they stated that British foreign policy was a key impetus 
behind the planned attacks. 
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What we are confronting here is an evil ideology…and the violence that is 
inherent in it did not start a few years ago in response to a particular 
policy…If it is Afghanistan that motivates them, why blow up innocent 
Afghans on their way to their first ever election? If it is Iraq that motivates 
them, why is the same ideology killing Iraqis by terror in defiance of an 
elected Iraqi government? 
(Blair, 2005a) 
 
In terms of assuaging public anxiety, unlike George W. Bush, who famously kept 
a low profile in the immediate aftermath of 9/11, Blair straightaway ‘attempted to 
provide clarity and meaning in confused times’ (Closs Stephens & Vaughan-
Williams, 2008: 2). Whilst travelling back from Gleneagles, where he had been 
hosting the G8 summit, Blair contemplated ‘how [best] to express our thoughts as 
a country’, arguing that such a response should not have been ‘about “emoting” or 
“empathising”…[but] about defining the feeling so the reaction can be shaped and 
the consequences managed’ (Blair, 2010: 568). In the aftershock, Blair was 
confident that Britons of all faiths would ‘reject prejudice in favour of solidarity’, 
but believed that ‘anger and a demand for action’ for tougher legislative measures 
would quickly ensue (Ibid.). On civil liberty arguments, Blair admitted that ‘By 
this point of [his] premiership, the iron had entered [his] soul on the issue of 
liberty versus anti-terror laws’, but recognised that, in terms of legislating, ‘there 
would be a battle to come’ (Ibid.). 
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In his speech on 5 August 2005, Blair declared ‘Let no one be in any doubt. The 
rules of the game are changing’ for terrorists, before unveiling his 12-point 
counter-terrorism plan (Blair, 2005b). Blair’s first edict was new powers for the 
Home Secretary to deport foreign nationals who were ‘fostering hatred, 
advocating violence to further a person's beliefs or justifying or validating such 
violence’ (Ibid.). In the face of ‘legal obstacles’, Blair stated that the government 
would ‘legislate further, including, if necessary amending the Human Rights Act, 
in respect of the interpretation of the ECHR’ (Ibid.). He also stated that a 
‘Memorandum of Understanding’ had been established with Jordan, and that the 
government was exploring similar avenues with ‘other relevant countries’ (Ibid.). 
Another measure proposed that foreign nationals who engaged with ‘specific 
extremist websites, bookshops, centres, networks and particular organisations of 
concern’ could face deportation (Ibid.).  
 
However, the two proposals that would prove to be the most contestable during 
the legislative debates were Blair’s pledge to ‘[meet] the police and security 
service request that detention pre-charge of terrorist suspects be significantly 
extended’ and the creation of ‘an offence of condoning or glorifying terrorism’ 
(Ibid.). A measure that would allow for the closure of mosques that were 
suspected of being ‘used as a centre for fomenting extremism’ was later 
abandoned after widespread condemnation from the Muslim community (Ibid.).  
 
However, several other proposed measures were met with little resistance in 
parliament, including: the automatic refusal of asylum to ‘anyone who has 
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participated in terrorism’; the reduction of the time limit for terrorism related 
extradition cases; the extension of the use of control orders; and the proscription 
of extremist groups such as Hizb-ut-Tahrir  (Ibid.). Not all of these measures were 
contained in the Terrorism Bill, but two of the most contestable measures – 
glorification of terrorism and 90-days detention – were. Whilst the glorification of 
terrorism made its way onto the statute book, albeit in an amended form,82 the 
government’s plan to extend pre-charge detention up to 90 days was rejected by 
parliament – constituting Blair’s first Commons defeat.83 
 
This chapter focuses on how the British press reported the Terrorism Act 2006 
(hereafter referred to as TA 2006). Before presenting the findings of the 
quantitative and qualitative content analyses of the news content, it provides an 
overview of the key provisions contained in the Act, as well as the different 
standpoints of the main actors involved in the debates. These being the 
government, the political opposition, members of the House of Lords, as well as 
the police and security services, and to a lesser extent, civil liberties and Muslim 
advocacy groups. In terms of the news content study, the chapter has been 
organised as follows: firstly, it details the quantitative findings, which include the 
level of press attention devoted to the Bill and the key sources that shaped the 
news agenda. Secondly, it discusses the findings of the framing analysis, 
specifically looking at how the media framed the policy debates as well as the 
editorial responses of particular newspapers. The chapter concludes with a 
                                                 
82
 Although rejected as an offence in its own right, it was later subsumed into the ‘encouragement 
of terrorism’ clause (Terrorism Act 2006, s 1). 
83
 Instead, the Commons voted to extend the detention limit to 28 days (HC Deb 9 November 
2005, vol 439, cols 382–385). 
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consideration of the overall performance of the press, with special reference to the 
theoretical arguments discussed in previous chapters. To underpin particular 
points of discussion, this chapter also draws on some of the insights gleaned from 
the interview with the then Home Secretary, Charles Clarke, conducted by the 
author on 4 February 2014. 
 
6.1  Background to the TA 2006 
Officially, then, the TA 2006 was the government’s legislative response to 7/7, 
and was introduced to the Commons by Clarke on 12 October 2005.84 Whilst the 
previous two acts had been criticised for the speed with which they were pushed 
through parliament, this was not the case with the TA 2006. Indeed, Clarke was 
widely commended for allowing adequate time for proper parliamentary scrutiny 
and for eliciting the views of the Opposition. Prior to the bill’s introduction to 
Parliament, Clarke twice wrote to the shadow home secretary, David Davis, and 
the Liberal Democrat home affairs spokesperson, Mark Oaten, to stimulate 
dialogue on the outline proposals.  
 
Whilst Davis and Oaten approved many of the provisions, there were two major 
sticking points, namely the 90-days detention and the glorification of terrorism 
proposals, with the press and civil liberties campaigners echoing the Opposition’s 
disquiet. The 90-days detention provision also attracted considerable opposition 
from a sizeable number of Labour backbenchers, who had, as it transpired, an 
                                                 
84
 That said, Clarke also announced that discussions around some of the legislative proposals had 
already been in progress prior to the terrorist attacks on London, as a means to close the gaps in 
the current terrorism laws. 
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instrumental role in bringing about the government’s first Commons defeat. Even 
some ministers at the heart of government were ‘privately’ sceptical of some of 
the proposals. For example, Jack Straw, who was Foreign Secretary at the time of 
the bill’s passage, affirmed that he believed that Blair had gone too far with the 
90-days detention limit. He stated, ‘There was a lot of criticism [from the press], 
and I think it was well placed as it turned out on the 90 days proposal’ (Interview 
with author, 12 February 2014). Moreover, in a leaked letter from Clarke to the 
Opposition parties, it appeared that Clarke himself was prepared to make 
concessions on the detention limit, but his stance was to change in his later 
correspondence. For Downing Street, however, 7/7 had vindicated the 
strengthening of previous legislation and provided ballast for new laws to counter 
a terrorist risk that was no longer based on an existential threat but on real world 
experience. 
 
The previous chapter dealt in some detail with Clarke’s recollections of the 
government-press nexus during his tenure at the Home Office, and thus, the 
present chapter will not cover the same ground. However, it is instructive to 
discuss the relationship between Blair and Clarke during the legislative debates. 
As discussed elsewhere, after Blunkett’s departure from the Home Office, Blair 
became much more politically and publically involved in the terrorism legislative 
drives; this was especially the case during the passage of the TA 2006. On the 
media relations side, Clarke provided an account of the relationship between 
Downing Street and the Home Office, in which he stated: 
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Lines to take would be agreed. Sometimes briefing instructions might be 
discussed with Number Ten.  If there was a big story running and PM’s 
Questions were coming etc., Number Ten might say: “How are we dealing 
with that?”  So, it [Blair’s involvement with the media] wasn’t rare. There 
was an active Number Ten engagement in the process and the senior press 
adviser to the Prime Minister would talk to him every day about what was 
coming, and if it were coming on the agenda, he would talk to Tony about 
it directly.  Would Tony get involved? Possibly.  
(Interview with author, 4 February 2014) 
 
Generally, though, Blair’s involvement with Clarke during the debates tended to 
be on matters of policy rather than the media minutiae. An occasion where Blair 
did become directly involved was during the debates around the 90-days detention 
provision, as Clarke affirmed: ‘When we were dealing with the actual stage of 
deciding whether to proceed with the 90 days or not, Tony was very directly 
involved with that, very, very, fully’ (Ibid.). Regarding the policymaking process, 
Clarke believed that the press had little influence in the area of terrorism policy, 
but rather served as a ‘backdrop in the debates’ (Ibid.), with Clarke conceding that 
to ‘start allowing the media to play very directly into the counter-terrorism stuff is 
a very slippery slope about where you end up’ (Ibid.).  
 
Clarke cited the police and the security services as being the ‘biggest force’ in 
terms of informing the government on the practicability of the legislative 
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measures. Indeed, Clarke restated many of the arguments put forward by the 
police, including the points raised in a letter he received from Andy Hayman, the 
Assistant Commissioner of the Met at the beginning of October 2005. A key 
argument being that the complexity of modern terrorism cases, including the 
global dimension, required longer pre-charge detention for police investigations. 
Blair confirmed that the security measures were drafted in accordance with police 
supplications, rather than in appeasement to the press, believing that after 7/7 it 
was especially prudent to ‘err on the side of toughness’ (Blair, 2010: 583). Indeed, 
Blair noted that, despite the shadow home secretary’s ‘crazy mistake’ of moving 
the Tories to a ‘liberal position’ on terrorism laws, the traditional right-leaning 
press ‘rallied to an untraditional Tory position’ (Ibid.). The implication being that 
no matter what the policy, the press were always likely to reflect its hitherto 
partisan line.  
 
Commenting on the government’s defeat in the Commons over the 90-days 
detention measure, Blair avowed that on ‘a simple, almost pristine issue of 
national security – [he] felt instinctively more comfortable losing than winning 
through compromise’ (Blair, 2010: 584). On the press reaction, Blair 
acknowledged that he had been aware of the negative articles that predicted his 
demise due to his ‘vanishing authority’, but could also ‘sense that the very 
recklessness of it, on something [he] believed was right, got [him] traction among 
the public’ (Ibid.). Opinion polls conducted at the time gave credence to his 
claims that the government had the support of the public. Indeed, a YouGov 
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survey found that 72 per cent of the public supported the 90-days detention 
proposal.  
 
On losing the argument in parliament, Clarke believed that the ‘media was not 
core in this’ (Ibid.). Where the media does have influence, Clarke conceded, was 
in the midst of a terrorist attack:  
On something as enormous as terrorism, the sense in which the media is 
important is if there has been a couple of explosions and we just go on as 
normal, and something else happens – then you are acutely aware that the 
media will say, “you were asleep on the job, why didn't you act?” – and it 
would be a fair criticism. 
(Ibid.)   
 
Regarding the ‘glorification of terrorism’ proposal, several influential human 
rights organisations, such as Amnesty International and Liberty criticised the 
vagueness of the clause, as well as its ‘chilling’ implications for freedom of 
expression (See Amnesty International, 2005: 5–10; and Liberty, 2005: 11).85 On 
28 November 2005, after the government’s dramatic defeat in the Commons, the 
JCHR published its third report of the session. Whilst the 90-days detention was 
no longer an issue, there was still concern over the glorification of terrorism 
                                                 
85
 A report published by the United Nations Human Rights Committee in 2008, also voiced 
‘concern that the offence of “encouragement of terrorism” [had] been defined in section 1 of the 
Terrorism Act 2006 in broad and vague terms’ and advised the government to ‘consider amending 
that part of section 1 of the Terrorism Act 2006 dealing with “encouragement of terrorism” so that 
its application does not lead to a disproportionate interference with freedom of expression’ (United 
Nations Human Rights Committee, 2008: 71). 
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proposal. Echoing the concerns of politicians, lawyers and civil liberties groups, 
the Committee expressed concern that the clause could hinder freedom of 
expression, and to some degree, was incompatible with human rights obligations. 
The Report stated: 
The Committee accepts, on balance, that the case has been made out by 
the Government that there is a need for a new, narrowly defined criminal 
offence of indirect incitement to terrorist acts. However, it considers that 
the offence of encouragement in clause 1 is not sufficiently legally certain 
to satisfy the requirement in Article 10 that interferences with freedom of 
expression be “prescribed by law” because of (i) the vagueness of the 
glorification requirement, (ii) the breadth of the definition of “terrorism” 
and (iii) the lack of any requirement of intent to incite terrorism or 
likelihood of such offences being caused as ingredients of the offence. In 
the Committee’s view, to make the new offence compatible, it would be 
necessary to delete the references to glorification, insert a more tightly 
drawn definition of terrorism, and insert into the definition of the offence 
requirements of intent (which could include subjective recklessness 
instead of the objective recklessness test introduced at Commons report 
stage) and likelihood. 
(Joint Committee on Human Rights, 2005: 3) 
 
The Act in its final form included several new offences as well as extensions to 
existing provisions. In regards to the two most debated measures, a longer pre-
charge detention limit and the glorification of terrorism, the TA 2006 increased 
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the detention limit from 14-days to 28-days, and made the encouragement or 
‘glorification’ of terrorism a criminal offence, and subject to a maximum prison 
sentence of seven years.86 It also afforded greater powers to the Home Secretary 
to proscribe extremist groups, and created the new offences of dissemination of 
terrorist publications, and preparation of terrorist acts and terrorist training.  
 
6.2  Press Attention 
This section presents the results of the quantitative part of the news content study. 
For ease of reference, Table 6.1 illustrates the progression of the TA 2006 with 
the corresponding newspaper sample dates, and spans the period between 12 
October 2005 (the day the Bill was first introduced) and 31 March 2006 (the day 
after the Bill gained the Royal Assent).  
 
Table 6.1 Progression of the TA 2006 with corresponding newspaper sample 
dates (12 October 2005 – 30 March 2006) 
PROGRESSION OF ACT NEWSPAPER SAMPLE 
DATES 
HC first reading: 12 October 2005 
HC second reading: 26 October 2005 
HC committee stage:  
2 November 2005 
3 November 2005 
HC report stage: 9 November 2005 
13 October 2005 
27 October 2005 
 
3 November 2005 
4 November 2005 
10 November 2005 
                                                 
86
 Officially defined as the ‘encouragement of terrorism’, the clause ‘applies to a statement that is 
likely to be understood by some or all of the members of the public to whom it is published as a 
direct or indirect encouragement or other inducement to them to the commission, preparation or 
instigation of acts of terrorism or Convention offences.’ Online. Available HTTP: 
<http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2006/11/part/1> (accessed 10 July 2014). 
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HC third reading: 10 November 2005 
HL first reading: 10 November 2005 
HL second reading: 21 November 2005 
HL committee stage:  
5 December 2005 
7 December 2005 
13 December 2005 
20 December 2005 
HL report stage:  
17 January 2006 
25 January 2006 
HL third reading: 1 February 2006 
HC consideration of Lords amendments: 
15 February 2006 
HL consideration of Commons amendments: 
26 February 2006 
HC consideration of Lords amendments: 
16 March 2006 
HL consideration of Commons amendments: 
22 March 2006 
Royal assent: 30 March 2006 
11 November 2005 
 
22 November 2005 
 
6 December 2005 
8 December 2005 
14 December 2005 
21 December 2005 
 
18 January 2006 
26 January 2006 
2 February 2006 
 
16 February 2006 
 
27 February 2006 
 
17 March 2006 
 
23 March 2006 
30 March 2006  
31 March 2006 
TOTAL: 20 days 
 
 
Echoing the 2001 and 2005 case studies, the broadsheets devoted significantly 
more coverage to the TA 2006 than did the tabloids. There was negligible 
difference between the broadsheets in terms of output, with the Guardian 
devoting 26,019 words (44 articles) to the debates surrounding the passage of the 
Bill, the Daily Telegraph  23,339 words (36 articles) and the Times 21,149 words 
(31 articles). Out of the tabloids, the Daily Mail devoted 14,389 words (25 
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articles) to the debates, significantly more than the Mirror and the Sun, who 
devoted 5,799 words (15 articles) and 3,801 words (15 articles) respectively. 
However, despite the difference in the number of words devoted to the Bill, the 
two redtops produced an equivalent number of articles. Figure 6.1 provides an 
illustrative representation of the number of words each newspaper devoted to the 
passage of the Bill, and Table 6.2 shows the number of words and total number of 
articles per newspaper. 
 
Figure 6.1 Words devoted to the TA 2006 by newspaper 
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Table 6.2 Total number of words and articles devoted to the TA 2006 per 
newspaper 
Newspapers Total Words N Articles 
Daily Mail 14,389 25 
Daily Mirror 5,799 15 
Daily Telegraph 23,339 36 
The Guardian 26,019 44 
The Sun 3,801 15 
The Times 21,149 31 
Total 94,496 166 
 
 
Figure 6.2 shows a timeline of the number of articles that appeared in each 
newspaper over the duration of the passage of the Bill. In terms of which issues 
garnered the most attention, there was a major peak in media interest on 10 
November 2005 (42 articles), then again on 11 November 2005 (29 articles) and 
16 February 2006 (21 articles). These dates corresponded respectively with the 
Commons report stage on 9 November 2005, the Commons third reading, as well 
as the Lords first reading on 10 November 2005, and the Commons consideration 
of the Lords amendments on 15 February 2006. Coverage on 10 November and 11 
November 2005 dealt with the aftermath of the government’s first Commons 
defeat, in which the Opposition and Labour rebels voted against 90-days 
detention.  Coverage on 16 February 2006, focused on the government’s victory 
in securing the vote for the ‘glorification of terrorism’ clause. 
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Figure 6.2 Number of articles appearing in all newspapers over the sample 
period (12 October 2005 – 30 March 2006) 
 
 
Table 6.3 shows the story location of news items by newspaper. In terms of story 
location, all of the newspapers included front page coverage of the policy debates, 
with the Daily Telegraph and the Guardian devoting six and seven front pages to 
the debates respectively. All the other titles devoted just one front page to the Bill, 
whilst most of the articles were located within the inside pages. On 10 November 
2005, all of the newspapers devoted front page coverage to the government’s first 
defeat in the Commons. Most of the headlines postulated what the defeat could 
mean for Blair’s political career, and included: ‘Blair’s blackest day?’ (Daily 
Telegraph); ‘After eight years in power Tony Blair hears a new word: defeat’ 
(Guardian); ‘Beginning of the end?’ (Times and the Daily Mail); and ‘Start 
packing Cherie? Blair rocked as rebels inflict first ever Commons defeat’ 
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(Mirror). Meanwhile, the Sun reflected a decidedly different view by declaring: 
‘Traitors: MPs betray public’.  
 
Table 6.3 Story location by newspaper (TA 2006) 
Newspaper Front 
Page 
Inside 
Pages 
Feature Editorial Total  
Daily Mail 1 17 2 5 25 
Daily Mirror 1 11 - 3 15 
Telegraph 6 21 4 5 36 
The Guardian 7 29 4 4 44 
The Sun 1 13 - 1 15 
The Times 1 21 6 3 31 
Total 17 112 16 21 166 
 
 
Table 6.4 shows the format of the news items. Over half of all articles across the 
newspaper spectrum were categorised as hard news, followed by the feature, 
editorial and background formats. As with the PTA 2005, all of the newspapers 
included editorials, with the highest number appearing in the Daily Mail and the 
Daily Telegraph, with five apiece, followed by four in the Guardian, three apiece 
in the Mirror and the Times, and one in the Sun. 
 
Table 6.4 Article format (TA 2006) 
Newspaper Hard 
News 
Background Editorial Feature Total  
Daily Mail 14 - 5 6 25 
Daily Mirror 10 2 3 - 15 
Telegraph 21 1 5 9 36 
The Guardian 21 9 4 10 44 
The Sun 11 - 1 3 15 
The Times 16 4 3 8 31 
Total 93 16 21 36 166 
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Table 6.5 shows the type of author. Staff writers and regular columnists wrote the 
majority of articles. Of the two titles that included pieces by guest opinion writers, 
the Times included a piece by the security expert Dean Godson, whilst the 
Guardian included a commentary by Louise Christian, a lawyer acting on behalf 
of Guantanamo detainees.  
 
Table 6.5 Type of Author (TA 2006) 
Newspaper Staff 
News 
Regular 
Opinion 
Guest  
Opinion 
Editorial Not 
Stated 
Total 
Daily Mail 11 6 - 5 3 25 
Daily Mirror 12 - - 3 - 15 
Daily Telegraph 21 7 - 5 3 36 
The Guardian 25 9 1 4 5 44 
The Sun 7 2 - 1 5 15 
The Times 17 7 1 3 3 31 
Total 93 31 2 21 19 166 
 
 
Table 6.6 shows the number and type of visuals that appeared in each newspaper. 
Unlike the PTA 2005, where Charles Clarke was the most depicted across the 
newspapers, there was significantly more focus on Blair during the coverage of 
the TA 2006, with the Mirror including nine photographs of the prime minster. 
The police with eleven appearances followed this, although images of the police 
were not included in the two redtops. Images of Clarke, government ministers, 
Labour rebels, the aftermath of 7/7 and stock images had nine appearances each. 
A surprising aspect was the relatively small number of images of the aftermath of 
the London bombings, especially as the legislation was officially defined as the 
political response to the atrocities. This could suggest that some of the newspapers 
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were deliberately avoiding using the emotive images of 7/7, as a means to negate 
the official justification for the legislation. 
 
Table 6.6 Number and type of visuals per newspaper (TA 2006) 
 
Visual Type 
DT Times Guard Mail Sun Mir Total 
Blair 3 1 3 3 4 9 23 
Clarke 3 1 3 2 - - 9 
Gov. Minister 4 1 2 - - 2 9 
Lab MPs 1 1 - - - 2 4 
Lab Opp MPs 1 7 1 - - - 9 
Peers 1 - - - - - 1 
Police 2 4 4 1 - - 11 
Law Lords 1 - - - - - 1 
Muslims - 1 - - - - 1 
Campaigners/
protestors  
1 - 4 - - - 5 
7/7 aftermath 
or victims 
- 1 2 - 3 3 9 
Terrorists or 
suspects 
1 - - 1 2 - 4 
Cartoon  2 2 2 1 - - 7 
Graphic 1 - - - - - 1 
Stock Image - 1 2 - 3 3 9 
Total 21 20 23 8 12 19 103 
 
 
Figure 6.3 shows the ratio of articles that contained images. As with the PTA 
2005, the Mirror included more articles with accompanying visuals than did the 
other newspapers, and the Daily Mail the least. Almost half of the articles in the 
Guardian and the Sun appeared with accompanying images. 
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Figure 6.3 Percentage of articles with accompanying images (TA 2006) 
 
 
As noted elsewhere, from 2005, the press was increasingly focusing on Blair as 
the main driver of the terrorism laws. After 7/7, Blair was the star player as far as 
the press was concerned, and had a higher proportion of representation both 
textually and visually than did his Home Secretary. Similarly, the police also 
became much more publically involved with the terrorism legislative campaigns 
around this period. In terms of political personalities, the newspapers tended to 
use generic photographs of both Clarke and Blair. Like the previous case studies, 
visuals were not generally used to reinforce the textual content or to bolster 
particular frames.  Captions also tended to be descriptive rather than used as a 
means to anchor a particular sentiment expressed in the accompanying article. 
One exception being the Mirror, which included an image of the 7/7 survivor 
John Tulloch just after the Edgware Road blast with the accompanying caption: 
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‘7/7 Victim: My Joy at Defeat’ (11 November 2005, p. 8). The obvious 
connotation being that even victims of terrorist attacks believed the 90-days 
detention measure to be too long. Another instance occurred in the Sun, where 
under the banner ‘Winners’ (with the overarching headline, ‘Traitors’), 
photographs of MPs who voted against the 90-days detention clause are explicitly 
aligned with terrorists, including Osama Bin Laden. This is contrasted with 
photographs of 7/7 victims with the caption ‘Losers’, with an image of a London 
bus damaged by the bomb blast positioned between the ‘winners’ and the ‘losers’ 
(10 November 2005, p. 6).  
 
 
6.3  The Primary Definers of the News Agenda 
As with the previous two case studies, elite sources dominated the parameters of 
debate, with government sources (Downing Street, the Home Office and Labour 
MPs) appearing 189 times (266 paragraphs), constituting 40 percent of all actor 
appearances, and a 41 percent share of all paragraphs devoted to source citations. 
The second most represented actor or body was the Conservative Party, appearing 
84 times (105 paragraphs), which accounted for 18 percent of all source 
appearances and a 16 percent share of all paragraphs devoted to source citations. 
Labour rebels constituted the third highest source group cited, with 60 
appearances (accounting for 13 percent of all appearances) and 71 paragraphs (11 
percent share of total paragraphs). As with the previous case studies, the civil 
liberties and Muslim contingents were noticeably underrepresented, with just 
three appearances by civil liberties campaigners in the Guardian and one in the 
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Times. However, there was a slight increase in appearances by Muslim actors in 
four of the six newspapers – four in the Guardian, two in both the Daily 
Telegraph and the Daily Mail and one in the Mirror. Table 6.7 shows the 
frequency of appearance and total paragraphs devoted to all source citations. 
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Table 6.7 Frequency of appearance and total paragraphs devoted to direct and 
indirect source citations (TA 2006) 
 
 
Source 
DT 
n  
(Pars) 
Times 
n  
(Pars) 
Guard 
n  
(Pars) 
Mail 
n  
(Pars) 
Sun 
n  
(Pars) 
Mir 
n  
(Pars) 
Total 
n  
(Pars) 
Backbenchers - 1 
(1) 
3 
(4) 
- - - 4 
(5) 
Civil Lib 2 
(2) 
- 3 
(3) 
- - 3 
(4) 
8 
(9) 
Con Party 32 
(43) 
11 
(12) 
21 
(22) 
14 
(21) 
4 
(4) 
2 
(3) 
84 
(105) 
Con Peers 4 
(10) 
1 
(1) 
5 
(6) 
- - - 10 
(17) 
Con Opp - 1 
(1) 
- - - - 1 
(1) 
Downing St. 29 
(41) 
13 
(19) 
21 
(28) 
18 
(26) 
6 
(11) 
10 
(16) 
97 
(141) 
Home Office 22 
(25) 
11 
(16) 
15 
(18) 
15 
(28) 
1 
(3) 
3 
(5) 
67 
(95) 
Lab Party 5 
(6) 
4 
(4) 
8 
(9) 
3 
(4) 
2 
(2) 
3 
(5) 
25 
(30) 
Lab Peers 6 
(7) 
4 
(5) 
7 
(10) 
1 
(1) 
2 
(2) 
1 
(1) 
21 
(26) 
Lab Rebels 17 
(21) 
9 
(9) 
13 
(14) 
13 
(17) 
1 
(1) 
7 
(9) 
60 
(71) 
Law Lords 4 
(14) 
- 1 
(1) 
- - - 5 
(15) 
LD Party 6 
(8) 
4 
(4) 
5 
(5) 
4 
(7) 
1 
(1) 
4 
(7) 
24 
(32) 
LD Peers 3 
(8) 
5 
(6) 
10 
(12) 
3 
(6) 
- 
 
1 
(1) 
22 
(33) 
Muslim 2 
(2) 
- 4 
(10) 
2 
(3) 
- 1 
(1) 
9 
(16) 
All Opp 2 
(2) 
1 
(1) 
2 
(2) 
3 
(3) 
- 0 8 
(8) 
Other Pol - - 2 
(2) 
- - 1 
(1) 
3 
(3) 
Other Peers 2 
(4) 
2 
(3) 
2 
(2) 
- 2 
(2) 
- 8 
(11) 
Police 6 
(7) 
3 
(5) 
4 
(5) 
2 
(3) 
1 
(2) 
2 
(2) 
18 
(24) 
Security 1 
(5) 
1 
(1) 
- - - - 2 
(6) 
UN - - 1 
(1) 
- - - 1 
(1) 
Total 143 
(205) 
71 
(88) 
127 
(154) 
78 
(119) 
20 
(28) 
38 
(55) 
477 
(649) 
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Figure 6.4 shows the proportion of pro-legislation, anti-legislation and 
mixed/unstated sources included in each newspaper based on frequency of 
appearance (a full breakdown of the sources and their positions on the legislation 
can be found in Appendix 9). At an aggregate level, pro-legislation and anti-
legislation sources each accounted for 47 percent of the total share, with 
mixed/unstated sources representing six percent.  With the exception of the Sun, 
all of the newspapers had an even spread of pro- and anti-legislation sources. 
Overall, the Sun had the highest proportion of pro-legislation sources, comprising 
65 percent of all sources, with 35 percent of all sources reflecting an anti-
legislation stance. Half of the newspapers were slightly slanted toward anti-
legislation sources, including the Daily Telegraph with 52 percent of its total 
sources reflecting an anti-legislation stance compared with 48 percent for pro-
legislation. Similarly, the anti-legislation sources constituted 46 percent of the 
share in the Guardian and 50 percent in the Mirror, with pro-legislation sources 
making up 42 percent and 47 percent of their respective sources. The Guardian 
also had the highest proportion of mixed/unstated sources, constituting 12 percent 
of all sources. Inversely, the Times and the Daily Mail tilted in favour of pro-
legislation sources, which comprised 49 percent and 47 percent of their total 
sources, with 42 percent and 46 percent of their respective sources reflecting anti-
legislation perspectives. The share of mixed/unstated sources was close to 9 
percent in the Times and nearly 7 percent in the Daily Mail. 
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Figure 6.4 Source position on legislation as proportion of frequency of 
appearance (TA 2006) 
 
 
Across all the newspapers, Figure 6.5 shows that 91 percent of the reporter tone 
toward the sources cited was coded as straight, with 4 percent of all source 
citations coded as deflating and 5 percent as reinforcing of source assertions. The 
straight percentage corresponds exactly with the ratio in the 2001 Act.  
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Figure 6.5 Reporter tone toward all sources across all newspapers as percentage 
(TA 2006) 
 
 
Table 6.8 demonstrates the reporter tone toward the different source positions in 
each newspaper.  As Figure 6.5 revealed, the vast majority of articles contained a 
straight reporter tone toward the sources cited. However, when reporters did move 
away from straight reporting, the majority of deflating comments at an aggregate 
level were aimed at pro-legislation sources, with anti-legislation sources gaining 
the most reinforcing comments. When considering the newspapers at an 
individual level, all four of the reinforcing comments in the Sun were aimed at 
government source assertions, whilst its one occurrence of a deflating tone was 
made toward the Conservative Party. The Times was the only other title that 
included a reinforcing tone toward a pro-legislation source citation, and that was 
reserved for the police. Contrariwise, the Guardian provided the most negative 
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commentary toward pro-legislation sources, with all six of its deflating comments 
levelled at the government. Similarly, all three of the Daily Telegraph’s deflating 
comments, and one apiece from the Times and the Daily Mail, were reserved for 
the government.  
 
Anti-legislation sources received five deflating evaluations from the Guardian, all 
of which were against the Conservative Party, as was the one occurrence in the 
Times. In terms of reinforcing evaluative comments devoted to anti-legislation 
sources, the Daily Telegraph included the most, half of which were devoted to the 
Conservative Party, followed by the Liberal Democrats and peers opposed to the 
terrorism Bill. Most of the reinforcing coverage in the Daily Mail was also 
directed at the Conservatives, closely followed by the Liberal Democrat Party, as 
was the two instances in the Guardian. The Mirror was the only title that did not 
include any deflating or reinforcing comments against pro- or anti-legislation 
sources. 
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Table 6.8 Reporter tone toward pro- and anti-legislation sources (TA 2006) 
 
Source Position 
DT Times  Guard  Mail  Sun Mir  Total 
 
Pro-Legislation 
 
69 
 
35 
 
53 
 
37 
 
13 
 
18 
 
225 
        Straight 66 32 47 36 9 18 208 
        Reinforcing - 1 - - 4 - 5 
        Mixed - 1 - - - - 1 
        Deflating 3 1 6 1 - - 11 
 
Anti-Legislation 
 
74 
 
30 
 
59 
 
36 
 
7 
 
19 
 
225 
        Straight 64 29 52 31 6 19 201 
        Reinforcing 10 - 2 5 - - 17 
        Mixed - - - - - - - 
        Deflating - 1 5 - 1 - 7 
 
Mixed/Unstated 
 
- 
 
6 
 
15 
 
5 
 
- 
 
1 
 
27 
        Straight - 6 15 5 - 1 27 
        Reinforcing - - - - - - - 
        Mixed - - - - - - - 
        Deflating - - - - - - - 
 
6.4  Media Framing of Policy Debates 
In terms of which frames predominated at an aggregate level, a similar pattern to 
the framing of the ATCSA 2001 and PTA 2005 emerges. The politics frame was 
the most prevalent across the entire sample of newspapers, accounting for 45 
percent of all articles, whilst 11 percent of the articles did not display any 
significant framing or reasoning devices relevant to a particular frame. Just 8 
percent of all articles displayed exclusive elements of the security frame, 18 
percent the civil liberties frame, with mixed frames constituting the remaining 18 
percent of the articles. Figure 6.6 provides an illustrative representation of which 
frames predominated across the sample. When comparing the broadsheets and the 
tabloids, six percent of all articles in the broadsheets and 13 percent of all articles 
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in the tabloids reflected the security frame. However, as with the PTA 2005, when 
considering the tabloids at an individual level, this measurement reflected the high 
incidence of the frame in the Sun – with just one appearance of the frame in the 
Mirror and none in the Daily Mail. Similarly, when considering the tabloids 
support for the civil liberties frame – which reflected 15 percent of frames at an 
aggregate level – only the Daily Mail included articles that were coded as 
exclusively reflecting civil liberties perspectives. Twenty percent of all articles 
across the broadsheet sample reflected the civil liberties frame. Again, there was a 
heavy slant towards the politics frame in both the broadsheets and the tabloids 
constituting 45 percent and 44 percent of their respective outputs. The broadsheets 
had a slightly higher incidence of frameless articles, 12 percent compared with 9 
percent for the tabloids. 
 
Figure 6.6 Predominant frames (%) across all newspapers, broadsheets and 
tabloids (TA 2006) 
 
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
40
45
50
All Newspapers Broadsheets Tabloids
%
Security
Civil Liberties
Politics
Sec/CL/Pol
Sec/CL
Sec/Pol
CL/Pol
None
239 
 
Table 6.9 shows the predominant frames in each newspaper. The security frame 
was most prevalent in the Sun with six articles, with the Daily Telegraph and the 
Guardian including three articles apiece, and the Times and Mirror just one each; 
whilst the Daily Mail was the only newspaper not to include any articles that 
exclusively reflected national security perspectives. The civil liberties frame was 
particularly prevalent in the Daily Telegraph, the Guardian and the Daily Mail, 
appearing nine, ten and eight times respectively. However, the two redtops did not 
include any articles with an exclusive civil liberties frame. With the exception of 
the Sun, the politics frame was the most heavily represented across the newspaper 
sample.  
 
Table 6.9 Predominant frames per newspaper (TA 2006) 
 
Frames 
DT Times Guard Mail Sun Mir Total 
Security 3 1 3 - 6 1 14   
Civil Liberties 9 3 10 8 - -  30  
Politics 13 21 16 11 4 9  74  
Sec/CL/Pol 1 1 - - - -  2  
Sec/CL 1 - 3 - 1 - 5   
Sec/Pol - 1 1 1 3 1  7  
CL/Pol 7 1 3 2 - 3 16 
None 2 3 8 3 1 1 18    
Total 36 31 44 25 15 15 166 
 
 
Figure 6.7 presents the quotient of frames per newspaper. Only eight percent of 
the Daily Telegraph’s coverage reflected the security frame, 25 percent the civil 
liberties frame, 22 percent mixed frames and 36 percent the politics frame. In the 
Times, just three percent of articles reflected the security frame, 10 percent the 
civil liberties frame and 68 percent the politics frame, with 10 percent of articles 
coded as reflecting mixed perspectives. The Guardian devoted most of its space 
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to the politics frame, with 36 percent of all articles reflecting this frame, and 23 
percent reflecting the civil liberties frame. Forty-four percent of all articles in the 
Daily Mail reflected the politics frame, with 32 percent devoted to civil liberty 
perspectives. Forty percent of the articles in the Sun reflected the security frame, 
compared to 27 percent for the politics frame. Out of all the newspapers, the 
politics frame had a higher proportion of representation in the Mirror, accounting 
for 60 percent of all articles.  
 
Figure 6.7 Composition (%) of frames per newspaper (TA 2006) 
 
 
Figure 6.8 shows the predominate frames at an aggregate level. When the mixed 
frames are combined with the three meta frames (security, civil liberties and 
politics) the findings show that the politics frame was the most prevalent in all the 
newspapers with the exception of the Sun, where the security frame dominated. 
Interestingly, out of the broadsheets, the Times had the least occurrences of the 
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security frame in its aggregate form, numbering three times compared with the 
Daily Telegraph with five instances and the Guardian with seven.  As with the 
PTA 2005 case study, the civil liberties frame was heavily represented in the 
Daily Telegraph (18 occurrences) and the Guardian (16 occurrences), and to a 
lesser extent in the Daily Mail (10 occurrences), whereas it had little 
representation in the Times, the Sun and the Mirror, with two, one and three 
appearances correspondingly.  
 
Figure 6.8 Predominate frames at an aggregate level (TA 2006) 
 
 
In terms of which themes or depictions were most heavily represented within the 
politics frame, as expected the ‘political conflict’ leitmotif gained considerable 
coverage. Across the newspaper sample, there was much focus on the conflict 
between the government and the Opposition, and between the government and 
Labour rebels. In relation to Blair’s defeat over 90-days detention, the press used 
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it as a springboard to undermine Blair’s leadership more generally, and to portend 
his imminent demise. There were also references to Blair’s abuse of power, 
especially his influence in persuading the police to lobby MPs on behalf of the 
government. In the main, there was also little support for the glorification of 
terrorism clause, which was criticised as being vaguely drawn, as well as being 
politically motivated – viz., to appease public opinion. 
 
The most prevalent theme or depiction in relation to the civil liberties frame was 
the impact of the glorification of terrorism clause on freedom of expression, with 
the 90-days detention clause criticised for compromising habeas corpus and 
ancient legal rights in general. There was also substantial focus on the triumph of 
Parliament in curtailing the 90-days detention measure, with much of the press 
perceiving Blair’s defeat in the Commons as a direct threat to his premiership. 
The Times, the Guardian and the Daily Mail also touched on how the measures 
might increase the risk of terrorist attacks, believing that the 90-days detention 
and glorification clauses could alienate Muslims further. 
 
In relation to the security frame, the legislation was depicted as safeguarding 
fundamental rights and freedoms. There were also instances where the 
government’s defeat in Parliament was seen as a negative development, with the 
Opposition defined as illogical and unpatriotic. Moreover, those opposed to the 
Bill were portrayed as jeopardising national security, as well as being out of touch 
with the electorate. All of these themes had most expression in the Sun. 
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6.5  Editorial and Commentary Standpoints 
This section focuses on the overt ideological direction of each newspaper, as 
expressed in the editorials and commentary pieces. 
 
Daily Telegraph: As expected, the Daily Telegraph’s coverage reflected its 
traditional anti-Labour government stance. In its first editorial coverage of the TA 
2006, the Daily Telegraph focused on the tension between the government and the 
judiciary, declaring each to be lacking in some regard. Using the Stansted 
hijacking case, where a group of Afghans had hijacked an aeroplane to escape the 
Taliban, the editorial criticised the reluctance of judges to repatriate foreign 
nationals. It went on to state that ‘judges are answerable to nobody’ and that Blair 
only has himself to blame, as ‘it was he who pushed through the Human Rights 
Act, which gave judges the power (and, indeed, the duty) to overturn any law that 
they thought incompatible with the ECHR’ (13 October 2005, p. 19). 
 
On the glorification of terrorism clause, the Daily Telegraph asserted that ‘British 
traditions of liberty, free speech and freedom of thought are all ridden over 
roughshod by this measure’ (16 February 2006, p. 23). The editorial on 4 
November 2005 urged parliament not to back the Bill, declaring that the 
glorification clause would be impossible to police. Furthermore, referring to 
Cherie Blair’s 2002 comment in which she apparently expressed sympathy for 
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Palestinian suicide bombers, the editorial sardonically declared that, under the 
new law her statement would be deemed a criminal offence.87  
 
The alleged discord between Blair and Clarke on the 90-days detention clause is 
also emphasised, with the Daily Telegraph claiming that Clarke believed it to be 
too long (4 November 2005, p. 23). Another editorial focused on Blair’s first 
defeat in the Commons, declaring that ‘Blair has, finally, lost the power to get his 
agenda into law’ (10 November 2005, p. 23). It goes on to warn that, if he wishes 
to remain in Number Ten, then he will have to stop behaving ‘like a self-
appointed despot’ (Ibid.).  
 
The editorial on 11 November 2005 criticised New Labour for encouraging the 
police to lobby MPs on their behalf, arguing that this was a blatant abuse of 
executive power. The overarching theme of the editorial was the role of New 
Labour in blurring the lines of distinction between the government and state 
institutions, claiming that the police and the civil service have now ‘come under 
the influence of politicians’ (p. 23). 
 
The Times: Whilst the previous terrorism legislative drives had gained broad 
support from the Times, its coverage of the TA 2006 was much more critical of 
the government’s agenda. Camilla Cavendish’s commentary on 13 October 2005 
argued that 90-days detention was ‘a leap too far’ (p. 20). Calling on politicians to 
                                                 
87
 Speaking at a charity event in 2002, Cherie Blair said that, ‘As long as young people feel they 
have got no hope but to blow themselves up you are never going to make progress’ (The 
Guardian, 18 June 2002, p. 1). At the time, the right-leaning press were highly critical of Cherie 
Blair’s statement, which she made shortly after a suicide bombing in Jerusalem. During the 
passage of the TA 2006 many of the newspapers made reference to Cherie Blair’s 2002 statement. 
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be wary of agreeing to an extension of police powers, she reasoned that ‘over-
repressive legislation will create resentment and help the enemy to breathe’ 
(Ibid.). In contrast, Dean Godson proclaimed that it was ‘unedifying to watch the 
Opposition cosying up to the Left and civil liberties lobby’ (3 November 2005, p. 
21).88 Godson goes on to state that he would put his trust in the judgement of the 
police and MI5 on matters of national security above that of the Law Lords and 
‘the worst of the hard Left’ (Ibid.). However, whilst his opinion piece supported 
the measures proposed by the government, Godson suggested that the government 
needed to go further and ignore the ‘private compromises’ it had made ‘with the 
civil liberties lobby and the Muslim Council of Britain’ (Ibid.). 
 
However, after his first parliamentary defeat, the Times pondered on what the 
future held for Blair. Editorially, the Times stated that Blair was wrong to ignore 
the advice of his Home Secretary, in which Clarke implored Blair to compromise 
on 90-days detention. It goes on to profess that privately the police had disclosed 
to the Times that operationally 42 days would have been sufficient. On this basis, 
the editorial accused Blair of ‘staging a show trial of strength’ for political ends, 
namely to satisfy public opinion. In its parting shot, the newspaper declared that 
Blair’s defeat proved that he was no longer invincible. (10 November 2005, p. 
19). This theme was repeated in a commentary by Peter Riddell, in which he 
announced ‘Teflon Tony is dead’ (10 November 2005, p. 20), arguing that Blair 
should have compromised on the detention limit. Questioning how long Blair can 
hold on to his office, he warned that like ‘Margaret Thatcher’s departure 15 years 
                                                 
88
 cf. Polly Toynbee’s take on the alliance between the political Right and the Left below (The 
Guardian, 10 November 2005, p. 32). 
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ago, the end of the Blair era is likely to lead to arguments and divisions within his 
party’ (Ibid.). The following day, David Aaronovitch contended that despite Blair 
being ‘the most talented centre-left politician in the Western world’ it was time 
for him ‘to move on’ because ‘his luck, his time and his mandate have run out’ 
(11 November 2005, p. 25). 
 
On the glorification of terrorism clause, the Times defined it as ‘glorifying 
nonsense’, arguing that the measure is unlikely to work in practice. Instead, the 
interpretation of the law could mean that much time is wasted ‘trying to prove 
cases of “glorification” that have no merit’, which could ultimately ‘deepen ethnic 
or religious rifts in some communities’ (16 February 2006, p. 19). 
 
The Guardian: In its opening editorial, the Guardian denounced the 90-days 
detention clause as ‘too long’, arguing that Clarke ‘thought so too, before being 
overruled by Downing Street’ (13 October 2005, p. 34). Whilst Seumas Milne 
warned that the ‘panic measures’ contained in the Bill would do little to fight 
terror, and instead would ‘increase the likelihood of further attacks in Britain’ (13 
October 2005, p. 33).  
 
Deliberations on Blair’s first defeat in the Commons were mixed. Polly Toynbee 
warned that whilst ‘Blair is reckless…Labour must not add to the damage’, 
arguing that the ‘dangerous coming together of right and left against the 
government’ signalled a ‘time for caution’ (10 November 2005, p. 32). 
Editorially, the vote against the 90-day detention clause was welcomed, but 
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advised that whilst Blair’s ‘strategy was an abnegation of good government’, the 
support for Blair in the ‘opinion polls and the tabloids’ [which was almost 
exclusively from the Sun] should not be ‘underestimated’ (10 November 2005, p. 
34). That said, it argued that the drafting of laws should not be overly influenced 
by public opinion or subject to the say-so of the police. Instead, government and 
parliament were responsible for the weighing up of one interest against another 
when it came to the rule of law, and concluded: ‘The government conspicuously 
failed to do that. Parliament conspicuously succeeded. Yesterday was a good day 
for the parliamentary system’ (Ibid.). The following day, the Guardian conceded 
that the government’s defeat was not due to Blair’s perceived ‘loss of authority’ 
but attributed to a ‘failure of political judgement’, which contained ‘echoes from 
the past and warnings for the future’ with the ‘loudest echoes most obviously 
[arising] from the failed policy on Iraq’ (11 November 2005, p. 38). 
 
In its final editorial, the Guardian focused on the ‘underlying problem’ of the 
government’s political response to terrorism, in which it argued that New Labour 
had become ‘dangerously addicted to campaigning by legislating’ and for using 
the terrorism threat for ‘party advantage’ (16 February 2005, p. 34). In its final 
analysis of the TA 2006, the Guardian criticised New Labour’s predilection for 
using the legislature for message sending.89  
New laws are too quickly promised as a way of taking a public stand 
rather than as a solution to a problem. Parliamentary votes then become, as 
                                                 
89
 Interestingly, Clarke touched on this subject whilst being interviewed for this research, in which 
he stated: ‘There is an interesting question about the extent to which responding to a problem is 
best done by legislation.  I think normally it is not best done by legislation, but sometimes there 
would be calls for legislation to try to deal with situations’ (Interview with author, 4 February 
2014).  
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Mr Blair put it yesterday, a way of sending a message (or not) rather than a 
means of addressing a lasting need. William Hague was not far wrong, in 
response, when he dubbed the anti-glorification clause a “press release 
law”. But the great irony - and perhaps the great injury - of this approach 
is that, far from calming the public mood about the genuine threats from 
Islamist terrorism and its apologists, it may provoke and exacerbate it. 
(Ibid.) 
 
Daily Mail: On the 90-days detention clause, the Daily Mail announced that 
whilst ‘no-one can argue with the need for the strictest possible measures to 
counter the terrorist threat’ that it felt ‘deeply uneasy about [the] measure’ (13 
October 2005, p. 14). It goes on to argue that the measure not only ‘subverts one 
of the central pillars of a civilised society that people cannot be detained without 
charge’ but could end up feeding extremism and enticing ‘even more willing 
recruits to the cause’ (Ibid.). This argument was reaffirmed in its editorial of 27 
October 2005, in which it stated: ‘This is an illiberal measure which will 
inevitably create political martyrs and fuel extremism’ (p. 14).  
 
After Blair’s defeat in the Commons, the editorials and opinion pieces switched 
their focus to party politics. Stephen Pollard’s commentary argued that Blair 
should have made compromises over the detention limit, and that failure to do so 
meant that he should now ‘resign with dignity’ (10 November 2005, p. 6). 
Similarly, an editorial published the same day, declared that Blair’s failure to 
secure the vote was a ‘major blow to his authority and credibility’ (10 November 
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2005, p. 14). For the Daily Mail, however, the most disturbing aspect of the whole 
affair was the police being ‘dragged into partisan politics’, in which it argued: 
‘Having so grossly politicised the civil service, this Prime Minister has now done 
the same thing to the police’ (Ibid.). In contrast, the Opposition is praised for 
daring ‘to check the executive, on an issue with profound implications for civil 
liberties and human rights’ (Ibid.).  
 
The Sun: Editorially, the Sun was emphatic in its support for the Bill. In reference 
to the government’s defeat over the 90-days detention provision, the Sun 
described the MPs who voted against the Bill as ‘traitors’ whose actions amounted 
to an ‘act of treachery’ and a betrayal of the country. The editorial goes on to 
argue that the ‘nation demanded greater protection – and deserved it…Holding 
suspects for twenty-eight days is simply not long enough…What's more, MPs 
know it’. Moreover, it warns Conservative MPs that their ‘role in the treachery 
will not be forgotten, either’. It extolled Blair for doing the ‘right thing at the right 
time for this country's security’, whilst his adversaries ‘deserted us’ (Ibid.). 
However, commentaries suggested that Blair needed to be tougher in his stance on 
countering terrorism, and echoed some of the arguments put forward by Dean 
Godson in the Times. 
 
The Mirror: In its first editorial, the Mirror portrayed Clarke as amenable to 
compromises, whilst Blair was depicted as obdurate in his disregard for civil 
liberties and in forcing through draconian laws that nobody wanted, including 
many within his own party (4 November 2005, p. 6). On 10 November 2005, the 
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Mirror declared that the government’s defeat over 90-days detention ‘was a 
victory for Parliament, common sense and the great tradition of British justice’ (p. 
6). Blair was defined as arrogant and ‘blind to reason’ in his attempts to push the 
laws through parliament, with the Mirror comparing his scare tactics to those 
employed by George W. Bush in the war on terror. Despite Blair ‘[dragging] in 
senior police officers to strong-arm MPs’, the Mirror praised the Opposition for 
‘[behaving] with principle’ in rejecting the proposal (Ibid.). A sentiment, it 
reminded its readers, was rarely printed in its newspaper. Another editorial 
announced that its poll had found that nearly half of its readers wanted Blair to 
resign. Despite this, the Mirror rallied its support behind Blair continuing as 
leader on the condition that he ‘listen to other opinions and work with his own 
party – and, on security, with the opposition’ (11 November 2005, p. 6). 
 
 
6.6  Summary 
This chapter has analysed the press coverage of the passage of the TA 2006, and 
with the exception of the Sun, found that there was a substantial focus on party 
politics across all of the newspapers. Security issues had the least representation 
across the sample, whilst civil liberty concerns were prominently featured in the 
Daily Telegraph, the Guardian and the Daily Mail. Unlike the previous case 
study, the Mirror mainly focused on the political machinations rather than civil 
liberty perspectives. Whilst the Sun continued its hitherto support for the 
government agenda. 
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As with the previous case studies, the broadsheets devoted more copy to the 
debates than did the tabloids. However, all of the newspapers included front page 
coverage. As with the 2005 Act, there was a much higher prevalence of editorials 
and feature articles across the newspaper spectrum than in the 2001 case study. 
The passage of the Bill took place over several months, with one of the most 
newsworthy events being Blair’s first defeat in the Commons, in which 
Parliament voted against the 90-days detention measure. Consequently, much of 
the press analysis focused on Blair’s ‘uncertain’ future in politics. 
 
Unsurprisingly, elite sources dominated the parameters of debate, with 
government sources appearing the most, followed by Conservative MPs and 
Labour rebels respectively. The lack of citations from civil liberties and Muslim 
rights campaigners was also a continuing trend. However, as with the 2005 case 
study, whilst unattributed, their main points of concern were widely represented. 
Proportionately, both pro-legislation and anti-legislation sources gained equal 
representation, with each accounting for nearly half of all citations. Like the 2001 
case study, the majority of the reporter tone was defined as straight, with the 
majority of reinforcing comments reserved for anti-legislation sources, and 
deflating comments for pro-legislation sources.  
 
Although government sources dominated the debates, the evidence suggests that 
they had limited influence over the news agenda, which again, runs contra to the 
government-driven hypothesis. Instead, at an aggregate level, the evidence lends 
greater support for the independent model.  However, there is also evidence that 
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some sections of the press, namely the Daily Telegraph, the Guardian and the 
Daily Mail did subject the legislation to more robust scrutiny, and thus, to some 
degree, fulfilled their role as political watchdogs. This, then, supports the 
oppositional model. Moreover, the framing of the debates suggests that, even 
when the country was reeling from the 7/7 attacks, the press maintained its 
adversarial role and refused to bow to populist sentiment. Indeed, during the 
passage of the Bill, several opinion polls showed significant public support for the 
government’s proposals. The security-centric coverage in the Sun, on the other 
hand, did reflect populist sentiment, and thus in this particular case, reinforces the 
government-driven thesis. 
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CHAPTER 7 
THE COUNTER-TERRORISM ACT 2008 
 
 
Two and a half years after the TA 2006 received the Royal Assent, the 
government of Gordon Brown introduced the Counter-Terrorism Act 2008 
(hereafter referred to as CTA 2008). Unlike the previous three Acts, which had 
been drafted in response to a specific set of circumstances, the CTA 2008 was not 
triggered by a particular event. Notwithstanding the terrorist attack on Glasgow 
International Airport on 30 June 2007, which mercifully did not result in any 
civilian deaths, the UK had not succumbed to a major terrorist attack since 7/7.90 
Instead, the CTA 2008 contained the counter-terrorism measures pledged by Blair 
during the 2006 Queen’s Speech, and thus, the ‘motivating themes’ behind the 
2008 legislation were distinctly ‘familiar’ (Walker, 2009: 31). Drawing on its 
previous justifications for creating new terrorism laws, the Brown government 
announced that the legislation was being forged because of the ‘unprecedented 
threat from terrorism in this country’ against which it was ‘determined to take 
                                                 
90
 Bilal Abdullah, who was born in Britain but raised in Iraq, and Kafeel Ahmed, who was born 
and raised in India, carried out the attack. They drove a jeep loaded with propane gas into the 
doors of the terminal building, but the jeep became stuck in the entrance. Although the jeep had 
caught fire, it failed to explode. Ahmed was severely burnt in the attack and later died of his 
injuries, whilst Abdullah was found guilty of conspiracy to murder and sentenced to life 
imprisonment. The Glasgow airport attack was believed to be connected to a terrorist incident in 
London the previous day, where police had managed to disable two car bombs that were set to 
detonate near a nightclub.  
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whatever action is necessary to protect the public from future attacks’ (Home 
Office, 2008).  
 
Whilst the Blair government was accused of politicising terrorism for party 
political ends, in the early days of Brown’s premiership, some critics argued that 
Brown, and his Home Secretary, Jacqui Smith, represented a more moderate force 
in the war on terror (Hewitt, 2008: 123).91 One example of this was the 
government’s ‘low-key response’ to the Glasgow Airport attacks, in which it 
sought to ‘portray the terrorists as criminals to deny them greater power and 
credibility’, and thus downplay the association between Muslims and terrorism 
(Ibid.).92 However, previous policies enacted under the rubric of the ‘war on 
terror’ had arguably had a destabilising impact on community cohesion. Indeed, a 
number of studies have looked at the impact that New Labour’s post-9/11 counter-
terrorism policy has had on Muslim communities with many of these concluding 
that the entwinement of Islam with terrorism, alongside the discriminatory nature 
of the policies themselves, had resulted in the construction of ‘suspect 
communities’ (see, for example, Choudhury & Fenwick, 2011; McGovern & 
                                                 
91
 Indeed, as discussed elsewhere, both the press and the Opposition accused Blair of using the 
terror threat for party political ends, with many critics arguing that the war on terror was 
continuously evoked to justify the government’s draconian terrorism laws. Pantazis and Pemberton 
(2009) provide an interesting discussion on New Labour’s disuse of the ‘war on terror’ discourse 
during Brown’s premiership – the change is not only viewed as a means of distinguishing himself 
from Blair, but also as a way of winning back the ‘hearts and minds’ of an increasingly 
disillusioned Muslim population. Another reason proposed was the role of the EU in pressuring 
the UK to moderate its language on Islamist terrorism. 
92
 Jacqui Smith had only been at the Home Office a few days prior to the Glasgow Airport attack. 
Interestingly, Smith thought that the depiction of her in the press as ‘calm and reassuring’ was not 
meant as ‘high praise’, but rather an intimation that she ‘managed to stay standing for two days 
and say something intelligent’ and not ‘run hysterically out of Number Ten’ declaring that she 
could not cope (Interview with author, 5 March 2014). 
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Tobin, 2010; Nickels et al., 2010; Pantazis & Pemberton, 2009; and Rehman, 
2007).  
 
Government concerns over the radicalisation of disaffected Muslim youths were 
heightened after 7/7, leading to renewed efforts to win back the ‘hearts and minds’ 
of the Muslim population. Launched in April 2007, the Prevent programme, a 
strand of the government’s CONTEST strategy, outlined ‘a range of concrete 
actions by which the Government [would] work with mainstream Muslim 
organisations to tackle violent extremism’ (DCLG, 2007: 12).93 Despite 
considerable financial and organisational resources, critics have argued that the 
Prevent programme has largely failed to win over the Muslim community. 
Research carried out by the Institute of Race Relations found that the Prevent 
programme had actually ‘fuelled local tensions…as different groups wrestle with 
the issue of whether to engage with the programme, often in the face of strong 
pressure from local authorities to accept money and strong pressure from the 
community to refuse it’ (Kundnani, 2009: 25). Moreover, many Muslim 
organisations have been suspicious of the government’s motives, with those 
groups deemed as ‘moderates’ and sympathetic to the government agenda being 
offered considerable financial incentives.94 As Kundnani reasoned: ‘The danger is 
that the distinction between “moderate” and “extremist” is flexible enough to be 
                                                 
93
 Around the same time, the Home Office established the Office for Security and Counter-
Terrorism (OSCT), which had overall responsibility for the CONTEST strategy, and was formed 
to coordinate the efforts across various government departments. 
94
 Joint interviews carried out in 2010 by Professor Jon Silverman and the author for another 
research project supports this assertion. For example, Dr Daud Abdullah, the former deputy 
secretary general of the Muslim Council of Britain, Douglas Murray, director of the Centre for 
Social Cohesion, and Robin Richardson, former director of the Runnymede Trust, made parallel 
claims. However, Quilliam, one such organisation to have received considerable funding from the 
government, refuted claims that they acted as a ‘mouthpiece’ for the government. 
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exploited by government to marginalise those who are critical of its policies’ 
(Ibid.: 35). 
 
Early suggestions that Brown’s premiership would ‘denote a new approach to the 
politics of security’ were ephemeral (Pantazis & Pemberton, 2012: 653). Indeed, 
to many critics, Brown simply continued the Blairite strategy of using the policy 
agenda for party political purposes (Ibid.), and was largely successful in 
‘[outflanking] the Tories (apparently all hug-a-hoodie and no-to-id-cards) on 
crime and security issues’ (Bale, 2010: 320). Thus, Brown’s original intent to 
renew government efforts to win back the ‘hearts and minds’ of the Muslim 
community were trumped by the impetus to win the next general election. 
 
This chapter focuses on how the British press reported the CTA 2008. Before 
presenting the findings of the quantitative and qualitative content analyses of the 
news content, it provides an overview of the key provisions contained in the Act, 
as well as the different standpoints of the key actors involved in the debates. The 
key actors being the government, the political opposition, members of the House 
of Lords, as well as the police and security services, and to a lesser extent, civil 
liberties and Muslim interest groups. In terms of the news content study, the 
chapter has been organised as follows: firstly, it details the quantitative findings, 
which include the level of press attention devoted to the Bill and the key sources 
that shaped the news agenda. Secondly, it discusses the findings of the framing 
analysis, specifically looking at how the media framed the policy debates as well 
as the editorial responses of particular newspapers. The chapter concludes with a 
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consideration of the overall performance of the press, with special reference to the 
theoretical arguments discussed in previous chapters. To underpin particular 
points of discussion, this chapter also draws on some of the insights gleaned from 
the interview with the then Home Secretary, Jacqui Smith, conducted by the 
author on 5 March 2014. 
 
7.1  Background to the CTA 2008 
The reasoning behind Brown’s appointment of Jacqui Smith, the first female 
Home Secretary, can only be speculated. Smith, however, surmised that her 
appointment might have been a means to present an alternative image of New 
Labour, especially in terms of demarcating the Brown government from the war 
on terror rhetoric of the Blair era. Referring to the machismo that existed in the 
Home Office prior to her arrival, Smith made the following deduction on the 
impetus for her promotion to Brown’s Cabinet.   
It wasn't just about the role of Home Secretary, it was because obviously 
he [Brown] wanted a woman in a senior job within the government…I 
think that there was probably a slight feeling particularly of course with 
John Reid immediately before me, that it was all a bit macho in the Home 
Office.  So, I think there might have been a feeling that it was a good idea 
to change that type of feel both in relation to the Home Office, and in 
relation to crime and terror policy. 
(Interview with author, 5 March 2014) 
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In terms of Brown’s interest in Home Office policy, like Blair (from 2005 
onwards), Brown ‘was interested and concerned with the counter-terrorist stuff’, 
but did not devote much attention to ‘the rest of the work of the Home Office’ 
(Ibid.). The other exception being on issues relating to knife crime, which, Smith 
asserted was ‘directly influenced by media coverage of stabbings’ (Ibid.).  
 
As with Blunkett and Clarke, Smith was fully aware of the importance of message 
sending during the counter-terrorism campaign, as she explained: ‘We tried to get 
that type of message [out] about both the potential threat and what we believed 
were the safeguards around the policy that we were proposing.  So there was quite 
a lot of work that was done in explaining that to the press’ (Ibid.). Although her 
media adviser did most of the front-line media-relations work, during the furore 
over ‘42-days’, Smith agreed to just one print interview (with Matthew d’Ancona 
for the Spectator), ‘explicitly with the intention of getting the case over through 
that particular interview’ (Ibid.). However, she did not believe that the press had 
much sway in shaping parliamentarians thinking on the legislative issues. As 
Smith reasoned: 
Probably what had more of an impact was what people had felt and 
thought the last time they'd gone through it – in terms of the 90 days stuff.  
So I think probably people were more dependent for their views on the 
media the first time round than they were the second time round.  Because 
the second time round I think they sort of thought, well we know what we 
thought last time, and what we were worried about last time, and we want 
to see to what extent that applies this time as well. 
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(Ibid.). 
 
That said, Smith believed that more generally, the press had significant influence 
over political debate. This was especially the case during her tenure as Home 
Secretary, where many of the issues she dealt with were ‘very salient to the 
public’, as well as to the press (Ibid.). Indeed, during the policymaking cycle, the 
press had an important function in communicating government policy to the 
public, and therefore Smith was acutely aware of the importance of trying to get 
the policy objectives ‘communicated properly’ or indeed ‘communicated at all’ 
(Ibid.). Consequently, Smith admitted that it was inevitable that she reacted to 
criticism in the press, as it was the issues highlighted in the press that constituents 
would refer to on the doorstep or in surgery (Ibid.). 
 
Regarding the sway of particular newspapers, Smith singled out the Times, the 
Daily Mail and the tabloids (chiefly the Sun, the Mirror, and their corresponding 
Sunday titles) as being of most concern in terms of the issues she was dealing 
with. Whilst the Guardian was perceived as being a significant force during her 
appointment as Minister for Schools, Smith admitted that she had ‘written off’ its 
opinions on matters of security. On trying to reconcile criticism from some 
sections of the press that the government’s policy agenda was imperilling civil 
liberties, alongside contrasting criticisms relating to the government’s obligations 
under the ECHR, Smith conceded that it was an impossible dilemma. However, 
on assessing the mood of the press on terrorism policy, she admitted: ‘if the 
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Guardian was saying that what we were doing was a hideous encroachment on 
people's human rights, and if the Daily Mail thought that what we were doing was 
weak and kowtowing to the ECHR, then you were probably in just about the right 
place’ (Ibid.). 
 
Ultimately, Smith maintained that, on the 42-days issue, the government was 
more concerned with public sentiment (which was ‘wholly supportive of what we 
were trying to do’), than the sentiments of the press (Ibid.). Interestingly, Smith’s 
overall view of the press during the passage of the CTA 2008 chimed with the 
findings presented in this chapter, viz. the majority of the press devoted a 
significant amount of attention to party political issues, above that of civil liberties 
and security concerns. As Smith asserted: 
The press are far more interested in a story about political division than 
they are about the difficult issues, and the contradictory positions and the 
problems and the balances that you need to find in order to deliver a good 
counter-terror policy.  I think they were far more interested in, “Is Gordon 
Brown going to win or lose?”...What does this mean for a Labour 
government?” – Than they were in, “why are they trying to do this?  What 
bits have they got right, what bits have they got wrong?"  Certainly when 
we got into the real meat of the Bill and the trying to get it through, that 
was far more, what the press were interested in.   
(Ibid.) 
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Indeed, she cited the Christopher Galley episode as an illustration of her 
argument. Galley, a junior Home Office civil servant, leaked several Home Office 
documents to the Conservative MP, Damien Green. Among these was a list of 
potential Labour rebels who might vote against the 42-days detention plan, along 
with other material relating to the counter-terrorism policy. However, as Smith 
noted:  
[Whilst Galley] had access to a whole load of stuff which also related to 
the policy, and as far as I know probably nicked that and leaked that as 
well…the [press] were far more interested in the details of which MP 
would or would not vote for the government…than they were about what 
thinking had gone into the policy in the first place. 
(Ibid.) 
 
Even before the counter-terrorism Bill had been introduced to parliament, some of 
the speculated proposals had been met with stiff opposition. One area in which the 
government had failed to achieve cross-party consensus was on extending the pre-
charge detention limit. However, there was support from the Opposition (as well 
as the press and civil liberties groups) for the use of alternative measures, such as 
the use of intercept evidence in court and post-charge questioning. In February 
2008, the ‘Privy Council Review of intercept as evidence’ published its report on 
the implications of using intercepted material in terrorism cases. The Review 
concluded that it ‘[agreed] with the principle that intercept as evidence should be 
introduced’, with the proviso that the legal framework in which it operates was 
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‘ECHR compatible’ (Privy Council Review, 2008: 48). However, the measure 
was later dropped from the Bill.95 A move that was welcomed by the security 
services who objected to the proposal because it could expose the inner workings 
of their investigations and thus compromise operations.  
 
The Bill, as it was introduced in the Commons on 24 January 2008, contained the 
following proposals: 
 An extension to the pre-charge detention of terrorist suspects from 28-days 
to 42-days in exceptional circumstances; 
 A provision to enable the post-charge questioning of terrorist suspects; 
 Enhanced sentences for terrorism-motivated general offences; 
 A provision to strengthen the monitoring arrangements for convicted 
terrorists and to prevent them from foreign travel; 
 A provision to ensure full use can be made of DNA in terrorism 
investigations. 
(Home Office, 2008) 
 
The ‘42-days’ provision gained considerable support from senior members of the 
police and from the independent reviewer of terrorism legislation, Lord Carlile. 
Speaking at a Home Affairs Committee on the Government's counter-terrorism 
proposals in October 2007, the Met Commissioner, Sir Ian Blair, the Met 
                                                 
95
 Although an amendment was made to the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000 (RIPA) 
that allowed for the use of intercept evidence in certain instances, e.g. the freezing of assets in 
terrorism cases. 
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Assistant Commissioner, Bob Quick, and the President of ACPO, Ken Jones, 
claimed that the current 28-day detention limit was inadequate for the complexity 
of modern terrorism cases (Home Affairs Committee, 2007). During the debates 
around the Bill, the police also took on a much higher media profile, in which 
statements promoting their support for ‘42-days’ became commonplace in the 
press. In May 2008, the government was accused of politicising the police when it 
was revealed that the Police Minister, Tony McNulty had requested Bob Quick to 
provide a briefing to MPs on the reasons behind police support for ‘42-days’.  
 
Although, opinion polls suggested that the measure had extensive support 
amongst the public, the Bill faced widespread opposition in parliament. Indeed, 
faced with losing the vote, Brown made several deals with the Democratic 
Unionist Party (DUP) in order to secure the extra votes needed. The government 
won by just nine votes. Headlines in the press savaged Brown over his alleged 
deal with the DUP – where inducements were said to include increased financial 
provisions for Northern Ireland – charges which Brown denied. The following 
day, the Shadow Home Secretary, David Davis, resigned in protest ‘against the 
slow strangulation of fundamental British freedoms by this government’ 
(Guardian, 13 November 2008: 4).96 Despite the win in the Commons, the ‘42-
days’ plan was eventually overturned in the House of Lords, forcing Smith to 
draft a reserve Bill that would increase the pre-charge detention limit for use in 
exceptional circumstances.  
                                                 
96
 However, pundits questioned the motivation behind Davis’ resignation, especially as the 
Conservative Party shared his disquiet over the provision. For many commentators, the move was 
more damaging to David Cameron’s leadership standing than it was to the government. 
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 7.2  Press Attention 
This section presents the results of the quantitative part of the news content study. 
For ease of reference, Table 7.1 illustrates the progression of the CTA 2008 with 
the corresponding newspaper sample dates, and spans the period between 24 
January 2008 (the day the Bill was first introduced) and 27 November 2008 (the 
day after the Bill gained the Royal Assent).  
 
Table 7.1 Progression of the CTA 2008 with corresponding newspaper sample 
dates (24 January 2008 – 26 November 2008) 
PROGRESSION OF ACT NEWSPAPER SAMPLE 
DATES 
HC first reading: 24 January 2008 
HC second reading: 1 April 2008 
HC committee stage:  
22 April 2008 
24 April 2008 
29 April 2008 
6 May 2008 
8 May 2008 
13 May 2008 
15 May 2008 
HC report stage: 
10 June 2008 
11 June 2008 
HC third reading: 11 June 2008 
HL first reading: 12 June 2008 
HL second reading: 8 July 2008 
HL committee stage:  
9 October 2008 
25 January 2008 
2 April 2008 
 
23 April 2008 
25 April 2008 
30 April 2008 
7 May 2008 
9 May 2008 
14 May 2008 
16 May 2008 
 
11 June 2008 
12 June 2008 
 
13 June 2008 
9 July 2008 
 
10 October 2008 
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13 October 2008 
15 October 2008 
21 October 2008 
HL report stage: 
4 November 2008 
11 November 2008 
HL third reading: 17 November 2008 
HC consideration of Lords amendments: 
19 November 2008 
HL consideration of Commons amendments: 
24 November 2008 
Royal assent: 26 November 2008 
14 October 2008 
16 October 2008 
22 October 2008 
 
5 November 2008 
12 November 2008 
18 November 2008 
 
20 November 2008 
 
25 November 2008 
26 November 2008  
27 November 2008 
TOTAL: 24 days 
 
 
As with the previous three case studies, the broadsheets devoted more coverage to 
the CTA 2008 than did the tabloids. However, there was a closing of the gap 
between the Daily Mail with 10,723 words (21 articles) and the Daily Telegraph 
(27 articles) and the Times (33 articles) in terms of the word count, with the two 
broadsheets only producing a third more coverage, 15,773 and 16,289 words 
respectively. The Guardian produced the most copy, devoting 23,533 words (39 
articles) to the passage of the Bill, whereas the redtops produced the least 
coverage, with the Mirror devoting 5,509 words (19 articles) and the Sun 5,588 
words (23 articles). Figure 7.1 provides an illustrative representation of the 
number of words each newspaper devoted to the passage of the Bill, and Table 7.2 
shows the number of words and total number of articles per newspaper. 
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Figure 7.1 Words devoted to the CTA 2008 by newspaper 
 
 
Table 7.2 Total number of words and articles devoted to the CTA 2008 per 
newspaper 
Newspapers Total Words N Articles 
Daily Mail 10,723 21 
Daily Mirror 5,509 19 
Daily Telegraph 15,773 27 
The Guardian 23,533 39 
The Sun 5,588 23 
The Times 16,289 33 
Total 77,415 162 
 
 
Figure 7.2 shows a timeline of the number of articles that appeared in each 
newspaper over the duration of the passage of the Bill. In terms of which issues 
garnered the most attention, the most notable peaks in media interest occurred on 
12 June 2008 (41 articles) and on 13 June 2008 (43 articles), and to a lesser extent 
on 11 June 2008 (23 articles) and 14 October 2008 (16 articles). These dates 
0
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corresponded respectively with the second day of the Commons report stage on 11 
June 2008, the Lords first reading on 12 June 2008, the first day of the Commons 
report stage on 10 June 2008, and the second day of the Lords committee stage on 
13 October 2008. On 11 June 2008, the newspaper coverage speculated on how 
the Commons would vote over the 42-days detention provision, whilst coverage 
on 12 June 2008 dealt with the outcome of the vote. However, in regards to the 
higher output on 13 June, this was principally due to the resignation of the 
Shadow Home Secretary, David Davis. Coverage on 14 October 2008, dealt with 
the government’s defeat in the House of Lords over its 42-days detention plan. 
There was no coverage of the Bill after 14 October 2008 in any of the newspapers. 
 
Figure 7.2 Number of articles appearing in all newspapers over the sample 
period (24 January 2008 – 26 November 2008) 
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Table 7.3 shows the story location of news items by newspaper. In terms of story 
location, all of the newspapers included front page coverage of the policy debates, 
with the Guardian and the Times producing the most front page copy, with five 
front pages each. This was followed by the Daily Telegraph and the Sun with 
three front pages, whilst the Mirror devoted two and the Daily Mail just one. On 
12 June 2008, the newspapers focused on Brown’s Commons win over 42-days 
detention, with most of the newspapers declaring that ‘Brown buys off 42-day 
rebels’ (Daily Mail). The Sun, on the other hand, did not mention the alleged deal, 
and framed the victory in triumphant terms: ‘Phew! Labour Terror vote win for 
PM’ (Sun). All of the newspapers, with the exception of the Daily Mail, devoted 
front page coverage to the resignation of David Davis, with most of the headlines 
focusing on the ‘Tories in turmoil’ (Mirror). On 14 October 2008, the attention 
was on the Lord’s vote against 42-days, which procured front-page headlines in 
the Guardian, the Times and the Sun. 
 
Table 7.3 Story location by newspaper (CTA 2008) 
Newspaper Front 
Page 
Inside 
Pages 
Feature Editorial Total  
Daily Mail 1 16 1 3 21 
Daily Mirror 2 10 3 4 19 
Daily Telegraph 3 16 5 3 27 
The Guardian 5 22 8 4 39 
The Sun 3 13 3 4 23 
The Times 5 22 2 4 33 
Total 19 99 22 22 162 
 
 
Table 7.4 shows the format of the news items. With the exception of the 
Guardian, the most dominant format across the newspaper spectrum was hard 
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news. However, there was a higher prevalence of background pieces in some of 
the newspapers than in the previous case studies, with the Guardian including 12 
items, the Daily Mail, five and the Daily Telegraph, four. Similarly, all of the 
newspapers included a high frequency of feature articles, with the Guardian 
containing 11, the Daily Telegraph, 10 and the Times, eight. Out of the tabloids, 
the Sun included eight features, with the other two titles including five each. 
There was an even spread of editorials across the newspapers, with the Daily Mail 
and the Daily Telegraph including two, and the rest of the newspapers four 
apiece. 
 
Table 7.4 Article format (CTA 2008) 
Newspaper Hard 
News 
Background Editorial Feature Total  
Daily Mail 8 5 3 5 21 
Daily Mirror 8 2 4 5 19 
Daily Telegraph 10 4 3 10 27 
The Guardian 12 12 4 11 39 
The Sun 10 1 4 8 23 
The Times 20 1 4 8 33 
Total 68 25 22 47 162 
 
 
Table 7.5 shows the type of author. Staff writers and regular columnists wrote the 
majority of articles. Four of the newspapers included pieces by guest opinion 
writers, with the Daily Telegraph publishing an opinion piece by David Davis on 
his reasons for resigning as shadow home secretary. The Guardian included two 
guest pieces, one by Garry Hindle, the head of security and counter-terrorism at 
the Royal United Services Institute (RUSI), and another by the human rights 
expert, Conor Foley.  Whilst the Mirror included a piece by Shami Chakrabarti, 
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the Director of Liberty, and the Sun an article by Lord Carlile, the Independent 
Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation. 
 
Table 7.5 Type of Author (CTA 2008) 
Newspaper Staff  
News 
Regular 
Opinion 
Guest 
Opinion 
Editorial Not  
Stated 
Total 
Daily Mail 9 5 - 3 4 21 
Daily Mirror 7 4 1 4 3 19 
Daily Telegraph 13 9 1 3 1 27 
The Guardian 20 9 2 4 4 39 
The Sun 13 3 1 4 2 23 
The Times 16 7 - 4 6 33 
Total 78 37 5 22 20 162 
 
 
Table 7.6 shows the number and type of visuals that appeared in each newspaper. 
The most prevalent visual type was Conservative MPs, accounting for over a third 
of all images across the newspaper sample. Again, this can be attributed to the 
intense coverage of David Davis’ resignation. This was followed by visuals of 
Gordon Brown, the police and stock images. Jacqui Smith had few appearances 
by comparison. As with the previous case studies, images did not tend to be used 
to emphasise the textual content or to connote particular frames.  Captions also 
tended to be informative rather than used as a means to anchor a preferred 
meaning. 
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Table 7.6 Number and type of visuals per newspaper (CTA 2008) 
 
Visual Type 
DT Times Guard Mail Sun Mir Total 
Brown 1 1 1 1 2 3 9 
Smith - 1 1 - 1 1 4 
Gov. Minister - - - 1 - - 1 
Con MPs 6 5 4 3 6 4 28 
Lab Opp MPs - - 1 - 1 1 3 
LibDem MPs - - - - 1 - 1 
Peers - 1 1 - - - 2 
Police - 1 1 3 2 1 8 
DPP - - 1 - - - 1 
Campaigners/
protestors  
- - 1 - 1 - 2 
7/7 aftermath 
or victims 
- - - - 3 - 3 
Cartoon  2 1 2 - 1 - 6 
Graphic 1 3 1 - - - 5 
Stock Image - 3 3 - 2 1 9 
Total 10 16 17 8 20 11 82 
 
 
Figure 7.3 shows the ratio of articles that contained images. At an aggregate level, 
only a third of all articles included visuals. The Daily Mail and the Daily 
Telegraph provided the fewest images, with three quarters of the articles not 
accompanied by visuals, whereas the Guardian had the most articles with 
accompanying visuals. 
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Figure 7.3 Percentage of articles with accompanying images (CTA 2008) 
 
 
 
7.3 The Primary Definers of the News Agenda 
As expected, elite sources dominated the parameters of debate. However, unlike 
the other three case studies, on this occasion the Conservative Party was the most 
dominant source group, with 89 appearances (155 paragraphs), constituting 27 
percent of all actor appearances, and a 32 percent share of all paragraphs devoted 
to source citations. The Conservatives were closely followed by the government 
(Downing Street, the Home Office and Labour MPs), who appeared 87 times (108 
paragraphs), accounting for just under 27 percent of all source appearances and a 
23 percent share of all paragraphs devoted to source citations. Again, there was a 
break with previous case studies when it came to the civil liberties groups (but not 
the Muslim advocacy groups), who, whilst still noticeably underrepresented, did 
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have a slight increase in terms of source appearances. Indeed, in terms of 
frequency of appearance they had equivalent representation to Labour rebels and 
the police, and greater representation than the Liberal Democrat Party. All titles 
included at least two citations from civil liberties sources, with the Times and the 
Guardian including four apiece, and the Daily Mail, three citations. Table 7.7 
shows the frequency of appearance and total paragraphs devoted to all source 
citations. 
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Table 7.7 Frequency of appearance and total paragraphs devoted to direct and 
indirect source citations (CTA 2008) 
 
 
Source 
DT 
n  
(Pars) 
Times 
n  
(Pars) 
Guard 
n  
(Pars) 
Mail 
n  
(Pars) 
Sun 
n  
(Pars) 
Mir 
n  
(Pars) 
Total 
n  
(Pars) 
Civil Lib 2 
(2) 
4 
(4) 
4 
(5) 
3 
(4) 
2 
(5) 
2 
(3) 
17 
(23) 
Con Party 19 
(25) 
21 
(32) 
18 
(33) 
15 
(42) 
9 
(15) 
7 
(8) 
89 
(155) 
Con Peers 3 
(3) 
3 
(4) 
3 
(3) 
2 
(2) 
1 
(1) 
1 
(2) 
13 
(15) 
Con Opp  - 1 
(1) 
- - - - 1 
(1) 
Downing St. 5 
(5) 
6 
(7) 
8 
(9) 
2 
(3) 
3 
(4) 
3 
(4) 
27 
(32) 
Home Office 9 
(11) 
7 
(7) 
10 
(12) 
5 
(9) 
4 
(8) 
5 
(6) 
40 
(53) 
Lab Party 3 
(3) 
5 
(6) 
7 
(9) 
2 
(3) 
1 
(1) 
1 
(1) 
19 
(23) 
Lab Peers 6 
(8) 
3 
(4) 
10 
(18) 
2 
(4) 
- 1 
(3) 
22 
(37) 
Lab Rebels 4 
(5) 
2 
(4) 
7 
(10) 
4 
(6) 
- 1 
(3) 
18 
(28) 
LD Party 2 
(2) 
2 
(2) 
5 
(8) 
2 
(4) 
- 3 
(3) 
14 
(19) 
LD Peers 1 
(1) 
- 3 
(4) 
- - - 4 
(5) 
Muslim - 1 
(1) 
2 
(2) 
1 
(1) 
- - 4 
(4) 
All Opp 1 
(1) 
1 
(1) 
1 
(1) 
2 
(2) 
- - 5 
(5) 
Other Pol 4 
(4) 
4 
(4) 
4 
(6) 
- 1 
(1) 
1 
(2) 
14 
(17) 
Other Peers 4 
(8) 
2 
(8) 
4 
(5) 
4 
(6) 
1 
(1) 
2 
(3) 
17 
(31) 
Police 8 
(13) 
2 
(4) 
1 
(1) 
2 
(3) 
3 
(5) 
1 
(1) 
17 
(27) 
Security 1 
(1) 
- 1 
(1) 
- - - 2 
(2) 
Speaker HC - - 1 
(1) 
- - - 1 
(1) 
Total 72 
(92) 
64 
(89) 
89 
(128) 
46 
(89) 
25 
(41) 
28 
(39) 
324 
(478) 
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Figure 7.4 shows the proportion of pro-legislation, anti-legislation and 
mixed/unstated sources included in each newspaper based on frequency of 
appearance (a full breakdown of the sources and their positions on the legislation 
can be found in Appendix 10). With the exception of the Sun, anti-legislation 
sources had a higher percentage of representation, accounting for 58 percent of the 
total share, with pro-legislation sources comprising 38 percent of the share, with 
mixed/unstated sources comprising the remainder. At an individual level, the 
Daily Telegraph devoted 56 percent to anti-legislation sources, compared with 40 
percent to pro-legislation and four percent to mixed/unstated sources. The other 
two broadsheets followed a similar pattern, with 55 percent of sources reflecting 
an anti-legislation stance in the Times and 58 percent in the Guardian. Pro-
legislation sources accounted for 45 percent of all sources in the Times and 35 
percent in the Guardian, with mixed/unstated sources constituting seven percent 
of space in the latter title. Across all of the newspapers, the Daily Mail had the 
highest proportion of anti-legislation sources (74 percent), with 24 percent of its 
space devoted to pro-legislation sources. Fifty-seven percent of all sources in the 
Mirror reflected an anti-legislation stance, with pro-legislation sources making up 
39 percent of its overall sources. As with the previous case studies, the Sun 
provided more space to pro-legislation sources than anti-legislation sources, albeit 
marginally on this occasion, with pro-legislation sources accounting for 52 
percent and anti-legislation sources 48 percent. 
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Figure 7.4 Source position on legislation as proportion of frequency of 
appearance (CTA 2008) 
 
 
Across all the newspapers, Figure 7.5 shows that 91 percent of the reporter tone 
toward the sources cited was coded as straight, with 4 percent of all source 
citations coded as deflating and 5 percent as reinforcing of source assertions. The 
percentages are equivalent to the findings of the TA 2006 case study.  
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Figure 7.5 Reporter tone toward all sources across all newspapers as percentage 
(CTA 2008) 
 
 
Table 7.8 illustrates the reporter tone toward the different source positions in each 
newspaper.  As Figure 7.5 revealed, the vast majority of articles contained a 
straight reporter tone toward the sources cited. However, when reporters did 
deviate from straight reporting, the majority of deflating comments at an 
aggregate level were aimed at pro-legislation sources, with anti-legislation sources 
gaining the most reinforcing comments. This finding replicates the ratio of pro- 
and anti-legislation sources in the 2006 case study. When considering the 
newspapers individually, the Sun was the only title to include reinforcing 
comments toward pro-legislation sources, with two directed at the police and one 
toward a Conservative peer.  Negative commentary toward pro-legislation sources 
came from the Daily Telegraph, the Guardian and the Daily Mail, with the Daily 
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Telegraph including three deflating comments, the Guardian, four and the Daily 
Mail, one. Most of the deflating commentary was directed at the government, with 
two occurrences apiece in the Daily Telegraph and the Guardian, and one in the 
Daily Mail. The Daily Telegraph also directed one deflating comment toward the 
police, with the Guardian directing one deflating comment toward a Conservative 
peer and one toward a Labour peer. Anti-legislation sources received three 
deflating evaluations from the Times, one from the Sun and one from the 
Guardian.  In the case of the Murdoch press, all of its deflating commentary was 
directed at the Conservative Party, whilst the Guardian reserved its deflating tone 
for a Liberal Democrat peer. Regarding reinforcing evaluative comments devoted 
to anti-legislation sources, the Daily Telegraph included seven and the Guardian, 
six – with the Daily Telegraph devoting five to anti-legislation peers and one 
apiece to the Conservative Party and the security services. Whilst the Guardian 
reserved most of its positive judgements for peers (two occurrences), Labour 
rebels (two occurrences), with the Liberal Democrats and a Muslim representative 
each receiving one positive reinforcement. Given the adversarial nature of the 
tabloid press, a surprising finding was the absence of any evaluative comments 
that supported or undermined the assertions of a source in the Mirror.  
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Table 7.8 Reporter tone toward pro- and anti-legislation sources (CTA 2008) 
 
Source Position 
DT Times  Guard  Mail  Sun Mir  Total 
 
Pro-Legislation 
 
29 
 
29 
 
31 
 
11 
 
13 
 
11 
 
124 
        Straight 26 29 27 10 10 11 113 
        Reinforcing - - - - 3 - 3 
        Mixed - - - - - - - 
        Deflating 3 - 4 1 - - 8 
 
Anti-Legislation 
 
40 
 
35 
 
52 
 
34 
 
12 
 
16 
 
189 
        Straight 33 32 45 33 11 16 170 
        Reinforcing 7 - 6 - - - 13 
        Mixed - - - 1 - - 1 
        Deflating - 3 1 - 1 - 5 
 
Mixed/Unstated 
 
3 
 
- 
 
6 
 
1 
 
- 
 
1 
 
11 
        Straight 3 - 6 1 - 1 11 
        Reinforcing - - - - - - - 
        Mixed - - - - - - - 
        Deflating - - - - - - - 
 
7.4  Media Framing of Policy Debates 
As with the previous case studies, this section considers how the newspapers 
framed the political debates. Again, the politics frame was the most prevalent 
across the entire sample of newspapers, accounting for 42 percent of all articles, 
whilst 9 percent of the articles did not display any significant framing or 
reasoning devices relevant to a particular frame. Just 11 percent of all articles 
displayed exclusive elements of the security frame, 23 percent the civil liberties 
frame, with mixed frames constituting the remaining 15 percent of the articles. 
Figure 7.6 provides an illustrative representation of which frames predominated 
across the sample. When comparing the broadsheets and the tabloids, six percent 
of all articles in the broadsheets and 19 percent of all articles in the tabloids 
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reflected the security frame. However, as with the PTA 2005 and the TA 2006, 
the high incidence of the security frame in the tabloids was due to its dominance 
in the Sun – on this occasion, the Sun was the only tabloid to include elements that 
exclusively reflected the security frame. Conversely, when considering the 
tabloids support for the civil liberties frame – which reflected 14 percent of their 
frames at an aggregate level – the Sun was the only title that failed to include 
articles that were coded as exclusively reflecting civil liberties perspectives. 
Twenty-eight percent of all articles across the broadsheet sample reflected the 
civil liberties frame. Again, there was a heavy slant towards the politics frame in 
both the broadsheets and the tabloids constituting 47 percent and 33 percent of 
their respective outputs. The broadsheets had a slightly lower incidence of 
frameless articles, seven percent compared with 11 percent for the tabloids. 
 
Figure 7.6 Predominant frames (%) across all newspapers, broadsheets and 
tabloids (CTA 2008) 
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Table 7.9 shows the predominant frames in each newspaper. The security frame 
was most prevalent in the Sun with 12 articles, followed by the Daily Telegraph 
with three occurrences, the Times with two and the Guardian with one. The other 
two tabloids did not include any articles that exclusively reflected national 
security perspectives. Out of the broadsheets, the civil liberties frame was 
particularly prevalent in the Guardian, the Times and the Daily Telegraph, 
appearing 13, eight and seven times respectively. The Sun was the only title not to 
include any articles with an exclusive civil liberties frame, whilst the Daily Mail 
and the Mirror had five and four instances apiece.  As with the TA 2006, the Sun 
was the only title that did not devote the majority of its focus to the politics frame.  
 
Table 7.9 Predominant frames per newspaper (CTA 2008) 
 
Frames 
DT Times Guard Mail Sun Mir Total 
Security 3 2 1 - 12 -  18  
Civil Liberties 7 8 13 5 - 4 37   
Politics 14 19 14 8 5 8  68  
Sec/CL/Pol - - 1 1 - - 2   
Sec/CL - - 1 1 1 1 4   
Sec/Pol - - - - 3 - 3   
CL/Pol 3 - 6 4 - 3 16 
None - 4 3 2 2 3 14    
Total 27 33 39 21 23 19 162 
 
 
 
Figure 7.7 presents the quotient of frames per newspaper. Only 11 percent of the 
Daily Telegraph’s coverage reflected the security frame, 26 percent the civil 
liberties frame, 11 percent mixed frames and 52 percent the politics frame. In the 
Times, just six percent of articles reflected the security frame, 24 percent the civil 
liberties frame and 58 percent the politics frame. The Guardian devoted 
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equivalent space to the politics frame and the civil liberties frame, 36 percent and 
33 percent respectively, whilst 21 percent of articles were defined as mixed 
frames. Thirty-eight percent of all articles in the Daily Mail reflected the politics 
frame, with 24 percent devoted to civil liberty perspectives, whilst 29 percent 
reflected mixed perspectives. Over half of the articles in the Sun reflected the 
security frame, compared with 22 percent for the politics frame. Forty-two percent 
of all articles in the Mirror reflected the politics frame, with the civil liberties 
frame and the mixed frames each comprising 21 percent of all articles. 
 
Figure 7.7 Composition (%) of frames per newspaper (CTA 2008) 
 
 
 
Figure 7.8 shows the predominate frames at an aggregate level. When the mixed 
frames are combined with the three meta frames (security, civil liberties and 
politics) the findings show that the politics frame was the most prevalent in all the 
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newspapers with the exception of the Sun, where the security frame 
preponderated. The high incidence of the politics frame in the Daily Telegraph 
and the Times was especially pronounced in terms of its ratio to the other frames. 
Out of the broadsheets, the Times had the least occurrences of the security frame 
in its aggregate form, appearing twice compared with the Daily Telegraph and the 
Guardian with three instances each. The civil liberties frame was heavily 
represented in all of the newspapers with the exception of the Sun, with the Daily 
Telegraph having 10 occurrences and the Times eight occurrences. In three of the 
newspapers, elements of the civil liberties frame appeared in either half or nearly 
half of all articles, with the frame appearing 21 times in the Guardian, 11 in the 
Daily Mail and eight in the Mirror. Across the entire sample, there was a lower 
occurrence of frameless articles. 
 
Figure 7.8 Predominate frames at an aggregate level (CTA 2008) 
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In terms of which themes or depictions were most heavily represented within the 
politics frame, issues around party politics gained considerable coverage. Across 
the newspaper sample, there was much focus on the conflict between the 
government and the Opposition, and between the government and Labour rebels 
over the 42-days provision. The subsequent deal between Brown and the DUP 
(and some Labour rebels) was also heavily criticised across the newspaper 
spectrum. For the press, Brown’s ‘hollow victory’ may well have satisfied public 
opinion, but had demeaned parliament. There were also references to Brown’s 
abuse of power, especially in the politicisation of the police (for example, the 
letter from the Home Office to MPs regarding Bob Quick’s support for 42-days), 
and for using the Bill for his own political advantage. The resignation of David 
Davis over the 42-days detention issue also acquired front-page coverage as well 
as substantial analysis on the future of the Conservatives under David Cameron in 
the press. 
 
The most prevalent theme or depiction in relation to the civil liberties frame was 
the impact of the 42-days detention provision on civil liberties. As with the 90-
days detention clause contained in the 2006 Bill, the provision was criticised for 
compromising habeas corpus and ancient legal rights in general. There were also 
references to how ‘42-days’ could undermine relations between Muslim informers 
and the police, and that the provision could be seen as disproportionately targeting 
the Muslim community.  
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In relation to the security frame, the legislation was depicted as safeguarding 
fundamental rights and freedoms. Those opposed to the Bill were portrayed as 
jeopardising national security, as well as being out of touch with the electorate. 
There were also instances where the Conservative Party was accused of using the 
42-days detention issue to score political points. All of these themes had most 
expression in the Sun. 
 
7.5  Editorial and Commentary Standpoints 
This section focuses on the overt ideological direction of each newspaper, as 
expressed in the editorials and commentary pieces.  
 
Daily Telegraph: Unsurprisingly, the Daily Telegraph was against the 42-days 
detention provision, with much of its coverage claiming that Brown was pushing 
through the measure for party political purposes – namely to show the electorate 
that the Labour Party was tougher on terror than the Opposition. This was best 
illustrated in Simon Heffer’s opinion piece on 11 June 2008. Referring to the 
director of MI5, Jonathan Evans’s, ‘reservations about the 42-day proposal’, 
Heffer cautioned that if the security services have its doubts, then ‘the rest of us 
should be sceptical’ too (p. 22). Heffer also questioned whether Brown was trying 
to push through the measure as a way of ‘reasserting his authority over his 
party…And given the public seem to be in favour not just of detention without 
trial for terrorist suspects, but also of their execution without trial, might it not 
also boost his pathetic opinion poll ratings?’ (Ibid.). 
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The following day, Mary Riddell claimed that the ‘vote was a defeat for liberty 
and a blow against Britishness’ (12 June 2008, p. 24).In relation to Brown’s deal 
with the DUP, Riddell argued that: ‘Habeas corpus has been flogged off to the 
highest bidder, in this case the Democratic Unionists, who allegedly repaid 
Brown’s reported blandishments by supplying the nine votes that saved the 
Government’ (Ibid.).  
 
In its editorial on the same day, the Daily Telegraph maintained that ‘the manner 
of the victory [was] unsatisfactory [as] the measure has its roots as much in raw 
politics as in the security of the realm’ (12 June 2008, p. 25). However, the 
‘underhanded’ manner in which Brown won the vote, had, the Daily Telegraph 
asserted, ‘done little to enhance his authority’ (Ibid.). 
 
On the resignation of David Davis, the Daily Telegraph asserted that Davis had 
‘made a brave mistake’ (13 June 2008, p. 27). It goes on to say that whilst his 
resignation ‘looks both wilful and quixotic’ that it ‘deserves admiration’, not least 
because his stand against an ‘authoritarian government’ highlighted how the UK 
had become ‘one of the most spied-upon and fettered societies in the Western 
world’ (Ibid.). However, the editorial also cautioned that his admirable stand 
against the erosion of our civil liberties could serve to weaken the Conservative 
Party. Indeed, it claimed: ‘Mr Davis wanted to embarrass the Labour Party, but 
has failed. The only embarrassment thus far is to his own party’ (Ibid.). 
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In response to the Lords vote against the 42-days detention measure, the editorial 
on 14 October 2008 welcomed the government’s announcement that it was to 
abandon the 42-days clause (p. 21). However, it goes on to criticise the Home 
Secretary’s move to draft a reserve measure to extend pre-charge detention that 
would be used in cases of national emergency. Drawing on the ‘party politics’ 
leitmotif, the newspaper argued that ‘a querulous Miss Smith continued to impute 
the worst of motives to the measure’s critics, suggesting they were soft on 
terrorism… [But] the fact remains that she and Mr Brown lost the vote because 
they lost the argument’ (Ibid.). 
 
The Times: Editorially, the Times were opposed to the 42-days detention 
measure, but welcomed some of the other proposals, such as DNA sampling and 
post-charge questioning. On 11 June 2008, the Times asserted that parliament 
must vote ‘no to the politics of fear’, and that the ‘yes’ campaign had been 
nothing more than ‘a trial of Mr Brown’s strength’ as prime minister (p. 2). It 
goes on to maintain that ‘Most MPs supporting it will do so grudgingly at best, to 
give their beleaguered leader a short-lived tactical victory’ (Ibid.). These themes 
are echoed the following day after the Commons voted yes to ‘42 days’ in both 
the editorial and the opinion pieces. In an editorial entitled ‘Westminster for Sale’, 
the Times contended: 
[Brown] has won a tactical victory that will be presented as proof of his 
seriousness about national security…The reality this morning is a prime 
minister willing to erode ancient freedoms with cataclysmic threats to 
shore up his positon; a government willing to write unworkable legislation 
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for the sake of a hollow political gesture; and MPs on both sides of the 
aisle demeaned by the worst sort of horse trading for their support. The 
currency of Parliament is the integrity of its Members. It has seldom been 
so wilfully devalued. 
(12 June 2008, p. 2) 
 
On the Davis resignation, the Times declared that whilst ‘David Davis may hold 
sincere convictions…he has put them and his party at risk for the sake of a 
disastrous ego trip’ (13 June 2008, p. 2). The commentaries reflected the same 
stance, with Peter Riddell warning that ‘resignation is often the prelude to 
obscurity’, and questioned what Davis was actually trying to achieve, given that it 
was ‘already official Tory policy’ (13 June 2008, p. 8). Whilst Rachel Sylvester 
declared that Davis’ resignation was ‘more about one man’s misguided impulses 
than the good of his party’ (13 June 2008, p. 33). 
 
The Guardian: Simon Jenkins set the parameters of the succeeding coverage by 
stating that ‘Tough? Brown looks more like an image-obsessed wimp: This gutter 
government looks anything but strong in its unnecessary, unpopular bid to extend 
detention without charge’ (2 April 2008, p. 33).  
 
In its editorial of 23 April 2008, the Guardian reasoned that even the director of 
public prosecutions, Sir Ken Macdonald, who, under the 42-days provision, would 
be responsible for authorising any detention beyond 28-days ‘does not think the 
new power is needed’ (p. 30). Instead, like the DPP and Liberty, the editorial 
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argued that ‘the extended use of intercept evidence and post-charge 
questioning…offers the government an honourable escape from the dead end of 
extended detention in which it is now trapped’ (Ibid.).  
 
However, in the interests of balance, the Guardian did provide space for two 
divergent guest opinion pieces. The first from Garry Hindle, who argued that 42 
days ‘would allow police the time to protect the public and build a genuine case, 
while enshrining a higher level of judicial and parliamentary oversight during that 
time’ (11 June 2008, p. 33). In contrast, Conor Foley argued that the Home 
Secretary was aware of how enhanced police powers can be abused, referring to 
his own arrest under draconian terrorism laws whilst a student activist in the 
Labour Party (11 June 2008, p. 33). 
 
On Brown’s narrow victory in the Commons, Timothy Garton Ash declared that 
‘this illiberal vote risks strangling freedom without any gain in security’ (12 June 
2008, 33). This ‘shaming victory’ had ‘always been about political advantage’ 
declared the Guardian’s editorial, and ‘a law no one [wanted] imposed by a 
government that wanted to look strong but ended up too weak to accept the 
obvious’ (12 June 2008, p. 36). Referring to Blair’s defeat over 90-days detention, 
it goes on to argue that the bitter rivalry with Blair had led Brown to attempt ‘to 
prove his mettle by succeeding where Mr Blair had failed’ (Ibid.). 
 
In terms of the ‘Davis stunt’, the editorial of 13 June 2008, noted that it is often a 
‘mistake’ for politicians to ‘talk up their own version of liberty [for] much that is 
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important is missing from the Davis brand of freedom’ (p. 40). Indeed, it 
discussed Davis’ defence of habeas corpus on the one hand, but his seeming 
loathing of the Human Rights Act, on the other – and highlighted his ‘support for 
the death penalty’ as being at odds with ‘the most basic [of freedoms]’ (Ibid.). 
Indeed, Julian Glover proposed that Davis’ real ‘struggle will be to explain what 
he is standing for, and what it is he is against’ (13 June 2008, p. 39). 
 
The Guardian concluded its attack on the Bill, and the wider politics of the Brown 
government, by stating that the ‘Lords have forced him to listen to reason and 
buried his poisonous proposal’, which for the newspaper was only ever ‘[cooked] 
up…to make the Conservatives look soft’ on terrorism (14 October 2008, p. 34). 
 
Daily Mail: Whilst the Daily Mail acknowledged that terrorism investigations 
were often more complex than criminal cases, it declared that it ‘[remained] 
deeply uneasy about depriving British citizens of their liberty for 42 days, on no 
better authority than the say-so of the police (whose ability to get the wrong man 
was demonstrated so horrifically by the shooting of Jean Charles de Menezes)’ 
(11 June 2008, p. 12). It goes on to argue that other laws originally intended to be 
used at a time of national emergency (such as ‘snooping’ on citizens phone calls 
and emails) were now routinely used by local authorities to ‘spy on citizens 
suspected of breaking byelaws on rubbish collection’ (Ibid.). The overarching 
theme being the gradual ‘sacrificing [of] our civil liberties’ have resulted in a 
‘[radical] altering [of] the relationship between the citizen and the state’ (Ibid.).  
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Coverage on 12 June 2008 focused on Brown’s ‘egregious arm-twisting and 
bribery’ of the DUP to win the vote over 42-days detention (p. 6). Quentin Letts 
declared the deal between Brown and ‘the gay-bashing, Pope-hating DUP’ was a 
‘bad day for Britain’ (p. 7). Using the Northern Ireland troubles as an historical 
exemplar, he goes on to say: 
But the damage is dire. We are left with an unworkable, wicked law and a 
legislature no longer worth the name. Hundreds of good British soldiers 
died saving Northern Irish Unionism over the past three decades. Now its 
MPs return the compliment by killing Magna Carta. What a crew it is that 
claims to govern us. 
(Ibid.) 
 
The Daily Mail’s editorial and commentary reactions to the resignation of Davis 
were generally supportive of his move. Quentin Letts announced, ‘let’s raise caps, 
hats, helmets, whatever we possess, to this bold buccaneer. At last, someone has 
swung a dramatic punch at this dark onrush of spooky officialdom’ (13 June 2008, 
p. 7). Andrew Alexander concurred, by describing Davis as ‘a brave man in all 
senses’, with references to his great experience as a politician and his former role 
in the SAS Territorials (p. 16). Editorially, the Mail declared that it ‘applauds 
everything Mr Davis says’, especially his warnings that New Labour had created 
an ‘Orwellian world’ of draconian security measures. However, it concluded on a 
cautionary note, by saying that while it wished Davis ‘all the luck in his fight to 
protect British freedoms, we worry – as a friend – that, in this instance, his 
292 
 
courage may have been greater than his judgment’ – in the sense that it could 
result in undermining the Conservative Party (p. 14).   
 
The Sun: As with the previous case studies, the Sun’s editorials and 
commentaries were wholly supportive of the government’s proposals. On 11 June 
2008, the Sun’s editorial pleaded with ‘a handful of Labour MPs [who] seem 
prepared to undermine their own leader’ to ‘Defend us’ (p. 8). It continued to 
maintain that the 42-days provision was not only ‘a vital weapon in the nation’s 
defence’, but had the backing of the police, the security services and the Muslim 
population (Ibid.). This theme is echoed in an opinion piece by the Independent 
Terrorism Review chief, Lord Carlile, who described the law as ‘a necessary 
protection’, which was ‘full of safeguards against misuse’ (13 June 2008, p. 8). 
 
A feature that appeared on the same day focused on an open letter addressed to the 
Tory whip John Baron from the father of a young woman killed in the 7/7 bomb 
attacks. The letter implored Baron to ‘rise above’ the ‘petty’ political point 
scoring to do all he could to encourage his party to safeguard the country, and that 
the human rights of ‘ordinary members of the public’ should be prioritised over 
the ‘rights of people who carry out [such] atrocities’ (p. 9). Whilst an opinion 
piece by David Blunkett, who was writing a regular column for the Sun at the 
time, maintained that voting yes to 42-days detention would send a vital message 
to terrorists that Britain was not soft on terrorism. Failure to pass the provision, he 
warned, could result in Britain being ‘seen as a sitting target’ by the terrorists (11 
June 2008, p. 24). 
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Regarding the government’s victory in the Commons over the 42-days detention, 
its editorial declared that Brown ‘stood up for the fight against extremism’ despite 
severe criticism from Labour rebels and the Conservative Party. The editorial then 
goes on to attack the Conservatives for putting their ‘narrow self-interests’ above 
that of ‘the national interest’ (12 June 2008, p. 8). A commentary by the political 
editor on the same day echoes the same themes as the editorial, by declaring 
Brown to be a ‘true statesman’, whereas the Conservatives were out of touch with 
the wants of the ‘British public’ who were ‘massively in favour of new powers for 
the police’ (12 June 2008, p. 9). Party politics were again the focus of its editorial 
the following day, where Davis was branded as ‘stark raving mad’ for resigning 
over an issue in which he already had his Party’s support (13 June 2008, p. 8).  
 
After Brown’s defeat in the Lords over the 42-days detention proposal, the Sun 
declared it ‘a sorry state of affairs’ (14 October 2008, p. 2). In its editorial, it 
stated that it was a victory for Al-Qaeda, who ‘must be revelling in the knowledge 
that Britain is more concerned about possible infringements of civil liberties than 
of taking the war on terror to them’ (14 October 2008, p. 8). However, its final 
condemnation was reserved for the Conservatives, who they maintained, would 
have to back ‘emergency 42-day legislation the next time a major suspect is held’, 
as ‘they cannot risk sabotaging a case for political advantage’ (Ibid.). 
 
The Mirror: In its opening arguments against the Bill, the Mirror included an 
opinion piece by the director of Liberty, Shami Chakrabarti, in which she stated 
that ‘One of the best things that Gordon Brown did on becoming Prime Minister 
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was to dump the language of the “War on Terror”’ (25 January 2008, p. 6).  
Indeed, she maintained that the discourse around the Anglo-American war on 
terror (and the concomitant policies) only served to put the UK at greater risk 
from terrorist attacks. On 42-days detention, Chakrabarti argued that there were 
‘reasonable alternatives’ which would sit more comfortably with civil rights 
obligations, such as telephone tap evidence, which could result in people facing 
‘proper charges sooner’ (Ibid.). On 2 April, regular columnist Kevin Maguire 
asserted that Brown is ‘stupendously wrong’ on the 42-days provision (p. 10), 
maintaining that the issue was being used for political ends to make the ‘Tory 
toff’ appear ‘soft on terrorism’ (Ibid.).  
 
Editorially, the Mirror was strongly opposed to the government’s plan for 42-days 
detention. Overall, ‘42-days’ was regarded as too long, with the government 
having failed to justify its inclusion in the Bill. On 11 June 2008, the Mirror 
argued that ‘anyone qualified to pass judgment on the 42-day terror detention plan 
dosesn’t want it’, including the police, security services and the DPP (p. 10). Like 
Maguire’s commentary, it goes on to claim that the provision was devised for 
party political reasons, to show the electorate that Brown was tough on terrorism. 
However, it levelled the same accusation at the Conservatives and Labour rebels, 
stating: ‘Opportunistic politicking by the Tories and former Labour grandees does 
them no credit, either’ (Ibid.). These arguments are repeated in Kevin Maguire’s 
opinion piece, in which he declared that ‘Brown will squander a lot of dwindling 
political capital just to show he’s tough and survive the wrong fight in 42 days. 
Lose and it’s a real crisis. Win and it’s a Pyrrhic victory, a triumph for political 
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desperation over principle’ (11 June 2008, p. 10). On Brown’s victory in the 
Commons, the Mirror declared that Brown won on luck and not on the strength of 
his policy, and urged him to refocus on ‘issues that really concern people’ such as 
the economy (12 June 2008, p. 10). 
 
As with all the other newspapers, coverage on 13 June 2008 focused on Davis’ 
resignation. Its editorial declared that it illustrated Cameron’s weak leadership 
skills, and warned that ‘If Cameron can’t keep a grip on his party in Opposition 
how would he cope with the pressure of running the country?’ (p. 10). 
 
On 14 October 2008, the editorial focused on the government dropping the 42-
days detention clause after it was overturned in the House of Lords. It reiterated 
its previous arguments on why it had to be abandoned, namely that it was not 
necessary and could result in ‘alienating the very communities in the frontline 
against terrorists’ (p. 10). 
 
7.6  Summary 
This chapter has analysed the press coverage of the passage of the CTA 2008, and 
with the exception of the Sun, found that there was a considerable focus on party 
politics across all of the newspapers. Security issues had the least representation 
across the sample, whilst civil liberty concerns were prominently featured in the 
Guardian, the Daily Mail and the Mirror. As with all of the previous case studies, 
the Sun provided extensive support for the government agenda. 
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As expected, the broadsheets devoted more copy to the debates than did the 
tabloids. However, all of the newspapers included front page coverage. As with 
the 2005 and 2006 acts, there was a much higher prevalence of editorials and 
feature articles across the newspaper spectrum than in the 2001 case study. As 
with the TA 2006, the passage of the Bill took place over several months. Whilst 
the majority of the coverage focused on the 42-days detention issue, one other 
newsworthy event was the resignation of David Davis, with the resulting press 
analysis focusing on the ramifications of Davis’ resignation for the Conservative 
Party. As with the previous case study, the home secretary’s role in the policy 
cycle was secondary to that of the prime minister in regards to press emphasis. 
 
As with the previous case studies, elite sources dominated the parameters of 
debate. However, on this occasion, Conservative Party sources had greater 
representation than government sources. This can partly be explained by the 
resignation of David Davis and the ensuing press attention. Although civil 
liberties groups (but not Muslim advocacy groups) had a slight increase in terms 
of source appearances, overall they were still noticeably underrepresented when 
compared with elite sources. Nonetheless, as with the other case studies their 
concerns were highlighted by other anti-legislation sources. Proportionately, anti-
legislation sources had greater representation than did pro-legislation sources, 
which was a notable change from the previous case studies. Like the 2001 and 
2006 case studies, the vast majority of the reporter tone was defined as straight, 
with the majority of reinforcing comments reserved for anti-legislation sources, 
and deflating comments for pro-legislation sources.  
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The dominance of Conservative Party sources combined with a higher incidence 
of the civil liberties frame in some sections of the press, namely the Guardian, the 
Daily Mail and the Mirror, provides support for the oppositional model. The 
framing in the Daily Telegraph and the Times, on the other hand, provide 
credence for the independent model. Unsurprisingly, a continuing trend was the 
security-centric coverage in the Sun, which reinforces the government-driven 
thesis. As with the 2006 case study, the Sun’s coverage largely reflected populist 
sentiment, as evidenced in the opinion polls on 42-days detention. 
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CHAPTER 8 
NEW LABOUR’S TERRORISM POLICY (2001–2008) 
AND THE PERFORMANCE OF THE BRITISH PRESS 
 
The previous four chapters presented the findings of the quantitative and 
qualitative content analyses of press coverage of the ATCSA 2001, the PTA 2005, 
the TA 2006 and the CTA 2008. This chapter provides a comparative analysis of 
the four case studies. It begins with a review of the quantitative findings, 
specifically focusing on the longitudinal patterns of press attention and media-
source relations. Then, it discusses the findings of the qualitative analyses, 
specifically looking at trends in the press framing of the policy debates over time. 
This is followed by an overall assessment of the performance of the press, with 
special reference to the theoretical frameworks relative to media-state relations. In 
particular, it revisits a key line of questioning in studies of media-state relations: 
‘How independently do the media frame issues and events, versus simply passing 
along to the public the frames originated by powerful political actors?’  
(Lawrence, 2010: 265). By this means, it assesses the extent to which the press 
fulfilled its historic ‘Fourth Estate’ role. Before concluding with a summary of the 
key findings of the comparative analysis, this chapter evaluates some of the key 
themes to emerge from the interviews with Jack Straw, David Blunkett, Charles 
Clarke and Jacqui Smith in relation to government-press relations.  
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8.1 Patterns of Press Attention 
In comparison with the Terrorism Act 2000, the press generally perceived the 
post-9/11 terrorism policy debates as highly newsworthy, devoting a significant 
amount of coverage to the passage of the bills. As previously mentioned, Jack 
Straw paid little attention to the press during the passage of the TA 2000, and 
concomitantly, its passage gained very little coverage in the press.97 This lack of a 
media strategy was not the norm however, as evidenced with the passage of the 
Human Rights Act 1998, which, as Straw confirmed, had a ‘good communications 
strategy’ (Interview with author, 12 February 2014). Thus, it leads us to question 
the motivating factors behind the lack of media interest in the passage of the TA 
2000. The dearth in press reporting could partly be explained by the increasing 
apathy for parliamentary debate and lack of interest in politics more generally, as 
corroborated by the steady decline in parliamentary reporting during this period.98 
Another reason could have been the 1998 Good Friday agreement, which 
represented the symbolic end of the PIRA era. Indeed, despite several Republican 
dissident groups still known to be in operation during this period, the terrorist 
threat to the British mainland was no longer defined as critical. As Straw pointed 
out, the TA 2000 was drafted as a precautionary measure and during a period of 
relative calm.  
                                                 
97
 The handful of articles that did appear, mainly in the broadsheets, focused on the widening of 
the terrorism definition, with some disquiet over the impact this would have on legitimate 
advocacy groups, leading to claims that the ‘Terrorism Bill ‘could silence green activists’ (The 
Times, 15 December 1999: 10). 
98
 See, for example, Jack Straw’s 1993 study on the steady decline of parliamentary reporting in 
the British press. The reasoning behind its decline were manifold, including general readership 
apathy toward parliamentary affairs, and the greater emphasis in the press on populist content (or 
what some critics have termed the tabloidisation of the press), which resulted in more attention 
being paid to political personalities rather than policy debates. Another reason was the introduction 
of television cameras to parliament. 
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It was done as a precautionary measure where many of its provisions 
wouldn’t have to be used that often. You then had 9/11, and inevitably, the 
overwhelming concern of the public at that stage was to preserve their 
most basic civil liberty, which was their right to stay alive.  
(Ibid.) 
 
Given that there was significant press focus on political conflict in parliament 
during the passage of the post-9/11 legislation, another possibility for the lack of 
coverage of the TA 2000 was simply that it was not deemed newsworthy enough. 
Indeed, as Straw pointed out, there was little by way of political conflict between 
elites, instead the Bill enjoyed broad parliamentary consensus (Ibid.). Thus, for 
the government (as borne out in the interviews), 9/11 represented a real step 
change in terms of its terrorism policy agenda and in its political communications. 
As discussed in Chapter 1, there was significant focus on allaying public fears, 
which also corresponded with a more emotive communicative approach. 
However, as previously argued, 9/11 did not mark the beginning of New Labour’s 
draconian legislative drives, and the civil liberties issues that the press so readily 
seized upon in the post-9/11 legislation, were largely absent in its coverage of pre-
9/11 terrorism legislative debates. 
 
Figure 8.1 shows the longitudinal press coverage of terrorism legislation between 
2001 and 2008. When comparing the amount of press attention each piece of 
legislation received, with the exception of the Sun, the press devoted more 
attention to the passage of the PTA 2005 than it did to the other bills. This was 
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followed by the TA 2006 and then the CTA 2008. The Sun, however, devoted 
more attention to the CTA 2008 than it did to the other pieces of legislation. The 
ATCSA 2001 received the least coverage across the entire sample. This could 
partly be explained by the fact that there was little resistance from the Opposition 
(but more so from Labour rebels), and thus did not fit with the media’s traditional 
emphasis on party political conflict. Indeed, this fits with Brown’s (2010) view of 
the complex relationship between the media and the policy process, with media 
attention wholly dictated by the relative newsworthiness of a particular policy 
debate. 
Only a tiny fraction of policy developments are reported in the mainstream 
news media. The assumption is that coverage is largely driven by conflict. 
The fraction that is reported will be driven by the perceived 
newsworthiness of the policy area and the level of conflict…Coverage 
gives priority to conflict that involves high profile actors. It will largely 
ignore policy areas where consensus exists. 
(Brown, 2010: 133) 
 
Thus, whilst 9/11 in itself reflected the most newsworthy news values, the fact 
that the legislation had broad cross-party consensus might have diminished its 
newsworthiness in the eyes of the press, which thrives on elite dissensus. In 
contrast, the PTA 2005 contained a higher level of conflict between political 
elites, and was debated over a relatively short period of time, which provided a 
sense of drama and immediacy to the press. Moreover, the issue of what to do 
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with the soon to be released Belmarsh detainees was also a major factor in terms 
of press interest. 
 
Figure 8.1 Longitudinal press coverage of terrorism legislation (2001–2008) 
 
 
The most notable peaks in media coverage tended to correspond to political 
conflict topics. For example, peaks in the coverage of the ATCSA 2001 correlated 
with the conflict between Blunkett and the Labour rebels, as well as the 
government’s defeat in the Lords over the incitement to religious hatred clause. 
Similarly, press coverage of the PTA 2005, peaked during the political ping-
ponging between the two houses over control orders, whilst Blair’s first Commons 
defeat gained the most attention during the coverage of the TA 2006. In regards to 
the CTA 2008, there was considerable focus on the political machinations of the 
Brown government, as well as much attention paid to the resignation of the 
Conservative shadow home secretary David Davis, with subsequent analysis 
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questioning the future direction of the Conservative Party. This, then, supports 
Brown’s assumptions that press ‘coverage is driven by the relationship between 
(first) the perceived significance of the policy domain, (second) availability of 
sources, (third) prominence of protagonists and (fourth) the nature of the conflict’ 
(Ibid.). Indeed, after 9/11, the anti-terrorism policy domain was perceived as 
highly newsworthy. This, combined with the availability of direct elite opinion 
and the battle between political elites as played out in parliament, could explain its 
significant impact on the press agenda.  
 
8.2 Media-Source Relations: Evidence to Support the 
Government-Driven Model?  
Table 8.1 shows the longitudinal frequency of source appearances by main source 
group across all newspapers between 2001 and 2008. Unsurprisingly, elite sources 
remained the dominant source group over time. Government sources were the 
most cited in the ATCSA 2001, the PTA 2005 and the TA 2006. However, by 
2008, the Conservatives became the most dominant source group. Whilst the 
government closely followed the Conservatives in terms of source representation, 
it was evident that the government were no longer the kingpins of the debate. As 
mentioned above, the broad support of the Conservatives for the ATCSA 2001 
might offer some explanation as to why they were the least represented during its 
passage, as the main political dissensus could be found in the House of Lords 
(who were the second most dominant source group during its passage). By 2005 
(and during the TA 2006), the Conservatives represented the second most cited 
source group, which paralleled their more overt stance against the terrorism 
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legislation during these periods. However, the resignation of David Davis during 
the passage of the CTA 2008 could have contributed to the increased incidence of 
Conservative citations. Over time, civil liberties campaigners and Muslim 
advocacy groups failed to gain much ‘direct’ representation in the press. 
Nonetheless, their views were reflected in some of the arguments put forward by 
elite challengers.  
 
Table 8.1 Longitudinal frequency of source appearances by main source group 
across all newspapers (2001–2008)99 
 ATCSA 
2001 
PTA 2005 TA 2006 CTA 2008 Total 
 n % n % n % n % n % 
Government 110 47% 251 46% 249 52% 104 32% 714 45% 
Opposition 36 16% 177 32% 120 25% 123 38% 456 29% 
Lords 79 34% 73 13% 66 14% 56 17% 274 17% 
Police/Security 1 0.5% 31 6% 20 4% 19 6% 71 4% 
Civil Liberties 1 0.5% 8 1.5% 8 2% 17 5% 34 2% 
Muslim 2 1% 6 1% 9 2% 4 1% 21 1.5% 
Other 3 1% 2 0.5% 5 1% 1 0.5% 11 0.5% 
Total 232 548 477 324 1581 
 
 
As Table 8.2 shows, at an aggregate level, the proportion of appearances of anti-
legislation sources increased over time. By 2008, pro-legislation sources 
accounted for 58 percent of all sources, whereas the ATCSA 2001 proportionately 
had more pro-legislation sources, which was not to be repeated in the reporting of 
the later legislation. Indeed, the 2005 and 2006 legislation comprised an equal 
                                                 
99
 Government sources include all Labour MPs regardless of their legislative stance, whilst 
Opposition includes the Conservatives and the Liberal Democrats, as well as all other political 
parties. Similarly, Lords refers to all members of the House of Lords regardless of their political 
persuasion. Due to the rounding of figures, the sum total in the above table might calculate above 
or below 100 percent. 
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number of pro- and anti-legislation sources. However, when examining trends of 
source inclusion in particular newspapers, two newspapers stand out. The Daily 
Telegraph included a higher percentage of anti-legislation sources across the case 
studies, which reflected their traditional anti-government position. Contrastingly, 
the Sun included a higher proportion of pro-legislation sources, which mirrored 
their support for the New Labour government more generally. With the exception 
of the Daily Telegraph, all of the newspapers included a higher proportion of pro-
legislation sources in the 2001 case study, but the newspapers steadily tilted in 
favour of anti-legislation sources over time. By 2005, the Guardian especially 
started to include a higher proportion of anti-legislation sources, which also 
reflected its general stance on the New Labour government during this period.  
 
Table 8.2 Longitudinal frequency of source appearance by legislation 
standpoint across all newspapers (2001–2008)100 
 
ATCSA 2001 PTA 2005 TA 2006 CTA 2008 Total 
 n % n % n % n % n % 
Pro- 
Legislation  
112 48% 266 49% 225 47% 124 38% 727 46% 
Anti- 
Legislation  
79 34% 259 47% 225 47% 189 58% 752 48% 
Mixed/ 
Unstated 
41 18% 23 4% 27 6% 11 3% 102 6% 
    Total  1581 
 
 
As Bennett argues, ‘the indexing hypothesis is intended to apply more to news 
accounts of everyday events, crises, and policies than to “special coverage” of 
things like elections that may have a normative-ritual order of their own’ 
                                                 
100
 NB. Due to the rounding of figures, the sum total in the above table might calculate above or 
below 100 percent. 
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(Bennett, 1990: 107). The news accounts of the policymaking cycle could 
arguably fall into this ‘normative-ritual order’ paradigm, insofar as the focus of 
the coverage was on political elite debate within the confines of parliament (i.e. an 
‘establishment’ setting). The extent to which journalists operated within their 
normative professional boundaries is also relevant here.101 Given that the focus 
was on parliamentary debate, it was unsurprising that journalists included such a 
high proportion of elite or official sources.102 In fact, to do otherwise would have 
contradicted established journalistic norms and conventions, regardless of the 
ideological direction of a particular newsroom. Moreover, it is generally accepted 
that official sources constitute the most newsworthy actors, and thus consideration 
of the findings must be viewed within broader journalistic cultures and working 
practices.  
 
Both Miller (2004) and Knightly (2003) suggest that during times of conflict the 
autonomy of the media is severely restricted due to the propagandist information 
strategies of governments. Indeed, many studies of media-source relations during 
the 2003 Iraq war suggest that elite sources (government and military) dominated 
media coverage and had considerable influence over the shaping of news agendas 
(Bennett et al, 2007; and Lewis et al., 2006). This confirms Bennett’s argument 
that journalists ‘tend to “index” the range of voices and viewpoints in both news 
and editorials according to the range of views expressed in mainstream 
                                                 
101
 However, it is important to note that this research was not a newsroom study and does not 
profess to make any direct claims that this was indeed the case. Rather it makes inferences based 
on established academic claims. 
102
 In contrast, the coverage of other situations such as a war or aftermath of a terrorist attack, 
would theoretically offer more opportunity for journalists to draw on a diverse range of source 
opinions.  
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government debate about a given topic’ (Bennett, 1990: 106). Furthermore, as 
Jones and Wolfe assert, the ‘major driver of indexing is elite conflict’, with media 
coverage closely following the problem-solution definitions of political elites 
(Jones & Wolfe, 2010: 21).  
 
At first glance, the high preponderance of elite sources across the case studies 
reinforces the indexing hypothesis (and by extension the elite-driven/government-
driven thesis). However, this finding comes with some qualifications. As 
Robinson et al. (2010) note, the significance of official sources in terms of their 
agenda setting ability can sometimes be overestimated. Indeed, in their analysis of 
the media coverage of the Iraq war, they found that although there was certainly a 
correlation between ‘official sources and supportive coverage…every news outlet 
surveyed relied on official sources to a substantial degree, even though some of 
them produced significant levels of [independent] and oppositional reporting’ 
(Robinson et al., 2010: 165). As was the case in this study, whilst the Sun’s use of 
sources certainly supported the government-driven model, across the rest of the 
newspapers, patterns of framing provided significant evidence of independent or 
oppositional reporting. Therefore, the findings challenge the indexing hypothesis, 
which predicates that the press ‘will follow closely the contours of official debate’ 
insofar as ‘reliance on official sources and opinions…is a variable that is not 
capable of explaining these variations in coverage by itself’ (Ibid.). 
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8.3 Media Performance: Watchdogs or Lapdogs?  
Figure 8.2 shows the predominant frames at an aggregate level. When the mixed 
frames are combined with the three meta frames (security, civil liberties and 
politics), the findings show that the politics frame was the most prevalent across 
all of the case studies. This was followed by the civil liberties frame, with the 
security frame gaining the least coverage over time.  
 
Figure 8.2 Trends in frame display across all newspapers (2001–2008) 
 
 
As for individual newspapers, the politics frame had considerable representation 
across the entire newspaper spectrum longitudinally, with the Times especially 
including a high preponderance of stories that reflected this frame. Moreover, the 
extensive focus on conflict between political elites supports Brown’s argument 
that a primary theme running through most media coverage of the policy process 
‘is what the outcomes of the issue will do for the political strength of those 
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involved’, and thereby ‘its implications for the political system as a whole’ 
(Brown, 2010: 133).  
 
Alongside the politics frame, a large proportion of stories in the Daily Telegraph 
during the 2005 and 2006 case studies also reflected the civil liberties frame. 
Similarly, the Guardian also had a high prevalence of news items that focused on 
civil liberties perspectives across the entire sample period. Out of the tabloids, 
coverage in the Sun consistently reflected the government stance on the 
legislation, whilst coverage in the Mirror tended to reflect the politics or civil 
liberties frames. Whilst a high proportion of the Daily Mail’s coverage reflected 
the politics frame, during the 2006 and 2008 case studies, it also devoted 
significant coverage to civil liberties perspectives.  
 
As discussed elsewhere in this thesis, previous studies on the media-state nexus 
within the context of post-9/11 conflict or foreign policy have found evidence 
consistent with the elite-driven model (redefined in this thesis as government-
driven). This study contradicts these findings. However, it does concur with some 
of the findings of Robinson et al. (2010), especially that the press coverage 
replicated the ‘longstanding editorial orientation of each newspaper’ (Goddard et 
al., 2008: 28). As with the present study, Goddard et al. (2008) found that the Sun 
was unambiguous in its support of the government agenda, with the Daily 
Telegraph, the Times and the Daily Mail offering various degrees of support for 
the coalition. Meanwhile, coverage in both the Guardian and the Mirror was more 
consistent with the independent or oppositional paradigms. However, even when 
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newspapers collectively reflected a pro-war bias, the study found that coverage 
was ‘likely to have some degree of historical basis as well as reflecting a complex 
series of transactions concerning the triangulation of (at the least) support for 
current policy, patriotism and party allegiance’ (Goddard et al., 2008: 28). This 
was certainly the case in the press reporting of the anti-terrorism legislative 
debates. 
 
In terms of independent reporting, there was a heavy focus on party politics and 
the wider political machinations of the New Labour government, which often 
reflected the traditional positions of the newspapers themselves. Indeed, the press 
would often use the reporting of the debates to express their wider disapprovals of 
the HRA/ECHR and the EU, as well as to criticise the extensiveness of New 
Labour’s power more generally. In terms of oppositional arguments around the 
implications of the legislation for civil liberties and human rights, these often 
reflected the viewpoints of advocacy groups opposed to the legislation.  
 
As Lawrence (2010) points out, ‘the media’s independence in crafting news 
frames varies across political contexts’ (Lawrence, 2010: 266). Indeed, when 
reporting foreign policy and national security issues (i.e. anti-terrorism 
legislation), the ‘media typically show less independence in framing issues and 
events, instead tending to rely heavily on high government officials to frame the 
news’ (Ibid.: 267). Whilst not constrained by the ‘patriotism’ dilemma of 
reporting in wartime (i.e. the pressure on the media to support ‘our boys’ during 
times of war), the policy debates were played out under the rubric of the ‘war on 
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terror’, with the government often employing the rhetoric of war to defend its 
policies.103 Despite this, the most striking aspect of the findings was the extent to 
which the press maintained its adversarial stance despite immense public support 
for the government’s policies in the wake of the catastrophic events of 9/11 and 
7/7.104  
 
As discussed in Chapter 2, the historic struggle for press freedom in Britain led to 
the emergence of an occupational ideology of journalism, the principles of which 
are public service (i.e. watchdogs), objectivity, autonomy, immediacy and ethics 
(Deuze, 2005: 447). A key finding of this thesis is the extent to which the 
performance of the British press negated the ‘prevailing elite-driven orthodoxy’ 
(Robinson et al., 2010: 173). This, then, provides some credence to the ‘Fourth 
                                                 
103
 See, for example, the Home Office press release of 3 October 2001 in which David Blunkett 
outlines his ‘new anti-terrorist measures’: ‘At this time of challenge to our country and our values 
it is vital to ensure that we are fighting the war against terrorism on every front…I am determined 
to protect our country and its democratic values from those who seek to undermine and attack 
them’ (Home Office, 2001a). Also, the Home Office press release of 12 December 2001 in which 
David Blunkett states: ‘The war on terrorism is a war on many fronts…There have been a number 
of public threats made by Bin Laden and his supporters against Western interests since 11 
September. We are all vulnerable and there is no room for complacency. The UK is part of a 
worldwide response to the atrocities in America. The scale of this operation cannot be 
underestimated…Our job is to protect those under threat in the US and across the world, as well as 
protect ourselves. This is what our own anti-terrorist legislation seeks to achieve’ (Home Office, 
2001b). Tony Blair also employed the rhetoric of war in his address to the Lord Mayor's Banquet 
on 11 November 2002: ‘So we make a judgement, day by day, week by week. So the international 
community has to work together to ensure the safest possible transport systems and tough laws, 
and proper inter-agency co-operation. Government has to ensure we take whatever security 
measures we can, consistent with the desire of people to live normal lives. Businesses have to 
ensure that the security measures we advised in the wake of September 11 continue to be 
implemented. Whether here in the UK or when travelling abroad, all of us as citizens have to be 
alert, vigilant, and to cooperate fully with the relevant authorities. This is a new type of war, 
fought in a different way by different means. But as with all wars, it will test not just our ability to 
fight, but our character, our resilience and our belief in our own way of life. It is a war I have total 
confidence we will win, but it will not be without pain or come without a price’ (Blair, 2002). 
104
 As mentioned elsewhere in this thesis, opinion polls suggested that the public were generally 
supportive of the various terrorism legislative proposals. It should also be noted that there were 
occasions where the anti-legislation views of particular newspapers ran contra to the views of their 
readership. For example, the poll conducted by YouGov and the Daily Telegraph in 2008 showed 
considerable public support for the 42-days detention policy, despite the newspaper taking an anti-
legislation stance. 
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Estate’ thesis, with press performance more closely aligned to the 
abovementioned ‘journalistic principles’ than previous research seems to suggest. 
Indeed, the findings raise important questions as to the cogency of the elite-driven 
model (redefined in this thesis as government-driven) in non-US contexts. As 
Robinson et al. (2010) argue, a large majority of the theories relating to media-
state relations, especially the elite-driven model, were devised and applied to US 
contexts, and thus there is considerable scope for further comparative research in 
this area (Ibid.: 174). Certainly, as this thesis and the works of Robinson et al. 
suggest, the independent (adapted to the adversarial character of the British press) 
and oppositional models might prove to be more apposite to examining British 
press performance in its coverage of national security policy contexts. This thesis 
attempts to make a modest contribution to media-state nexus research within this 
particular policy domain. 
 
8.4 Media-State Relations: The View from Westminster  
Whilst the views of the media are evident in their various outputs, the views of 
government officials are often hidden behind the official Westminster consensus. 
Thus, the interviews provided a means to gain greater insight into the dynamics of 
the media-state nexus from the perspective of those in front-line political 
positions. Several distinct themes emerged from the interviews, namely: 
1. The press was perceived to have significant influence over defining the 
parameters of political debate in parliament. 
2. The level of press influence over individual political decision-making varied 
across policy areas. However, none of the interviewees believed that the press (or 
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the media more generally) had any significant impact over terrorism policy-
making decisions. However, most admitted that the press had at one time or 
another influenced the trajectory of a particular issue in other policy domains.  
3. There was a general sense of distrust of the press amongst the home secretaries 
and their colleagues, but at the same time, the press was perceived as a vital 
conduit for political communication. 
4. The changing media landscape has had an immense impact on political life, in 
terms of its changing foci and the speed in which politicians have to respond.  
5. In the final analysis, none of the interviewees regarded the press as effective 
scrutinisers of terrorism policy, which in their view, belied its status as the ‘Fourth 
Estate’. 
 
This section will now expand on the above themes, with particular reference to the 
comparative features between the interview data presented in the present study 
and Davis’s interview-based studies on journalist influences on political issue 
agendas at Westminster (Davis, 2007a; 2007b; 2010). 
 
All of the Home Secretaries interviewed viewed the press as having significant 
influence over the parameters of parliamentary debate, but this varied across 
policy domains. For Blunkett and Smith it was inevitable that issues highlighted 
in the press would be reflected in parliament, especially in relation to crime and 
security issues, which were highly salient to both the public and the press. Straw 
believed that the press had most influence over parliamentary debate when an 
issue arose suddenly. Contrastingly, Clarke maintained that the press 
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‘substantially influenced the parameters of political debate over a considerable 
period. They changed the climate and…were very important in setting the agenda 
and in giving a tone to the response to the agenda issues as they arose’ (Interview 
with author, 4 February 2014). This was especially the case in regards to crime 
issues, but less so in areas of national security. These views chime with the 
interview material presented in the studies by Davis, in which ‘most MPs’ were 
able to provide ‘examples of when the weight of a media campaign had been 
responsible for initiating or altering new legislation’, with several referring to 
‘media campaigns being the main driving force behind an issue agenda, policy 
shift, or ministerial resignation’ (Davis, 2007a: 186). 
 
In terms of the impact of the press on political decision-making, all of the 
interviewees cited examples where the press had influenced policy, or the course 
of a particular issue, to some degree. One such example cited by Straw was the 
‘save Ben James campaign’ which was started by the Daily Express to persuade 
Straw to reverse a deportation order against a Nigerian commodities broker who 
had been living in Britain since the age of fourteen. Consequently, the press 
campaign led to Straw revoking the deportation order and allowing James to 
remain in Britain. Straw admitted that ‘the truth [was] he would have been 
deported but for media pressure’ (Interview with author, 12 February 2014). 
Straw also believed that the press had had significant influence over some of the 
extradition cases to America. Similarly, Blunkett revealed that there were 
occasions when a media campaign made him re-examine an issue, although he 
maintained that the press did not influence any policy outcomes whilst he was 
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Home Secretary. Clarke and Smith both cited the News of the World campaign for 
‘Sarah’s Law’105 as being a prime example of the agenda setting power of the 
press. Press focus on the European Union and asylum and immigration were other 
broad areas where the press had some level of influence. Although Smith 
maintained that she did not abandon any policies due to pressure from the press, 
she did admit that ‘the progress of ID cards was slower than it would have been 
had it not been for the press’ (Interview with author, 5 March 2014). 
 
As documented in previous chapters, there was a deep sense of distrust and 
guardedness amongst the Home Secretaries toward the press. At the same time, all 
stressed (some reluctantly so) the vital importance of the press in terms of its 
political communicative function in a democracy.  Like Davis’s findings, 
‘discussions of policy were frequently linked to the issue of how the policy would 
play in the media’, which Davis defines as a ‘media anticipatory effect’ (Davis, 
2007b: 104). A key complaint of the media has been the overreliance of 
politicians on ‘spin’ to present their policies, and their reluctance to speak ‘the 
truth’ on record (Phillis, 2004: 2). This, claimed the Home Secretaries, was 
wholly due to the relentless misrepresentation of their policies in the press, which 
in turn had hindered any meaningful public debate on policy. For Clarke, besides 
‘the mischief and malevolence’ of the press, ‘the biggest factor was its laziness’ 
resulting in a ‘group think culture, which just doesn’t think properly about things 
and can’t be bothered to explain to people what the situation is’ (Interview with 
author, 4 February 2014).  Similarly, Smith argued that she found it difficult to 
                                                 
105
 ‘Sarah’s Law’ refers to a child sex offender disclosure scheme, which allows parents to apply 
formally to the police to check whether an individual has a record for child sexual offences. 
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engage the media in any meaningful dialogue around policy issues. Indeed, any 
hint of policy uncertainty amounted to political suicide. For Smith, there was 
immense pressure to ‘express [her]self with absolute certainty all the time’ for 
fear of being misrepresented or for an off-handed comment to be needlessly over-
amplified (Interview with author, 5 March 2014). Consequently, she simply 
stopped engaging with the media in any profound sense, other than to relay a 
‘press release version’ of policy via official channels. Again, these themes also 
resonate in Davis’s studies, where politicians generally shared ‘a high degree of 
skepticism’ toward the news media (Davis, 2007b: 102).  
 
One of the key themes to emerge was the immense impact a changing media has 
had on politics (Silverman, 2012). Firstly, the influence of celebrity culture, with 
its focus on political personalities has had a detrimental impact on politics (Davis, 
2010; and Louw, 2010). Secondly, the 24/7 mediasphere has had a qualitative 
impact on government-press relations, especially concerning the speed in which 
politicians need to respond to particular issues. Just weeks after the TA 2006 
gained the Royal Assent, Clarke faced a particularly hostile onslaught from the 
press over the ‘foreign prisoners’ scandal, which resulted in his sacking. Recalling 
the pressure he felt from the media during the furore, Clarke said:  
For a government to respond quickly and accurately is very, very difficult.  
On foreign national prisoners, there was a long issue going on, which 
lasted for about four or five days (about how many there were). And you 
couldn't give an answer because you didn’t know and so if you gave an 
answer which was wrong, then it was an even more chaotic situation.  So, 
317 
 
the speed of the news agenda is an absolutely dominant factor that 
everybody has to address and that is the story of modern media.   
(Interview with author, 4 February 2014)   
 
There was a general sense amongst the interviewees that negative or distorted 
press attention on a particular issue needed a swift response from government 
before it developed a life of its own. As Straw argued: ‘I’ve seen a number of 
colleagues who did not spot the early warnings from the newspapers and then got 
engulfed in quite serious problems’ (Interview with author, 12 February 2014). 
However, despite Blunkett’s obsession with trying to control the media agenda, 
and responding to issues as they arose, he believed that in hindsight he and his 
colleagues had ‘probably felt under more pressure than [they] really were’ 
(Interview with author, 21 March 2014). He went on to say:  
I think when things arose, we felt that if we didn't give an answer, the 
thing would have legs of its own and would take off.  Whatever the line 
that was being run, it would run and run, and we'd have greater difficulty 
in pulling it back.  On occasions, I think we probably overestimated the 
likelihood of that, and the power of the media. 
(Ibid.) 
 
Finally, all of the Home Secretaries regarded the press as ineffective scrutinisers 
of terrorism policy, which in their view, negated their traditional role as the 
watchdogs of the state. Instead, they argued that, for the most part, the press were 
more interested in political conflict stories, often at the expense of substantive 
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debate on government policy. Interestingly, the home secretaries remained 
convinced that the terrorism legislation enacted under New Labour was a 
proportionate response to the threat level. Even Clarke and Smith, who both left 
politics in 2010, did not alter their stance. Only Straw expressed some uncertainty 
on the 90 days provision, which in retrospect he believed to be excessive. 
 
In terms of the theoretical implications, unlike Davis, who found that to some 
extent his findings provided ‘evidence of a classic political agenda-setting 
paradigm’ (albeit a more nuanced paradigm than the simplistic stimulus-response 
model implies), this was not the case in regards to the media’s role in the passage 
of the terrorism policy (Davis, 2007b: 101).106 Indeed, as Straw argued, the 
media’s role in terrorism policy debates was largely ‘benign’ (Interview with 
author, 12 February 2014). Instead, the Home Secretaries credited 
parliamentarians, the judiciary, the police and security services – and indeed, the 
public – as having far more sway over eventual policy outcomes than did the 
media. As this thesis has argued, the home secretaries believed – rightly or 
wrongly – that they had significant support from the public. Indeed, it would 
appear that on this occasion, press opinion was largely at odds with public 
sentiment.  
 
8.5 Summary 
This chapter has provided a comparative analysis of the four case studies. Overall, 
the findings reveal that of the three meta-frames (national security, civil liberties 
                                                 
106
 However, in other policy areas, the interview material gleaned for this thesis corroborates some 
of Davis’s findings. 
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and party politics), the politics frame dominated across all four case studies. 
Returning to the key question: ‘How independently [did] the media frame issues 
and events, versus simply passing along to the public the frames originated by 
powerful political actors?’  (Lawrence, 2010: 265), the evidence suggests that 
although government sources dominated the debates, they had limited influence 
over the news agenda, which runs contra to the government-driven hypothesis. 
Instead, at an aggregate level, the evidence lends greater support for the 
independent model.  There is also evidence that some sections of the press did 
subject the legislation to more robust scrutiny, and thus, to some degree, fulfilled 
their role as political watchdogs, which supports the oppositional thesis. The 
following chapter provides a summary of the findings, before discussing the 
theoretical implications and contributions of the research, the strengths and 
limitations of the conceptual framework, as well as possible areas of future 
inquiry. 
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CHAPTER 9 
CONCLUSION 
 
Post-9/11, the New Labour government introduced an unparalleled amount of 
terrorism legislation in the form of the Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Act 
2001, the Prevention of Terrorism Act 2005, the Terrorism Act 2006, and finally 
the Counter-Terrorism Act 2008. The intention of this thesis was to explore the 
media-state nexus in the context of the passage of the aforementioned legislation, 
specifically analysing the media framing of the policymaking cycle. Many 
previous studies that have examined the relationship between the media and the 
state in the context of policy responses to the ‘war on terror’ have found evidence 
to support the elite-driven model (redefined in this thesis as government-driven), 
whereby the media have been shown to fail in their adversarial ‘watchdog’ role by 
acting as ‘faithful servants’ to the government (Wolfsfeld, 1997). As summarised 
below, this thesis found that this was not the case in regards to domestic terrorism 
policymaking, and rather than be the servants to the government and other elites, 
this thesis has argued that the performance of the British press largely supported 
the independent model. This chapter outlines the key research findings, before 
discussing the theoretical implications of the study and its contribution to 
knowledge, the strengths and limitations of the conceptual framework, before 
concluding with an outline of possible areas for future inquiry.  
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9.1 Summary of the Research Findings 
The aims of this thesis were to analyse the press coverage of the legislative 
debates, principally in terms of ascertaining which issues received the most 
attention, how these issues were framed and by whom. The overarching intention 
was to gain greater insight into media-government relations in the context of 
terrorism policy by assessing the extent to which the press criticised or reinforced 
the government agenda. Taking a longitudinal approach, the research questions 
were formulated to discern the level of press attention, the prominence of 
particular issues, media-source relations, the predominant news frames, as well as 
the media-political dynamic during the policymaking process. The empirical 
findings are outlined below.  
 
In relation to RQ1 (press attention), all of the Acts received a significant amount 
of press attention, with attention peaking during the passage of the PTA 2005. 
Possible reasons for this were the relative short duration of its passage, alongside 
the perceived pressure of having to legislate to deal with the impending release of 
the Belmarsh prisoners after the Law Lords ruling. That said, given the 
immediacy of the cataclysmic events of 9/11 and 7/7, it was still surprising that 
the ATCSA 2001 gained the least coverage, and that the TA 2006 did not receive 
as much press attention as the PTA 2005. In explaining why the ATCSA 2001 
received the least coverage, this could have been a reflection of the lack of elite 
dissensus in the Commons. 
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In relation to RQ2 (press-source relations), the findings revealed that elite sources 
dominated the parameters of the debates. However, this did not necessarily 
transpose to the framing of events by the press. Indeed, there is considerable 
evidence that the press pursued an independent line of inquiry, followed by 
occasions where its framing reflected elite dissensus. In terms of elite challengers, 
these had the most representation in the CTA 2008, whereas government sources 
dominated the other three case studies. In terms of the prominence of non-elite 
sources, such as civil liberties and Muslim advocacy groups, these had limited 
representation across all four case studies. Nonetheless, many of the concerns 
expressed by these groups were articulated by elite opposition sources. For 
example, the shadow home secretary, David Davis (2003–2008) was in close 
consultation with the director of Liberty, Shami Chakrabarti during the passage of 
the bills. 
 
In relation to RQ3 (press framing), whilst there was some focus on civil liberties 
issues, the majority of the coverage reflected the politics frame. There was 
considerable focus on the conflict between political parties (especially between 
New Labour and the Conservative Party), between the government and the House 
of Lords, or on intra-party conflict (e.g. the government and Labour rebels or the 
divisions within the Conservative Party after the resignation of David Davis). The 
extent to which the press framed the debates within the broader rubrics of the 
‘War on Terror’, human rights or civil liberties varied. The limited representation 
of the security frame demonstrates that the ‘War on Terror’ leitmotif was not 
heavily deployed in the press coverage. However, human rights and civil liberties 
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arguments did have significant expression as evidenced by the number of 
appearances of the civil liberties frame. In the case of negative criticisms of the 
HRA/ECHR and the perceived influence of the EU on British constitutional 
affairs more generally, this reflected conventional newspaper positions. On 
whether there was a qualitative change in the tone of coverage between 2001 and 
2008, whilst there was broad support from some sections of the press for the 
ATCSA 2001, this had all but vanished by 2005, with the Times still offering a 
sliver of support (on some issues) in its coverage of the PTA 2005. From July 
2005 onwards, however, the press was largely hostile to the government’s policy 
agenda and to the politics of New Labour more generally. The exception to this 
being the Sun, which maintained its support for the government agenda 
throughout the period under investigation. 
 
In relation to RQ4 (press-government relations), taken as a whole, New Labour 
was not very successful in setting and managing the media agenda, as reflected in 
the limited appearance of the security frame. In terms of the media-political 
dynamic during the policymaking process, although the home secretaries 
dismissed the notion that the press had any real sway over the terrorism policy 
agenda, it was evident that they all perceived the press as a vital medium for 
communicating with the public, but were often frustrated by their lack of success 
in influencing the press agenda. Indeed, the overall findings show that the press 
was highly critical of the official policy agenda. 
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9.2 Contribution to Knowledge 
The research questions were examined within three competing theoretical models 
of media-state relations, namely the government-driven model (defined by 
Robinson et al. as elite-driven), the oppositional model, and the independent 
model. These models are based on the ones outlined by Robinson et al. (2010), 
whose study synthesised a range of theoretical positions, with the overarching 
tripartite framework drawn from Hallin’s (1986) media spheres model and 
Wolfsfeld’s (1997) political contest model. To assess the extent to which each 
model prevailed, this thesis constructed a frame matrix based on the signature 
matrix originally devised by Gamson and his colleagues. As laid out in Chapters 2 
and 3, the media performance models were further modified and characterised as 
follows: 
 Press coverage that reflected the government-driven paradigm was 
characterised as being largely supportive of the government and its policy 
aims, with much of the coverage reinforcing the government’s preferred 
security frame. The meta-frame was security, with the media package 
defining the debates as a proportionate legislative response.  
 Press coverage that reflected the oppositional paradigm was characterised 
as being largely against the government and its policy aims, with much of 
the coverage reinforcing the discourse of politicians, peers and interest 
groups that opposed the legislation due to its negative impact on civil 
liberties. The meta-frame was civil liberties, with the media package 
defining the debates as a disproportionate legislative response. 
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 Finally, press coverage that reflected the independent model was 
characterised as largely using the legislative debates as a conduit either to 
criticise the politics of New Labour or to focus on the political conflict 
between or within parties. Consideration of the legislation itself was 
limited, often reflecting a neutral editorial stance. The meta-frame was 
politics, with the media package reflecting a party politics focus. 
 
In terms of the study’s theoretical contribution, the findings revealed that there 
was significant focus on party politics (politics frame), which represented the 
independent model. Some sections of the press also devoted significant coverage 
to civil liberties issues (civil liberties frame), which represented the oppositional 
model. Modifications were made to these models to fit the particular 
circumstances of the adversarial character of the British press. The independent 
model in particular draws on an eclectic range of research paradigms that moves 
the model beyond normative definitions of press objectivity, and allows for a 
more nuanced understanding of what constitutes independent press reporting in 
the British context. The findings presented in this thesis contradict previous 
findings where the elite-driven (redefined in this thesis as government-driven) 
paradigm has dominated media coverage during times of conflict or national 
emergencies, where the press tended to operate within the bounds of patriotism. 
Instead, the most surprising theoretical implication was the trend for independent, 
and to a lesser extent, oppositional coverage in the British press. 
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Thus, this thesis also contributes to the theoretical debate about the democratic 
function of the press in Britain. Indeed, in the post-Leveson era, there has been a 
radical rethinking of the societal role of the press, especially in regards to its 
relationship to the state. Whilst many still champion the merits of the press as a 
functioning Fourth Estate, others are predicting its imminent demise.107 The most 
surprising finding, that the press coverage provided significant support for the 
independent model, also revealed that, even in times of national emergencies, the 
British press maintained its adversarial stance. Speaking about the profound 
media backlash to the government’s ‘spinning’ of the Iraq war, Gavin (2010) 
argued: ‘We might not always appreciate the pugnacity and independence of the 
British media, but herein perhaps lies some hope for its role within the British 
political process’ (Gavin, 2010: 80). Indeed, whilst the Leveson inquiry did 
highlight some truly shocking behaviour from some sections of the British press, 
that politicians are still rankled by press coverage can only be applauded. 
Interestingly, despite their antithetical stance toward the press, the home 
secretaries themselves argued that the demise of the British press would not be in 
the interest of democracy.  
 
                                                 
107
 It is instructive to note that these arguments tend to be in relation to the press in its ‘old media’ 
form as opposed to its online presence. In the online circulation war, the Mail Online continues to 
triumph, with the ABC (Audit Bureau of Circulations) November 2013 figures recording 168 
million global browsers to its website in a month, whilst its nearest competitors, theguardian.com 
recorded figures of nearly 84 million, Telegraph.co.uk 60 million, and Mirror Group Digital 40 
million. In January 2012, the internet traffic auditor comScore announced that the irrepressible 
Daily Mail brand had traversed borders to become the most accessed news website in the world, a 
position previously held by the online edition of the New York Times (Greenslade, 2012). Many 
critics believe that the popularity of the Mail Online is due to both its easy to navigate website 
design and its eclectic mix of hard news and celebrity gossip. Moreover, unlike some of its 
competitors it has created a distinct business model for its online edition, by breaking with ‘the 
editorial priorities of its print counterpart’ (Bateman, 2012). 
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So far, longitudinal studies that map the UK media-state nexus within the context 
of terrorism policymaking have been limited. This thesis therefore, goes some 
way to address this gap in the scholarship. Furthermore, studies that deal primarily 
with press coverage of the UK policymaking cycle within the domestic context 
are also lacking. Indeed, as previously discussed, much of the media-state nexus 
research has hitherto focused on the foreign policy domain, or been applied to US 
contexts. Again, this study makes a modest contribution to this particular field of 
inquiry. In terms of the theoretical implications, it concurs with Robinson et al. 
(2010) who found that US-devised models of media-state relations could prove 
problematic when applied to non-US contexts, on the basis that the UK media 
differs significantly to its US counterpart. For this reason, the adapted model 
could prove useful when applied to the policymaking process in the UK, 
especially within domestic policy domains. Furthermore, it could offer an 
alternative measure for other countries with media environments more comparable 
to the UK than the US.  
 
9.3  Strengths and Limitations of the Conceptual Framework 
The adoption of the tripartite media performance models of Robinson et al. have 
allowed for a more theoretically informed analysis of media-state relations in the 
context of the domestic policy domain. Moreover, the rejection of the traditional 
diametrically opposed models of pro- and anti-government has enabled ‘a much 
richer and more diverse understanding of media-state relations’ (Robinson, 2011). 
Robinson et al. argued that a more nuanced approach to understanding patterns of 
media performance was required, with new institutionalism and field theory 
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frameworks being proposed as a way forward in analysing media-state relations. 
Although the independent and oppositional models both predict instances where 
coverage is antipodal to the government’s position, this study provides further 
evidence of substantive differences in the type of coverage each model would 
predict. In summary, the oppositional model predicted coverage that overtly 
challenged the government’s counter-terrorism agenda, whilst the independent 
model predicted coverage that focused on aspects of the debates that reflected the 
longstanding concerns and biases of particular newspapers. Had this thesis 
employed a traditional binary model of media-state relations, i.e. pro- versus anti-
government, the subtleties of the data would have been lost. Indeed, whilst the 
politics frame and civil liberties frame could both be characterised as 
unsupportive of the government, the core positions and depictions inherent to each 
frame were markedly diverse, and consequently each frame required alternative 
theoretical explanations. 
 
However, the models are not without weaknesses or limitations. In the Iraq War 
study, Robinson et al. found that the coverage in the Sun was overwhelmingly 
supportive of the government’s position, which corresponded with their elite-
driven model. Similarly, the present study found that the Sun consistently 
reflected the government stance on the counter-terrorism legislation, which 
corresponded with the government-driven model. However, this does not take into 
account the political and ideological biases of the newspaper. Thus, it is important 
to state that, at times, the models do prove somewhat problematic in terms of 
defining what constitutes ‘independent’ reporting. For example, it could be argued 
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that the Sun’s security-centric coverage was actually consistent with the political 
and ideological ethos of the newspaper, and that rather than acting as a ‘faithful 
servant’ to the government, the newspaper was in fact following its own 
(independent) agenda. This, then, would more closely reflect the independent 
model. Indeed, had the government taken an alternative approach (such as being 
more sympathetic to the civil liberties perspective), might the Sun have 
maintained its pro-security stance and instead portrayed the government 
unfavourably? Similarly, would the Tory press have been so anti-legislation had a 
Conservative government introduced the Bills? Although this thesis does not 
provide any definitive answers to these questions, it does highlight these issues for 
future debate on the models. It should also be noted that even Robinson (2011) 
emphasises that the models are ‘very much an initial step, and idea that requires 
much further attention by way of theoretical development and testing. But the 
framework…does promise to achieve a number of advances in terms of how we 
all think about media-state/political relations’ (Robinson, 2011). 
 
9.4 Scope for Further Research 
As pointed out in the introduction, the multidisciplinary nature of this research, 
which spans aspects of the media, politics and the law, is fundamentally rooted in 
the scholastic traditions of media studies and political communication. That said, 
this research might provide useful data for scholars working in the areas of 
political science or the law in terms of its focus on the policymaking cycle, as well 
as the potential impacts of the media on these processes. Terrorism policy is a 
dynamic area of research, and an area that is rich with possibility. Even since this 
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PhD topic was first conceived, there has been tremendous change in both the 
realms of politics and the press, with both undergoing forensic examination by the 
Leveson inquiry. The defeat of the Brown government in 2010 ended thirteen 
years of New Labour, and heralded a new Conservative-Liberal Democrat 
coalition government. However, in many ways the terrorism policy concerns have 
remained somewhat familiar. The present government, which had largely fought 
on the side of civil liberties during New Labour’s legislative drives, have faced 
the same quandaries as their predecessors, with the deportation fiasco of Abu 
Qatada being a direct legacy of the New Labour years. Moreover, recent atrocities 
carried out by British citizens under the auspices of the Islamic State (Isis) have 
led to the announcement of new tougher measures, with detractors of the 
proposals drawing on the same leitmotifs as before. Thus, there is an obvious 
opportunity to apply the same research paradigms to a new case study, such as the 
press framing of terrorism policy enacted under the coalition government. This 
would be an interesting comparative study with the New Labour years, especially 
given the previous positions of the Conservative and Liberal Democrat parties. 
 
As scholars have argued, ‘research on the media-policy nexus is still in its 
infancy’ but nonetheless, it is an ‘emerging [and] exciting area of academic 
investigation in which further work is clearly warranted’ (Koch-Baumgarten and 
Voltmer, 2010: 225). Thus, the testing of the tripartite models on other policy 
domains, especially within domestic policy contexts would be another area of 
inquiry that could contribute further to this emerging field of research. As would a 
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cross-country comparative analysis, especially in regards to testing the cogency of 
the model in other non-US contexts. 
 
The empirical contribution of this thesis was an explication of the longitudinal 
relationship between the press and the New Labour government during the anti-
terrorism policymaking cycle. Its primary methodological approach was the 
examination of journalistic outputs, and to a lesser extent, interviews with key 
political actors involved in the policymaking process. In light of this, it does not 
make any claims to be a newsroom study, which would have necessitated a wider 
selection of interviews, viz. with journalists. Thus, this area is rich for further 
inquiry. During the interviews, David Blunkett and Jacqui Smith raised interesting 
points about the views of their constituents being out of step with the press, 
especially on matters of security and asylum and immigration. Therefore, it seems 
that this might also prove to be an interesting area of further inquiry, especially in 
examining the interplay between the media, politicians and their audiences.  
 
Finally, given the widespread adoption of the internet and mobile technologies by 
British society, further research on the effects of these media on the press 
reporting of parliamentary debate, or indeed on the policymaking cycle itself, 
seems an obvious direction to pursue. It is instructive to note at this point, that the 
home secretaries interviewed for this thesis, were generally sceptical of the 
democratising potential of social media and as an enhancer of the political-public 
sphere. For the most part, they believed that not only is a professional media still 
needed as an organiser and analyser of news, but that the current usage amongst 
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politicians amounts to little more than ‘policy announcements’, as opposed to 
facilitating substantive policy debate. Indeed, many scholars have warned against 
being overly optimistic about the democratising function of the internet (Frost, 
2010; Hermida & Thurman, 2008; Newman, 2011; Newman & Levy, 2013; 
O’Sullivan, 2012; Phillips, 2010; and Redden & Witschge, 2010). Nonetheless, it 
would seem that the new generation of politicians are seeing its potential as a tool 
for political communication and perhaps as a way of bypassing the oligopolistic 
media. Whilst there is a burgeoning body of work that has explored the impact of 
new media on political communications (Adi et al., 2014; and Lilleker & Jackson, 
2011), studies on the impact of new media on the actual policymaking process are 
still in their infancy.  
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APPENDIX 1 
CONTENT ANALYSIS CODEBOOK 
 
VARIABLE 1:  ARTICLE IDENTIFICATION NUMBER   
 
VARIABLE 2:  NEWSPAPER TITLE 
1)     Daily Telegraph 
2)     The Times 
3)     The Guardian 
4)     Daily Mail 
5)     The Sun 
6)     Daily Mirror 
 
VARIABLE 3:  DATE  
 
VARIABLE 4:  ACT OF PARLIAMENT  
1)     Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001 
2)     Prevention of Terrorism Act 2005 
3)     Terrorism Act 2006 
4)     Counter-Terrorism Act 2008 
 
VARIABLE 5: LENGTH OF ARTICLE (Words)  
 
VARIABLE 6: LOCATION OF ARTICLE  
1)     Front Page 
2)     Inside Pages (General/Political News Sections) 
3)     Feature/Opinion/Commentary Sections 
4)     Editorial Section 
367 
 
 
VARIABLE 7: ARTICLE FORMAT 
1)     Hard News 
2)     News Background/Analysis 
3)     Editorial 
4)     Feature/Opinion/Commentary 
 
VARIABLE 8: TYPE OF AUTHOR  
1)     Staff News Correspondent 
2)     Regular Opinion Writer 
3)     Guest Opinion Writer 
4)     Editorial Writer 
5)     Unattributed Writer 
 
VARIABLE 9: NUMBER OF VISUALS  
 
VARIABLE 10: VISUAL DEPICTIONS 
 
VARIABLE 11: SOURCES CITED 
1)     Backbenchers (All Parties) 
2)     Civil Liberties Group 
3)     Conservative Party 
4)     Conservative Peers 
5)     Conservative Opposition MPs (code when at odds with party     
position) 
6)     Downing Street/Cabinet Office/Government 
7)     EU Justice and Home Affairs Council 
8)     European Court of Human Rights/Strasbourg 
9)     Home Office 
10)     House of Commons 
11)     House of Lords 
12)     Labour Party 
13)     Labour Peers 
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14)     Labour Opposition MPs (code when at odds with party position) 
15)     Law Lords 
16)     Liberal Democrat Party 
17)     Liberal Democrat Peers 
18)     Liberal Democrat Opposition MPs (code when at odds with party 
position) 
19)     Ministry of Defence 
20)     Muslim Group 
21)     Opposition (Collective Parties/MPs) 
22)     Other Political Party 
23)     Other Peers 
24)     Police 
25)     Security Services (MI5 or MI6) 
26)     Speaker of the House of Commons 
27)     Special Immigration Appeals Commission (SIAC) 
28)     United Nations 
 
VARIABLE 12: TYPE OF CITATION 
All recorded speech in quotation marks should be coded. An example of a direct 
body/group would be “Liberty said…” You should code as an indirect citation 
when it is evident that the journalist has paraphrased an individual or body/group 
(e.g. ‘The Home Secretary said that he would do what it takes to protect our way 
of life’). Do not code if there is ambiguity as to whether an indirect citation is the 
sentiment of the journalist rather than the assertion of the source (e.g. ‘The Home 
Secretary must be feeling demoralised after his defeat in the Commons last 
night’).  
1)     Direct Individual 
2)     Indirect Individual 
3)     Direct Body/Group 
4)     Indirect Body/Group 
 
VARIABLE 13: LENGTH OF CITATION  
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Use a paragraph as the unit of measurement. This will make comparison between 
direct and indirect quotations more straightforward, as paraphrased material can 
be especially problematic to measure in words, i.e. the distinction between the 
reporter’s voice and the source’s voice can sometimes be unclear, but generally, a 
single statement will constitute a paragraph. This also addresses instances where a 
reporter might use a combination of direct and indirect citations for the same 
source in a single paragraph. 
 
VARIABLE 14: SOURCE POSITION ON LEGISLATION  
1)     Pro-Legislation 
2)     Anti-Legislation 
3)     Mixed Position 
4)     Not Explicitly Stated 
 
VARIABLE 15:  REPORTER TONE TOWARD SOURCE 
This variable takes into account the reporter tone toward the sources cited. If the 
reporter presents the assertions of the source without the inclusion of evaluative 
comments then code as straight reporting (this would typically apply to most brief 
news items). If the reporter clearly interpolates with evaluative comments that 
support or undermine the position of the source then code as reinforcing, mixed or 
deflating accordingly.  
1)     Straight (Non-evaluative) 
2)     Reinforcing 
3)     Mixed (Combination of reinforcing and deflating evaluations) 
4)     Deflating 
 
VARIABLE 16: STORY ACTORS/BODIES AS SUBJECT 
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This code applies when a particular actor (e.g. David Blunkett or Tony Blair) or 
body (e.g. the Government or the Police) constitutes a major part of the story. For 
example, an article focusing on the weaknesses or strengths of a particular Home 
Secretary in the context of the policy debates would qualify for inclusion. 
Similarly, if a story should focus on the divergent views of the government and a 
particular civil liberties group, each actor/body should be coded. However, do not 
code every actor/body mentioned by rote. For example, if the story should 
mention the Speaker of the House of Commons in the context of maintaining 
order, this would not qualify for inclusion. 
1)     Backbenchers (All Parties) 
2)     Civil Liberties Group 
3)     Conservative Party 
4)     Conservative Peers 
5)     Conservative Opposition MP (code when at odds with party 
position) 
6)     Downing Street/Cabinet Office/Government 
7)     EU Justice and Home Affairs Council 
8)     European Court of Human Rights/Strasbourg 
9)     Home Office 
10)     Home Secretary 
11)     House of Commons 
12)     House of Lords 
13)     Labour Party 
14)     Labour Peers 
15)     Labour Opposition MP (code when at odds with party position) 
16)     Law Lords 
17)     Liberal Democrat Party 
18)     Liberal Democrat Peers 
19)     Liberal Democrat Opposition MP (code when at odds with party 
position) 
20)     Ministry of Defence 
21)     Muslim Group 
22)     Opposition (Collective Parties/MPs) 
23)     Other Peers 
24)     Other Political Party 
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25)     Police 
26)     Prime Minister 
27)     Security Services (MI5 or MI6) 
28)     Special Immigration Appeals Commission (SIAC) 
29)     United Nations 
 
VARIABLE 17: ACTORS/BODIES POSITION ON LEGISLATION 
1)     Pro-Legislation 
2)     Anti-Legislation 
3)     Mixed Position 
4)     Not Explicitly Stated 
 
VARIABLE 18:  REPORTER TONE TOWARD ACTORS/BODIES 
This variable takes into account the reporter tone toward the actors/bodies as 
subject. If the reporter presents the facts of the story without the inclusion of 
evaluative comments then code as straight reporting (this would typically apply to 
most brief news items). If the reporter clearly interpolates with evaluative 
comments that support or undermine the position of the story actor then code as 
reinforcing, mixed or deflating accordingly.  
1)     Straight (Non-evaluative) 
2)     Reinforcing 
3)     Mixed (Combination of reinforcing and deflating evaluations) 
4)     Deflating 
 
VARIABLE 19: FRAMING DEVICES PRESENT 
Code each occurrence. 
19.1 Security frame: 
1)     Metaphors/Lexical Choices 
2)     Exemplars 
3)     Catchphrases 
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19.2 Civil Liberties frame: 
1)    Metaphors/Lexical Choices 
2)    Exemplars 
3)    Catchphrases 
19.3 Politics frame: 
1)    Metaphors/Lexical Choices 
2)    Exemplars 
3)    Catchphrases 
 
VARIABLE 20: CORE POSITIONS/DEPICTIONS PRESENT  
Use a paragraph as the unit of measurement. 
20.1 Security frame: 
1)     Legislation proportionate to threat level 
2)     Legislation safeguards fundamental rights and freedoms 
3)     Derogation from HRA/ ECHR necessary measure for national 
security 
4)     Government defeat in Commons/Lords negative development 
5)     Opposition illogical, undemocratic and/or unpatriotic 
6)     Legislation safeguards ethnic minorities and strengthens race 
relations 
7)     Threat level requires urgent passage of the Bill 
8)     UK position in the broader ‘war on terrorism’ strengthened by 
legislation 
 
20.2 Civil Liberties frame: 
9)     Legislation disproportionate to threat level 
10)     Legislation compromises civil liberties and human rights 
11)     Excessive state powers / laws and legal definitions too wide-
ranging  
12)     Derogation from HRA/ ECHR negative for civil liberties/human 
rights 
13)     Government defeat in Commons/Lords positive development 
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14)     Opposition defenders of fundamental rights and freedoms 
15)     The construction of suspect communities and destabilisation of 
race relations  
16)     Lack of parliamentary scrutiny  
(code if the focus is on the implications for the legislation rather 
than for politics per se) 
17)     Legislation increases risk of terrorist attacks 
 
20.3 Politics frame: 
18)     Negative references to HRA and/or ECHR (as attack on New 
Labour politics) 
19)     Negative references to EU or the European Court of Human Rights  
(as attack on New Labour politics) 
20)     Intra party conflict / Labour rebellion  
(in context of party disunity undermining Prime Minister’s 
authority as opposed to the impact on the legislation itself) 
21)     Conflict between government and MPs/Lords  
(as comment on excessive government powers) 
22)     ‘War on terror’ being evoked to justify draconian laws / abuse of 
power 
23)     Lack of parliamentary scrutiny  
(code if discussed in the context of New Labour’s modernising 
project, with limited focus on the legislation itself) 
24)     Labour MPs are lapdogs to the government 
25)     Government policy on asylum and immigration is weak 
26)     Blair/Brown leadership undermined by Commons/Lords defeat  
 
VARIABLE 21:  REPORTER TONE TOWARD CORE POSITIONS 
PRESENTED 
This variable takes into account the reporter tone toward the core positions 
presented. If the reporter presents the facts of the story without the inclusion of 
evaluative comments then code as straight reporting (this would typically apply to 
most brief news items). If the reporter clearly interpolates with evaluative 
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comments that support or undermine the core positions presented then code as 
reinforcing, mixed or deflating accordingly. 
1)     Straight (Non-evaluative) 
2)     Reinforcing 
3)     Mixed (Combination of reinforcing and deflating evaluations) 
4)     Deflating 
 
VARIABLE 22: REASONING DEVICES PRESENT 
Code each occurrence. 
 22.1 Security frame: 
1)     Roots 
2)     Consequences 
3)     Appeals to principle 
 
22.2 Civil Liberties frame: 
1)    Roots 
2)    Consequences 
3)    Appeals to principle 
 
22.3 Politics frame: 
1)    Roots 
2)    Consequences 
3)    Appeals to principle 
 
VARIABLE 23: PREDOMINANT    FRAME(S) 
A predominant frame is when 50 per cent of the article displays the framing and 
reasoning devices of a particular frame. Where no single frame predominates, use 
a ‘mixed’ code if applicable or code as ‘none present’ if no framing or reasoning 
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devices can be detected (e.g. brief news items might be frameless). If the selection 
of a particular frame is marginal, the cues for the overall tenor of the article 
should be drawn from the lexical choices present in the headline and lead 
paragraph. 
1) Security 
2) Civil Liberties 
3) Politics 
4) Mixed Security, Civil Liberties and Politics 
5) Mixed Security and Civil Liberties 
6) Mixed Security and Politics 
7) Mixed Civil Liberties and Politics 
8) None/Insufficient Frames Present 
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APPENDIX 2 
Signature Matrix with Competing Theoretical Models 
 
Media 
Performance 
Model 
 
Government-
Driven 
 
The media will 
largely be 
supportive of the 
government and 
its policy aims, 
with much of the 
coverage 
reinforcing the 
government’s 
preferred 
security frame. 
 
Oppositional 
 
The media will 
largely be against 
the government 
and its policy 
aims, with much 
of the coverage 
reinforcing the 
discourse of 
politicians, peers 
and interest 
groups that 
oppose the 
legislation due to 
its negative 
impact on civil 
liberties. 
 
Independent 
 
The media will 
largely use the 
legislative debates 
as a conduit either 
to criticise the 
politics of New 
Labour or to focus 
on the political 
conflict between or 
within parties. 
Consideration of 
the legislation 
itself will be 
limited, often 
reflecting a neutral 
editorial stance. 
 
META-FRAME 
 
Security Civil Liberties Politics 
Package Proportionate 
Legislative 
Response 
 
Disproportionate 
Legislative 
Response 
Party Politics 
Focus 
Core frame The issue is the 
immediate threat 
that post 9/11 
terrorism poses to 
the nation’s way 
of life, and the 
most effective 
legislative means 
to protect British 
citizens. The 
issue of security 
requires urgent 
action and must 
be viewed within 
The issue is the 
impact the 
legislation will 
have on civil 
liberties, human 
rights and 
minority Muslim 
groups. There is 
also concern that 
the legislation will 
undermine 
community 
cohesion, as well 
as augment the 
The issue is the 
state of UK politics 
itself – with a focus 
either on the 
politics of the New 
Labour 
government or on 
the political 
conflict between or 
within parties. 
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the broader 
context of the 
‘war on 
terrorism’. 
 
powers of the 
state without any 
utilitarian gain.  
Core position The new 
terrorism posed 
by the events of 
9/11, and the 
resulting ‘war on 
terrorism’, 
requires 
extraordinary 
measures to 
safeguard UK 
citizens. Thus, 
the legislation is 
not only deemed 
vital for national 
security but is a 
proportionate 
response to the 
current threat 
level. 
The legislation 
erodes civil 
liberties and has a 
negative impact 
on human rights. 
The proposed 
legislation with its 
inclusion of 
measures that 
enhance state 
power has no 
substantive 
benefit other than 
to make the 
government look 
as though it is 
tackling the 
terrorist threat. 
The legislative 
response is 
disproportionate 
to the actual threat 
level. 
New Labour’s 
modernising 
project is to the 
detriment of 
democracy. Too 
much power 
resides with the 
executive, which 
has led to the 
government 
abusing its power 
to bring in too 
many draconian 
laws, without 
adequate 
parliamentary 
scrutiny. Labour 
MPs have become 
lapdogs to the 
government. At the 
other end of the 
spectrum, disunity 
within the Labour 
Party is evident, 
and indicates that 
Blair has lost 
authority over his 
own party.  
 
Metaphors & 
Lexical Choices 
Terrorism seen as 
‘act of war’, 
‘battle’ or 
‘disease’ that 
needs to be 
‘fought’ and 
‘won’ or ‘excised 
from humanity’; 
Government as 
the ‘moral 
guardians’ of 
democratic 
values; 
Opposition 
Government 
depicted as 
‘warmongers’ or 
‘scaremongers’ 
or as an 
‘authoritarian 
regime’; 
Government using 
the Bill to 
‘smuggle’ in wide 
ranging measures 
not relevant to 
current threat 
levels; Britain 
MPs/peers depicted 
as ‘rebels’ or 
‘revolutionaries’; 
Government at 
‘war’ or doing 
‘battle’ with own 
party members 
and/or oppositional 
parties; 
Government 
referred to as 
‘dictatorial’ in its 
approach to 
governance. 
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depicted as 
‘traitors’ in the 
‘war on terror’; 
Measures 
required to 
‘defeat the 
[foreign] enemy 
[within]’. 
 
becoming a ‘Big 
Brother’ state; 
‘Ancient 
freedoms’ under 
threat. 
Exemplars Legislation is 
strengthening 
national security; 
The government 
is winning the 
war on terrorism. 
Historical 
exemplars might 
include the 
‘Spirit of the 
Blitz’ and the 
unifying of 
Britain in times 
of war. 
 
Rebel MPs/peers 
successful in 
tempering some 
of the measures 
contained in the 
terrorism Bill. 
Historical 
exemplars might 
include the failure 
of internment in 
the PIRA era. 
Home Secretary 
losing the battle 
against rebel 
MPs/opposition. 
Historical 
exemplars might 
include the 
Maastricht 
Rebellion when 
rebel MPs in John 
Major’s 
government voted 
against the 
Maastricht Treaty 
(Treaty on the 
European Union). 
 
Catchphrases State of 
emergency; 
War on terrorism; 
Crackdown on 
terror; 
Vital we ‘protect 
our way of life’; 
Those who 
oppose the Bill 
are ‘airy fairy 
liberals’. 
 
Draconian laws 
and/or powers; 
Traditional 
freedoms/civil 
liberties under 
threat; 
Government is 
‘riding roughshod 
over democracy’. 
Home Secretary 
under fire; Rebel 
MPs savage Bill; 
Lack of 
parliamentary 
scrutiny; New 
Labour abusing 
power. 
Depictions Legislation 
depicted as 
proportionate 
response to 
current threat 
level; 
Government 
depicted as tough 
but even-handed 
in its approach to 
Legislation 
depicted as 
undermining civil 
liberties; Stories 
that deal with the 
impact the 
legislation is 
having on 
individuals’ 
human rights; 
New Labour 
policies and 
governance 
depicted in a 
negative light; 
Personal attacks on 
Blair/Brown 
leadership and/or 
attacks on the 
competency of 
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handling the 
terrorist threat. 
Oppositional 
voices 
represented as 
illogical, 
undemocratic and 
unpatriotic in the 
face of the 
current threat. 
Government 
depicted as 
excessive and 
authoritarian in its 
approach to 
dealing with the 
terrorism threat; 
Oppositional 
arguments 
depicted as 
rational and 
apolitical in tone. 
 
Home Secretary; 
Human Rights Act 
and ECHR heavily 
criticised; 
Disharmony within 
the Labour Party 
used to undermine 
government 
authority. 
Roots Terrorists willing 
to be suicide 
bombers 
necessitate 
policies that can 
deal with this 
new terrorism 
threat.  
In its desire to be 
seen to act, the 
government has 
rushed to legislate 
without adequate 
deliberation or 
scrutiny. 
New Labour’s 
modernising of 
parliament and the 
reforms to the 
House of Lords has 
undermined the 
parliamentary 
process. 
 
Consequences Without 
legislative action, 
the UK leaves 
itself vulnerable 
to a terrorist 
attack. 
 
The introduction 
of wide ranging 
laws have 
undermined civil 
liberties. 
The government 
has too much 
unchecked power. 
Appeals to  
principle 
UK citizens 
deserve measures 
that will keep 
them safe and 
safeguard their 
way of life. 
Terrorists must 
not be allowed to 
win the ‘War on 
Terrorism’. 
Present legislation 
is adequate to deal 
with the perceived 
terrorist threat. 
Further legislation 
will only serve to 
augment state 
power without 
enhancing 
security. In fact, 
some of the 
measures 
contained in the 
Bill could make 
the UK even more 
of a terrorist 
target. 
 
New Labour 
should revise its 
approach to 
leadership and 
governance or else 
face an increase in 
rebellions from 
Labour 
backbenchers and 
peers alike. 
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Appendix 3 Interview Schedule: The Rt Hon David Blunkett 
 
Date and Location: Friday 21st March 2014 @ 11.30, London 
 
1. To what extent did the press influence the parameters of political debate in 
parliament on a typical day? Which newspapers did you consider the most 
significant in terms of their agenda setting ability? Did this change over time or 
across policy areas (e.g. between education and criminal justice policy)? 
 
2. Whilst you were Home Secretary were there instances when press coverage led 
you to pursue (or abandon) a particular policy initiative. If so, could you provide 
an example of a policy issue where attention from the national press had a direct 
impact on political decision-making?  
 
3. Critics have argued that there was already a crisis of insecurity in the UK prior 
to the events of 9/11 (e.g. the race riots in the summer of 2001 and the increasing 
prominence of far-right groups, as well as mounting fears on asylum and 
immigration).  
a. In your view, what part did the media play in heightening these 
insecurities?  
b. Your appointment as Home Secretary certainly seemed to signify that 
the Home Office was about to take a tougher approach on issues such as 
crime and immigration. Do you think this was a deliberate ploy by Tony 
Blair to restore public trust? 
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c. How did you go about using the media as a conduit to allay public fears 
on the breakdown of community cohesion, immigration and security pre- 
and post-9/11? 
 
4. Despite initial support, the press were highly critical of some of the measures 
contained in the Anti-terrorism, Crime and Security Bill (e.g. the inciting religious 
hatred clause). 
a. During the passage of the Act, what role did you personally take in 
regards to communicating the government agenda and in minimising 
negative reporting?  
b. What is your response to criticisms that security became too politicised 
after 9/11, and that some of the political responses to terrorism actually 
had the effect of heightening public anxiety? 
 
5. Both you and Charles Clarke have indicated that the era of 24/7 media has 
meant that ‘instant response was everything and … no pause for reflection 
justifiable.’ On reflection, were there certain policy areas in which you felt greater 
pressure from the media to respond instantly? 
 
6. In the context of a changing media (e.g. 24/7 rolling news, tabloidisation, 
personalisation): 
a. Did you notice a qualitative change in government-press relations over 
the course of your ministerial career?  
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b. What impact has a changing media environment had on the reporting of 
politics/policymaking? 
 
7. Looking back on your ministerial career, do you believe the British press has 
subjected terrorism and security policy to robust scrutiny? Have they fulfilled 
their adversarial watchdog / Fourth Estate role for the good of public or self-
interest?  
 
8. In the context of terrorism policymaking, what are your recollections of trying 
to square the circle with regards to criticisms relating to the erosion of civil 
liberties on the one hand, and the press obsession with the ECHR and Human 
Rights laws on the other?  
 
9. You make a point about the media’s role, particularly citizen journalism, on the 
day of the 7 July 2005 bombings in London. You state that ‘the news media were 
ahead of the material being presented to us’. Looking to the future, do you think 
that social media will diminish the power of the press, if so, what impact might 
this have on the communication of politics, and political life in general? 
 
10. You have previously spoken of the role your constituency has played in 
shaping your attitudes towards crime and security. You have said that there was a 
need to demonstrate that you were on their side.  
a. To what extent did these concerns, as expressed by the local press 
and/or your constituents, transmute into policy? 
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b. Was there ever a disconnect between media sentiment and the sentiment 
of your constituents on issues of security/terrorism, civil liberties or 
human rights? 
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Appendix 4 Interview Schedule: The Rt Hon Charles Clarke 
 
Date and Location: Tuesday 4th February 2014, 11:30, London  
 
1. To what extent did the press set the parameters of political debate in parliament 
on a typical day?  Which newspapers did you consider the most significant in 
terms of their agenda setting ability? Did this change over time or across policy 
areas (e.g. between education and criminal justice policies)?  
 
2. Have there been instances where press coverage led you to pursue a particular 
policy initiative. If so, could you provide an example of a policy issue where press 
attention had a direct impact on political decision-making? 
 
3. You have previously said that ‘some dialogue between the senior judiciary and 
the executive would be beneficial, and finding a channel is quite important.’ The 
Law Lords ruled on the Belmarsh case on your first day as Home Secretary. A 
battle between the judiciary and executive ensued. What role did the media play in 
this struggle? (E.g. did the press exacerbate an already tense relationship or did 
they offer a conduit for interchange?)  
 
4. Could you provide an insight into the day-to-day management of the press 
during the passage of the 2005/ 2006 terrorism legislation, especially in terms of 
communicating the government agenda and in minimising negative reporting? 
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5. In the context of terrorism policymaking, what are your recollections of trying 
to square the circle with regards to criticisms relating to the erosion of civil 
liberties on the one hand, and the press obsession with the ECHR and Human 
Rights laws on the other?  
 
6. Has there been a qualitative change in government-press relations over the 
course of your ministerial career? For example, what impact has a changing media 
environment (e.g. 24/7 news outlets, the tabloidisation of the press) had on the 
government-press dynamic in the context of policy-making?  
 
7. In your 2007 Royal Television Society speech, you state: ‘Media competition 
was intensifying, both in broadcasting and print. Instant response was everything 
and no vacuum was acceptable, no pause for reflection justifiable.’ On reflection, 
was there some policy areas in which you felt pressured to respond instantly, e.g. 
7/7 or the deportation of foreign prisoners episode? 
 
8. You also state: ‘That media power has changed Government policy on 
important matters of substance. I have no doubt that media attitudes and threats 
have been decisive in influencing British attitudes to the European Union, in 
inhibiting reform in the criminal justice system…’ What influence did the media 
have in the area of terrorism policy? 
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9. Was there ever a disconnect between media sentiment and the sentiment of 
your constituents on issues of security/terrorism, civil liberties or human rights, 
especially in the context of legislative responses to the Belmarsh case and 7/7?  
 
10. Looking back on your ministerial career, do you believe the British press has 
been a robust critic of terrorism and security policy? Have they fulfilled their 
adversarial watchdog role for the good of public or self-interest?  
 
11. David Blunkett makes a point about the media’s role, particularly citizen 
journalism, on 7 July 2005. He notes that ‘the news media were ahead of the 
material being presented to us’. Looking to the future, do you think that social 
media as a tool for government communication usurp the power of the press in the 
UK? If so, what impact would this have on future politics?  
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Appendix 5 Interview Schedule: The Rt Hon Jack Straw  
 
Date and Location: Wednesday 12th February 2014 @ 15:00, Telephone 
 
1. To what extent did the press set the parameters of political debate in parliament 
on a typical day?  Which media titles did you consider the most significant in 
terms of their agenda setting ability?  
 
2. In your Leveson witness statement you stated, ‘In a policy area such as those 
covered by the Home Office and the Justice Ministry pressures from the press can 
be intense’, and that there had been instances where press coverage had led you to 
pursue a particular policy initiative. Could you expand on these points and 
provide an example of a policy issue where press attention had a direct impact on 
political decision-making?  
 
3. An interview-based study (Aeron Davis, 2007) on journalist influences on 
political issue agendas in Westminster found that issues and policy decisions are 
increasingly selected with ‘future news headlines in  mind’, and that no policy is 
developed without considerable media management. Could you provide an insight 
into the planning of media management prior to the launch of a particularly 
divisive policy initiative? 
 
4. Has there been a qualitative change in government-press relations over the 
course of your ministerial career? For example, what impact has a changing media 
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environment (e.g. 24/7 news outlets, the tabloidisation of the press) had on the 
government-press dynamic in the context of policy-making? 
 
5. The passage of the Terrorism Act 2000 was not without its critics (e.g. the 
impact of Section 44 on civil liberties), but how much forethought was paid to the 
press on its launch and how did this compare to later security policy initiatives? 
 
6. The Human Rights Act, known in some media quarters as the ‘villain’s 
charter’, has had a mixed reception. After 9/11, what efforts were made by the 
Government to encourage a positive ‘human rights culture’, especially in 
countering some of the negative press coverage of high profile cases where the 
perpetrator was seen to benefit rather than the victim?  
 
7. In your Leveson witness statement, you stated, ‘As a decision-taker I took 
notice of the sentiment of the press, though I did my best to cross-check that with 
the sentiment of my constituents.’ Was there a disconnect between media 
sentiment and the sentiment of your constituents on issues of security/terrorism, 
civil liberties or human rights?  
 
8. Looking back on your ministerial career, do you believe the British press has 
been a robust critic of terrorism and security policy? Have they fulfilled their 
adversarial watchdog role for the good of public or self-interest?  
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Appendix 6 Interview Schedule: The Rt Hon Jacqui Smith  
 
Date and Location: Wednesday 5th March 2014 @ 14.30, Telephone 
 
1. To what extent did the press influence the parameters of political debate in 
parliament on a typical day?  Which newspapers did you consider the most 
significant in terms of their agenda setting ability? Did this change over time or 
across policy areas? 
 
2. Have there been instances where press coverage led you to pursue (or abandon) 
a particular policy initiative. If so, could you provide an example of a policy issue 
where press attention had a direct impact on political decision-making? (E.g. the 
decision to reclassify cannabis as a Class B drug in May 2008?) 
 
3. Reflecting on your personal experience as the first female Home Secretary, do 
you feel that press representation of your political decisions was markedly 
different to that of your male predecessors? If so, could you provide an example? 
 
4. The first couple of days as Home Secretary you had to deal with the failed 
terrorist attacks in London and Glasgow. Critics have said that your response was 
calm and measured, and that there was a rejection of the ‘war on terror’ discourse 
in favour of a new rhetoric. What influenced this change in approach? 
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5. Could you provide an insight into the day-to-day management of the press 
during the passage of the Counter Terrorism Act 2008, especially in terms of 
communicating the government agenda and in minimising negative reporting? 
 
6. From 2005 onwards, Number 10 (Tony Blair) seemed to be more involved with 
the Home Office when it came to the media management of terrorism policy, was 
this the case under Gordon Brown’s premiership? 
 
7. In the context of a changing media (e.g. 24/7 rolling news, tabloidisation, 
personalisation), did you notice a qualitative change in government-press relations 
over the course of your ministerial career? Looking to the future, do you think that 
social media will diminish the power of the press, if so, what impact might this 
have on the communication of politics? 
 
8. In regards to the above, both David Blunkett and Charles Clarke have indicated 
that the era of 24/7 media has meant that ‘instant response was everything and … 
no pause for reflection justifiable.’ On reflection, was there some policy areas in 
which you felt pressure from the media to respond instantly?  
 
9. What are your thoughts on the argument that the police/MI5 used certain 
sections of the media to promote their support for the 42 days detention clause? In 
hindsight, do you think the arguments for 42 days detention an overstated case?  
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10. In the context of terrorism policymaking, what are your recollections of trying 
to square the circle with regards to criticisms relating to the erosion of civil 
liberties on the one hand, and the press obsession with the ECHR and Human 
Rights laws on the other?  
 
11. A YouGov/Telegraph poll showed considerable public support for the 42 days 
detention policy, contra to the position the Telegraph was taking at the time. Was 
there ever a disconnect between media sentiment and the sentiment of your 
constituents on issues of security/terrorism, civil liberties or human rights?  
 
12. Looking back on your ministerial career, do you believe the British press has 
subjected terrorism and security policy to robust scrutiny? Have they fulfilled 
their adversarial watchdog role for the good of public or self-interest?  
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Appendix 7 Source Positions on Legislation (ATCSA 2001) 
Source  
Position 
DT 
(N=64)  
Times 
(N=52)  
Guard 
(N=74)  
Mail 
(N=21)  
Sun 
(N=13)  
Mir 
(N=8)  
Total 
(N=232) 
Pro-Legislation 23 24 39 14 7 5 112 
    Government 17 22 28 12 6 5 90 
    Lab. Peers 4 2 4 - - - 10 
    Con. Party 2 - 3 2 - - 7 
    LD Party - - 2 - - - 2 
    Other Peers - - 2 - - - 2 
    Police/Security - - - - 1 - 1 
 
Anti-Legislation 
 
27 
 
12 
 
26 
 
6 
 
5 
 
3 
 
79 
    Lab. Rebels 3 5 7 2 2 1 20 
    Lab. Peers 1 - 4 - - 1 6 
    Con. Opp. MPs - - 1 - - - 1 
    Con. Peers 14 5 9 3 2 1 34 
    LD Peers 6 2 5 - 1 - 14 
    Other Peers 2 - - - - - 2 
    Civil Liberties - - - 1 - - 1 
    Muslim 1 - - - - - 1 
 
Mixed/Unstated 
 
14 
 
16 
 
9 
 
1 
 
1 
 
- 
 
41 
    Lab. Peers 1 1 - - 1 - 3 
    Con. Party 6 8 5 1 - - 20 
    Con. Peers 3 1 - - - - 4 
    LD Party 1 2 1 - - - 4 
    LD Peers 1 1 - - - - 2 
    Other Peers - 1 - - - - 1 
    Law Lords - 1 - - - - 1 
    All Opp. MPs - - 2 - - - 2 
    Speaker HC 2 1 - - - - 3 
    Muslim - - 1 - - - 1 
 
Total (n) 
 
 
64 
 
52 
 
74 
 
21 
 
13 
 
8 
 
232 
Pro-Legislation 23 
(36%) 
24 
(46%) 
39 
(53%) 
14 
(67%) 
7 
(54%) 
5 
(63%) 
112 
(48%) 
Anti-Legislation 27 
(42%) 
12 
(23%) 
26 
(35%) 
6 
(29%) 
5 
(38%) 
3 
(38%) 
79 
(34%) 
Mixed/Unstated 14 
(22%) 
16 
(31%) 
9 
(12%) 
1 
(5%) 
1 
(8%) 
- 41 
(18%) 
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Appendix 8 Source Positions on Legislation (PTA 2005) 
Source  
Position 
DT 
(N=159)  
Times 
(N=130)  
Guard 
(N=121)  
Mail 
(N=67)  
Sun 
(N=27)  
Mir 
(N=44)  
Total 
(N=548) 
Pro-Legislation 67 72 43 33 24 27 266 
    Government 52 61 32 24 18 20 207 
    Lab. Peers 9 8 8 - - 1 26 
    Con. Opp. MPs - 1 - - - - 1 
    Con. Peers - - - 8 - - 8 
    Police/Security 6 2 3 1 6 6 24 
 
Anti-Legislation 
 
90 
 
49 
 
67 
 
34 
 
3 
 
16 
 
259 
    Lab. Rebels 15 2 10 8 - 3 38 
    Lab. Peers 2 2 2 2 - - 8 
    Con. Party 32 20 26 19 3 7 107 
    Con. Peers 9 6 3 - - - 18 
    LD Party 7 7 10 2 - 3 29 
    LD Peers 4 3 6 1 - - 14 
    All Opp. MPs 2 2 - - - - 4 
    All Lords - - - 1 - - 1 
    Other Peers 11 4 7 1 - - 23 
    Law Lords 3 2 - - - - 5 
    Civil Liberties 1 1 3 - - 3 8 
    Muslim 4 - - - - - 4 
 
Mixed/Unstated 
 
2 
 
9 
 
11 
 
- 
 
- 
 
1 
 
23 
    Lab. Party 1 3 3 - - - 7 
    Lab. Peers 1 1 - - - - 2 
    Con. Peers - 1 - - - - 1 
    LD Peers - - 1 - - - 1 
    Other Peers - - 1 - - - 1 
    Police/Security - 3 4 - - - 7 
    SIAC - 1 - - - 1 2 
    Muslim - - 2 - - - 2 
 
Total (n) 
 
 
159 
 
 
130 
 
121 
 
67 
 
27 
 
44 
 
548 
Pro-Legislation 67 
(42%) 
72 
(55%) 
43 
(36%) 
33 
(49%) 
24 
(89%) 
27 
(61%) 
266 
(49%) 
Anti-Legislation 90 
(57%) 
49 
(38%) 
67 
(55%) 
34 
(51%) 
3 
(11%) 
16 
(36%) 
259 
(47%) 
Mixed/Unstated 2 
(1%) 
9 
(7%) 
11 
(9%) 
- - 1 
(2%) 
23 
(4%) 
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Appendix 9 Source Positions on Legislation (TA 2006) 
Source  
Position 
DT 
(N=143)  
Times 
(N=71)  
Guard 
(N=127)  
Mail 
(N=78)  
Sun 
(N=20)  
Mir 
(N=38)  
Total 
(N=477) 
Pro-Legislation 69 35 53 37 13 18 225 
    Government 56 27 39 35 9 16 182 
    Lab. Peers 6 3 7 - 2 - 18 
    Con. Opp. MPs - 1 - - - - 1 
    Con. Peers - - 2 - - - 2 
    LD Peers - 1 - - - - 1 
    Other Peers - - 1 - 1 - 2 
    Police/Security 7 3 4 2 1 2 19 
 
Anti-Legislation 
 
74 
 
30 
 
59 
 
36 
 
7 
 
19 
 
225 
    Lab. Rebels 17 9 13 13 1 7 60 
    Lab. Peers - 1 - - - 1 2 
    Con. Party 32 11 19 14 4 2 82 
    Con. Peers 4 1 3 - - - 8 
    LD Party 6 4 5 4 1 4 24 
    LD Peers 3 - 5 - - - 8 
    All Opp. MPs 2 1 2 3 - - 8 
    Other Parties - - 2 - - 1 3 
    Other Peers 2 2 1 - 1 - 6 
    Law Lords 4 - 1 - - - 5 
    Police/Security - 1 - - - - 1 
    Civil Liberties 2 - 3 - - 3 8 
    Muslim 2 - 4 2 - 1 9 
    United Nations - - 1 - - - 1 
 
Mixed/Unstated 
 
- 
 
6 
 
15 
 
5 
 
0 
 
1 
 
27 
    Backbenchers - 1 3 - - - 4 
    Lab. Party - 1 5 1 - - 7 
    Lab. Peers - - - 1 - - 1 
    Con. Party - - 2 - - - 2 
    LD Peers - 4 5 3 - 1 13 
 
Total (n) 
 
 
143 
 
71 
 
 
127 
 
78 
 
 
20 
 
38 
 
 
477 
Pro-Legislation 69 
(48%) 
35 
(49%) 
53 
(42%) 
37  
(47%) 
13 
(65%) 
18 
(47%) 
225 
(47%) 
Anti-Legislation 74 
(52%) 
30 
(42%) 
59 
(46%) 
36 
(46%) 
7 
(35%) 
19 
(50%) 
225 
(47%) 
Mixed/Unstated - 
 
6 
(8%) 
15 
(12%) 
5 
(6%) 
- 1 
(3%) 
27 
(6%) 
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Appendix 10 Source Positions on Legislation (CTA 2008) 
Source  
Position 
DT 
(N=72)  
Times 
(N=64)  
Guard 
(N=89)  
Mail 
(N=46)  
Sun 
(N=25)  
Mir 
(N=28)  
Total 
(N=324) 
Pro-Legislation 29 29 31 11 13 11 123 
    Government 16 18 22 8 8 8 80 
    Lab. Peers 1 2 2 - - - 5 
    Con. Opp MPs - 1 - - - - 1 
    Con Peers 2 2 1 1 1 1 7 
    Other Parties 2 4 4 - 1 1 12 
    Other Peers - - 1 - - - 1 
    Police/Security 8 2 1 2 3 1 17 
 
Anti-Legislation 
 
40 
 
35 
 
52 
 
34 
 
12 
 
16 
 
190 
    Lab. Rebels 4 2 7 4 - 1 18 
    Lab. Peers 5 1 8 2 - 1 17 
    Con. Party 18 21 18 15 9 7 88 
    Con. Peers 1 1 2 1 - - 6 
    LD Party 1 2 5 2 - 3 13 
    LD Peers 1 - 2 - - - 3 
    All Opp. MPs 1 1 1 2 - - 5 
    Other Parties 2 - - - - - 2 
    Other Peers 4 2 3 2 - - 11 
    Police/Security 1 - - 2 1 2 6 
    Civil Liberties 2 4 4 3 2 2 17 
    Muslim - 1 2 1 - - 4 
 
Mixed/Unstated 
 
3 
 
- 
 
6 
 
1 
 
- 
 
1 
 
11 
    Lab. Party 1 - 3 1 - 1 6 
    Con. Party 1 - - - - - 1 
    LD Party 1 - - - - - 1 
    LD Peers - - 1 - - - 1 
    Police/Security - - 1 - - - 1 
    Speaker HC - - 1 - - - 1 
 
Total (n) 
 
 
72 
 
64 
 
 
89 
 
46 
 
25 
 
28 
 
324 
Pro-Legislation 29 
(40%) 
29 
(45%) 
31 
(35%) 
11 
(24%) 
13 
(52%) 
11 
(39%) 
124 
(38%) 
Anti-Legislation 40 
(56%) 
35 
(55%) 
52 
(58%) 
34 
(74%) 
12 
(48%) 
16 
(57%) 
189 
(58%) 
Mixed/Unstated 3 
(4%) 
- 6 
(7%) 
1 
(2%) 
- 1 
(4%) 
11 
(3%) 
NB. Due to the rounding of figures, the sum total in all of the above tables 
(Appendices 7–10) might calculate above or below 100 percent. 
